EP2893667A1 - Verfahren zur authentisierung eines portablen datenträgers - Google Patents
Verfahren zur authentisierung eines portablen datenträgersInfo
- Publication number
- EP2893667A1 EP2893667A1 EP13747354.2A EP13747354A EP2893667A1 EP 2893667 A1 EP2893667 A1 EP 2893667A1 EP 13747354 A EP13747354 A EP 13747354A EP 2893667 A1 EP2893667 A1 EP 2893667A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- key
- secret
- data carrier
- public
- ski
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
- H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
- H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/047—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] without using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0471—Key exchange
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/108—Source integrity
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for authenticating a portable data carrier in relation to a term device, a correspondingly set up portable data carrier, a correspondingly set up terminal device and a system consisting thereof.
- a portable data carrier for example in the form of an electronic identity document, comprises an integrated circuit with a processor and a memory.
- the memory typically stores data that provides information about the owner of the volume, such as the name of the owner.
- An authentication application can be executed on the processor, via which the data carrier can authenticate against a term device, in the case of an identification document, for example, at a border control or the like.
- a secure data confor- mation between the data carrier and the term device is prepared by agreeing a secret communication key for the symmetric encryption of a subsequent data communication, for example by means of the known Diffie and Hellman key exchange method or other suitable methods. Furthermore, as a rule, at least the terrestrial device verifies the authenticity of the data carrier, for example by means of a certificate.
- both the terminal and the data carrier each have a secret key and a public key Provide key.
- the certificate of the volume may affect its public key.
- each volume of a set or group of volumes is personalized with an individual key pair consisting of a public key and a secret key, problems arise with regard to the anonymity of the owner of the volume. It would then be possible to uniquely assign each use of the data carrier to the corresponding owner on the basis of the individual public key, thus creating, for example, a complete movement profile of the owner.
- WO2012 / 031681 describes an authentication method which preserves the anonymity of the owner of a data carrier and in which the compromising of one of the data carriers has no negative effects on the security of other data carriers.
- a public key and a secret key of the data carrier as well as a public session key and a secret session key of the term device are used.
- the volume uses a public group key as the public key.
- a secret key the volume uses a secret key derived from a secret group key associated with the public group key.
- the public key used is the public group key, which is not volume-specific, but is identical for all volumes in the group. In this regard, all volumes of a group are indistinguishable. Thus, the anonymity of the owner of the data carrier can be maintained.
- the attacker issuing the disk calculates the following values:
- PK0 A SKT an attacker can successfully portray himself as an authentic data carrier in relation to a terrestrial device without knowing the private group key SKO or a key derived therefrom, eg SKI.
- the object of the present invention is to ensure that the process described in WO 2012/031681 while retaining its advantages over the attack described above.
- the data carrier uses the public group key PKO as the public key and a key SKI as the secret key, which is derived from a secret group key SKO assigned to the public group key PKO using a derivation parameter RND1.
- the portable data carrier uses the secret group key SKO to generate a digital signature Sig (gl) of a data element gl required for the authentication, into which the derivation parameter RND1 flows.
- the secret key of the data carrier SKI is replaced by a secret key SKI "of the data carrier derived from the secret key. ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/> ⁇ br/>
- the secret key SKI" deriving from the secret key is preferably replaced by a first multiplication of the secret key.
- key SKI with another random number RND1 1 and a second multiplication with another random number RND1 "generated.
- the public group key PKO and the secret key SKI of the data carrier and the public session key PKT and the secret session key SKT of the term means a communication key KK between the data carrier and the Terrnmal raised agreed, preferably by means of a Diffie-Hellman ScM Kunststoffe.
- the Schnorr signature is used, into which the secret group key SKO flows.
- the secret key SKI is derived from the secret group key SKO using a first random number RND1.
- the public group key PKO is determined by exponentiation of a given prirnitivwurzel or base g with the secret group key SKO, the secret key SKI formed by multiplication of the secret group key SKO with a first random number RND1 and a derived base gl means of an exponentiation of the primitive root or Basis g formed with the reciprocal of the first random number RND1.
- the derived base gl of the term means is provided by the data carrier.
- the public session key PKT of the terminal device is determined by means of exponentiation of the derivative base gl provided by the data carrier with the secret session key SKT of the terrestrial device.
- a portable data carrier comprising a processor, a memory, and a data correspondence courier to a terminal device, the portable data medium adapted to authenticate to the terminal device using a public key PKO and a secret key SKI of the disk coming out of a public secret key PKO is derived using a derivation parameter RND1, and a public session key PKT and a secret session key SKT of the terrestrial device, wherein the portable data carrier is further configured to use the secret group key SKO a digital signature Sig (gl ) to generate a required for the authentication data element gl, in which the derivative parameter RND1 flows.
- a term means is provided which is set up to authenticate to a portable data carrier using a public key PKO and a secret key SKI of the data carrier which consists of a public group key PKO secret group key SKO using a Derivation parameter RND1 is derived, as well as a public session key PKT and a secret session key SKT the Termmal Vietnamese perform, the Termmal pain is adapted to check using the secret group key SKO a digital signature Sig (gl) of a data required for the authentication data gl, in that the derivative parameter RND1 flows into.
- the term means is adapted to determine its public key PKT using a derived base gl provided by the data carrier in combination with the secret session key SKT of the term means.
- FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing steps of a preferred embodiment of the method according to the invention for authenticating a data carrier
- Fig. 3 is a flow chart, the further steps of a preferred
- Embodiment of the inventive method for au- thentization of a data carrier with respect to a terminal device shows, and
- FIG. 4 shows a flow diagram which, according to a preferred embodiment, shows the steps made by the data carrier for authenticating in a further session with a terminal device.
- 1 shows a schematic representation of a preferred embodiment of a portable data carrier according to the invention in the form of a chip card 10.
- the chip card 10 is configured to exchange data with an external entity in the form of a termmarker 20.
- a data exchange can be described by the transmitter-receiver model known from information theory: data or information is encoded in characters and then transmitted from a transmitter to a receiver via a transmission channel.
- both the chip card 10 and the term device 20 have suitable communication interfaces 12 and 22.
- the interfaces 12 and 22 may, for example, be designed such that the communication between them or between the chip card 10 and the term device 20 is contactless, ie via the air interface, as indicated in FIG.
- the chip card 10 via the interface 12 galvanic, ie contact-related, with the interface 22 of the Termmal boots 20 are in communication.
- the interface 12 is usually designed as a contact field arranged on the chip card 10 with a plurality of contact surfaces for data exchange with the terminal device 20.
- the present invention also includes portable data carriers which both have an interface to the contact-type as well as an interface for contactless Koimnunikation with a terminal device and the Professional in the context of smart cards are known as dual-interface smart cards.
- the portable data carrier 10 in the form of a chip card comprises a central processing unit (CPU) in the form of a microprocessor 14 which is in communication with the interface 12 for communication with the term device 20 stands.
- the central tasks of the CPU or the microprocessor 14 include the execution of arithmetic and logic functions and the reading and writing of data, as defined by a computer program running on the microprocessor 14 in the form of machine instructions.
- a memory unit 16 which is in communication with the microprocessor 14 comprises, in particular, a volatile random access memory (RAM) for receiving the machine instructions of a computer program to be executed by the microprocessor 14.
- RAM volatile random access memory
- the memory unit 16 may comprise a nonvolatile, preferably rewritable memory in which data can be securely stored, which relate, inter alia, to the owner of the portable data carrier 10.
- the nonvolatile memory is a flash memory (flash EEPROM). This may be, for example, a flash memory with a NAND or a NOR architecture.
- the memory unit 16 may also comprise a read-only memory (ROM).
- ROM read-only memory
- a portable data carrier 10 according to the invention may have further electronic elements than those shown in FIG.
- the portable data carrier 10 could also have a memory management unit interacting with the microprocessor 14 for managing the memory unit 16, or the microprocessor 14 could have its own internal memory unit or a coprocessor for performing cryptographic calculations ,
- the portable data carrier 10 if it represents, for example, an electronic identity document, further features (not shown). These can be visibly applied to a surface of the portable data carrier 10, for example printed on it, and designate the holder of the data carrier, for example by its name or a photo.
- FIG. 2 shows preparatory steps. These can be carried out, for example, during the production of the data carrier 10, for example in a personalization phase.
- a secret group key SKO and a public group key PKO are formed as part of a public key infrastructure (PKI).
- PKI public key infrastructure
- the public group key PKO is calculated as the result of an exponentiation of a given base gO, which is also known to the person skilled in the art as a primitive root or generator, modulo a predetermined prime number p. All calculations described below are to be read modulo the prime number p, without this being always explicitly stated.
- the two keys SKO and PKO form a group key pair and provide the basis for the key architecture for a group of like volumes 10 described below.
- step S2 a certificate Cert (PK0) is formed, which serves for the verification of the public group key PKO.
- the data carrier 10 which represents a data carrier of a given group of data carriers, is equipped with a key pair.
- the public group key PKO serves the volume 10 as a public key.
- a secret key SKI of the data carrier 10 is randomized, ie using a random number RND1, from the derived secret group key SKO.
- each data carrier 10 of the group is equipped with a key pair, which differs from a corresponding key pair of another data carrier of the group-due to the randomized component in the key derivation-by respectively different secret keys SKI.
- all volumes 10 of the group comprise the same public key PKO.
- all secret keys of the group of volumes have been derived from the same secret group key SKO.
- a derived basis gl for the data carrier is calculated.
- the reciprocal 1 / RND1 of the random number RND1 forms the multiplicative inverse of the random number RND1 with respect to the multiplication modulo the prime number p and is also known in the art as RND1 -1 .
- a signature Sig (gl) of the derived base gl is created using the secret group key SKO.
- the Schnorr signature is used here.
- H stands for a suitable hash function and M
- r for the concatenation of the data element M to be signed with the value r g A k derived from the random number r.
- Schnorr signature as well as other signature methods suitable according to the invention, such as DSA, ElGamal and the like, can be found, for example, in section 11 and in particular section 11.5 of the book "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by A. Menezes, P. van Oorschot and S. Vanstone, 1997, to which reference is hereby incorporated by reference.
- the Schnorr signature preferred according to the present invention as the signature method
- the key SKI derived from the secret group key SKO and the public group key PKO are written in substep TS34 together with the derived base gl, the signature sig (gl) of the derived base g1, the original base g0 and the certificate Cert (PKO) in the memory unit 16 of the portable data carrier 10 is stored.
- the original base gO can be included in the certificate Cert (PKO).
- the Random number RND1 and secret group key SKO are not stored in the volume 10. This is set up to perform an authentication with respect to the termimaging device 20, as will be described in greater detail with reference to FIG.
- the portable data carrier 10 provides the terminal device 20 with the data necessary for mutual authentication.
- a communication key KK requires the term means 20 in the illustrated embodiment, the derived base gl and the public group key PKO.
- the signature device 20 provides the signature Sig (g1) of the derived base g1 created in substep TS33 and the original base g0.
- the terrestrial device 20 requires the corresponding certificate Cert (PKO).
- PKO certificate Cert
- the original base gO can also be integrated in such a chain or be part of the certificate Cert (PKO), for example, if it is a certificate according to the standard X.509. It is also possible that the data to be provided to the termmaker 20 in step S4 are stored in a freely readable memory area of the memory unit 16 of the portable data carrier 10 and are read out by the termmaker 20 if necessary.
- step S5 the terrestrial device 20 verifies by means of the digital signature Sig (gl) whether the derived base gl transmitted from the data carrier 10 corresponds to the base with which the signature Sig (gl) was originally created. that is.
- the teririnal device 20 is followed by the signature Sig (gl) being generated by means of a matching secret key has been, ie by means of the secret group key SK0 or a key derived therefrom, e.g. the key SK, as is the case with a preferred embodiment of the invention described in connection with FIG. 4 at subsequent sessions.
- step S6 the toll device 20 checks the certificate Cert (PKO) of the public group key PKO.
- This check of the certificate can alternatively also take place after the agreement of the communication key KK in step S8 and / or of the secret session key SKT in step S7.
- step S7 the toll device 20 prepares the authentication. It generates a secret session key SKT. This can be done, for example randomized, ie using a random number.
- a public session key PKT of the term device 20 calculates this by means of exponentiation of the derived base gl provided by the portable data carrier 10 with its own secret session
- PKT: gl A ST rj> he public session key PKT is provided to the portable volume 10 by the term means 20.
- step S8 the communication key KK is now concretely agreed between the terrrunal worn 20 and the portable data carrier 10.
- the data carrier 10 calculates this communication key KK by exponentiation of the public session key PKT of the term device 20 with its own derived secret key SKI:
- the Termmal acquired 20 calculates the communication key KK by exponentiation of the public group key PK0 with the secret session key SKT the Terrnmal pain 20:
- the portable data carrier 10 and the terrarium device 20 arrive at the same result, ie at the same key of the communication key KK, on the basis of the respective data available to them. This is the authentication between the portable data carrier 10 and the terminal device 20 is completed.
- the data stored in the portable data carrier 10 are preferably in accordance with the following
- the method described with reference to FIG. 4 varies from session to session. This relates to the derived secret key SKI as well as the derived base gl. This is, as described above, transmitted to the terminal device 20 as part of the authentication procedure or provided in another way. An unchanged, data carrier-individual basis gl could thus be used to identify the data carrier 10.
- the deduced key SKI 'and the derived base gl' would be used in a further authentication session used in the preferred embodiment in which a sniffer Signature is used and in which in step S4 to verify the signature Sig (gl ') of the new base gl' of Terrrunal stimulating 20 both the new derived base gl 'and the previous base gl are transmitted, the Terrrunal stimulating 20 or a so Connected background sys tem clearly identify the portable data carrier 10, since the Terrrunal responded 20 and the background system knows the base gl and the original base gO that they have been provided by the portable data carrier 10 in the previous authentication session.
- step S12 the further derived base is signed using the secret key SKI ', preferably again using the Schnorr signature
- the further derived secret key SKI ", the further derived base gl", the signature Sig (Gl ") and the base gl 'derived in step S10 are stored in the data carrier 10 for the next authentication session.
- the data carrier 10 would preferably provide the values gl ", Sig (gl"), gl 1 , PK0 and Cert (PKO) in a step analogous to step S4 of the term means 20. Since the memory device 20 can not relate the values gl "and gl 'to the values gl and gO used in the preceding authentication session, the preferred method illustrated in FIG. 4 ensures that the data carrier 10 can not be tracked.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102012017835.2A DE102012017835A1 (de) | 2012-09-10 | 2012-09-10 | Verfahren zur Authentisierung eines portablen Datenträgers |
PCT/EP2013/002319 WO2014037075A1 (de) | 2012-09-10 | 2013-08-01 | Verfahren zur authentisierung eines portablen datenträgers |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP2893667A1 true EP2893667A1 (de) | 2015-07-15 |
Family
ID=48949117
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP13747354.2A Withdrawn EP2893667A1 (de) | 2012-09-10 | 2013-08-01 | Verfahren zur authentisierung eines portablen datenträgers |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
EP (1) | EP2893667A1 (de) |
DE (1) | DE102012017835A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2014037075A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE102014019067A1 (de) * | 2014-12-18 | 2016-06-23 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zum pseudonymen Vereinbaren eines Schlüssels zwischen einem portablen Datenträger und einem Terminal |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6038322A (en) * | 1998-10-20 | 2000-03-14 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Group key distribution |
DE10141396A1 (de) * | 2001-08-23 | 2003-03-13 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zur Erzeugung eines asymmetrischen kryptografischen Gruppenschlüssels |
DE102008055076A1 (de) * | 2008-12-22 | 2010-07-01 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Vorrichtung und Verfahren zum Schutz von Daten, Computerprogramm, Computerprogrammprodukt |
DE102010035098A1 (de) | 2010-08-23 | 2012-02-23 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Verfahren zum Authentisieren eines portablen Datenträgers |
DE102010055699A1 (de) * | 2010-12-22 | 2012-06-28 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Kryptographisches Verfahren |
-
2012
- 2012-09-10 DE DE102012017835.2A patent/DE102012017835A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2013
- 2013-08-01 WO PCT/EP2013/002319 patent/WO2014037075A1/de active Application Filing
- 2013-08-01 EP EP13747354.2A patent/EP2893667A1/de not_active Withdrawn
Non-Patent Citations (2)
Title |
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None * |
See also references of WO2014037075A1 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE102012017835A1 (de) | 2014-03-13 |
WO2014037075A1 (de) | 2014-03-13 |
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