EP3312073A1 - Procédé de contrôle d'un système ferroviaire et système ferroviaire - Google Patents
Procédé de contrôle d'un système ferroviaire et système ferroviaire Download PDFInfo
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- EP3312073A1 EP3312073A1 EP16195110.8A EP16195110A EP3312073A1 EP 3312073 A1 EP3312073 A1 EP 3312073A1 EP 16195110 A EP16195110 A EP 16195110A EP 3312073 A1 EP3312073 A1 EP 3312073A1
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/60—Testing or simulation
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for testing a railway system or parts thereof and to a railway system operating according to this method.
- Control-technical or safety-related units that fulfill defined tasks are normally electronically controllable, with process variables occurring when the corresponding tasks are performed or when the corresponding processes expire, such as the attributes mentioned when constructing or dismantling a route.
- the process variables are accessible via interfaces, possibly air interfaces.
- WO2010148528A1 Is known to replace existing interlockings with electronic interlockings, wherein the switching logic of the existing interlocking is mapped by means of a transformation to a functionally equivalent circuit of semiconductor electronic components, and the outputs of this circuit are connected to at least some of the installed components to be controlled.
- Processes for operating, securing and testing existing railway systems are therefore also mostly adapted to the installed process control units, such as interlockings, which have a different level of technology and can be supplied by different manufacturers. Control and testing of the facility functions are therefore at a low level with relatively high effort. Statements on superordinate operational processes, and in particular on changes in superordinate processes that could be used for preventive measures or for planning the necessary expansion of the rail system, are therefore missing.
- a train control system based on ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) and ETCS (European Train Control System) Level 2 with a RBC (Radio Block Center) is eg in [4], EP1897781A2 , described.
- the RBC which is connected to an interlocking, is used to guide vehicles on a certain stretch of section by means of wireless connections via the GSM-R (Global System for Mobile Communication Railways) mobile radio network.
- GSM-R Global System for Mobile Communication Railways
- the ETCS realizes the safe functions of train control.
- GSM-R enables data transmission between vehicles and the RBC. For example, Position messages of the vehicle are sent to the RBC and driving permissions to the vehicle.
- the mission data can be updated whenever contacts are made to the selectively installed Eurobalises.
- EP2631152B1 discloses scheduling functions, ie a method for the management of mobile terminals provided with resources, in particular of locomotives, which operate in a rail network and are each registerable by a mobile terminal to a cellular mobile network, which provided for the operation of the railway network functions, such as functional registration of participants, provides.
- the train run data of trains are monitored and change messages are generated for status changes of the trains.
- the radio cells are sent by means of requests to the mobile network or inquiries to the appropriate ones Mobile terminals are determined where the resources listed in the candidate list are located. Based on the detected radio cells, it is determined whether the resources are at the operating point of arrival and resources that do not belong to any radio cell of this operating point are removed from the candidate list.
- EP2868547A1 discloses, for example, an interlocking for controlling decentralized functional units, which are connected via communication channels with the process control system, comprising a number of computer-aided control units, the control units are connected in series or in parallel according to a control plan and receive and / or output control data according to this control plan , As a computerized control units mobile devices can be used.
- Documents [1] to [8] describe railway systems and subsystems of planning, scheduling and control technology that fulfill different functions and generate a large number of signals and messages.
- the present invention is therefore based on the object of specifying an improved method for testing a railway system and a railway system operating according to this method.
- the method according to the invention should make it possible to efficiently use the information present in the railway system in order to gain insights that are particularly valuable for the maintenance and expansion of the railway system are. Furthermore, already existing control systems should be monitored and secured.
- the check should be automatically feasible and scalable.
- the operator of the railway system should also be able to adapt the subject matter of the test optionally.
- the examination of the rail system should be possible at different levels of the rail system.
- the width and depth of the test should therefore be selectively adjustable.
- the method should provide test results that allow the performance and changes in the railway system to be identified in order to be able to initiate necessary corrective measures in the long term.
- Necessary corrective measures should be able to be derived directly from the information determined according to the invention, preferably taking into account further data sources, in particular master data of the railway system.
- the method according to the invention should be able to be carried out in parallel with existing test methods and supplement, verify or replace them on a case-by-case basis.
- the inventive method should be implemented with little effort in parts of the railway network and possibly extended to the entire railway system.
- the method is intended to include any operating processes, e.g. serve the performance, security or disposition, can optionally check
- the method is used to test a railway system or parts thereof.
- the railway system comprises resources of a structural infrastructure, in particular a rail network, vehicle resources, resources of a control technology and resources of a safety technology, which are used by at least a control system based on operating rules and operating methods are used by means of which defined operating processes are implemented on a case by case, the process data, such as input variables, output variables and operating variables, are assigned.
- operating processes implemented during the operation of the railway system are identified and process results of the identified operating processes from the railway system are recorded and compared with reference data in a test computer in order to check the course of the identified operating processes.
- individual operating processes are thus identified, which usually consist of several sub-processes.
- at least one sub-process or the entire operating process is tested. For example, a train journey from an operating point A to an operating point B is checked. If necessary, measures to safeguard the driving distance with following protection, driving safety, flank protection, securing movable infrastructure elements, protection at level crossings, protection against external objects (clearance monitoring), speed monitoring (train control) monitored. For example, the clear messages and the positions of the holding signals are checked for the block sections of the route. This check can be performed redundantly to existing backup procedures to verify them. On the basis of the method, however, it is also possible to carry out extensive tests involving larger track sections or higher-level system parts. If the operating points A and B are far from each other and e.g. By separate operating points are separated higher-level information can be determined, which relate in particular to the performance of the railway system and the disposition of vehicles.
- the method according to the invention can also take place with the involvement of a plurality of test computers which test processes independently of one another or which fulfill different tasks when testing a process.
- a first test computer can check registered feed data.
- a second test computer can check the vehicles and their condition.
- a third test computer can check safety aspects.
- a fourth test computer can consolidate the data obtained and initiate necessary measures.
- process data are provided in particular by the planning technology, control technology or security technology.
- identification data are formed by means of which operating processes can be identified, selected and checked.
- the test computer or the test process came here selectively, selectively or randomly to access and verify business processes.
- the operator of the rail system may also specify which types of operating processes should be prioritized. It can also be determined which process parameters or process results of a particular process should be tested.
- test is possible depending on the time.
- it is possible to check events and conditions for certain time windows for which certain regulations or regulations have been made or in which different loads of the railway system occur.
- the completeness and plausibility of the determined data and / or the registered events are preferably also checked.
- event messages have a correct time sequence or exist in a specific sequence. For example, a barrier should be closed before the passage of a train and not in hindsight. If the closure of the barrier is reported after the passage of the train, an error message is again issued.
- the examination of the railway system is not limited to the isolated monitoring of individual trains and their associated processes, but can also monitor several parallel operating processes, in particular different train movements, which should run independently or separately from each other safety.
- the train data train network are monitored to detect hazards or compaction potential.
- test computer planned Operating processes and changes thereof as well as internal influencing variables, such as fault messages, and external influencing variables reported. It is thus possible, for example, to monitor train journeys in the area of temporary construction sites, eg compliance with reduced maximum speeds.
- the test procedure has a high degree of flexibility and can be adapted to any task with little effort. If all construction sites in the railway system are registered in a higher-level computer, eg a maintenance computer, the relevant data can be loaded from this maintenance computer and operating processes or train journeys in the area of selected construction sites can be checked and evaluated.
- test computer or the test process carries out the testing of the railway system while it is in normal operation. There are therefore no special measures to be taken to carry out the tests. Operating processes that are integrated in the daily operation of the railway system and that normally run on schedule are optionally identified, selected and checked.
- the testing processes are completely separate from the operating processes. That is, there are no repercussions from the test computer on the railway system. In further preferred embodiments, repercussions are allowed for parts of the railway system and e.g. Excluded only for safety technology. In particularly preferred embodiments, however, the examination process can additionally intervene in the safety technology.
- Safety conditions can be defined which must be met by the safety technology and monitored by the test process or test computer.
- the master data are also checked. If a mismatch between the master data of the railway system and the process results is determined, the corresponding master data is preferably checked.
- the test system can work in the background and detect system failures in any area of the railroad system.
- control system of the railroad system that controls the selectable operating process sends an identification and all associated process parameters to the test computer prior to implementation so that it can derive the reference data therefrom and monitor and test the selected operating process.
- appropriate data for all operating processes can be stored as test cases or reference cases at the test computer.
- test computer identifies operational processes of interest and provides the reference data required for the test.
- Status data are stored in the checked resources, in particular the process control units, which can be queried directly by the test computer, or which are buffered by a control device and can be queried by the latter. Status data can also be queried multiple times to track changes that are triggered by the operating process.
- reference data are formed. This can be done in different ways. For example, the changes or process results that an implemented operating process causes are registered. The registered process results will subsequently serve as a reference case for others used similar operating processes. Assuming that the part of the railway system in question functions properly, the test computer can thus register operating processes and / or corresponding process data and store them in a database as a reference case. The corresponding reference data, eg the determined process data or process variables, which are preferably associated with time specifications, can subsequently be used for checking this or the same operating processes. If, for example, the railway system has a certain number of identically designed, star-shaped, diverging routes, a reference case can be registered and used for all identical routes.
- the railway system is analytically divided into parts, which are subsequently classified into groups in which the same or similar parts are provided. Parts of a group may also be assigned, e.g. in one parameter, whereby the different parameter is registered. For example, two distances differ only by the distance between two points or signals. If the test process knows these different parameters, it can take into account the resulting time delays in the test. For different groups of operating processes, it is therefore possible to provide the corresponding reference data with reduced effort. These measures are particularly effective in railway systems made up of largely similar modules. For the similar modules also the generic descriptions can be provided with reduced effort. In the application, after identification of an operating process, it is thus preferably determined whether it belongs to a group for which reference data have already been provided.
- the test computer uses the infrastructure data to determine, for example, which control-technical units are available and how they are used by definition and preferably uses their generic description. For example, is checked for the construction and dismantling of a secured road, which control units, e.g. Switches or signals in which order of time must be served. It also checks which input signals and output signals are assigned to these process control units.
- the corresponding generic descriptions of the process control units are therefore linked to a reference process.
- process data i. Set process variables, and preferably set the timing within which these target process variables occur.
- the reference data can therefore define desired processes or reference processes and / or desired process variables or reference variables, which are compared with the processes being tested or with the process results.
- the reference data can therefore consist of individual or linked rules of a generic reference system.
- Corresponding desired process variables may e.g. from tables, flowcharts or state event charts.
- process data of this operating process and preferably associated vehicle data and / or infrastructure data are provided which can be optionally retrieved by the test computer.
- the test computer identifies individual operating processes. For identified operating processes, reference data that are already required for the check can be available, which are retrieved from a database after the identification of the operating process. Alternatively, reference data for the selected operating process are determined based on process data and operational rules.
- the process data used to provide reference data in this way is usually larger than the process data used to identify an operational process.
- Process data used for the identification on the one hand and the provision of reference data on the other hand can also form an intersection.
- the exam may take into account the nature of the Train traffic, such as the presence of passenger transport, freight, shunting, etc., to be performed.
- the vehicle data On the basis of the train run data, the vehicle data, in particular the train configurations and the traveled infrastructure, operating processes can be predicted and corresponding reference data can be created taking into account the operating rules.
- Process results essentially consist of process data or are formed from data that can be retrieved from control technology, safety technology, train control or vehicle technology. Process results therefore describe the states or state changes of elements, in particular process control units, which are the subject of the tested operating process.
- the compatibility of the reference data with the tested operating process is not given, the cause of the error is analyzed and a correction made. For example, an adjustment or supplement to the company rules is made. In this way, the examination system can be steadily improved.
- Expected values are preferably determined from the respectively acquired test results so that deviations of a currently tested operating process from the expected values can be determined.
- data in particular event data
- group new events are to be assigned.
- For a first group e.g. no follow-up measures planned.
- For a second group data is forwarded for review.
- For a third group an alarm is triggered.
- For a fourth group e.g. Correctly intervened in the railway system.
- continuous changes of test results for repeatedly implemented and tested operating processes can be determined.
- the operator of the railway system thus has a "sensor" by means of which changes, bottlenecks and overloads can be detected early on and any necessary corrective measures can be evaluated and initiated.
- Fig. 1 shows the schematic structure of a railway system 100 according to the invention in a preferred embodiment, with at least one suitable for performing the inventive method test computer 1, which is connected to one or more distributed databases 11, 12, ..., 14, in which on the one hand for the test stored reference cases and operational rules and on the other hand test results are stored.
- Fig. 1 covers the basic components of a railway system, namely 'rolling stock', 'structural infrastructure' and 'control and safety technology', which are shown in [6], page 5, as abutting triangles enclosing another triangle representing the operating procedures and the Interaction of vehicles, building infrastructure as well as control and safety technology symbolizes.
- Fig. 1 shows a module 3 for the control technology, a module 5 for the security technology and an intermediate module 4 for the processing of data that occur in the control system 3 or in the security technology 5 or supplied from the outside. Further modules 2 and 6 represent the planning technology and scheduling as well as the vehicles 9 and the infrastructure 8.
- a system computer 1000 is provided, which can preferably communicate with all modules 1-9 directly or indirectly, without bidirectional or bidirectional, in order to collect data or act on the railroad system 100.
- this system computer 1000 can be integrated into the module control system 3 and / or comprise the module data transfer / data processing 4.
- the system computer 1000 can access further computer systems 1001, 1002,..., In order to obtain required data, in particular data of external influencing variables, such as weather data and Climatic data, retrieve or store determined data that are used for example for the billing of services or the maintenance of the railway system 100.
- the symbolically shown system computer 1000 may preferably also exchange data directly or indirectly with the test computer 1, so that the test computer 1 preferably has all the data of the railway system 100 available and preferably data determined by the test computer 1 and possibly control commands and / or alarms to the railway system 100 can be supplied centrally or selectively.
- the system computer 1000 can exchange data with a test vehicle 1003, which operates on the rail network of the railroad system 100. These data can also be queried by the system computer 1000 to the test computer 1 or by the test computer 1 directly from the test vehicle 1003.
- the communication between the modules 1-9 and 1000, 1001, 1002, 1003 can be wireless or wired, circuit-switched or packet-switched.
- the modules "Planning” and “Disposition” are e.g. in [7].
- train run data are relevant for checking operating processes which relate to local shifts of vehicles.
- the train run data of trains is preferably provided by a management unit which monitors train movements and receives from a scheduler plan data of the train run and of the control system feedback of the actual train run, such as data of the entrance and exit of trains in a route block of an operating point.
- the test computer 1 can query from the modules 2-9, 1000, ... static and dynamic information and data. Data of the control system 3 and the security technology 5 can be queried via the module data processing 4. Planning data, in particular timetable data, and possibly scheduling data are supplied by module 2. External process variables are supplied, for example, by the system computer 1000.
- the test computer 1 preferably automatically determines two types of information and data from the railway system 100.
- process data i. Data and information about operating processes are retrieved from modules 2-9, 1000 that are being implemented or have already been implemented.
- the test computer can identify and select operating processes. From the timetable data, the test computer 1 may e.g. determine that a train leaves operating point A at 10:00 and transfers it to operating point B. The overall process for this shift or sub-processes thereof, the test computer 1 of a monitoring and testing. It is also possible to use the train departure message from operating point A as an incentive to monitor and test the appropriate operating process.
- the text computer 1 can also retrieve process results from the modules 2-9, 1000 in order to compare them with reference data.
- process results are typically status information or status change information for process elements or functional elements of the railroad system 100, such as control engineering or safety units involved in the local train movement process from A to B.
- Messages about status changes of the process elements concerned can be transmitted directly or indirectly to the test computer 1 via the various wired or wireless communication channels of the railway system.
- [8] discloses an interlocking for controlling decentralized functional units connected to the process control equipment via communication channels, comprising a number of computerized control units, the control units being connected in series or in parallel according to a control plan and receiving and / or controlling data according to this control scheme output.
- As a computer-based control units mobile devices are used.
- the method according to the invention can be used particularly easily in a railroad system according to [8] since process data, referred to as control data in [8], can be transmitted directly to the test computer 1 via a communication channel.
- the communication can be over GSM communication network, such as GSM-R or LTE, or via a packet-switched network, such as the Internet are transmitted to the test computer 1, which is equipped with the appropriate communication devices and communication addresses.
- the test computer 1 can thus identify and select individual operating processes on the basis of static and dynamic process data. For selected operating processes, the test computer 1 can retrieve corresponding process results, typically dynamic process data, from the railway system and use any communication channels for this purpose.
- reference data is provided, which is compared with the process results.
- Reference data can be determined in different ways.
- the sequence of operating processes can be monitored and the process results can be stored as reference data.
- the control device of the railway system which controls the selectable operating process, can send identification data and associated process parameters to the test computer 1 before implementation so that the latter can derive and store the reference data therefrom.
- the test computer 1 can also identify operational processes and generate reference data based on operational rules and the use of process data, as described above.
- FIG. 2 shows a flow diagram for a test process TP according to the invention, on the basis of which the at least one test computer 1 in the railway system 100 of FIG Fig. 1 identifies implementable operational processes, identifies corresponding reference data and process results and compares them with each other.
- the test process TP or the test method comprises a plurality of process steps S1,..., S7, some of which can be reversed or executed in parallel in the sequence.
- the test process TP is preferably run through repetitively in order to gain as much information about the railway system as possible.
- process data for the operating processes of the railroad system 100 are provided.
- the required process data can be collected and provided by the system computer 1000.
- process data can be queried directly from other modules 2-9 of the railroad system 100.
- Such process data such as timetable data, are present in known railway networks and are generated routinely and typically form input variables of the carried out operating processes.
- data specific to each process or data valid for all processes can be provided.
- Process data may relate to static or dynamic states of functional units in the railway network 100. Furthermore, process data may relate to planned and actual process events, which ideally coincide in time. Process data can also relate to information about already implemented operating processes. In contrast to process results, process data typically relates to process variables that occur during the initialization of the operating processes.
- process results mentioned in process step S52 are basically also process data which, however, relate to relevant results of the operating processes and typically occur toward the end of the process phases. Process results therefore form a special class of process data.
- identification data are determined for operating processes that are planned or already implemented.
- an operating process is identified and selected, which is to be subjected to a test.
- the selection can be done randomly.
- Operating processes of a timetable are sequentially recorded and checked.
- the identification process can be controlled so that e.g. various types of functions are subjected to a test.
- the control technology, the safety technology, the vehicle technology, the turnout technology, the signaling technology and / or the communication technology can be checked for a local shift of a train from A to B. That is, the input signals and output signals of functional units of these technical areas can be checked.
- the operator of the railway network 100 can also have business processes that are relevant to scheduling checked.
- process results are determined for the latter in process step S4 and process results in process step S5, which are compared with one another in process step S6.
- the determination of reference data in process step S4 can take place in various ways. Preferably, it is checked (process step S43) whether for this operating process in the database 12 reference data or a Reference case exists. In another preferred embodiment, it is checked (process step S42) whether the operating process belongs to a group of operating processes for which reference data or a reference case already exists. If there is no reference case yet, reference data are determined on the basis of operational rules from database 11, possibly with the inclusion of process data (process step S41). For example, data of the part of the infrastructure which is used by the operating process is consulted. From the infrastructure data, the involved process elements and their locations are determined. Based on the operational rules, it is subsequently determined which status changes are to be expected for the process elements involved in the course of the operating process.
- the reference data determined for this operating process are stored in the database 12 and are available as a reference case if the same operating process is selected once more.
- the example mentioned process steps S41, S42, S43 and S44 can be used as alternatives or, as described, in combination with each other.
- process elements which are used in the implementation of the identified operating process are preferably determined on the basis of the identified operating process, taking into account process data.
- process elements such as control units, switches, signals, junctions, barriers, are used in the implementation of the operating process.
- Status changes during the course of the identified operating process are registered for these process elements and corresponding process results are formed. The query of status changes can only occur at certain times.
- address data are formed or loaded for the identified process elements, by means of which process results for e.g. can be queried by the control technology, the safety technology, the train control, the vehicle technology or directly from the process elements.
- the comparison results formed in the process step S6 are evaluated in the process step S7 to audit results for the audited Form operating process, which are preferably used as a basis for necessary actions.
- Examination results are stored in the database 14 and can be analyzed and statistically evaluated by means of the test computer 1 or further arithmetic units in order to identify errors, weaknesses and changes, in particular load changes of the railway network 100.
- previously determined examination results can also be read out of the database 14 and used.
- Comparison results and examination results are preferably stored in the database 14 in the context of primary actions. In the context of secondary actions, repercussions on the railroad system 100 are preferably triggered. In this case, errors can be signaled and alarms triggered. Furthermore, control signals can be issued with the appropriate priority. If, for example, a collision situation is detected on a route that has not been intercepted by the safety technology, then signals can be switched and the vehicles in question can possibly be activated in order to avoid a collision.
- Fig. 3 symbolically shows a part of the railway system 100 of Fig. 1 with process results that occur during the course of an operating process in which a train 9 passes through a track section 8 in the area of the railway safety technology 5 and the train control 7 and can be retrieved by the test computer 1.
- the shown part of the railway system 100 relates to a control circuit of the operational safety in rail traffic, as shown and described in [9], chapter 10.1.3, page 492, fig. 10.4.
- the track vacancy stands for the freedom of the track 8 from other rail vehicles.
- the clearance clear message stands for the freedom of the track 8 of non-system objects.
- the track section 8 When the track section 8 has been left by the previous train 9 ', the track section 8 is cleared. After processing the information, it may be necessary to issue a setting command in order to bring the movable track elements into the correct position, resulting in a read in of the position again. If the requirements are met, a move command can be issued. This leads to the acceleration of the vehicle 9, which can enter the track section 8. Compliance with the permissible speed is monitored by the train control 7.
- mobile devices can be used as computer-aided control units that transmit corresponding status changes to the test computer 1 via a mobile radio network.
- Fig. 4 shows the railway system 100 of Fig. 1 with a section 8, within which a route FS is created, with a schematically shown functional system, which exchanges input variables and output variables with neighboring systems and fulfills corresponding functions.
- pages 64-56 see Figure 29
- input and output play a special role in the demarcation of a functional system to be considered. It defines what the functional system has to perform (output) and what it does not do, but should take over from other systems (input). Who or what delivers these inputs is, in principle, irrelevant in a generic way. Therefore theoretically the indication of the neighboring systems could be omitted and the demarcation can be made solely by the information on the in- and outputs.
- functions s1, s2 are shown, which are not transmitted as output to a neighboring system but, for example, relate to a configuration change of the functional system.
- the signals Input x, y, z and Output o can in turn be transmitted to the test computer 1.
- operational rules can be defined that describe the behavior of the functional system, which represents a process element, at the end of the operating process. After the process element in question has been identified for an operating process, the expected behavior of this process element and corresponding reference data can thus be determined. Likewise, the actual behavior of this process element can be detected in the sequence with corresponding process results. Processes in the functional system shown basically form an operating process.
- test computer 1 can also be regarded as a neighboring system to which an output, namely status messages are transmitted.
- the functional systems such as the mobile terminals described in [8], preferably have an interface over which they can transmit data to the test computer 1.
- the functional system is part of a route section 8, in which, based on the identified operating process, a route FS is created and control-technical units, such as points W1, W2, are correspondingly activated.
- the route section 8 corresponds, for example, to the route section 8 of FIG Fig. 3 and is monitored and controlled accordingly. It is also possible to test shorter track sections, for example, the track section between the points W1 and W2, or selectively elements of the railway system 100th
- Fig. 5 shows the railway system 100 of Fig. 4 with the schematic representation of operating processes, of which a subprocess p, eg the functional system of Fig. 4 corresponds, was identified by the test computer 1, selected and checked. It is schematically shown that a plurality of operating processes can run parallel to one another or that an operating process can have a plurality of partial processes running parallel or serially to one another.
- the subprocess p is checked and process variables x, y, s and o are recorded as process results, by means of which the subprocess P is checked taking into account generic descriptions of the subprocess P or corresponding reference data.
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Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP16195110.8A EP3312073B1 (fr) | 2016-10-21 | 2016-10-21 | Procédé de contrôle d'un système ferroviaire et système ferroviaire |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP16195110.8A EP3312073B1 (fr) | 2016-10-21 | 2016-10-21 | Procédé de contrôle d'un système ferroviaire et système ferroviaire |
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Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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CN115335270A (zh) * | 2020-03-30 | 2022-11-11 | 西门子交通有限公司 | 用于运输工具中的数据管理的方法和*** |
WO2023247158A1 (fr) * | 2022-06-21 | 2023-12-28 | Siemens Mobility GmbH | Procédé et système de détermination de la consommation d'énergie d'un véhicule ferroviaire |
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CN115335270A (zh) * | 2020-03-30 | 2022-11-11 | 西门子交通有限公司 | 用于运输工具中的数据管理的方法和*** |
CN115335270B (zh) * | 2020-03-30 | 2024-01-26 | 西门子交通有限公司 | 用于运输工具中的数据管理的方法和*** |
WO2023247158A1 (fr) * | 2022-06-21 | 2023-12-28 | Siemens Mobility GmbH | Procédé et système de détermination de la consommation d'énergie d'un véhicule ferroviaire |
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EP3312073C0 (fr) | 2023-08-23 |
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