EP4387847A1 - Personalisierungsverfahren einer sicherheitsvorrichtung, personalisierte sicherheitsvorrichtung, identitätsdokument mit einer solchen vorrichtung und authentifizierungsverfahren einer solchen vorrichtung - Google Patents
Personalisierungsverfahren einer sicherheitsvorrichtung, personalisierte sicherheitsvorrichtung, identitätsdokument mit einer solchen vorrichtung und authentifizierungsverfahren einer solchen vorrichtungInfo
- Publication number
- EP4387847A1 EP4387847A1 EP22757907.5A EP22757907A EP4387847A1 EP 4387847 A1 EP4387847 A1 EP 4387847A1 EP 22757907 A EP22757907 A EP 22757907A EP 4387847 A1 EP4387847 A1 EP 4387847A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- security device
- micro
- location
- pattern
- uniqueness
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 43
- 238000007620 mathematical function Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 52
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 37
- 239000003550 marker Substances 0.000 claims description 29
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 7
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000008520 organization Effects 0.000 description 2
- 210000001747 pupil Anatomy 0.000 description 2
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004069 differentiation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000006185 dispersion Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000005530 etching Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000002245 particle Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000003672 processing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B42—BOOKBINDING; ALBUMS; FILES; SPECIAL PRINTED MATTER
- B42D—BOOKS; BOOK COVERS; LOOSE LEAVES; PRINTED MATTER CHARACTERISED BY IDENTIFICATION OR SECURITY FEATURES; PRINTED MATTER OF SPECIAL FORMAT OR STYLE NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; DEVICES FOR USE THEREWITH AND NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR; MOVABLE-STRIP WRITING OR READING APPARATUS
- B42D25/00—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof
- B42D25/20—Information-bearing cards or sheet-like structures characterised by identification or security features; Manufacture thereof characterised by a particular use or purpose
- B42D25/23—Identity cards
Definitions
- TITLE Method for personalizing a security device, personalized security device, identity document comprising such a device, and method for authenticating such a device
- the invention relates to a method for personalizing a security device.
- the invention also relates to a personalized security device and to a method for authenticating such a device. It also relates to an identity document comprising such a device.
- a security device here designates an element whose authenticity we want to be able to verify, at any time, in order to grant rights to the holder of such a device.
- An identity document here designates for example an identification card, often but not necessarily including a microcircuit, such as a bank card, an identity card, a driving licence; it can also be a passport, generally in booklet format comprising several pages, of which a page of data readable by the naked eye is linked by a hinge integral with the booklet to the other pages.
- a microcircuit such as a bank card, an identity card, a driving licence
- a passport generally in booklet format comprising several pages, of which a page of data readable by the naked eye is linked by a hinge integral with the booklet to the other pages.
- a security device generally comprises an identity photograph of its holder, and/or alphanumeric data specific to the holder, a personalized character and/or even patterns, which may be random. These different data contribute to making each security device unique, depending on its holder.
- the security device is for example compared with a digital copy thereof, the copy having been acquired before sending the device to its holder.
- This copy forms a digital clone which can be used to follow the evolution of the device and to detect fraud or falsification, for example thanks to image processing techniques based on comparison and matching.
- a practical example is to perform a high resolution scan of the security device before sending it to the holder and to store uniqueness characteristics in a database. A result of correspondence between the digital copy and a scan of the device after sending to its holder thus provides information on its authenticity.
- the example above as well as the other solutions proposed so far have a certain number of drawbacks. Indeed, it is necessary to perform high quality scans of the security device to obtain a reliable comparison result. Digitizing every security device leads to cumbersome storage and usually requires setting up cloud computing. These solutions are therefore expensive, and may not comply with laws on the confidentiality of personal data.
- the authentication of a security device in particular the image processing necessary for this authentication, is carried out by means of standard image acquisition devices, in particular smartphones. The use of such devices, although easy and inexpensive, can be a source of errors because of the significant image processing required by the solutions of the state of the art.
- Document EP 3459 757 describes for example a solution based on guilloche patterns forming a network of wavy lines superimposed on an identity photograph and visible to the naked eye. This solution was developed to secure the alphanumeric data mentioned on the security device by inserting, on the identity photograph, variable guilloche patterns encoding the alphanumeric data.
- guilloche patterns are easily identifiable and can be reproduced and affixed to another identity photograph.
- the passport photograph can be changed between the guilloche patterns by image processing or by overprinting.
- This solution therefore does not prevent the falsification of an identity photograph of a security document by a usurper.
- the presence of the guilloche patterns on the photograph may affect its visibility and make it more difficult to verify a security document during an identity check.
- the invention aims to at least partially resolve these drawbacks.
- the object of the invention in particular, during the manufacture of a security device, is to make it possible to obtain in a simple manner a specific signature of each security device, the memorization of which does not involve the entry and storage of a large amount of data and the recognition of which when it is desired to authenticate such a device does not involve a specific or complex device, therefore without requiring significant costs.
- the invention proposes for this purpose, according to a first aspect, a method for customizing a security device comprising at least one uniqueness parameter in a predetermined object geometric space, said method comprising the steps of:
- the uniqueness parameter defines a specific signature to distinguish a security device among a multitude of personalized or non-personalized security devices.
- the uniqueness parameter comprises for example at least one alphanumeric datum, a logo, a drawing or a coat of arms or even a particular point of these elements.
- Such a uniqueness parameter can correspond to different biometric points such as the pupils, the nose and the corners of the mouth on the identity photograph of the holder of the security device.
- the uniqueness parameter can comprise any data characteristic of the security device capable of satisfying the conditions of a non-cloneable physical function (PUF).
- PEF non-cloneable physical function
- the identification step consists in recognizing and selecting from among the information present on the security device, a predetermined uniqueness parameter, for example the nose of the holder of the security device.
- the uniqueness parameter is subject to random phenomena during the manufacture of the safety device whose deviations from a reference configuration are measurable. These random phenomena in a manufacturing process are defined by the notion of “non-clonable physical particularity”, abbreviated as PUF (for “Physical unclonable function”).
- PUF Physical unclonable function
- Such a personalization process makes it possible to provide a specific signature by generating at least one micro-pattern whose location is reasonably easy to identify optically, while presenting a very wide variety of possible reference configurations. It is also possible to avoid adding a foreign element since the basic data, namely the at least one uniqueness parameter, is intrinsically present in the security device.
- the personalization method thus makes it possible to reversibly, or even uniquely, link this specific signature to at least part of the data of the holder of the security device.
- the location of the at least one uniqueness parameter of the security device is linked to the location of the at least one micro-pattern by the injective mathematical function.
- the present invention aims to define a function for which any element of the image geometric space has at most one antecedent in the predetermined object geometric space.
- the antecedent represents the location of the at least one uniqueness parameter and the image represents the location of the at least one micro-pattern.
- a function is said to be injective if in the geometric object space, two elements always have two distinct images by this function in the geometric image space.
- the sine function can be considered as an injective function, when defined on the interval , for example.
- the at least one uniqueness parameter and the at least one micro-pattern are visually identifiable, at least by a display device, on the personalized security device, it is not necessary to store information about them, such as their location in the security device.
- the at least one uniqueness parameter is subject to random phenomena, during the manufacture of the security devices, which do not involve the addition of any foreign particle, but whose deviations from a reference configuration distinguish each device.
- These random phenomena in a manufacturing process are defined by the notion of “non-clonable physical particularity”, abbreviated as PUF (for “Physical unclonable function”).
- PUF Physical unclonable function
- Determining the location of the at least one uniqueness parameter can be performed by known image processing methods, using relatively simple devices, such as smartphones.
- the identification of the at least one uniqueness parameter and the determination of its location on the security device can for example be performed by the same device. Given the observation precision of many current optical devices of up to 20 microns, it is possible to define a specific signature for each security device.
- each security device is thus obtained in a much simpler way than in the state of the art where the signature specific to each security device involves the acquisition and storage of information specific to each security device.
- the injective mathematical function can for example be stored on a secure server, and be accessible by an issuer of the security device and/or a control entity.
- This mathematical function can be common for the plurality of security devices while having little risk of identically personalizing at least two devices for different holders.
- the injective mathematical function can be encrypted in order to increase the security of the personalized security device.
- the mathematical function can be configured in such a way as to maximize the dispersion of the locations of the plurality of micropatterns generated in the geometric image space of the security device .
- the math function can be configured to generate a micro-pattern location separate from the location of the at least one uniqueness parameter.
- the predetermined object geometric space and the image geometric space may correspond to a surface of the security device.
- the object and image geometric spaces can be identical.
- the object and image geometric spaces can be superimposed at least in part.
- the object and image geometric spaces can be distinct.
- object and image geometric spaces can be of any shape, arbitrary, or for example square, rectangular, triangular or even circular.
- the object geometric space includes at least one photograph of a holder of the security device, whereas the image geometric space is defined outside the photograph so as to avoid the generation of at least one micro -pattern on the photograph.
- the mathematical function can be bijective, when it is both injective and surjective.
- a bijective function is a function for which any element of its image geometric space has a single antecedent in the object geometric space, and vice versa.
- two distinct micropatterns are associated with two distinct uniqueness parameters, and vice versa.
- the marking step may include a sub-step of etching and/or printing the at least one micro-pattern in the security device.
- Such an engraving sub-step can for example be carried out using a laser, while a printing step can be carried out using any ink.
- the method may further comprise a step of parameterizing the mathematical function in which at least one coefficient of said mathematical function is determined.
- the at least one coefficient can be determined from at least one characteristic datum of the security device.
- Characteristic data can be data relating to the holder of the security device, such as for example a photograph, alphanumeric data or even a signature. This data may also be data relating to the issuer of the security device, which may be a bank in the case of a bank card, a security organization in the case of a badge, or a State in the case of visa or passport.
- the at least one characteristic datum can for example be an alphanumeric datum, a logo or even a guilloche pattern.
- the at least one coefficient of the injective mathematical function can be determined as a function of at least one characteristic datum of the security device so that the injective mathematical function can vary from one security device to another.
- the at least one coefficient of said mathematical function can include a cryptographic key.
- a cryptographic key can be configured to encrypt and decrypt the mathematical function and/or to define an additional degree of verification of the mathematical function.
- the cryptographic key may include at least one bit.
- each micro-pattern can be associated with at least one bit.
- the identification, determination or generation of micro-patterns in a predetermined order makes it possible to define a sequence of bits forming an additional security code.
- micro-patterns can be associated respectively with a bit, together forming the sequence 10101.
- the 10101 suite can be stored on the security device, for example via an electronic chip integrated into the security device, and/or encoded on the security device, for example via a bar code or a QR code (from English “Quick Response code”).
- Redundancy check elements for example redundancy bits, can be added to the security code to verify its integrity.
- the injective mathematical function can comprise a coefficient determined from a characteristic datum of the security device and a coefficient comprising a cryptographic key or part of a cryptographic key.
- the cryptographic key may be independent of the security device, that is to say not be generated from characteristic data of the security device.
- the method may further comprise a step of defining a predetermined marker.
- the location of the at least one uniqueness parameter in the object geometric space can be defined by coordinates in said predetermined reference and/or the location of the at least one micro-pattern in the image geometric space can be defined by coordinates in the predetermined coordinate system.
- the predetermined marker can be linked to the security device and can be defined from at least one characteristic datum of said security device.
- the predetermined marker can depend on at least one characteristic datum and can therefore also satisfy the conditions of a non-cloneable physical function (PUF).
- the coordinates of the at least one micro-pattern thus generated in the predetermined marker can be specific to each security device.
- the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter can be defined in a first predetermined marker and the coordinates of the micro-patterns can be established in a second marker, different from the first.
- the invention also relates, according to a second aspect, to a personalized security device comprising at least one uniqueness parameter in a predetermined object geometric space and at least one micro-pattern in an image geometric space, and at least one location of the at least one uniqueness parameter and at least one location of the at least one micro-pattern being linked by an injective mathematical function.
- Such a device is for example obtained by the personalization method comprising all or part of the characteristics described previously.
- Such a personalized security device thus has advantages similar to those described above in connection with the method.
- the at least one micro-pattern may comprise at least one dot engraved and/or printed in the personalized security device.
- the at least one micro-pattern can have a characteristic dimension of less than 200 ⁇ m, or even less than 50 ⁇ m, or even less than 5 ⁇ m.
- the image geometric space can be configured to be distinct from at least one predetermined zone, such as for example a photograph of a holder of the device.
- a predetermined zone can for example be defined so as not to alter the visibility of certain characteristic data, or even so as to avoid interference with the at least one uniqueness parameter.
- a predetermined zone can also be defined so as to include characteristic data in order to reduce the visibility of the at least one micropattern to the naked eye.
- the invention also relates, according to a third aspect, to an identity document comprising an identity photograph and/or alphanumeric data relating to a holder of said identity document and a personalized security device according to the second aspect, the identity photograph comprising the at least one uniqueness parameter.
- a front and/or a back of the identity document may include the object and image geometric spaces of the security device.
- a front of an identity document can include one of the object geometric space or the image geometric space of the security device while a back of the identity document can include the other object geometric space or image geometric space of the security device.
- a first page of an identity document may include the object geometric space and a second page of the identity document may include the image geometric space of the security device.
- This example may apply in particular when the identity document is a passport or any other identity document comprising at least two pages.
- the invention also relates, according to a fourth aspect, to a method for authenticating a personalized security device according to the second aspect of the invention, said authentication method comprising the steps of:
- Matching between locations can be considered when a difference between locations is less than a predefined tolerance zone.
- This tolerance zone can be intended to take into account the inaccuracies linked to certain stages of the personalization or authentication processes, such as the stage of acquiring the image, determining the locations, or even marking the micro-patterns .
- the personalized security device includes a plurality of uniqueness parameters and associated micro-patterns, it may be possible to detect whether only part of the security device has been tampered with.
- a coefficient of the mathematical function includes a cryptographic key
- the cryptographic key found or the security code can be verified with information that can be stored on the security device, for example on a chip or encoded with a bar code or a QR code in the security device.
- FIG. 1 shows a personalized security device according to the invention, comprising characteristic data and micro-patterns
- FIG. 2 shows a non-personalized security device comprising characteristic data before a micro-pattern marking step
- FIG. 3 shows an example of application of a method for authenticating a personalized security device a) comprising micro-patterns and an identity photograph, and of a falsified version b) comprising micro- patterns in identical locations and a different identity photograph than the authentic device;
- FIG. 4 schematically shows a method of customizing a security device according to an example implementation of the invention
- FIG. 5 schematically represents a method for authenticating a personalized security device according to an exemplary implementation of the invention.
- FIG. 1 represents a personalized security device 1 according to the invention.
- a personalized security device 1 is intended to authenticate an individual, in particular its holder, and thus to allow verification of the identity of this individual.
- the personalized security device 1 is in particular intended to be unique, so as to avoid any confusion between several individuals.
- the personalized security device 1 comprises a security device 10 represented for example in FIG. 2, which comprises at least one characteristic datum linked to at least one characteristic specific to the holder or to the issuer of the security device 10.
- the security device 10 includes several characteristic data specific to its holder, including an identity photograph 2, alphanumeric data 3 and a signature 4.
- the security device 10 further comprises at least one characteristic datum of the issuer of the security device 1, for example a bank in the case of a bank card, a security organization in the case of a badge, or a State in the case of a visa or a passport.
- This at least one characteristic datum of the transmitter is presented here in the form of alphanumeric data 5, a logo 6 and guilloche patterns 7.
- the at least one characteristic datum may be in other forms such as a drawing.
- This at least one characteristic datum is present on the security device 10 before the personalization according to the invention and is linked to random characteristics caused during its manufacture.
- such a security device 10 comprises a uniqueness parameter 8 which here comprises at least one of such characteristic data.
- the security device 10 comprises a predetermined geometric object space E comprising at least one uniqueness parameter 8.
- the object geometric space E corresponds here to the identity photograph 2 of the security device 10.
- the uniqueness parameter 8 is used to define a specific signature to distinguish a security device among a multitude of personalized or non-personalized security devices.
- Such a uniqueness parameter 8 is for example identified in FIGS. 1 and 2 by a hatched circle and corresponds to a biometric point on the identity photograph 2. In this case, several uniqueness parameters 8 are identified and correspond at different biometric points such as the pupils, nose and corners of the mouth on the identity photograph 2 of the holder of the security device 10.
- the uniqueness parameters 8 identified by hatched circles represent here only a selection from among all the uniqueness parameters of the security device 10.
- Each uniqueness parameter 8 comprises for example at least one alphanumeric datum, a logo, a drawing or a coat of arms or else a particular point of these elements.
- a uniqueness parameter 8 can comprise any data characteristic of the security device 10 likely to satisfy the conditions of a non-cloneable physical function (PUF).
- PEF non-cloneable physical function
- a uniqueness parameter 8 can constitute uniqueness information that can be used on the one hand for authentication of a security device, and on the other hand for the differentiation between several of these security devices.
- the personalized security device 1 represented in FIG. 1 comprises for this purpose the security device 10 represented in FIG. 2 as well as at least one micro-pattern 9 identified by a cross.
- the security device 10 further comprises an image geometric space E′ in which the location of the at least one micro-pattern 9 is generated.
- the image geometric space E′ corresponds here to the represented side of the security device 10.
- Each micro-pattern 9 is intended to be invisible to the naked eye. However, the at least one micro-pattern 9 is adapted to be detectable by a device such as a smartphone, from an image that can also be obtained via such a device.
- the at least one micro-pattern 9 comprises for example a point or cloud of points which can have a maximum dimension of the order of a micrometer.
- a micro-pattern 9 can have dimensions comprised between 1 ⁇ m and 500 ⁇ m.
- the dimensions of a micro-pattern 9 can be between 50 ⁇ m and 200 ⁇ m for authentication with a smartphone or a scanner and between 5 ⁇ m and 50 ⁇ m for laboratory authentication with a high-resolution scanner.
- each micro-pattern 9 is laser engraved on the security device 1 .
- a micro-pattern 9 can also be produced using various methods, such as printing, allowing them to be marked on a security device, for example.
- the micro-pattern 9 can comprise for example at least one point, or a cloud of points, or any type of pattern such as for example a spiral, a circle, a triangle, a square etc.
- the micro-pattern 9 is linked to at least one uniqueness parameter 8 via a mathematical function which here is injective. Furthermore, the micro-pattern 9 is configured to encode a uniqueness parameter 8 and thus authenticate the personalized security device 1 .
- micro-pattern 9 Because it is invisible to the naked eye, the detection and/or reproduction of a micro-pattern 9 is made difficult for a usurper. In addition, it is all the more difficult to reproduce a micro-pattern 9 without knowledge of the mathematical function and of at least one uniqueness parameter 8 chosen to generate it.
- the location of at least one micro-pattern 9 in the image geometric space E′ of the personalized security device 1 corresponds to a result of the mathematical function applied to a location of the uniqueness parameter 8 in the geometric space object e.
- the injective mathematical function can be a sine function taken on an interval L 2 ' 2J W
- the at least one micro-pattern 9 is here marked towards the periphery of the personalized security device 1, so as not to interfere with the at least one characteristic datum such as the identity photograph 2 for example.
- the image geometric space E′ can be defined in such a way that the location of the micro-pattern 9 does not interfere with other data such as characteristic data for example.
- the personalized security device 1 of FIG. 1 is obtained from a security device 10 represented in FIG. 2 to which is applied a personalization method described below according to an exemplary implementation of the invention.
- Such a personalization method comprises a step of determining the location of the uniqueness parameter 8 in the predetermined geometric object space E of the security device 10 with a view to determining a micro-pattern location.
- an image of the security device 10 is acquired.
- the uniqueness parameter 8 can be identified by means of recognition algorithms when an image of the security device 1 is acquired.
- five uniqueness parameters 8 are identified in the object geometric space E in the security device 10 and correspond to particular biometric points of the identity photograph 2.
- the same characteristic data can be identified from one security device to another.
- a predetermined reference 11 is here defined from the image of the security device
- the predetermined marker 11 is here linked to the security device 10 and is formed by two axes X and Y.
- the X axis is defined from the alphanumeric data 5 adjacent to the logo 6, while the Y axis is defined from an edge of the identity photograph 2 of the security device 10.
- the characteristic data used to define the marker are here chosen so that the predetermined marker 11 is orthogonal. Any type of marker can be envisaged, such as a standardized or even orthonormal marker, and the predetermined marker 11 can be defined from any other data characteristic of the security device 10.
- coordinates of at least one uniqueness parameter 8 identified in the geometric object space E by the predetermined reference 11 are determined and used in order to generate a location for at least one micro-pattern 9 in the geometric space image E' security device 10.
- the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 can be marked by Cartesian, polar, cylindrical or even spherical coordinates.
- the coordinates of at least one uniqueness parameter 8 in the predetermined frame 11 are here obtained directly after image processing given that each uniqueness parameter 8 corresponds to a point.
- the coordinates can be subjected to subsequent processing, in particular when the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 corresponds, not to a point, but to a difference, for example the distance between the eyes.
- the coordinates of at least one uniqueness parameter 8 identified in the object geometric space E with the predetermined reference 11 are temporarily stored, for example in a device external to the security device 10, in order to be used as a parameter input of a mathematical function configured to generate coordinates of one or more micro-patterns, these coordinates being uniquely linked to the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8.
- the coordinates of at least one micro-pattern 9 are generated by the injective mathematical function from the coordinates of at least one uniqueness parameter 8 identified in the predetermined reference 11 .
- the coordinates of at least one micro-pattern 9 generated by the injective mathematical function are established from the predetermined reference 11 .
- the coordinates of the at least one micro-pattern can be established in another marker.
- the injective mathematical function can be adapted to generate the coordinates of a micro-pattern 9 from the coordinates of at least two uniqueness parameters 8 identified in the predetermined reference 11, so that the number of micro- patterns 9 is less than the number of uniqueness parameters 8 identified.
- an image is acquired, for example during an identity check, in order to identify the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 and to determine its coordinates in the predetermined mark 11 .
- This acquisition step is identical to the acquisition step of the method for personalizing the security device 10 described above.
- the coordinates of at least one micro-pattern 9 in the geometric image space E′ of the security device 1 are also determined analogously to the personalization process. Therefore, the determination of the coordinates from the image of the personalized security device 1 does not require significant image processing either.
- So-called verification coordinates of at least one verification micro-pattern 12 are then generated, with the injective mathematical function, from the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 identified on the image of the personalized security device 1, in the predetermined mark 11.
- the coordinates of at least one micro-pattern are compared with the verification coordinates of the at least one verification micro-pattern 12, calculated via the injective function from the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 in order whether or not to establish a correspondence between these coordinates.
- the personalized security device 1 is considered authentic when the coordinates correspond, within a tolerance zone.
- the security device 1 is declared non-authentic when at least one of the coordinates does not correspond, within a tolerance zone.
- the tolerance zone is defined for the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 and/or of the at least one micro-pattern 9 and makes it possible to take account of the inaccuracies linked for example to the acquisition of the image, the determination of the predetermined marker 11, the determination of the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 and of the at least one micro-pattern 9, or even the marking of the at least one micro- pattern 9 on safety device 10.
- FIG. 3 Such an example of application of the authentication method is represented in FIG. 3, in which a first personalized security device 1, represented by FIG. 3a, comprises an identity photograph 2 from a first owner.
- This security device 1 further comprises alphanumeric data relating to its holder 3 and to its issuer 5, as well as a signature 4, a logo 6 and a plurality of micro-patterns 9 having coordinates corresponding to a result of a injective mathematical function applied to the coordinates of uniqueness parameters 8 in a predetermined reference 11, which corresponds to one or more biometric points e the identity photograph 2.
- FIG. 3 and in particular FIG. 3b also represents a second personalized security device 1′ which comprises the same alphanumeric data 3 and 5, the same logo 6 and the same guilloche patterns 7 as the first personalized security device 1 .
- the second personalized security device T comprises an identity photograph 2' which differs from the identity photograph 2 of the first personalized security device 1 and has for this purpose uniqueness parameters 8' different from the parameters of uniqueness 8 of the first personalized security device 1 .
- the identity photographs 2 and 2' of the first and second personalized security devices 1 and 1' are positioned identically, so that the predetermined marker 11 is identical for each of these personalized security devices .
- Such an example is likely to arise during a modification of the identity photograph by a usurper for example.
- the mismatch can be established when the coordinates of the identified micro-patterns 9 and the verification coordinates of the verification micro-patterns 12 differ by a distance at least equal to the tolerance zone.
- FIG. 4 schematically illustrates an example of implementation of a method for securing a security device 10 according to the invention.
- the method comprises:
- step S3 for identifying at least one uniqueness parameter 8 of the security device 10 in the object geometric space E;
- step S6 of generating coordinates of at least one micropattern in an image geometric space E' of the security device 10 by an injective mathematical function, from the coordinates of the at least one uniqueness parameter 8 in the reference predetermined 11; - a step S7 of marking the at least one micro-pattern at a location defined by the coordinates generated by the mathematical function on the security device 10.
- a security device 1 as represented in FIG. 1 is for example obtained following such a securing method.
- Figure 5 schematically illustrates an example of implementation of a method for authenticating a personalized security device 1 according to the invention, as shown in Figure 1 for example.
- the method comprises:
- step S9 for identifying at least one uniqueness parameter 8 in the object geometric space E of the personalized security device 1;
- step S13 for determining the coordinates of the at least one micro-pattern identified in the personalized security device, in the predetermined reference mark 11;
Landscapes
- Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR2108740A FR3126196A1 (fr) | 2021-08-17 | 2021-08-17 | Procédé de personnalisation d'un dispositif de sécurité, dispositif de sécurité personnalisé, document d’identité comportant un tel dispositif, et procédé d'authentification d'un tel dispositif |
PCT/EP2022/071004 WO2023020795A1 (fr) | 2021-08-17 | 2022-07-26 | Procédé de personnalisation d'un dispositif de sécurité, dispositif de securite personnalise, document d'identite comportant un tel dispositif, et procéde d'authentifiction d'un tel dispositif |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP4387847A1 true EP4387847A1 (de) | 2024-06-26 |
Family
ID=78649389
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP22757907.5A Pending EP4387847A1 (de) | 2021-08-17 | 2022-07-26 | Personalisierungsverfahren einer sicherheitsvorrichtung, personalisierte sicherheitsvorrichtung, identitätsdokument mit einer solchen vorrichtung und authentifizierungsverfahren einer solchen vorrichtung |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP4387847A1 (de) |
FR (1) | FR3126196A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2023020795A1 (de) |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
PT3459757T (pt) | 2017-09-26 | 2021-08-19 | Gemalto Sa | Processo de geração de motivos guilhochados variáveis, dispositivo de implementação e documento de identidade compreendendo tais motivos |
-
2021
- 2021-08-17 FR FR2108740A patent/FR3126196A1/fr active Pending
-
2022
- 2022-07-26 WO PCT/EP2022/071004 patent/WO2023020795A1/fr active Application Filing
- 2022-07-26 EP EP22757907.5A patent/EP4387847A1/de active Pending
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2023020795A1 (fr) | 2023-02-23 |
FR3126196A1 (fr) | 2023-02-24 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
EP1716520B1 (de) | Verwendung einer digitalen signatur, die aus mindestens einer strukturellen kenngrösse eines hardwareelements erhalten wird, um das direkte lesen sensitiver informationen zu schützen, und verfahren zum lesen geschützter sensitiver informationen | |
EP3539058B1 (de) | Verfahren zur authentifizierung einer illustration | |
FR2973137A1 (fr) | Procede et systeme d'authentification d'un document securise | |
CA3000153A1 (fr) | Procede d'analyse d'un document structure susceptible d'etre deforme | |
EP3731117A1 (de) | Verfahren zum erfassen von daten eines identitätsdokuments einer person und zur authentifizierung eines identitätsdokuments | |
WO2011058012A2 (fr) | Documents d'identite comportant une photographie d'identite securisee au moyen de motifs | |
EP3686761B1 (de) | Gesichertes markierungselement und kodierungs- und authentifizierungsverfahren dieses markierungselements | |
WO2020078998A1 (fr) | Marquage imprime pour un procede d'authentification et procede d'impression et d'authentification d'un marquage imprime | |
EP4387847A1 (de) | Personalisierungsverfahren einer sicherheitsvorrichtung, personalisierte sicherheitsvorrichtung, identitätsdokument mit einer solchen vorrichtung und authentifizierungsverfahren einer solchen vorrichtung | |
CA2982878C (fr) | Procede de verification d'un dispositif de securite comportant une signature | |
EP1747526B1 (de) | Verfahren zur Maskierung eines digitalen Datenelements wie etwa eines biometrischen Abdrucks und Verwendung dafür zur Sicherung eines Sicherheitsdokuments | |
EP2073175A1 (de) | Datenträger für die gesicherte Identifikation und Sicherungsverfahren eines solchen Datenträgers | |
WO2013156728A1 (fr) | Dispositif de securite et document identitaire | |
EP3999357B1 (de) | Verfahren zur herstellung eines zweidimensionalen farbigen strichcodes und zugehörige sicherheitsvorrichtung | |
FR3065557A1 (fr) | Procede de fabrication d'un dispositif de securite forme de couches superposees, et procede d'authentification d'un tel dispositif de securite | |
FR2996660A1 (fr) | Support d'identification et procede de realisation d'un support d'identification et procede de verification d'authenticite | |
EP4049182A1 (de) | Verfahren und vorrichtung zur sicherung eines objekts und verfahren zur authentifizierung eines objekts | |
FR3135544A1 (fr) | Procédé d’authentification d’un document d’identité d’un individu et éventuellement d’authentification dudit individu et d’authentification d’un individu présentant un document d’identité comme étant le sien | |
FR3076251A1 (fr) | Procede de protection d'un portrait dans un document d'identite | |
FR3116760A1 (fr) | Procédé de fabrication d’un dispositif de sécurité et dispositif de sécurité associé | |
WO2004063999A1 (fr) | Procede de personnalisation securisee d'un objet | |
FR3093836A1 (fr) | Identité numérique | |
WO2019202027A1 (fr) | Procédé pour authentifier un document securisé |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: UNKNOWN |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATION HAS BEEN MADE |
|
PUAI | Public reference made under article 153(3) epc to a published international application that has entered the european phase |
Free format text: ORIGINAL CODE: 0009012 |
|
STAA | Information on the status of an ep patent application or granted ep patent |
Free format text: STATUS: REQUEST FOR EXAMINATION WAS MADE |
|
17P | Request for examination filed |
Effective date: 20240112 |
|
AK | Designated contracting states |
Kind code of ref document: A1 Designated state(s): AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR |