EP2481229A1 - Method and device for processing data in a wireless network - Google Patents
Method and device for processing data in a wireless networkInfo
- Publication number
- EP2481229A1 EP2481229A1 EP09783214A EP09783214A EP2481229A1 EP 2481229 A1 EP2481229 A1 EP 2481229A1 EP 09783214 A EP09783214 A EP 09783214A EP 09783214 A EP09783214 A EP 09783214A EP 2481229 A1 EP2481229 A1 EP 2481229A1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- mobile terminal
- network
- base station
- radio
- sim
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
- H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
- H04W12/79—Radio fingerprint
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W8/00—Network data management
- H04W8/26—Network addressing or numbering for mobility support
- H04W8/265—Network addressing or numbering for mobility support for initial activation of new user
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method and to a device for proc ⁇ essing data in a wireless network.
- the problem to be solved is to provide an efficient mechanism that allows increasing the level of security of a network comprising mobile terminals or devices with a radio inter ⁇ face .
- a method for processing data in a wireless network wherein a mobile ter ⁇ minal is registered with the wireless network by utilizing a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal.
- the wireless network may be any network com ⁇ prising a wireless interface.
- the mobile terminal may be any device or terminal comprising at least one interface to the wireless network.
- the registration of the mobile terminal comprises in particular an authentication or a validation; after such registration of the mobile terminal, the mobile terminal may convey data towards the wireless network (and in particular receive data from the wireless network) .
- this approach efficiently enables an regis ⁇ tration mechanism that can be used in addition to existing registration techniques as well as it may (at least partly) replace existing registration techniques.
- the mobile terminal may thus get access to the wireless network by using radio fingerprint information that could be made accessible to the network in advance or it could be requested by the network when the registration is conducted.
- the radio fingerprint is stored and access is granted.
- access may be granted without the radio fingerprint being stored.
- the level of security can be flexibly adjusted and may depend upon the requirement of the particular scenario applied. It is in particular an option that the level of security is adjusted on and/or provided by a different (e.g., application) layer or that the services admissible are largely restricted.
- SIM- less devices devices util ⁇ izing a SIM card and for devices without such SIM card (“SIM- less devices”) .
- the mobile terminal is registered with a network by processing the following steps:
- the network compares the radio fingerprint with pre ⁇ defined data and grants access for the mobile termi ⁇ nal in case the predefined data matches the radio fingerprint or a portion thereof to a predetermined extent .
- Said predefined data may comprise data previously stored at and/or being accessible to the network.
- the predefined data and the radio finger ⁇ print are not necessarily identical; they may be similar to a certain degree.
- the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal may differ from the previously stored value to a certain extent and the mobile terminal may still be granted access to (is registered with) the network.
- the network comprises a base station that communicates with the mobile terminal and the mobile terminal is registered with the base station.
- the base station may be any base station of a wireless or cellular network, e.g., a Node B, a femto access point, etc.
- the base station may provide services to the mobile terminal as if it was directly connected to the wireless network and the base station may (also) provide services towards the net ⁇ work as if the mobile terminal was directly connected with this network.
- the base station provides registra ⁇ tion (in particular authentication and/or validation) for the mobile terminal towards the network, in particular by utiliz- ing an identification provided with the base station.
- Such identification could be a SIM card that is deployed with the base station.
- the base station may be responsible for au ⁇ thenticating the mobile terminals (that are about to be) at- tached to it.
- the base station can be equipped with its own SIM card and may utilize its credentials to authenti ⁇ cate the SIM-less devices that are served by this base sta ⁇ tion .
- the base station is a femto access point or a home base station.
- the mobile terminal is regis ⁇ tered with the network by utilizing credentials of the base station and/or by utilizing credentials of at least one other terminal .
- the identification, e.g., SIM card credentials, of the base station can be used by the mobile terminal in order to become registered with the network.
- the base station may manage the connections between several (SIM-less) mobile terminals and the network wherein all such mobile ter- minals use the credentials of the base station.
- the at least one other terminal may be at least one other mo ⁇ bile terminal that could be provided as a piece of software or as a physical entity.
- the mobile terminal has re ⁇ stricted access and/or uses limited services of the wireless network .
- the mobile terminal can be configured to only send messages to a predefined destination (or several such prede ⁇ fined destinations) .
- the mobile terminal may utilize only a predefined selection of services. This advantageously reduces the risk of fraudulent use of such a mobile terminal: For example, if the device does not support voice calls to various addressees, it is of less interest for potential fraudulent users .
- the mobile terminal conveys data via a packet-switched service of the wireless network.
- the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal comprises at least one of the following: - radio channel characteristics;
- the mobile terminal comprises a SIM card or it is a SIM-less device.
- the SIM card may be any device comprising data used for en ⁇ cryption and/or authentication of the mobile terminal, in particular of the user that is associated with such mobile terminal.
- the SIM card may be used to uniquely identify the mobile terminal.
- the mobile terminal is regis ⁇ tered with the network by sending the radio fingerprint to- wards the network, in particular after being triggered by the network .
- the mobile terminal may convey the radio fingerprint to the network.
- the mobile terminal may be triggered by the network to convey the fingerprint.
- the mobile terminal is de ⁇ ployed at a given location or area.
- the radio fingerprint for this location changes only within certain parameters and thus this radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal can be used for authentication purposes.
- a common identification is used for an initial registration of the mobile terminal.
- the radio fingerprint is con ⁇ veyed to the network and stored for later registrations.
- the mobile terminal may convey hard-coded information (e.g., a common or a default user identification, e.g., an IMEI number, an IMSI number, a default IMSI number) towards the network.
- hard-coded information e.g., a common or a default user identification, e.g., an IMEI number, an IMSI number, a default IMSI number
- the network ac knowledges this common/default identification and stores the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal.
- the fingerprint of the terminal transmitter can be compared with this previously stored radio fingerprint.
- the mobile terminal may convey a radio fin ⁇ gerprint after it has been switched on or prior to any commu- nication.
- the initial connection can be au ⁇ thenticated by the IMSI of the terminal during connection of the set-up phase and it may be enhanced by a public key in- frastructure (PKI) after the IP connection establishment.
- PKI public key in- frastructure
- radio signatures or application- specific encryption keys embedded in the terminal are trans ⁇ ferred in a secured way to the network operator prior to the actual registration procedure. This may further increase the level of security.
- the wireless network may be any 2G, 2.5G, 3G or LTE network.
- the wireless network may be any network according to IEEE 802. xx, wherein "xx" refers to existing standards and suggestions as well as upcoming standards .
- the wireless network may be any network based on a currently available or upcoming wireless communication technique or standard.
- a device compris ⁇ ing or being associated with a processing unit that is arranged such that the method as described herein is executable thereon .
- Said processing unit may comprise at least one of the follow ⁇ ing: a processor, a microcontroller, a hard-wired circuit, an ASIC, an FPGA, a logic device. It is noted that such device may be a mobile terminal or a base station, in particular a component of the wireless net ⁇ work .
- Fig.l shows a block diagram comprising a base station that is connected to a core network, wherein several mo ⁇ bile terminals are connected to this base station;
- Fig.2 shows a schematic message chart between a terminal and a network, wherein said network triggers regis ⁇ tration of the mobile terminal or the mobile terminal by itself starts registration with the network.
- the approach provided herein in particular relates to mobile radio systems, e.g., based on a GSM or a 3GPP architecture.
- mobile radio systems e.g., based on a GSM or a 3GPP architecture.
- the solution presented is also applicable for other systems .
- Such devices are referred to as (mobile or wireless) termi ⁇ nals, user equipments or the like. These devices may be or be associated with at least one of the following: A mobile tele- phone, a laptop, a personal digital assistant, a smart phone or any device comprising a wireless or radio interface.
- the device may in particular use a packet-switched mode of trans ⁇ port to exchange data with a packet network.
- the device may be a self-operating reporting device used in a machine-to-machine communication or a home appliance or mul ⁇ timedia device equipped with a 3GPP-compliant radio inter ⁇ face.
- the device may be a device comprising a SIM card or it may be a SIM-less device.
- This approach in particular suggests a device authentication procedure that may be initiated by a Master Authorization Terminal (MAT) using a radio fingerprinting method, e.g., in combination with an analysis of at least one radio channel characteristics and/or at least one radio environment report.
- MAT Master Authorization Terminal
- the approach in particular applies to stationary terminals operating in a pre-defined location or area. Steps of the authentication procedure:
- the authentication procedure may comprise the following steps : A. Registration Procedure
- the MAT (that may be fully compliant with an exist ing specification and equipped in an application allowing activation and/or registration of other terminals) sends a request to the network initiat ⁇ ing the new terminal registration procedure.
- IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
- the MAT could be provided as a separate, hand-held device that may be used for triggering an authentication procedure for a terminal (that is to be attached, e.g., for the first time) .
- the MAT may be a typical cellular phone (ac ⁇ cording, e.g., to the GSM standard) comprising a SIM card, wherein the subscription allows such registration of a further terminal. This procedure may be referred to as triggering authentication procedure .
- the MAT may also be de ⁇ ployed as a piece of software with a SIM card, wherein the SIM card may be provided as a piece of memory accessible to said software.
- the user terminal located may initiate the network registration procedure using its initial network access credentials.
- Initial network credentials in 3GPP networks are provided either on classic SIM card or SIM applica ⁇ tion stored in the memory of the device.
- the cre ⁇ dentials may comprise unspecific "common/default user" initial credentials that may, e.g., be used for registration purposes (only) .
- the network may also initiate registration proce ⁇ dure by sending, e.g., a paging message to the cells within the location area of the terminal to be registered.
- the terminal may be activated via a network-initiated procedure; in this case, the terminal may listen to and be able to respond to paging messages from the network.
- the terminal may communicate with the cellular network for the first time and user equipment specific radio features are identi ⁇ fied and transmitted, e.g., via an IP connection and stored in an authentication server.
- Such features may be caused by manufacture process imper ⁇ fections and are also referred to as "radio finger ⁇ print".
- the network may request several such char ⁇ acteristics from the terminal, in particular from the terminal's transmitter.
- the initial connection can be authenticated by the IMSI of the terminal during connection of the set ⁇ up phase and it can be enhanced by a public key in ⁇ frastructure (PKI) after the IP connection estab ⁇ lishment .
- PKI public key in ⁇ frastructure
- a "Common SIM” connection can be used (common SIM card features are stored with the terminal and/or with a network component, e.g., a base sta ⁇ tion) .
- This connection can be secured by a PKI or by a secured environment architecture. Accordingly, an "initialization/registration application" shell can be provided with the terminal.
- Radio environment measurements (served cell and neighboring transmit ⁇ ter's ID's (BCCH ARFN, BSICS, SC and strengths)) may be sent over a secured IP connection and are stored with the authentication server.
- a terminal imprinted number e.g., IMEI
- SIM credential e.g., a SIM credential
- application layer security detail e.g., a digital signature embedded in the de ⁇ vice or its software
- a credential transfer i.e. a SIM cre ⁇ dential transfer over the air interface
- a credential can be user-specific.
- SIM functions, IMEI numbers or/and application layer se ⁇ curity features and/or certificates used during the identification, authentication and/or authorization are enhanced by matching user terminal radio characteristics recorded during the initialization procedure and stored with the authentication server as described above.
- Such matching may utilize a "fuzzy logic" approach to account for statistical variations of the radio signa ⁇ tures.
- statistical analysis of the re ⁇ ceived signals may be used.
- a certain degree of discrepancy between the stored characteristics and the actual characteristics may be admissible.
- the terminal is granted access to the network if the pa ⁇ rameters recorded during registration and parameters of measured during a service request connection comply with each other (to a given degree) .
- Billing for traffic and services used can be conducted on the account of the user initiating the registration procedure towards the MAT.
- SIM card ter ⁇ minals can be handled as well as SIM-less devices, wherein both types of terminals can be provided with an additional security when they connect to a wireless network. This is achieved in particular by providing a MAT and appropriate network control elements.
- the approach is in particular cost effective as there is no need for a complex handling of SIM cards.
- Fig.l shows a block diagram comprising a base station BS 101 that is connected to a core network CN 102.
- the combination of base station 101 and core network 102 could be regarded as network or wireless network, wherein the wireless network may be further connected to a fixed network or to other wireless networks (not shown) .
- Mobile terminals 103 to 105 can be con ⁇ nected to the base station 101 via radio links.
- the mobile terminals 103 to 105 may be cellular devices comprising a SIM card or they may be SIM-less devices. These devices 103 to 105 may in particular support machine-to-machine communica ⁇ tion and could be apparatus of different kinds.
- the devices 103 to 105 may use a common identification to become regis ⁇ tered with the base station 101 and thus with the core net- work 102.
- the base station 101 may use a SIM card of its own to manage registration of the mobile terminals 103 to 105.
- the mobile terminals 103 to 105 may be deployed at a pre-defined location.
- Fig.2 shows a message chart between a terminal and a network, wherein said network may comprise the base station (as shown, e.g., in Fig.l) .
- the terminal e.g., after it has been switched on, conveys a radio fingerprint to the network, in particular to the base station of the network (see message 201) .
- the radio fingerprint could be re ⁇ quested (see message 202) by the network, i.e. the network triggers conveying said message 201.
- pre-defined information that serve as a basis for the radio fingerprint can be conveyed to the network in advance of message 201; this enhances the security of the authentica ⁇ tion or registration as the network is then able to decide whether the message 201 provides parameters that are a valid identification of the terminal.
- the pre-defined information may comprise fingerprint information of the terminal or secu ⁇ rity information (e.g., at least one key that is used for the communication or part thereof between the terminal and the network) .
- Machine-originated traffic can be generated by various de ⁇ vices sending alarms or status updates to a control server.
- Such devices e.g., Point of Sale terminals
- Such devices are usually un ⁇ manned and sometimes placed unattended. Therefore, such a de ⁇ vice is exposed to a risk of SIM card tampering (e.g., steal ⁇ ing and/or fraudulent use of its SIM card) .
- distribution of SIM cards for such devices bears a lo- gistic burden in particular if such devices are deployed in large numbers. For example, changing the network provider may require a manual exchange of all SIM cards that are deployed with the devices of this network provider.
- authentica ⁇ tion credentials stored in the firmware of such a device or transmitted over an air interface to the device are consid ⁇ ered a cost-efficient alternative.
- the approach suggested herein allows for an authentication of SIM-less devices, in particular devices that are deployed at a fixed location. Although a level of security is less than the level of security of a device comprising a SIM card, the approach is nevertheless efficient and beneficial to a sig- nificant amount of applications that do not require a high level of security.
- An exemplary device may be a cigarette vending machine that sends inventory & fault reports to the dedicated server
- the potential benefit for an attacker is limited to an unnecessary visit of the device's operator, but without any direct profit for the attacker.
- the application may have its own security mecha ⁇ nisms, e.g., electronic signatures needed by the application.
- the terminal may request a new kind of access class to the network. Based on this access class, new types of authentication and particular restrictions on access may be enforced.
- Such predefined functions can be used for ini ⁇ tial network access. Also the functions can be used until the over-the-air (OTA) user-specific credential transfer is com- pleted by means of initialization.
- OTA over-the-air
- radio signatures or application-specific encryption keys embedded in the terminal are trans- ferred in a secured way to the network operator prior to the actual registration procedure. This may further increase the level of security.
- SIM-less Device SIM-less Device
- SIM-less devices may increase due to additional capacity provided by the wireless networks. So far, there is no efficient solution for a SIM-less device to be authenticated with the wireless network.
- a SIM-less device may be preferred over a device with a SIM card as it may only transmit a limited amount of data, e.g., to a particular addressee. It is hence rather inefficient or impractical to subscribe each such de ⁇ vice to the wireless network by assigning individual SIM cards .
- a femto access point is a base station (also referred to as home Node B) that is deployed at the customer's prem ⁇ ises.
- a femto access point may require a separate sub ⁇ scription to the wireless network and thus a SIM card may be required for each device connecting to a femto access point.
- This is also rather complicated for standalone devices such as internet radio sets, kitchen devices (e.g., refrigerator) or digital cameras that are connected to the internet via said femto access point.
- each such device needs a SIM card reader, which requires additional hardware as well as space.
- These devices could be sim ⁇ plified devices regarding the services used over the air in- terface, because they may only use a subset of the function ⁇ ality of the wireless network (e.g., only packet-switched calls, only mobile-originated or mobile-terminated calls, no mobility management may be required, etc) .
- a subset of the function ⁇ ality of the wireless network e.g., only packet-switched calls, only mobile-originated or mobile-terminated calls, no mobility management may be required, etc.
- it is beneficial to be operated in a cost-efficient and has- sle-free way.
- SIM-less device application may in particular work as follows (see also “steps of the authentication procedure” above) :
- the device can be authorized in the wireless network without having to use a dedicated physical SIM card. This can be achieved in case the tasks of registration and authentication are taken over by a serving base station (a Node B or a Home Node B) , hereinafter referred to as "base station”.
- base station a serving base station or a Home Node B
- the base station may thus certify (in particular to other components of the wireless network) that the device is au ⁇ thenticated and validated.
- existing authenti- cation protocols do not have to be modified, nor do the 3GPP- compliant core network nodes. Only the base station is modi ⁇ fied to support said authentication (and/or validation) of SIM-less devices. It is noted that the authentication procedure for legacy equipment is not affected; the additional feature introduced herein is the authentication method of the SIM-less terminal.
- Several (different) authentication methods could be sup- ported; some are exemplarily discussed in more detail herein ⁇ after. However, other authentication schemes may apply as well
- the base station is equipped with its own SIM card and utilizes its credentials to authenticate the SIM-less devices that are served by this base station.
- the SIM-less device can be utilized in a two-step approach:
- the device is locally registered at the base station, for example using an IMEI.
- such registration at the base station could be achieved by using a "default IMSI" concept.
- a commonly known IMSI number could be assigned to all SIM-less devices, e.g., by being hard- coded into these devices.
- the base station then recog ⁇ nizes that a special registration procedure is needed whenever it received a connection setup request using this "default IMSI".
- the first step of authentication may advantageously filter out unauthorized devices that try to connect to the base station. This filtering step, however, may be an option.
- the device may authenticate itself by launching an authentication procedure.
- a procedure could be a dedicated procedure or it may be a part of a first connection setup.
- the au ⁇ thentication could be performed just once, at every con ⁇ nection setup or periodically.
- the SIM-less device does not have its unique IMSI
- the SIM-less device can, however, start the call setup pro- cedure and establish an initial connection with the base station. Within the connection request, the device sends its identity. Without an IMSI, the device may insert its IMEI. If the IMEI is known to the base station, the base station may launch a dedicated network authentication procedure; otherwise the radio connection with the un ⁇ known device is dropped.
- an additional device authentication procedure can be provided and in particular be launched at this point.
- the base station may use its own credentials to allow the device to communicate with the network.
- a SIM card could be present at the base station and the base station may then act as a substitute subscriber for all SIM-less devices that are served by this base station.
- all connections be ⁇ tween the SIM-less devices and the network are treated as multiple communication sessions established between the subscriber residing in the base station and the network.
- the base station may provide a transparent service for the SIM-less devices as if these were communicating with the wireless net ⁇ work .
- a SIM-less device when a SIM-less device wants to authenticate itself to the network, it may use the SIM credentials of the base station to obtain the T-IMSI number.
- the core network in particular the SGSN
- the core network may have to be configured accordingly so that the T-IMSI number does not expire too early.
- additional approaches e.g., a secure IP approach can be utilized.
- the authentication procedure being conducted by the base sta ⁇ tion instead of the SIM-less device bears the advantage that adding new devices to the network is simplified. This allows for an easy setup of a local network (e.g., a home network) and may enhance the popularity of a femto access network as well as machine-to-machine applications.
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- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
A method and a device for processing data in a wireless network are provided, wherein a mobile terminal is registered with the wireless network by utilizing a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal.
Description
Description
Method and device for processing data in a wireless network The invention relates to a method and to a device for proc¬ essing data in a wireless network.
Various wireless or cellular communication systems are known. An authentication of a radio terminal in the cellular commu- nication system is a complex issue, for which various solu¬ tions have been proposed. One common solution is the usage of a SIM card comprising data used for encryption and authentication . This SIM card approach provides a certain degree of security and attacks for breaching such security require a consider¬ able amount of effort. However, the process of distributing and maintaining SIM cards is a complicated and costly proc¬ ess .
The problem to be solved is to provide an efficient mechanism that allows increasing the level of security of a network comprising mobile terminals or devices with a radio inter¬ face .
This problem is solved according to the features of the inde¬ pendent claims. Further embodiments result from the depending claims . In order to overcome this problem, a method for processing data in a wireless network is provided, wherein a mobile ter¬ minal is registered with the wireless network by utilizing a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal. It is noted that the wireless network may be any network com¬ prising a wireless interface. The mobile terminal may be any device or terminal comprising at least one interface to the wireless network. The registration of the mobile terminal
comprises in particular an authentication or a validation; after such registration of the mobile terminal, the mobile terminal may convey data towards the wireless network (and in particular receive data from the wireless network) .
Advantageously, this approach efficiently enables an regis¬ tration mechanism that can be used in addition to existing registration techniques as well as it may (at least partly) replace existing registration techniques. The mobile terminal may thus get access to the wireless network by using radio fingerprint information that could be made accessible to the network in advance or it could be requested by the network when the registration is conducted. In addition, it is also an option that the radio fingerprint is stored and access is granted. As an alternative, access may be granted without the radio fingerprint being stored. The level of security can be flexibly adjusted and may depend upon the requirement of the particular scenario applied. It is in particular an option that the level of security is adjusted on and/or provided by a different (e.g., application) layer or that the services admissible are largely restricted. In these cases, a rather lenient security detail could be efficient: If a fraudulent attacker is only able to send messages to a particular ad¬ dressee, this may limit the prospects of a promising attack and may lead to a useful application with limited security during registration.
Advantageously, this approach is applicable for devices util¬ izing a SIM card and for devices without such SIM card ("SIM- less devices") .
In an embodiment, the mobile terminal is registered with a network by processing the following steps:
- a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal is con- veyed to the network;
- the network compares the radio fingerprint with pre¬ defined data and grants access for the mobile termi¬ nal in case the predefined data matches the radio
fingerprint or a portion thereof to a predetermined extent .
Said predefined data may comprise data previously stored at and/or being accessible to the network.
It is noted that the predefined data and the radio finger¬ print are not necessarily identical; they may be similar to a certain degree. Hence, the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal may differ from the previously stored value to a certain extent and the mobile terminal may still be granted access to (is registered with) the network.
In another embodiment, the network comprises a base station that communicates with the mobile terminal and the mobile terminal is registered with the base station.
The base station may be any base station of a wireless or cellular network, e.g., a Node B, a femto access point, etc.
The base station may provide services to the mobile terminal as if it was directly connected to the wireless network and the base station may (also) provide services towards the net¬ work as if the mobile terminal was directly connected with this network.
In a further embodiment, the base station provides registra¬ tion (in particular authentication and/or validation) for the mobile terminal towards the network, in particular by utiliz- ing an identification provided with the base station.
Such identification could be a SIM card that is deployed with the base station. The base station may be responsible for au¬ thenticating the mobile terminals (that are about to be) at- tached to it. Hence, the base station can be equipped with its own SIM card and may utilize its credentials to authenti¬ cate the SIM-less devices that are served by this base sta¬ tion .
In a next embodiment, the base station is a femto access point or a home base station. It is also an embodiment that the mobile terminal is regis¬ tered with the network by utilizing credentials of the base station and/or by utilizing credentials of at least one other terminal . Hence, the identification, e.g., SIM card credentials, of the base station can be used by the mobile terminal in order to become registered with the network. In such case, the base station may manage the connections between several (SIM-less) mobile terminals and the network wherein all such mobile ter- minals use the credentials of the base station.
The at least one other terminal may be at least one other mo¬ bile terminal that could be provided as a piece of software or as a physical entity.
Pursuant to another embodiment, the mobile terminal has re¬ stricted access and/or uses limited services of the wireless network . Hence, the mobile terminal can be configured to only send messages to a predefined destination (or several such prede¬ fined destinations) . Also, the mobile terminal may utilize only a predefined selection of services. This advantageously reduces the risk of fraudulent use of such a mobile terminal: For example, if the device does not support voice calls to various addressees, it is of less interest for potential fraudulent users .
According to an embodiment, the mobile terminal conveys data via a packet-switched service of the wireless network.
According to another embodiment, the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal comprises at least one of the following:
- radio channel characteristics;
- radio environment report;
- characteristics of the mobile terminal;
- information that is based on imperfections of manu- facture of the mobile terminal;
- location of the mobile terminal;
- identification information of the mobile terminal.
In yet another embodiment, the mobile terminal comprises a SIM card or it is a SIM-less device.
The SIM card may be any device comprising data used for en¬ cryption and/or authentication of the mobile terminal, in particular of the user that is associated with such mobile terminal. The SIM card may be used to uniquely identify the mobile terminal.
According to a next embodiment, the mobile terminal is regis¬ tered with the network by sending the radio fingerprint to- wards the network, in particular after being triggered by the network .
Hence, after it has been switched on, the mobile terminal may convey the radio fingerprint to the network. As an alterna- tive, the mobile terminal may be triggered by the network to convey the fingerprint.
Pursuant to yet an embodiment, the mobile terminal is de¬ ployed at a given location or area.
Hence, the radio fingerprint for this location changes only within certain parameters and thus this radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal can be used for authentication purposes. According to a further embodiment, a common identification is used for an initial registration of the mobile terminal.
Pursuant to yet an embodiment, the radio fingerprint is con¬ veyed to the network and stored for later registrations.
Hence, for an initial registration, the mobile terminal may convey hard-coded information (e.g., a common or a default user identification, e.g., an IMEI number, an IMSI number, a default IMSI number) towards the network. The network ac¬ knowledges this common/default identification and stores the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal. For registration purposes, the fingerprint of the terminal transmitter can be compared with this previously stored radio fingerprint.
It is noted that the mobile terminal may convey a radio fin¬ gerprint after it has been switched on or prior to any commu- nication.
It is further noted that the initial connection can be au¬ thenticated by the IMSI of the terminal during connection of the set-up phase and it may be enhanced by a public key in- frastructure (PKI) after the IP connection establishment.
It is also possible that radio signatures or application- specific encryption keys embedded in the terminal are trans¬ ferred in a secured way to the network operator prior to the actual registration procedure. This may further increase the level of security.
According to an embodiment, the wireless network may be any 2G, 2.5G, 3G or LTE network. Also, the wireless network may be any network according to IEEE 802. xx, wherein "xx" refers to existing standards and suggestions as well as upcoming standards .
In particular, the wireless network may be any network based on a currently available or upcoming wireless communication technique or standard.
The problem stated above is also solved by a device compris¬ ing or being associated with a processing unit that is arranged such that the method as described herein is executable thereon .
Said processing unit may comprise at least one of the follow¬ ing: a processor, a microcontroller, a hard-wired circuit, an ASIC, an FPGA, a logic device. It is noted that such device may be a mobile terminal or a base station, in particular a component of the wireless net¬ work .
The problem stated supra is further solved by a communication system comprising at least one device as described herein.
Embodiments of the invention are shown and illustrated in the following figures: Fig.l shows a block diagram comprising a base station that is connected to a core network, wherein several mo¬ bile terminals are connected to this base station;
Fig.2 shows a schematic message chart between a terminal and a network, wherein said network triggers regis¬ tration of the mobile terminal or the mobile terminal by itself starts registration with the network.
The approach provided herein in particular relates to mobile radio systems, e.g., based on a GSM or a 3GPP architecture. However, the solution presented is also applicable for other systems .
The proposed idea in particular allows for an efficient utilization of simplified devices over the radio interface. Such devices are referred to as (mobile or wireless) termi¬ nals, user equipments or the like. These devices may be or be associated with at least one of the following: A mobile tele-
phone, a laptop, a personal digital assistant, a smart phone or any device comprising a wireless or radio interface. The device may in particular use a packet-switched mode of trans¬ port to exchange data with a packet network.
The device may be a self-operating reporting device used in a machine-to-machine communication or a home appliance or mul¬ timedia device equipped with a 3GPP-compliant radio inter¬ face. The device may be a device comprising a SIM card or it may be a SIM-less device.
This approach in particular suggests a device authentication procedure that may be initiated by a Master Authorization Terminal (MAT) using a radio fingerprinting method, e.g., in combination with an analysis of at least one radio channel characteristics and/or at least one radio environment report. The approach in particular applies to stationary terminals operating in a pre-defined location or area. Steps of the authentication procedure:
The authentication procedure may comprise the following steps : A. Registration Procedure
The MAT (that may be fully compliant with an exist ing specification and equipped in an application allowing activation and/or registration of other terminals) sends a request to the network initiat¬ ing the new terminal registration procedure.
A location area of an initiated terminal and its
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) may be provided.
It is noted that the MAT could be provided as a separate, hand-held device that may be used for
triggering an authentication procedure for a terminal (that is to be attached, e.g., for the first time) . The MAT may be a typical cellular phone (ac¬ cording, e.g., to the GSM standard) comprising a SIM card, wherein the subscription allows such registration of a further terminal. This procedure may be referred to as triggering authentication procedure .
It is further noted that the MAT may also be de¬ ployed as a piece of software with a SIM card, wherein the SIM card may be provided as a piece of memory accessible to said software.
After powering up, the user terminal located (that may be deployed at a fixed location) may initiate the network registration procedure using its initial network access credentials.
Initial network credentials in 3GPP networks are provided either on classic SIM card or SIM applica¬ tion stored in the memory of the device. The cre¬ dentials may comprise unspecific "common/default user" initial credentials that may, e.g., be used for registration purposes (only) .
The network may also initiate registration proce¬ dure by sending, e.g., a paging message to the cells within the location area of the terminal to be registered. Hence the terminal may be activated via a network-initiated procedure; in this case, the terminal may listen to and be able to respond to paging messages from the network.
During this procedure, the terminal may communicate with the cellular network for the first time and user equipment specific radio features are identi¬ fied and transmitted, e.g., via an IP connection
and stored in an authentication server. Such features may be caused by manufacture process imper¬ fections and are also referred to as "radio finger¬ print". The network may request several such char¬ acteristics from the terminal, in particular from the terminal's transmitter.
The initial connection can be authenticated by the IMSI of the terminal during connection of the set¬ up phase and it can be enhanced by a public key in¬ frastructure (PKI) after the IP connection estab¬ lishment .
Due to the missing SIM card in case of the SIM-less terminal, there may only be a non-secured communi¬ cation over the radio interface; however, such connection could be secured by an application layer. Regarding the communication with the SIM-less terminal, a "Common SIM" connection can be used (common SIM card features are stored with the terminal and/or with a network component, e.g., a base sta¬ tion) . This connection can be secured by a PKI or by a secured environment architecture. Accordingly, an "initialization/registration application" shell can be provided with the terminal.
User terminal reports of the radio environment measurements (served cell and neighboring transmit¬ ter's ID's (BCCH ARFN, BSICS, SC and strengths)) may be sent over a secured IP connection and are stored with the authentication server.
A terminal imprinted number (e.g., IMEI), a SIM credential and/or an application layer security detail (e.g., a digital signature embedded in the de¬ vice or its software) used to authenticate the user terminal are logically associated with recorded
transmitter and/or environment specific data gath¬ ered in the previous steps.
(e) Optionally, a credential transfer (i.e. a SIM cre¬ dential transfer over the air interface) to the terminal may occur at this stage. Contrary to a "common SIM" profile used for an initial network access, such credential can be user-specific.
(f) End of initialization phase. (Usual) Mode of Operation
SIM functions, IMEI numbers or/and application layer se¬ curity features and/or certificates used during the identification, authentication and/or authorization are enhanced by matching user terminal radio characteristics recorded during the initialization procedure and stored with the authentication server as described above.
Such matching may utilize a "fuzzy logic" approach to account for statistical variations of the radio signa¬ tures. In particular, statistical analysis of the re¬ ceived signals may be used. Hence, a certain degree of discrepancy between the stored characteristics and the actual characteristics may be admissible.
During such a comparison also characteristics of the transmission channel and radio environment reports spe¬ cific for each terminal can be used. Based on the re¬ spective implementation it can be decided which connec¬ tion is allowed for a terminal to pass the authentica¬ tion procedure. This is particularly valid for SIM-less terminals. For example, an emergency call can be allowed without requirement for an authentication.
The terminal is granted access to the network if the pa¬ rameters recorded during registration and parameters of
measured during a service request connection comply with each other (to a given degree) .
Billing for traffic and services used can be conducted on the account of the user initiating the registration procedure towards the MAT.
The approach provided bears the advantage that SIM card ter¬ minals can be handled as well as SIM-less devices, wherein both types of terminals can be provided with an additional security when they connect to a wireless network. This is achieved in particular by providing a MAT and appropriate network control elements. The approach is in particular cost effective as there is no need for a complex handling of SIM cards.
Fig.l shows a block diagram comprising a base station BS 101 that is connected to a core network CN 102. The combination of base station 101 and core network 102 could be regarded as network or wireless network, wherein the wireless network may be further connected to a fixed network or to other wireless networks (not shown) . Mobile terminals 103 to 105 can be con¬ nected to the base station 101 via radio links. The mobile terminals 103 to 105 may be cellular devices comprising a SIM card or they may be SIM-less devices. These devices 103 to 105 may in particular support machine-to-machine communica¬ tion and could be apparatus of different kinds. The devices 103 to 105 may use a common identification to become regis¬ tered with the base station 101 and thus with the core net- work 102. The base station 101 may use a SIM card of its own to manage registration of the mobile terminals 103 to 105. Also, the mobile terminals 103 to 105 may be deployed at a pre-defined location. Fig.2 shows a message chart between a terminal and a network, wherein said network may comprise the base station (as shown, e.g., in Fig.l) . The terminal, e.g., after it has been switched on, conveys a radio fingerprint to the network, in
particular to the base station of the network (see message 201) . As an alternative, the radio fingerprint could be re¬ quested (see message 202) by the network, i.e. the network triggers conveying said message 201. Optionally (not shown in Fig.2), pre-defined information that serve as a basis for the radio fingerprint can be conveyed to the network in advance of message 201; this enhances the security of the authentica¬ tion or registration as the network is then able to decide whether the message 201 provides parameters that are a valid identification of the terminal. The pre-defined information may comprise fingerprint information of the terminal or secu¬ rity information (e.g., at least one key that is used for the communication or part thereof between the terminal and the network) .
Exemplary Scenarios:
Machine-originated traffic can be generated by various de¬ vices sending alarms or status updates to a control server. Such devices (e.g., Point of Sale terminals) are usually un¬ manned and sometimes placed unattended. Therefore, such a de¬ vice is exposed to a risk of SIM card tampering (e.g., steal¬ ing and/or fraudulent use of its SIM card) . In addition to that, distribution of SIM cards for such devices bears a lo- gistic burden in particular if such devices are deployed in large numbers. For example, changing the network provider may require a manual exchange of all SIM cards that are deployed with the devices of this network provider. Hence, authentica¬ tion credentials stored in the firmware of such a device or transmitted over an air interface to the device are consid¬ ered a cost-efficient alternative.
The approach suggested herein allows for an authentication of SIM-less devices, in particular devices that are deployed at a fixed location. Although a level of security is less than the level of security of a device comprising a SIM card, the approach is nevertheless efficient and beneficial to a sig-
nificant amount of applications that do not require a high level of security.
An exemplary device may be a cigarette vending machine that sends inventory & fault reports to the dedicated server
(hence utilizing a limited APN) via a GPRS interface on a pe¬ riodical (or regular) basis. This connection does not have to be provided with a high level of security as a potential breach of security may only lead to a faulty status informa- tion triggering an unnecessary visit to the remote machine.
Hence, the potential benefit for an attacker is limited to an unnecessary visit of the device's operator, but without any direct profit for the attacker. In addition, the application may have its own security mecha¬ nisms, e.g., electronic signatures needed by the application.
Furthermore, as an enhancement to a signaling used during a GPRS attach procedure, the terminal may request a new kind of access class to the network. Based on this access class, new types of authentication and particular restrictions on access may be enforced.
It is also an option that default encryptions, authorization keys and/or functions (i.e. individual subscriber key K, set of functions fl to f5 for calculation of authorization vectors, function f8 for ciphering, f9 for integrity control) are hard-coded in the terminal and used for SIM-less communi¬ cation as the terminal security is based on a detection of its radio features.
Alternatively, such predefined functions can be used for ini¬ tial network access. Also the functions can be used until the over-the-air (OTA) user-specific credential transfer is com- pleted by means of initialization.
It is also possible that radio signatures or application- specific encryption keys embedded in the terminal are trans-
ferred in a secured way to the network operator prior to the actual registration procedure. This may further increase the level of security. Further exemplary Embodiment: SIM-less Device
Appearance and proliferation of SIM-less devices may increase due to additional capacity provided by the wireless networks. So far, there is no efficient solution for a SIM-less device to be authenticated with the wireless network.
In several scenarios, a SIM-less device may be preferred over a device with a SIM card as it may only transmit a limited amount of data, e.g., to a particular addressee. It is hence rather inefficient or impractical to subscribe each such de¬ vice to the wireless network by assigning individual SIM cards .
An exemplary scenario relates to a so-called "femto" environ- ment . A femto access point is a base station (also referred to as home Node B) that is deployed at the customer's prem¬ ises. Such femto access point may require a separate sub¬ scription to the wireless network and thus a SIM card may be required for each device connecting to a femto access point. This is also rather complicated for standalone devices such as internet radio sets, kitchen devices (e.g., refrigerator) or digital cameras that are connected to the internet via said femto access point. Also, each such device needs a SIM card reader, which requires additional hardware as well as space.
Hence, as indicated, there are various scenarios that utilize connecting SIM-less devices to the wireless network. Existing solutions stem from times when merely a single de¬ vice was assigned to a single user providing largely one kind of service, i.e. voice calls. This scenario, however, is not adequate for the situation of increasing packet transmissions
and of multiple devices being owned by a single person, wherein some of these devices may operate independently or may not even have any form of user interface. As indicated, semi-automated or even completely automated de¬ vices may introduce new applications when being connected to the wireless network, such devices may establish a source of income for the network operators. These devices could be sim¬ plified devices regarding the services used over the air in- terface, because they may only use a subset of the function¬ ality of the wireless network (e.g., only packet-switched calls, only mobile-originated or mobile-terminated calls, no mobility management may be required, etc) . For these devices it is beneficial to be operated in a cost-efficient and has- sle-free way.
Such SIM-less device application may in particular work as follows (see also "steps of the authentication procedure" above) :
The device can be authorized in the wireless network without having to use a dedicated physical SIM card. This can be achieved in case the tasks of registration and authentication are taken over by a serving base station (a Node B or a Home Node B) , hereinafter referred to as "base station".
The base station may thus certify (in particular to other components of the wireless network) that the device is au¬ thenticated and validated. Advantageously, existing authenti- cation protocols do not have to be modified, nor do the 3GPP- compliant core network nodes. Only the base station is modi¬ fied to support said authentication (and/or validation) of SIM-less devices. It is noted that the authentication procedure for legacy equipment is not affected; the additional feature introduced herein is the authentication method of the SIM-less terminal. Several (different) authentication methods could be sup-
ported; some are exemplarily discussed in more detail herein¬ after. However, other authentication schemes may apply as well
According to one exemplary authentication method, the base station is equipped with its own SIM card and utilizes its credentials to authenticate the SIM-less devices that are served by this base station.
The SIM-less device can be utilized in a two-step approach:
(a) At first, the device is locally registered at the base station, for example using an IMEI.
As an alternative, such registration at the base station could be achieved by using a "default IMSI" concept. In such case, a commonly known IMSI number could be assigned to all SIM-less devices, e.g., by being hard- coded into these devices. The base station then recog¬ nizes that a special registration procedure is needed whenever it received a connection setup request using this "default IMSI". The first step of authentication may advantageously filter out unauthorized devices that try to connect to the base station. This filtering step, however, may be an option.
Once registered with the base station, the device may authenticate itself by launching an authentication procedure. Such a procedure could be a dedicated procedure or it may be a part of a first connection setup. The au¬ thentication could be performed just once, at every con¬ nection setup or periodically.
The SIM-less device does not have its unique IMSI,
MSISDN, nor does it have authentication keys needed to calculate an appropriate response to a challenge se¬ quence used during the authentication procedure. The SIM-less device can, however, start the call setup pro-
cedure and establish an initial connection with the base station. Within the connection request, the device sends its identity. Without an IMSI, the device may insert its IMEI. If the IMEI is known to the base station, the base station may launch a dedicated network authentication procedure; otherwise the radio connection with the un¬ known device is dropped.
As an option, an additional device authentication procedure can be provided and in particular be launched at this point.
With the device being authenticated with the base sta¬ tion, the base station may use its own credentials to allow the device to communicate with the network.
In an exemplary scenario, a SIM card could be present at the base station and the base station may then act as a substitute subscriber for all SIM-less devices that are served by this base station. Hence, all connections be¬ tween the SIM-less devices and the network are treated as multiple communication sessions established between the subscriber residing in the base station and the network. In such scenario, it is the base station's respon¬ sibility to correctly associate the SIM-less devices with PDP tunnels created for them. The base station may provide a transparent service for the SIM-less devices as if these were communicating with the wireless net¬ work .
Another alternative is applicable for the one-time au¬ thentication. In such case, when a SIM-less device wants to authenticate itself to the network, it may use the SIM credentials of the base station to obtain the T-IMSI number. In this case the core network (in particular the SGSN) may have to be configured accordingly so that the T-IMSI number does not expire too early.
If a secure communication between the simplified devices and the base station is required, additional approaches, e.g., a secure IP approach can be utilized. The authentication procedure being conducted by the base sta¬ tion instead of the SIM-less device bears the advantage that adding new devices to the network is simplified. This allows for an easy setup of a local network (e.g., a home network) and may enhance the popularity of a femto access network as well as machine-to-machine applications.
List of Abbreviations:
3GPP Third Generation Partnership Program
APN Access Point Name
ARFN Absolute Radio Frequency Number
BCCH Broadcast Common Channel
BSIC Base Station Identity Code
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
GTP GPRS Tunneling Protocol
HSPA High Speed Packet Access
IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IP Internet Protocol
MAT Master Authorization Terminal
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MSISDN Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory
Number
OTA Over The Air
PDP Packet Data Protocol
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
SC Scrambling Code
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
T-IMSI Temporary IMSI
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
Claims
Claims :
A method for processing data in a wireless network,
- wherein a mobile terminal is registered with the
wireless network by utilizing a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the mobile terminal is registered with a network by processing the following steps:
- a radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal is con¬ veyed to the network;
- the network compares the radio fingerprint with pre¬ defined data and grants access for the mobile termi¬ nal in case the predefined data matches the radio fingerprint or a portion thereof to a predetermined extent .
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the network comprises a base station that commu¬ nicates with the mobile terminal and the mobile terminal is registered with the base station.
The method according to claim 3, wherein the base sta¬ tion provides registration for the mobile terminal to¬ wards the network, in particular by utilizing an identification provided with the base station.
The method according to any of claims 3 or 4, wherein the base station is a femto access point or a home base station .
The method according to any of claims 3 to 5, wherein the mobile terminal is registered with the network by utilizing credentials of the base station and/or by utilizing credentials of at least one other terminal.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the mobile terminal has restricted access and/or uses limited services of the wireless network.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the mobile terminal conveys data via a packet- switched service of the wireless network.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the radio fingerprint of the mobile terminal comprises at least one of the following:
- radio channel characteristics;
- radio environment report;
- characteristics of the mobile terminal;
- information that is based on imperfections of manu¬ facture of the mobile terminal;
- location of the mobile terminal;
- identification information of the mobile terminal.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the mobile terminal comprises a SIM card or it is a SIM-less device.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the mobile terminal is registered with the net¬ work by sending the radio fingerprint towards the net¬ work, in particular after being triggered by the network .
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein the mobile terminal is deployed at a given loca¬ tion or area.
The method according to any of the preceding claims, wherein a common identification is used for an initial registration of the mobile terminal.
The method according to claim 13, wherein the radio fingerprint is conveyed to the network and stored for later registrations .
A device comprising or being associated with a process¬ ing unit that is arranged such that the method according to any of the preceding claims is executable thereon.
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Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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PCT/EP2009/062162 WO2011032605A1 (en) | 2009-09-21 | 2009-09-21 | Method and device for processing data in a wireless network |
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EP2481229A1 true EP2481229A1 (en) | 2012-08-01 |
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