Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
  • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
  • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
  • G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
  • G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
  • G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
  • G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
  • G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
  • G05B19/042—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers using digital processors
  • G05B19/0428—Safety, monitoring
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
  • G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
  • G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
  • G05B2219/30—Nc systems
  • G05B2219/36—Nc in input of data, input key till input tape
  • G05B2219/36542—Cryptography, encrypt, access, authorize with key, code, password
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

• the invention relates to a method and a device for providing at least one secure cryptographic key for the execution of a cryptographic security function by a control unit.
• the control devices are provided with cryptographic keys for executing a cryptographic security function.
• Such cryptographic keys are often configured manually, that is, a value for the respective cryptographic key is entered via an input mask.
• the kryp ⁇ tographischen keys are for example guration inserted into a Confi- or entered using a configuration tool.
• the cryptographic protection provided by a cryptographic key depends on the length and entropy of the cryptographic key used. The longer the cryptographic key is used and the higher its entropy or randomness therein USAGE ⁇ Deten mark, the greater is usually the strength attained by the cryptographic key cryptographic protection function. For example, a long cryptographic key with a large number of special characters has a relatively high cryptographic protection.
• the invention provides a device for providing at least one secure cryptographic key for the execution of a cryptographic security function by a control unit requesting a cryptographic key for this purpose, wherein a configured one of a first configuration memory provided for the security function
• Key is read and is checked on the basis of the read out configured key, whether in a second configuration memory configured to one
• the cryptographic keys may be a any desired string of numbers, letters and Sonderzei ⁇ chen, especially for passwords.
• control device has a calculation unit which executes the cryptographic security function by encrypting or decrypting data with the provided cryptographic key or by calculating or checking cryptographic checksums.
• access is made to the first configuration memory and to the second configuration memory by a user as a function of access authorizations to the respective configuration memory.
• an access authorization to the second configuration memory exists only for a system administrator.
• a secure replacement key to a Si ⁇ cherheitsfunktion by means of a key derivation function KDF (Key Derivation Function) is calculated ter sayl automatically in accordance with the configured security functions for the key and a mass.
• a secure replacement key to acampti ⁇ on by a user with an access permission is registered for access to the second configuration memory in the second configuration memory.
• the configured key is provided to the controller for Ausu ⁇ tion of the security function, with a corresponding warning is generated if no associated secure spare key is stored in the second configuration memory for the configured key read from the first configuration memory.
• the replacement key has a higher information entropy and / or a larger key length than an associated, configured key.
• the configured key is entered by a user with an access authorization for accessing the first configuration memory for the security function of the control unit.
• control device is connected to an automation network of an automation system.
• more cryptographic secure ⁇ safety functions are executable by the control unit, for at least a cryptographic key is used.
• the device according to the invention are useful in the automation system for its configuration, its construction, the maintenance and operation thereof differing ⁇ che security requirements provided by the set up by the control unit of the automation system to execute security functions ⁇ cryptographic key.
• the device it is checked whether the device tion of the respective security function provided cryptographic key of a currentforceanfor ⁇ tion of the automation system is sufficient.
• the invention further provides a method for providing a secure cryptographic key having the features specified in claim 14.
• the invention provides a method for providing a secure cryptographic key for executing a cryptographic security function by a control unit requesting a cryptographic key for this purpose, wherein a configured key intended for the security function is read from a first configuration memory and configured on the basis of the readout
• the invention further provides an automation network with a plurality of control devices having the features specified in claim 15.
• the invention provides an automation network with a plurality of control devices for controlling components of an automation system
• control device for executing a cryptographic security function each receive at least a cryptographic key from a connected with the respective control unit key providing device, wherein the key providing apparatus at least provides a secure cryptographic key for performing a cryptographic security function by a control device for requesting a cryptographic Keyring ⁇ sel , wherein from a first configuration memory configured for the security function configured Key is read and is checked by means of the read out configured key, whether in a second configuration memory stored to the read out configured key associated secure spare key, which is provided instead of the configured key for the execution of the safety function to the control unit.
• Components of the automation system Components of a production control, in particular robot arms, welding machines, production actuators and manufacturing sensors, as well as components of a traffic control, components of an energy distribution control, components of a transport control, components of a process control and components of an apparatus control.
• Fig. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a possible
• Embodiment of the device according to the invention for providing at least one secure cryptographic key for providing at least one secure cryptographic key
• FIG. 2 shows an example for an inventive automation ⁇ approximately network having a plurality of control devices for actuation of components of an automation system.
• FIG. 3 is a block diagram of an automation communication device, the automation shown in FIG. s istsnetztechnik is provided and which has a device according to the invention for providing a cryptographic key; 4 shows a diagram for illustrating a configuration interface for explaining advantages of the device according to the invention and of the method according to the invention; a diagram illustrating a configuration interface according to a possible embodiment of the inventive device and the method according to the invention for providing secure cryptographic keys; a diagram illustrating a configuration interface in a further embodiment of the inventive device and the method according to the invention for providing secure cryptographic keys;
• FIG. 7 shows a diagram for illustrating a configuration interface in a further embodiment of the device according to the invention and of the method according to the invention for providing secure cryptographic keys.
• an inventive device 1 for providing at least one secure cryptographic key to a control unit 2 may be integrally Schlos ⁇ sen.
• the control unit 2 can execute and control a cryptographic Si ⁇ cherheitsfunktion SF.
• the control unit 2 requires at least one cryptographic key SFK (Security Function Key).
• SFK Security Function Key
• the cryptographic key may be a sequence of characters insbesonde ⁇ re numbers, letters and special characters.
• the cryptographic key can also be a required password be.
• the control unit 2 can control a device or a component 4 in one possible execution ⁇ form for one or more control cables 3, of which the security function SF is executed.
• the controlled device or the controlled component 4 can contain a calculation unit, for example a microprocessor or a cryptographic chip, in order to execute a safety function SF as a function of a cryptographic key SFK.
• the control unit 2 as shown in Fig. 1, a calculation ⁇ -drying unit 5 which performs the cryptographic security ⁇ function SF.
• This calculation unit 5 can also be a microprocessor or an application-specific integrated ASIC or chip.
• the cryptographic security function SF is executed by encrypting or decrypting data with a provided cryptographic key.
• the cryptographic security function SF may also be carried out by a cryptographic checksum calculated or ge ⁇ is checked.
• the controller 2 issues this request or request SFK for a cryptographic key SFK for executing a security function SF via an interface to the key providing device 1 according to the invention.
• the interface between the controller 2 and the device 1 may be a wireless or a wired interface.
• control unit 2 is connected to the device 1 via a network.
• the device 1 may be connected to a plurality of control devices 2.
• the device 1 receives a message from the control unit 2, in which a cryptogram tographic key is requested. The over the
• Interface received message is received by a unit 6.
• the unit Once the unit has 6 catch the request message R SFK to Anfor ⁇ alteration of a security key from the control unit 2 emp ⁇ , it reads from a first configuration memory 7 from an intended for the particular security function SF configured key CK, as shown in FIG. 1. Based on the read out configured key CK is then checked by the unit 6, whether in a second configuration memory 8 is stored to the read-out configured key CK secure backup key SK is stored. If this is the case, the associated secure spare key SK from the second configuration ⁇ memory 8 is read out and set instead of the configured key CK for the execution of the security function SF control unit 2 via the interface as the key SK ready ⁇ .
• the two cryptographic configuration memories 7, 8 can be two separate data memories or separate memory segments of the same data memory.
• the first configuration memory 7 and the second configuration memory 8 are accessed by a user as a function of access authorizations to the respective configuration memories 7, 8.
• only one system administrator has access authorization the second configuration memory 8 in which the secure spare keys SK associated with the configured keys CK are stored.
• the replacement key SK has in each case a higher information ⁇ onsentropie and a larger key length than a konfiguru- rier key CK, which is stored in the first configuration ⁇ memory 7.
• the secure spare key SK can thus be a long, relatively complex cryptographic key with a high number of hard noticeable special characters, which offers a high degree of cryptographic protection.
• the configured key CK which is stored in the first configuration memory 7, in one possible embodiment can be accessed by a user A with access authorization for accessing the first configuration memory 7 for a respective safety function SF of a control unit 2 via a user interface of the device 1 be registered.
• these user interface parts can also be used to enter the associated secure replacement key SK by another user B with access authorization to access the second configuration memory 8 in the second configuration memory 8.
• This user B may, for example, be a system administrator with access authorization for the second configuration memory 8.
• the configured key CK is figured kon ⁇ via a first configuration interface and the second associated spare key SK via a second configuration interface. Access to the first configuration interface and access to the second configuration interface may be subject to various restrictions or security controls.
• the second configuration ⁇ interface or call and vice versa User who is allowed to make the configuration setting at the first configuration interface can not be used at a mög ⁇ handy embodiment, the second configuration ⁇ interface or call and vice versa.
• further configurations may possibly be made via the first configuration interface .
• the second configuration interface is designed such that it allows only the configuration of the key value or of the secure replacement key SK. In this way, Si ⁇ cherheitsadministrator can gain access to the second configuration memory 8, without having to know the other configuration settings.
• the configured key CK is provided to the controller 2 for executing the safety function SF.
• the device 1 can give the control unit 2 a corresponding warning that no associated secure spare key SK is present.
• the secure replacement key SK for a safety function SF is automatically calculated using a key derivation function KDF (Key Derivation Function) as a function of the key CK configured for the safety function SF with a master key MK.
• KDF Key Derivation Function
• the secure replacement keys SK are not entered in the second configuration memory 8, but automatically calculated by a calculation unit by means of a key derivation function KDF and written in the second configuration memory 8.
• the key derivation function KDF can, as shown in FIG. 1, be stored in an internal memory of the unit 6.
• a master key or Mas ⁇ more excellent reduction key MK with a key value for the safe replacement key SK is derived using the key derivation function KDF is entered via the two-te configuration interface.
• an HMAC function in particular an HMAC-SHA1 (Master Key, first key value), for example, be used.
• HMAC-SHA1 Master Key, first key value
• KDF Key removal ⁇ forwarding function
• the Key derivation function KDF is configurable or time-changeable.
• several safe replacement key SK in the two ⁇ th configuration memory 8 are provided for each configured key CK.
• these different backup spare keys SK provided for each time are made available to the control unit 2 one after the other for each request SF SFK for a safety function SF. In this way, the control unit 2 always receives a different or newer secure replacement key SK when performing a multiple security function SF.
• These different secure replacement keys SK can be automatically derived in a possible embodiment with different key derivation functions KDF from a master key MK.
• the secure replacement keys SK are already stored in the configuration memory 8 after receiving a request R SFK for carrying out a security function.
• the secure spare keys SK are generated only after receiving a request R SFK .
• the control unit 2 and the device 1 communicate via an interface .
• the device 1 for providing a secure cryptographic key for the execution of the cryptographic security function SF by the control unit 2 can also be integrated in the control unit 2.
• the device 1 via an interface in the control ⁇ device 2 can be inserted. As shown in FIG. 1, the control unit 2 can control a device or a component 4 or, in a further variant, several components 4.
• the control unit 2 can in turn be integrated in the component 4 to be controlled.
• the component 4 to be controlled may be a component of an automation system.
• the component 4 may be a component of a Vietnamesessteue ⁇ tion, in particular a robot arm to be controlled, a welding machine, manufacture actuators and production sensors.
• the component 4 may be a component of a traffic control, a component of an energy distribution control, a component of a transport control, a component of a process control or even a component of an apparatus control.
• In the apparatus 1 for providing a secure cryptic tographischen key 1 can be a fixed installation, but also to a mobile device, which com municates ⁇ via a wireless interface with the control unit.
• the control device 2 can be a networked industrial control device, for example an 802.1ae / af MACSEC, IPsec, SSL / TLS, WLAN, 802.15.4, ZigBee, Bluetooth or Wireless HART device.
• the control unit 2 can be connected to a network of an automation system.
• Several cryptographic security functions SF may be performed by the control unit 2, which is incorporated ⁇ for at least a cryptographic key is SFK.
• the construction, the maintenance and operation thereof may have different security requirements for the set up by the control unit 2 of the automation system to the off ⁇ execution of safety functions SF cryptic tographischen key SFK be provided.
• a lower security requirement can be provided than in the actual operation of the automation system, since the operation is generally more safety-critical than the structure of the automation system.
• the controller 2 may in a possible embodiment, a further request or a request R to the device 1.
• a plurality of secure replacement keys SK can be stored in the second configuration memory 8 for a configured key CK, which satisfy different security requirements or security requirement levels.
• FIG. 2 shows an example of an automation network with a plurality of control devices for controlling components of an automation system, in which the device according to the invention and the inventive method for providing at least one secure cryptographic key for executing cryptographic security functions SF can be used.
• an office or office network O-NW is connected via a firewall FW to an industrial network I-NW, which in the illustrated example has two production cells FZ1, FZ2.
• an access point AP is provided on the industrial network I-NW.
• the two manufacturing cells FZ1, FZ2 each have a security module SM1, SM2 to protect the respective manufacturing cell FZ.
• Both manufacturing cells FZ1, FZ2 each have a local bus which connects a plurality of sensors / actuators S / A with the robot arm RA or an automatic welding machine SWA.
• the robot arm RA, the production cell FZ1 and the welding machine SWA in the manufacturing cell FZ2 and the security modules SM, for example security gateways, as well as sensors or actuators represent components 4, which can be controlled by a control unit 2, as shown in FIG have an integrated control unit 2.
• These components 4 of the Automation network are to be partially configured, and this can be done in a possible configuration of a directly to the respective component 4 configurable ⁇ computer.
• the configuration of a component 4 takes place via a configuration computer connected by means of a network, which is also referred to as a configuration computer.
• remote access to a configuration computer available in the industrial network I-NW or in the office network O-NW is possible.
• Fig. 3 shows a block diagram of a possible execution ⁇ form for a control unit 2.
• This control unit 2 is an automation communication device AKG, which may be connected via a network interface NW-INT with the automation ⁇ network.
• the Automatmaschineskommunika- tion device AKG has a microprocessor or Kommunikati ⁇ onsreaor CPU.
• the automation communication device AKG can have an input / output unit I / O via which, for example, sensors or actuators can be connected to the automation communication device AKG.
• the CPU can execute a program that is stored in a program memory PS and access data stored in a working memory ⁇ AS.
• the automation communication device AKG forms a control unit 2 for controlling an arbitrary component 4 within the automation network.
• FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a possible execution ⁇ form for a control unit 2.
• the control unit 2 includes an integrated device 1 for providing a secure cryptographic key for the execution of a cryptographic security function SF by the control unit 2.
• the control unit 2 has a configuration interface or a configuration In ⁇ terface C-INT on.
• a first configuration memory 7 and a second configuration memory 8 are located in the device 1.
• a configured key CK provided for the safety function SF is stored in the first configuration memory 7.
• the CPU or the calculation unit 5 of the controller 2 for a cryptographic security function SF for example, encryption of data or a calculation of a cryptographic checksum for a component 4 of the automation ⁇ tleitersnetztechnikes executes, it can request a corresponding cryptographic key in the device.
• a configured key CK provided for the safety function SF is read from the first configuration memory 7 of the device 1 and checked based on the read out configured key CK whether in the second configuration memory 8 a secure spare key SK associated with the read-out configured key CK is stored. is chert.
• the secure replacement key SK is read from the second configuration memory 8 and provided to the CPU or the calculation unit 5 of the automation communication device 2 or the control unit 2 instead of the configured key CK for the execution of the safety function SF of the control unit 2 ,
• the two configuration memories 7, 8 are accessed via the configuration interface C-INT. In this case, the access to the two configuration memories 7, 8 in dependence on different
• Access permissions are granted. In one possible embodiment, only one system administrator has access to the second configuration memory 8 within the key delivery device 1.
• Fig. 4 shows a diagram illustrating a first configuration interface for inputting a Radiokonfigurati ⁇ on BK comprising more configured key CK.
• a conformity via an input mask among other parameters, such as IP addresses, times and dates, and port settings ⁇ also configured key CK, especially for safety functions SF, can be input.
• a WSAN join key, a WLAN PSK (pre-shared key) and a control server key are input via the configuration interface shown in FIG. 4 into the key supply device 1 according to the invention.
• the input can be made manually, for example, by a user on site.
• the 4 configured key CK can be stored for example in the first Configurati ⁇ ons acknowledged 7 of the device 1.
• the keys CK may, for example, weak key is to act with little key length that are just noticeable, particularly for technicians who move within the Au ⁇ tomatmaschinesstrom.
• the commissioning of an automation system with a ⁇ times manageable configured keys CK can thus be worked currency ⁇ rend. Only when the system goes into operative operation at a later time are strong Excellenceschlüs ⁇ sel SK configured and used.
• Fig. 5 is a diagram showing another input template for the configuration interface in the OF INVENTION ⁇ to the invention key providing device 1.
• This screen can be used for each configured key CK provide a substitute key field, in which a safe substitute key SK can be input.
• only one user with special access rights, in particular a security administrator of the network has access to the input mask illustrated in FIG. 5.
• the user or security administrator can enter an associated secure replacement key SK for each simple configured key CK.
• the spare key SK a higher Informationsentro ⁇ pie and a longer key length than the associated confi gured ⁇ normal operating key CK.
• the configured key CK is usually a simple, short, easily recognizable cryptographic key, whereas the associated spare key SK is a relatively long complex cryptographic key comprising a plurality of special characters and relatively difficult to remember is.
• the configured operating key CK is entered by a first user A, eg a technician installing and commissioning the automation system, and the secure replacement key SK is entered by a second user B, in particular a security administrator with special
• the configured spare key SK is not recognizable to the first user A, and in many cases the first user A does not know about the existence of the associated configured security key SK.
• the input of the operating key or of the configured simple key CK by a user A takes place locally at the respective control unit 2 via a corresponding configuration interface.
• the associated security key and replacement key SK is a second user B is not input, for example, a security administrator locally at the control unit 2, but remote from a remote terminal, which is connected to the control unit 2 via a network.
• the user A who is for example in technicians for the commissioning of the system, thus does not need to know and configure the strong spare key, but he can still install the automation system and put into operation.
• an associated spare key SK is entered by a system administrator.
• a safety function SF namely VPN PSK
• no associated secure replacement key SK ishimge ⁇ ben in the appropriate field.
• the configured key CK in the event that no associated secure spare key SK is stored in the second configuration memory 8 for the configured key CK stored in the first configuration memory 7, the configured key CK will be the respective control unit 2 for executing the safety function SF - Semi asked.
• a user additionally receives a corresponding audible or visual warning .
• a system administrator can obtain ei ⁇ nen hint that a cryptographic key is required for a safety function SF, with no associated secure replacement key SK is defined.
• Fig. 6 shows a further input mask of a configuration ⁇ sections of the key providing apparatus according to the invention 1.
• a Systemadmi- are not trator to any normal configured key CK an associated spare key SK a, but only a master key MK.
• the system administrator can, for example, by clicking a button on the mask from a master key MK automatically by means of a
• Key CK can be calculated or generated by corresponding spare keys SK. These are then displayed in the corresponding substitute key field. In a possible exporting ⁇ approximate shape the system administrator can then edit the derived safe replacement key SK.
• the spare key SK is in this embodiment with a
• Key derivation function KDF depending on the configured key CK and the master key MK automatically ⁇ calculated or derived.
• Fig. 7 is a diagram showing another exemplary form of the configuration interface in the OF INVENTION ⁇ to the invention the device 1 for providing secure cryptographic keys.
• the automatic various keys are provided.
• different cryptographic keys K are activated (A) or modified (M) for the phases P configuration PI, service P2 and operation P3.
• the system administrator has the opportunity to generate a new set of cryptographic keys K for the respective phase P of the automation system.
• CNK Create New Keys
• the keys can then be replaced by a plant security administrator by strong or secure replacement key SK at a later time, when the automation system is in the operating mode over ⁇ .
• the device 1 according to the invention and the method according to the invention are not only suitable for providing secure cryptographic keys, but also for providing secure passwords, for example in the authentication or authorization of a user with respect to a system.
• a new replacement key after executing a security function SF, a new replacement key automatically becomes Derived or calculated SK.
• the method according to the invention and the device 1 according to the invention can be used in a variety of ways.
• the key providing device 1 according to the invention is suitable not only for control units 2 of a production control, but also for other controllable components or devices, in particular in the field of traffic control, energy distribution control, transport control, process automation and apparatus control.
• the provision of the cryptographic keys as well as the execution of the cryptographic security function SF takes place in one possible embodiment by the device 1 according to the invention in real time.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
• Storage Device Security (AREA)
• Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
• Programmable Controllers (AREA)
• Testing And Monitoring For Control Systems (AREA)
• Selective Calling Equipment (AREA)

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• 2010
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• 2011
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  • 2011-02-14 EP EP11704055A patent/EP2520043A1/de not_active Withdrawn
  • 2011-02-14 CN CN2011800142079A patent/CN102792629A/zh active Pending
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