EP3381166B1 - Systeme und verfahren zur kanalübergreifenden vorrichtungsbindung - Google Patents
Systeme und verfahren zur kanalübergreifenden vorrichtungsbindung Download PDFInfo
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- EP3381166B1 EP3381166B1 EP16810557.5A EP16810557A EP3381166B1 EP 3381166 B1 EP3381166 B1 EP 3381166B1 EP 16810557 A EP16810557 A EP 16810557A EP 3381166 B1 EP3381166 B1 EP 3381166B1
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- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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Definitions
- This disclosure generally relates to techniques for registration of user devices with servers and, in particular, to registration of a single user device that can communicate with different servers via different communication channels.
- a typical user's mobile device generally includes one or more apps such as banking apps, ticket-purchasing apps, healthcare apps, etc. Many of these apps communicate via a network (e.g., the Internet) with a corresponding app server and exchange information therewith.
- the information that is exchanged often includes sensitive and private information such as account numbers, information about financial transactions, medical information etc.
- a malicious user uses an unauthorized device that is different from an authorized user's device, but masquerading as the authorized device, and may cause an app server to share the user's private and sensitive information with the unauthorized device.
- Mobile users may also use mobile browsers to connect to mobile websites, where the mobile devices and web servers may exchange the user's sensitive and private information.
- a malicious user may use an unauthorized device that is different from an authorized user's device and may cause a web server to share the user's private and sensitive information with the unauthorized device.
- U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2015/230089 describes a technique where a service that is typically provided via a mobile/cellular network may be provided via a data network, where such service may be accessed using a software application.
- a software application may be provided via a data network, where such service may be accessed using a software application.
- an identifier of an instance of a software application using which the requested service may be provided is associated with a user device identifier.
- U.S. Patent Application Publication No. US2015/180857 describes a user authentication process in which an authentication server authorizes a user using user-supplied credentials, and provides to the user client a cookie that corresponds to an app server.
- the app server expects to receive the cookie from the user client as part of a request for service, and transmits that cookie to the authentication server to authorize the user for the requested service.
- U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2005/0108574 describes a communication infrastructure for communication between multi-modal phones or devices and web applications, where the infrastructure includes a proxy that acts as a representative, i.e., the proxy combines the functionality of each mode of communication of a multi-modal device using session management, to present the device as a single device to the web application.
- a security system associated with a particular communication channel can generate and assign a unique identifier (ID) to a mobile device for communication via that channel. That unique ID may then be stored at a server associated with that particular channel. The server may exchange information with a mobile device via that channel only if the device ID for that channel matches with the stored ID.
- ID unique identifier
- One example of a communication channel includes a communication link between a mobile app and a corresponding app server. An ID associated with this device can be called app-device-ID, which identifies a particular user device to an app server for communication with an app running on that device.
- InMobileTM from InAuth, Inc. is an example of a security system that can protect mobile applications executing on the AndroidTM or iOSTM operating systems. InMobileTM generates an app-device-ID called InPermIDTM that may be used by an app server.
- Another example of a communication channel includes a communication link between a mobile browser and a corresponding web server.
- An ID associated with a device can be called browser-device-ID, which identifies a particular user device to a web server for communication with a browser running on that device.
- InBrowserTM from InAuth, Inc. is a security system that can authenticate a user device using browser fingerprinting. InBrowserTM may collect browsing-related data in real time. InBrowserTM generates a browser-device-ID called InBrowserlDTM that may be used by a web server.
- the channel-specific device IDs can prevent or at least reduce the risk of unauthorized access to user information, because a server associated with a channel (e.g., an app server communicating with an app, a web server communicating with a browser, etc.) may exchange information with a mobile device via that channel only if the device ID for that channel matches with a stored ID.
- a server associated with a channel e.g., an app server communicating with an app, a web server communicating with a browser, etc.
- a user may communicate with a service provider (e.g., a healthcare provider, a bank, a transportation service provider, etc.) or a vendor (e.g., an on-line store) via one particular channel, e.g., using an app, using the user's authorized mobile device.
- a security system such as InMobileTM may allocate a unique ID (e.g., InPermIDTM) to the authorized device for that channel and may use that ID in subsequent communications via this channel.
- InPermIDTM unique ID
- Unbeknownst to the user a malicious user may communicate with the same service provider via a different channel, e.g., using a web browser, using an unauthorized mobile device and masquerading as the user.
- a security system associated with the other channel such as InBrowserTM, may allocate another unique ID (e.g., InBrowserlDTM) to the unauthorized device for that channel and may use that ID in subsequent communications via this channel. Even if the user had previously used this other channel and established an ID for that channel for the authorized user device, the malicious user may cause the security system to replace such an ID with the one associated with the unauthorized device. User information in these situations may thus be vulnerable to unauthorized access.
- another unique ID e.g., InBrowserlDTM
- the security of mobile communications can be improved further by linking channel-specific device IDs across two or more channels.
- a user communicates via one channel e.g., using an app on a mobile device with an app server
- additional channel-specific device IDs are created and stored even if the user did not attempt communication via the other channels.
- the different channel-specific device IDs are linked together, which permits the different security systems associated with different channels to determine whether the same authorized user device is registered for communication via different channels, even though different IDs may be allocated to that device for communication via such different channels. If a malicious user attempts to register with a security system a new channel-specific ID that corresponds to the malicious user's unauthorized device, the security system may determine that a new device is being registered and may flag such a registration attempt for further investigation. The likelihood of unauthorized access to user, service provider, and/or vendor information can thus be reduced.
- cross-channel device binding is provided as an add-on feature to the InBrowserTM product.
- various embodiments of a cross-channel device binding process and/or system 100 can link one device/app identifier referred to as device/app_ID_CH1 and allocated to a device/app 102 with another device/app identifier referred to as device/app_ID_CH2, also allocated to the device/app 102.
- the ID device/app_ID_CH1 may correspond to one particular communication channel 106 and may be provided by a device and/or software app identification system 108 designed for the channel 106.
- the device/app_ID_CH2 may correspond to another different communication channel 110 and may be provided by a device and/or software app identification system 112 designed for the channel 110.
- an identification system corresponding to a particular communication channel can allocate a unique ID to each device or software app that communicates via that particular communication channel for the first time.
- the identification system may also recognize a returning device/app, when any device or app attempts to communicate via the corresponding channel again, at a later time.
- InMobileTM is an example of one identification system corresponding to a communication channel between a client app installed and executed on a user device and an app server.
- the kind of device identifiers this system generates is called the InPermIDTM.
- InBrowserTM is an example of another identification system corresponding to a communication channel between a web browser installed and executed on a user device and a web server.
- the kind of identifier this other system generates is called InBrowserlDTM.
- An individual may use a browser on the individual's mobile device (e.g., ChromeTM, SafariTM, etc.) to connect to one kind of server (e.g., a web server) protected by InBrowserTM.
- server e.g., a web server
- the individual may use the same mobile device to connect to another kind of server (e.g., an app server) protected by InMobileTM.
- the respective servers i.e., the web server and the app server, may use the InBrowserTM and InMobileTM security systems to identify the user's device.
- the two kinds of servers are owned and/or operated by the same entity. In some cases, the two kinds of servers are owned and/or operated by different entities.
- a single device 202 connects to two different servers 204, 206 via two different device/app identification systems (e.g., InBrowserTM and InMobileTM).
- two different devices/apps 208, 210 also connect separately to the servers 204, 206.
- the device/app 208 communicates with the server 204 and the device app 210 communicates with the server 206.
- cross-channel device binding can provide the requisite linkage to distinguish between these two scenarios.
- a linker component 312 installed on a user device 302.
- a user device may have installed thereon one or more client apps, such as BankingApp#1 322, BankingApp#2 324, BankingApp#3 326, HelthCareApp#1 328, etc.
- client apps need not include banking and/or health-care apps, and may not be limited to such apps.
- Other types of apps such as e-commerce apps, music/video service apps, news apps, etc., are also contemplated.
- the device/app IDs associated with one or more of these apps may be cross linked with IDs used in other communication channels.
- a linker component links with one or more apps.
- the linker component 312 is linked with the client apps 322, 324, 328, but not with the client app 326.
- cross channel binding may be performed using the IDs used by the client apps 322, 324, 328, but not for the ID used by the client app 326.
- the app 324 communicates with the app server 334 via channel CH 1.
- the app server Upon receiving a communication from a client app, the app server typically determines whether the communicating device and/or instance of the app is a new, previously unseen device/app instance, or a returning one. The app server relies upon a device/app identification server 362 to perform this determination.
- One or more app servers may be configured to perform this determination themselves. Various techniques for performing such determination accurately are described in U.S. Patent Applications Nos.
- 15/053,362 (entitled Systems and Methods For Recognizing a Device); 15/297,889 (entitled Systems and Methods for Recognizing a Device and/or an Instance of an App Invoked on a Device); and 15/297,894 (entitled Systems and Methods for Facilitating Recognition of a Device and/or an Instance of an App Invoked on a Device).
- the linker component 312 When the app 324 is launched, the linker component 312 generates a unique random, generally unguessable number called the SessionID, and transmits the SessionID to the app server 334 and/or to the device/app identification server 362.
- the session identifier e.g., SessionID
- the session identifier can be generated randomly or pseudo-randomly. It may include alpha-numeric and/or other characters. The number of characters can be 3, 5, 8, 10, 15, or even more.
- the app server is configured to forward the SessionID it receives to the device/app identification server 362.
- One or more of these transmissions may be performed using a secured path, which can provide protection against unauthorized access to or change or destruction of the SessionID via techniques such as tampering, replay, etc.
- a secured path which can provide protection against unauthorized access to or change or destruction of the SessionID via techniques such as tampering, replay, etc.
- the device/app identification server 362 determines whether the device 302 and/or the instance of the client app 324 is new or returning. For a device/app instance determined to be new, the device/app identification server 362 generates a new ID. For a device/app determined to be returning, the ID that was previously allocated to the device/app is retrieved. The new or the retrieved ID corresponds to channel CHI, and is generally denoted ID_CH1. The device/app identification server 362 associates 1D_CH1 (which can be a newly assigned ID or a retrieved ID) with the SessionID that was received from the linker component 312.
- a user device such as the device 302 has installed thereon one or more browsers, e.g., browsers 342, 344, 346.
- One or more of these browsers may be used to communicate with one or more web servers 352-358, to obtain information and/or services.
- the web server 352 may provide the same or similar services as those available via the client app 332 and its corresponding app server.
- the web servers 354, 356, 358 may respectively provide the same or similar services as those available via the client apps 334, 336, 338 and their respective app servers.
- Some web servers may provide services that are not available through app servers and, conversely, some app servers may provide services that are not available through a web server.
- the communication between a web browser and a web server is said to have occurred through a different communication channel (e.g., channel CH_2), even though, the underlying communication medium may the same as that underlying channel CH_1, e.g., the Internet, a proprietary network, a cellular phone network, etc.
- a different communication channel e.g., channel CH_2
- one or more web servers may determine whether the requesting user device/browser is a new, i.e., previously unseen app/browser or a returning one.
- the web server 352 relies upon the device/app identification server 362 to perform this determination.
- One or more web servers may be configured to perform such determination themselves, and/or one or more web servers may rely upon identification server(s) other than the identification server 362.
- the linker component 312 launches a default browser, e.g., the browser 342.
- the default browser is pre-selected for a user device (e.g., SafariTM for an AppleTM device, ChromeTM for an AndroidTM-based device, etc.)
- the user can choose the default browser.
- the browser most frequently used is designated as the default browser.
- the SessionID generated by the linker component 312 is provided to the default browser 342, which the default browser transmits to the device/app identification server 362.
- the default browser communicates with a web server (e.g., the web server 352) via channel CH_2, and transmits the SessionID to the web server.
- the web server 352 may be configured to transmit the SessionID to the device/app identification server 362.
- the device/app identification server 362 determines whether the device on which the instance of the default browser 342 was invoked is a new device or a returning one. Alternatively, or in addition, the device/app identification server 362 may determine whether the instance of the browser 342 is a new instance or a returning one. Here again, if the device/browser instance is determined to be a new one, the device/app identification server 362 generates a new device/browser ID corresponding to channel CH_2. Otherwise, the device/browser instance is determined to be a returning one, and the device/app identification server 362 retrieves a device/browser ID that was previously allocated to the device/browser and that corresponds to channel CH_2. The new or retrieved device/browser ID is generally denoted ID_CH2.
- the device/app identification server 362 associates the received SessionID with ID_CH2.
- the SessionID thus links two device/app IDs, namely, ID_CH1 (which corresponds to a communication channel between the client app 324 and the app server 334), and ID_CH2 (which corresponds to a communication channel between the browser 342 and a web server) with the SessionID.
- ID_CH1 which corresponds to a communication channel between the client app 324 and the app server 33
- ID_CH2 which corresponds to a communication channel between the browser 342 and a web server
- the SessionID may be associated with a user ID, as well.
- the device/app identification server 362 provides ID_CH2 to the web server 352.
- the device/app identification server 362 may provide ID_CH1 linked to SessionID to the web server 352, and the web server can link the two device/app IDs, namely, ID_CH1 and ID_CH2 with the SessionID.
- ID_CH1 and ID_CH2 the two device/app IDs
- the linking described herein is not limited to two channels.
- Other channels can include channels between other apps and their corresponding app servers and other browsers and the web servers with which the browsers can communicate, where several of the app servers and/or the web servers may be served by the same device/app identification server or by different identification servers.
- a malicious user communicates with a web server 402 via one channel (e.g., channel CH_2, as shown in FIG. 4 ) using an unauthorized device 412 masquerading an authorized user device, and attempts to register the unauthorized device.
- the web server 402 and/or a device/app identification server 404 that the web server uses for device/app identification would recognize that the registration request lacks a SessionID and may suspect that a malicious user is attempting registration.
- the malicious user may include a phony SessionID in the request. If the format of the phony SessionID (e.g., the particular arrangement of alphabetical, numerical, and other characters, the numbers of the different kinds of characters, etc.) is not the same as that of a genuine SessionID, the server 404 can suspect that a malicious user is attempting registration. In some cases, the malicious user may be able to provide a SessionID in the format of a genuine SessionID.
- the format of the phony SessionID e.g., the particular arrangement of alphabetical, numerical, and other characters, the numbers of the different kinds of characters, etc.
- the web server 402 or the device/app identification server 404 Upon receiving such a request, the web server 402 or the device/app identification server 404 would determine whether the unauthorized device 412 or the browser instance seeking communication is a new device/browser instance or a returning one, and would generate or retrieve an ID corresponding to the particular communication channel (i.e., CH_2 in this case). For the sake of convenience, this ID is referred to as UnAuthorized_ID_CH2.
- the web server 402 or the device/app identification server 404 would also access a device/app ID corresponding to the particular communication channel (i.e., CH_2 in this case), and/or another communication channel (e.g., CH_1), using the phony SessionID.
- a device/app ID corresponding to the particular communication channel (i.e., CH_2 in this case), and/or another communication channel (e.g., CH_1)
- the SessionID is phony there would be no device/app ID associated therewith for any channel and, as such, the attempt to access a device/app ID would fail.
- the web server 402 and/or a device/app identification server 404 may therefore suspect that a malicious user is attempting registration.
- the phony SessionID may match with the SessionID allocated to some user device/app instance that was previously processed by the web server 402 and/or a device/app identification server 404. That matching user device would likely be the device of another non-targeted user, and not likely the device of the targeted user that the malicious user is trying to masquerade.
- the probability that the phony SessionID is the same as that linked with the targeted user's device is typically less than one in a billion, tens of billions, a trillion, etc.
- an ID would be linked with the phony but matching SessionID. For the sake of convenience, this ID is referred to as OtherUser_ID_CH2.
- the UnAuthorized_ID_CH2 would not match with OtherUser_ID_CH2, however, and, thus, the web server 402 or the device/app identification server 404 would recognize that the device/app associated with the ID Authorized_ID_CH2 is not an authorized device.
- the web server 402 may then take further actions such as denying request, requesting other forms of identification, flagging the request for manual review, etc.
- InMobileTM software development kit links with a client mobile application.
- the InMobileTM SDK When a user invokes or executes the client mobile application on a user device, the InMobileTM SDK generates a unique random, generally unguessable number, i.e., the SessionID (e.g., 9348), and sends the SessionID to the InMobileTM server through a secure communication link, e.g., the InMobileTM Trusted PathTM.
- SessionID e.g., 9348
- the client app communicates with an app server, and the InMobileTM server informs the app server whether the device/client app instance communicating with the web server is a new device/client app instance or a returning one.
- the InMobileTM server generates (for devices/client app instances determined to be new) or retrieves (for devices/client app instances determined to be returning) InPermIDTM, which corresponds to a communication channel between a client app and an app server.
- the InMobileTM SDK automatically launches a browser (e.g., a default browser) on the same device.
- the launch communicates the same SessionID to the browser.
- the browser communicates with a web service implemented on a web server and protected by the InBrowserTM server.
- the InBrowserTM server may inform the web server whether the device/browser communicating with the web server is a new device/browser instance or a returning one.
- the InBrowserTM server generates (for devices/browser instances determined to be new) or retrieves (for devices/browser instances determined to be returning) InBrowserlDTM, which corresponds to a communication channel between a browser and a web server.
- the browser sends the SessionID in the communication to the web server, so that the InBrowserTM server learns the SessionID.
- the InBrowserTM server may send the InBrowserlDTM to the InMobileTM server and the InMobileTM server may send the InPermIDTM to the InBrowserTM server.
- the InBrowserTM server and the InMobileTM server associate or link the InBrowserlDTM (e.g., 345027) with the InPermIDTM (e.g., 19347) via the SessionID (e.g., 9348).
- the InBrowserTM server and the InMobileTM server understand that the linked InBrowserlDTM and InPermIDTM (e.g., 345027 and 19347), represent the same device and/or app instance.
- a single server can be configured to function as the InBrowserTM server and the InMobileTM server.
- communication of SessionID and the linking of InBrowserlDTM and InPermIDTM by InBrowserTM and InMobileTM is performed in a secure manner.
- Typical operations at a registering user device can be described as follows: Upon launching of a client app, provide via a linker component (e.g., an SDK) a session identifier (e.g., SessionID 9348) to the client app. Send via the client app to an associated server (e.g., InMobileTM server) a link request including the session identifier (e.g., the SessionID 9348). Invoke via the linker component (e.g., the SDK) a browser app (e.g., a default browser) and provide the session identifier (e.g., the SessionID 9348) to the browser app. Transmit via the browser app another link request including the session identifier (e.g., the SessionID 9348) to another server (e.g., InBrowserTM server).
- a linker component e.g., an SDK
- SessionID 9348 Send via the client app to an associated server
- Typical operation of a server (e.g., InMobileTM Server) during registration/linking can be described as follows: Receive at a server (e.g., InMobileTM server) a first link request along with session identifier (e.g., SessionID 9348), where the first link request corresponds to first communication channel (e.g., a channel between a client app and the server). Generate a new device/app ID corresponding to the first communication channel, denoted ID_CH1, (e.g., InPermIDTM 19347) or obtain the new ID_CH1 from another server (e.g., an app server). Receive a second link request from another server (e.g., InBrowserTM server) corresponding to a different communication channel (e.g., a channel between a browser app and the other server).
- ID_CH1 e.g., a new device/app ID corresponding to the first communication channel
- ID_CH1 e.g., InPermIDTM 1934
- the second link request includes the same session identifier that was included in the first link request (i.e., SessionID 9348).
- Associate ID_CH1 and ID_CH2 with session identifier e.g., both InPermIDTM 19347 and InBrowserlDTM 345027 are linked with SessionID 9348).
- send the linked ID_CH1 and/or ID_CH2 to the other server i.e., the InBrowserTM server).
- Typical operation of server associated with another communication channel can be described as follows.
- a server e.g., InBrowserTM server
- a client e.g., Browser Client
- Test whether the received request includes a session identifier e.g., SessionID 9348. Mark the request for further processing and/or as potentially received from an unauthorized user if the requests do not include a session identifier.
- ID_CH_NEW e.g., InBrowserlDTM 345027.
- ID_CH_PREV a device/app ID corresponding to another communication channel, denoted ID_CH_PREV, where ID_CH_PREV also corresponds to the session identifier (e.g., SessionID 9348, where ID_CH_PREV can be, e.g., InPermIDTM 19347).
- ID_CH_PREV also corresponds to the session identifier (e.g., SessionID 9348, where ID_CH_PREV can be, e.g., InPermIDTM 19347).
- the request for further processing and/or as potentially received from an unauthorized user if no ID_CH_PREV is received; otherwise link the ID_CH_NEW and ID_CH_PREV with the session identifier (e.g., both InBrowserlDTM 345027 and InPermIDTM 19347 are linked with SessionID 9348).
- ID_CH_NEW corresponding to the session identifier (i.e., SessionID 9348) and test whether the generated or obtained ID_CH_NEW is same as the ID_CH_NEW received from the identification server (e.g., for the communication channel between InBrowserTM server and the Browser Client and for SessionID 9348, InBrowserTM server and InMobileTM server must both provide InBrowserlDTM 345027). If the two device/app IDs are different, mark the request for further processing and/or as potentially received from an unauthorized user.
- two communication channels may include two different client apps communicating with two different app servers.
- Two communication channels can also include two browser apps communicating with two different web servers.
- linking is not limited to only two types of device/app IDs corresponding to two different channels; more than two types of device/app IDs (e.g., 3, 5, 10 IDs) corresponding to different respective channels can be linked together at one or more servers.
- the linking process can be ergonomically unpleasing. For example, when the InMobileTM SDK launches a browser on the user's device, the visible control over the device screen switches from the mobile application, which may have been invoked by the user, to the browser. As such, the browser typically moves into the device foreground activity; and the mobile application slides to a background activity. This can confuse the user because the user, who may have invoked/executed the mobile application, would unexpectedly see the mobile application replaced by the browser. The user may then need to take an explicit action such as closing the browser in order to access the mobile app.
- a SessionID is generated in the InMobileTM SDK and the InMobileTM server gets the SessionID through the Trusted PathTM. These steps can be performed at any time once the user invokes a mobile app.
- the InMobileTM SDK invokes a browser using the SessionID.
- the browser sends an HTTP request to the server passing the SessionID as a parameter.
- the server may respond with an ergonomically pleasing message and the message is placed on the browser window. Since the user closed the mobile application, the user does not need to take any further action and simply views a closure window.
- the window may thank the user for using the services of a bank, merchant, or healthcare provider.
- the InBrowserTM server would receive the SessionID and InBrowserIDTM. Using the SessionID the InMobileTM server and the InBrowserTM server may link together the InPermIDTM and InBrwoserIDTM, as described above.
- cross-channel device binding can link two or more channel-specific device IDs, such as Device_ID_1: corresponding to App_1 communicating with App_Server_1; Device_ID_2: corresponding to App_2 communicating with App_Server_2; App_ID_3: corresponding to App_3 communicating with App_Server_3; Device_ID_4: corresponding to Browser_1 communicating with one or more web servers; Browser_ID_5: corresponding to Browser_2 communicating with one or more web servers; Device_ID_6: corresponding to Browser_3 communicating with one or more web servers; etc.
- Each Device_ID identifies the user device, each App_ID identifies an app instance, and each Browser_ID identifies a browser instance.
- Each of these IDs is associated with a respective communication channel.
- two or more (and in some cases all) of these IDs are linked together via a SessionID, which may also be associated with the user registered with the device.
- a server associated with any of the available channels can determine if a new, previously uncorrelated device is attempting communication with the server. Such a determination can avoid or at least reduce the risk of unauthorized access to user, service provider, and/or vendor information.
- a visually pleasing message such as a business-supplied message can be displayed on the user device via another communication channel. For example, a message can be displayed in a browser window. This can avoid the need for the user to take an action to regain control of the client associated with the particular communication channel initially used by the user, such as the mobile application. This implementation can also reduce or avoid user confusion.
- InMobileTM InBrowserTM
- Cross linking can further enhance the security provided by InMobileTM, InBrowserTM, and/or cross linking described herein.
- These systems include the InRiskTM system that can analyze collected data and apply unique and customizable rules to identify risk(s) in real time and to improve analytics.
- InAuthenticateTM can securely deliver two-factor authentication messages to a registered device through the InAuth Trusted PathTM.
- InExchangeTM is a device reputation network that can enable decision capability and may stop fraudulent activity before it occurs by leveraging the experience of other users.
- InMarketTM system can provide enhanced device recognition for businesses, helping identify online customers that are "in market" products and services of a particular business.
- a bank provides two communication channels: an online banking website; and an on-line banking mobile application.
- a user signs up for both channels.
- an unauthorized entity a person, a business entity, a software program, etc.
- the unauthorized entity By masquerading as the user, the unauthorized entity successfully registers its own unauthorized device for web-based online banking. Unbeknownst to the user, the unauthorized entity may thus gain the ability to perform online banking operations using the entity's device.
- InBrowserTM automatically collects information from a device attempting or performing communication with the website and identifies the unauthorized entity's device as a mobile device.
- the bank would notice that the authorized user registered one mobile device for mobile online banking, but a different mobile device for web-based online banking. The bank can then raise a risk flag and investigate whether the different device is indeed another device used by the authorized user or an unauthorized device.
- a merchant deploys a mobile app that allows a user to view a catalog and purchase products.
- the merchant architects the application as a hybrid.
- the merchant develops portions of the application using native software technology on the user's mobile device (e.g., AndroidTM, iOSTM, or other operating systems).
- the merchant implements other portions of the application using a Webroot object that queries the merchant's website and populates the mobile screen with the website's contents.
- the merchant protects the mobile app using InMobileTM and the website application using InBrowserTM. Since the mobile app is hybrid, in various embodiments cross-channel device binding links the InMobileTM InPermIDTM to webroot's InBrowserIDTM.
- the merchant would generally face an increased risk that malicious entity (e.g., a person, a business entity, a software program, etc.) would inject itself into the midst of the hybrid application.
- malicious entity e.g., a person, a business entity, a software program, etc.
- Such an entity may have unauthorized access to the user's and/or merchant's information.
- such an entity may provide information not supplied and/or authorized by the merchant to the user.
- a user has an online banking account which is accessible with a web browser.
- the user wishes to sign up for mobile banking.
- the user downloads the mobile banking application and wishes to onboard securely.
- the user wants to associate his or her mobile banking application with the same (or linked) account as was used for browser-based on-line banking.
- the user does not want another unauthorized user to link the unauthorized user's mobile banking application with the user's account.
- the user opens the mobile banking application, and the mobile banking application initiates the registration sequence.
- the result of the registration sequence is that the mobile application's InPermID is registered with a corresponding server.
- the registration aspect of the mobile banking application is a hybrid app that invokes a browser (e.g., a browser on the user's device, such as the default browser or webroot). 1) When the hybrid mobile application opens the browser, the corresponding server obtains the InBrowserID. Additionally, according to some embodiments of cross-channel device binding, a SessionID is generated and used to link the InBrowserID with the InPermID, as described above. 2) Next, the user logs in to the browser-based online banking using the online banking credentials, e.g., userid/password. Once the user is logged into the browser-based online channel, the online banking server can determine that the user has a properly vetted identity.
- a browser e.g., a browser on the user's device, such as the default browser or webroot.
- the online banking server may also determine that the user's browser is under the user's control. Using cross-channel device binding, the online banking server determines that the mobile application is also under the user's control. 3) Therefore, the server may complete the onboarding of the mobile application. The server completes this step by associating the InPermID of the mobile application with the user's ID. At this point the same userid (or linked userid) is associated with both the InBrowserlD and the InPermID of the device.
- the user may subsequently use the mobile application without needing to execute the registration sequence because the bank server can determine that the device is under the control of the user.
- the bank server can determine that the device is under the control of the user.
- the next time that the user opens the mobile banking application the user need not enter the browser-based online banking credentials. Instead, the user may only need to enter the mobile-based credentials, even though, the browser-based credentials and the mobile-based credentials may be different.
- the disclosed methods, devices, and systems can be deployed on convenient processor platforms, including network servers, personal and portable computers, and/or other processing platforms. Other platforms can be contemplated as processing capabilities improve, including personal digital assistants, computerized watches, cellular phones and/or other portable devices.
- the disclosed methods and systems can be integrated with known network management systems and methods.
- the disclosed methods and systems can operate as an SNMP agent, and can be configured with the IP address of a remote machine running a conformant management platform. Therefore, the scope of the disclosed methods and systems are not limited by the examples given herein, but can include the full scope of the claims and their legal equivalents.
- the methods, devices, and systems described herein are not limited to a particular hardware or software configuration, and may find applicability in many computing or processing environments.
- the methods, devices, and systems can be implemented in hardware or software, or a combination of hardware and software.
- the methods, devices, and systems can be implemented in one or more computer programs, where a computer program can be understood to include one or more processor executable instructions.
- the computer program(s) can execute on one or more programmable processing elements or machines, and can be stored on one or more storage medium readable by the processor (including volatile and non-volatile memory and/or storage elements), one or more input devices, and/or one or more output devices.
- the processing elements/machines thus can access one or more input devices to obtain input data, and can access one or more output devices to communicate output data.
- the input and/or output devices can include one or more of the following: Random Access Memory (RAM), Redundant Array of Independent Disks (RAID), floppy drive, CD, DVD, magnetic disk, internal hard drive, external hard drive, memory stick, or other storage device capable of being accessed by a processing element as provided herein, where such aforementioned examples are not exhaustive, and are for illustration and not limitation.
- RAM Random Access Memory
- RAID Redundant Array of Independent Disks
- floppy drive CD, DVD, magnetic disk, internal hard drive, external hard drive, memory stick, or other storage device capable of being accessed by a processing element as provided herein, where such aforementioned examples are not exhaustive, and are for illustration and not limitation.
- the computer program(s) can be implemented using one or more high level procedural or object-oriented programming languages to communicate with a computer system; however, the program(s) can be implemented in assembly or machine language, if desired.
- the language can be compiled or interpreted.
- the processor(s) and/or processing elements can thus be embedded in one or more devices that can be operated independently or together in a networked environment, where the network can include, for example, a Local Area Network (LAN), wide area network (WAN), and/or can include an intranet and/or the Internet and/or another network.
- the network(s) can be wired or wireless or a combination thereof and can use one or more communication protocols to facilitate communication between the different processors/processing elements.
- the processors can be configured for distributed processing and can utilize, in some embodiments, a client-server model as needed. Accordingly, the methods, devices, and systems can utilize multiple processors and/or processor devices, and the processor/ processing element instructions can be divided amongst such single or multiple processor/devices/ processing elements.
- the device(s) or computer systems that integrate with the processor(s)/ processing element(s) can include, for example, a personal computer(s), workstation (e.g., Dell, HP), personal digital assistant (PDA), handheld device such as cellular telephone, laptop, handheld, or another device capable of being integrated with a processor(s) that can operate as provided herein. Accordingly, the devices provided herein are not exhaustive and are provided for illustration and not limitation.
- references to "a processor”, or “a processing element,” “the processor,” and “the processing element” can be understood to include one or more microprocessors that can communicate in a stand-alone and/or a distributed environment(s), and can thus can be configured to communicate via wired or wireless communication with other processors, where such one or more processor can be configured to operate on one or more processor/ processing elements-controlled devices that can be similar or different devices.
- Use of such "microprocessor,” “processor,” or “processing element” terminology can thus also be understood to include a central processing unit, an arithmetic logic unit, an application-specific integrated circuit (IC), and/or a task engine, with such examples provided for illustration and not limitation.
- references to memory can include one or more processor-readable and accessible memory elements and/or components that can be internal to the processor-controlled device, external to the processor-controlled device, and/or can be accessed via a wired or wireless network using a variety of communication protocols, and unless otherwise specified, can be arranged to include a combination of external and internal memory devices, where such memory can be contiguous and/or partitioned based on the application.
- the memory can be a flash drive, a computer disc, CD/DVD, distributed memory, etc.
- References to structures include links, queues, graphs, trees, and such structures are provided for illustration and not limitation. References herein to instructions or executable instructions, in accordance with the above, can be understood to include programmable hardware.
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Claims (14)
- Verfahren zum Ermöglichen von sicherem Informationsaustausch, wobei das Verfahren die folgenden Schritte umfasst:Empfangen, von einer autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302), an einem ersten Server (334), einer ersten Verbindungsanforderung entsprechend einem ersten Kommunikationskanal, umfassend eine Verbindung zwischen einer ersten Applikation (324), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302) installiert ist, und dem ersten Server (334), wobei die erste Verbindungsanforderung eine Sitzungskennung umfasst, die durch die autorisierte Benutzervorrichtung (302) erzeugt wird;Erhalten einer ersten Vorrichtungskennung, zugeordnet zur autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302), zur Identifizierung davon während einer Kommunikation über den ersten Kommunikationskanal, wobei die autorisierte Benutzervorrichtung mit einem autorisierten Benutzer verknüpft ist;Empfangen, am ersten Server, von einem zweiten Server (352), einer zweiten Verbindungsanforderung entsprechend einem zweiten Kommunikationskanal, umfassend eine Verbindung zwischen einer zweiten Applikation (342), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302) installiert ist, und dem zweiten Server (352), wobei die zweite Verbindungsanforderung eine zweite Vorrichtungskennung, zugeordnet zur autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung, zur Identifizierung davon während einer Kommunikation über den zweiten Kommunikationskanal umfasst;Bestimmen, dass die zweite Verbindungsanforderung die Sitzungskennung umfasst, die in der ersten Verbindungsanforderung enthalten war; undVerbinden, durch den ersten Server, der ersten und der zweiten Vorrichtungskennung mit der Sitzungskennung.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei:die erste Applikation (324) eine mobile Applikation umfasst, die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, und der erste Server (334) einen Applikationsserver umfasst; unddie zweite Applikation (342) einen Browser umfasst, der auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, und der zweite Server (352) einen Webserver umfasst.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder Anspruch 2, wobei der erste Server (334) zumindest einen aus einem Applikationsserver, einem Webserver und einem ersten Vorrichtungsidentifizierungsserver umfasst.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, Anspruch 2 oder Anspruch 3, wobei der zweite Server (352) zumindest einen aus einem Webserver, einem Applikationsserver und einem zweiten Vorrichtungsidentifizierungsserver umfasst.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder einem der Ansprüche 2 bis 4, das ferner Folgendes umfasst:
Senden, über einen sicheren Pfad, von zumindest einer aus der ersten Vorrichtungskennung und der zweiten Vorrichtungskennung durch den ersten Server an den zweiten Server. - Verfahren zum Ermöglichen von sicherem Informationsaustausch, wobei das Verfahren die folgenden Schritte umfasst:auf einer Benutzervorrichtung (302), in Reaktion auf Benutzeraufruf einer ersten Applikation (324), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, in Verbindung mit dem ersten Kommunikationskanal, der die erste Applikation mit einem ersten Server (334) verbindet, Erzeugen, durch eine Verbindungskomponente (312), einer Sitzungskennung;Kommunizieren, durch die erste Applikation (324), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, der Sitzungskennung an den ersten Server (334) über den ersten Kommunikationskanal;Bereitstellen der Sitzungskennung für eine zweite Applikation (342), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, ausgelegt zum Kommunizieren mit einem zweiten Server (352) über einen zweiten Kommunikationskanal, der die zweite Applikation (342), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, mit dem zweiten Server (352) verbindet, und zum Senden der Sitzungskennung an den zweiten Server; undAufrufen der zweiten Applikation (342), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 6, wobei der Aufrufschritt in Reaktion auf Benutzerbeendigung der ersten Applikation (324), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, automatisch ausgeführt wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 6 oder Anspruch 7, ferner umfassend Anzeigen einer Nachricht durch die zweite Applikation (342), die auf der Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist.
- System zum Ermöglichen von sicherem Informationsaustausch, das Folgendes umfasst:eine Verarbeitungseinheit, umfassend einen ersten Prozessor, wobei die Verarbeitungseinheit als ein erster Server (334) programmierbar ist; undein Speichermodul, umfassend einen ersten Speicher, wobei die Verarbeitungseinheit in Kommunikation mit dem Speichermodul ist und der erste Speicher in Kommunikation mit dem ersten Prozessor ist, wobei der erste Speicher Anweisungen umfasst, die, wenn sie durch die Verarbeitungseinheit ausgeführt werden, die Verarbeitungseinheit als einen ersten Server (334) programmieren:Empfangen, von einer autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302), einer ersten Verbindungsanforderung entsprechend einem ersten Kommunikationskanal, umfassend eine Verbindung zwischen einer ersten Applikation (324), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302) installiert ist, und dem ersten Server (334), wobei die erste Verbindungsanforderung eine Sitzungskennung umfasst, die durch die autorisierte Benutzervorrichtung (302) erzeugt wird;Erhalten einer ersten Vorrichtungskennung, zugeordnet zur autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302), zur Identifizierung davon während einer Kommunikation über den ersten Kommunikationskanal, wobei die autorisierte Benutzervorrichtung mit einem autorisierten Benutzer verknüpft ist;Empfangen, von einem zweiten Server (352), einer zweiten Verbindungsanforderung entsprechend einem zweiten Kommunikationskanal, umfassend eine Verbindung zwischen einer zweiten Applikation (342), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung (302) installiert ist, und dem zweiten Server (352), wobei die zweite Verbindungsanforderung eine zweite Vorrichtungskennung, zugeordnet zur autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung, zur Identifizierung davon während einer Kommunikation über den zweiten Kommunikationskanal umfasst;Bestimmen, dass die zweite Verbindungsanforderung die Sitzungskennung umfasst, die in der ersten Verbindungsanforderung enthalten war; undVerbinden der ersten und der zweiten Vorrichtungskennung mit der Sitzungskennung.
- System nach Anspruch 9, wobei:die erste Applikation (324) eine mobile Applikation umfasst, die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, und der erste Server (334) einen Applikationsserver umfasst; unddie zweite Applikation (342) einen Browser umfasst, der auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, und der zweite Server (352) einen Webserver umfasst.
- System nach Anspruch 9, wobei der zweite Server (352) zumindest einen aus einem Applikationsserver, einem Webserver und einem ersten Vorrichtungsidentifizierungsserver umfasst.
- System nach Anspruch 9, Anspruch 10 oder Anspruch 11, wobei die Anweisungen die Verarbeitungseinheit programmieren zum: Senden, über einen sicheren Pfad, von zumindest einer aus der ersten Vorrichtungskennung und der zweiten Vorrichtungskennung an den zweiten Server.
- System zum Ermöglichen von sicherem Informationsaustausch, das Folgendes umfasst:eine autorisierte Benutzervorrichtung (302), umfassend eine Verarbeitungseinheit und ein Speichermodul;wobei die Verarbeitungseinheit einen ersten Prozessor umfasst; und wobei das Speichermodul einen ersten Speicher umfasst, wobei die Verarbeitungseinheit in Kommunikation mit dem Speichermodul ist und der erste Speicher in Kommunikation mit dem ersten Prozessor ist, wobei der erste Speicher Anweisungen umfasst, die, wenn sie durch die Verarbeitungseinheit ausgeführt werden, die Verarbeitungseinheit programmieren zum:Arbeiten, zumindest teilweise, als eine Verbindungskomponente (312) und Erzeugen einer Sitzungskennung in Reaktion auf Benutzeraufruf einer ersten Applikation (324), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, verbunden mit einem ersten Kommunikationskanal, der die erste Applikation, die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, mit einem ersten Server (334) verbindet;Auslegen der ersten Applikation (324), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, zum Kommunizieren der Sitzungskennung an den ersten Server (334) über den ersten Kommunikationskanal;Bereitstellen der Sitzungskennung für eine zweite Applikation (342), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, ausgelegt zum Kommunizieren mit einem zweiten Server (352) über einen zweiten Kommunikationskanal, der die zweite Applikation, die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, mit dem zweiten Server (352) verbindet, und zum Senden der Sitzungskennung an den zweiten Server; undAufrufen der zweiten Applikation (342), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist.
- System nach Anspruch 13, wobei die Anweisungen die Verarbeitungseinheit programmieren, um die zweite Applikation (342), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, in Reaktion auf Benutzerbeendigung der ersten Applikation (324), die auf der autorisierten Benutzervorrichtung installiert ist, automatisch aufzurufen.
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- 2016-11-23 EP EP16810557.5A patent/EP3381166B1/de active Active
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EP3381166A1 (de) | 2018-10-03 |
US20170149777A1 (en) | 2017-05-25 |
US10826901B2 (en) | 2020-11-03 |
WO2017091672A1 (en) | 2017-06-01 |
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