EP2316088A2 - System and method for securing a user interface - Google Patents
System and method for securing a user interfaceInfo
- Publication number
- EP2316088A2 EP2316088A2 EP09784296A EP09784296A EP2316088A2 EP 2316088 A2 EP2316088 A2 EP 2316088A2 EP 09784296 A EP09784296 A EP 09784296A EP 09784296 A EP09784296 A EP 09784296A EP 2316088 A2 EP2316088 A2 EP 2316088A2
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- user interface
- information
- software component
- user
- main part
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Withdrawn
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/82—Protecting input, output or interconnection devices
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
- G06F21/53—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow by executing in a restricted environment, e.g. sandbox or secure virtual machine
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2105—Dual mode as a secondary aspect
Definitions
- the invention relates to a system for securing a user interface, and a method of securing such an interface.
- the user interface is the interface through which a user of a computer machine, for example a computer or an embedded system, dialogs with this machine.
- the user interface includes one or more interface devices.
- the interface devices are diverse. Some devices are so-called input devices, which allow you to enter information into the machine. Other devices are so-called output devices, which provide information from the machine. Other interface peripherals are so-called input / output devices, which allow to enter information into the machine or to output information from it.
- Input devices include keyboards, mice or other pointing devices, pinpad (personal identification keyboard in French), smart card readers, graphics tablets, microphones.
- output devices include screens or speakers.
- touch screens In most cases, the information is displayed in pixel mode on a screen, usually in a window environment, and the user uses a keyboard and a mouse, or the screen itself - if it is touch-sensitive - to interact with the machine. It is then up to applications controlling the interface to process and interpret information coming from the user.
- the banking application identifies the user by asking the user to enter his customer number. The user then enters their customer number using the computer keyboard.
- the banking application authenticates the client user by asking the latter to enter his secret access code using the keyboard of his computer and / or the mouse. If the identification and authentication are validated by the banking application, then the application displays the status of the client user account on the screen.
- Such man / machine interactions are subject to many malicious attacks. For example, some of these attacks consist of retrieving the identifier and the secret access code of the client user so that the hacker can consult at leisure the accounts of the client user to include making illegal transfers.
- the first technique is to intercept and record all events related to the input devices of the user interface and, in particular, to collect all keys that have been pressed by the user on a keyboard and / or all mouse clicks even the displacements of this one. Fatally, the identifier and the access code of the client user are retrieved by the malicious application.
- a second technique is to take control of the output devices of the interface and, in particular, to take control of the display of the screen and emulate or simulate the banking application.
- the client user who then believes that he is dealing with the real banking application, provides his credentials and access codes to the malicious application. These identifiers and codes are recovered for fraudulent use. Phishing is an example of such fraudulent practices.
- the pilot software of the peripherals of said interface This is for example the security of the keyboard driver, the mouse and / or the security of the driver of the graphics card of the screen.
- the secure drivers include for example a secret key shared with the controlled hardware, so that the information processed by the driver is encrypted and therefore not accessible in clear by malicious applications.
- Terra TM As for the so-called Terra TM technology, which is disclosed in the document entitled “Terra: A Virtual Machine-Based Platform for Trusted Computing", TaI Garfinkel et al., Computer Science Department, Stanford University, it has not been implemented. commercially essentially for the reasons mentioned above. Moreover, this is confirmed in this document, which teaches, in point 2.3, that "We have not implemented a secure user interface in our Terra prototype. We believe that the implementation of a secure user interface, which would allow the use of graphics hardware capabilities, should require additional hardware and software support. "
- security indicators in the user interface. This is, in a non-limiting example, a small padlock in a corner of the browser, a red frame around a window, and / or a reserved banner at the top of the screen. Thus, a window or information entered on the keyboard will be considered as trusted if the security indicator is present.
- Such indicators are disclosed in particular in the international application published under the number WO2007060322.
- the security of this approach is based on the difficulty of guessing all the indicators provided by the application and displaying an indicator at the particular location of the user interface. It is therefore a practical approach, which is commonly used in computer science, but which offers a more modest level of security, the display of an indicator in a window being potentially within the reach of an attacker more or less aware.
- L4Linux is, in fact, the Linux operating system implemented as an application above the L4 microkernel.
- This particular application is thus seen as an application of the micronucleus L4, operating in user mode.
- the classic Linux window manager is in the L4Linux application.
- the graphics events for the L4 micronucleus applications are handled directly by the first Nitpicker TM interface controller and are invisible to Linux applications, and vice versa.
- This third approach allows a good separation of applications.
- it imposes a duplication of the user interface controllers, which implies an increase in the size of the code, an increased consumption of resources and, of course, errors to be corrected in each of the controllers is a technical support to ensure.
- a problem proposes to solve the invention is to provide a system for securing a user interface comprising: a user interface managed by hardware devices; one or more applications using the user interface; one or more hardware devices of the user interface for interacting with said interface, said hardware devices being controlled by pilot software, which overcomes the aforementioned drawbacks of the state of the art and which, in particular, does not require modification of the hardware devices or duplication of interface controllers, while showing an adequate level of security against, for example, malicious applications that proceed by recording keystrokes or phishing.
- the solution of the invention to this problem posed first object is a system for securing a user interface comprising: a user interface comprising one or more hardware devices of the user interface for interacting with said interface, said hardware peripherals being piloted by pilot software; one or more applications using the user interface; characterized by further comprising: a hypervisor having direct access to hardware devices of the user interface; one or more virtual machines for executing the application or applications using the user interface, said virtual machines having no direct access to the hardware resources of the user interface; and a security software component comprising a front portion controlled by the one or more virtual machines, said front portion of the security software being included in said one or more virtual machines, and a main portion controlled by the hypervisor, said main part of the software of security being included in said hypervisor, the drivers of hardware devices of the user interface being split into two parts, a main part of said drivers being placed under the control of the hypervisor, a front portion of said drivers being placed under the control of the machines virtual, the front end of the security software component ensuring the management of the front part
- Its second object is a method for securing a user interface, characterized in that it comprises the steps of: providing a user interface comprising one or more hardware peripherals of the user interface for interacting with said interface, said hardware devices being driven by pilot software; providing a hypervisor, one or more virtual machines for executing one or more applications using the user interface, said virtual machines having no direct access to the hardware resources of the user interface and a security software component comprising a front portion controlled by the one or more virtual machines, said front portion of the security software being included in said one or more virtual machines, and a main portion controlled by the hypervisor, said main part of the security software being included in said hypervisor; executing an application of a virtual machine; enabling a secure mode of the system at the request of the application; securely displaying information controlled by the main portion of the security software component, the hypervisor accessing the hardware peripherals of the user interface directly; then disable the secure mode of the system.
- the hardware peripherals of the user interface comprise at least one user information input device and a screen; the main part of the software component is able to display and control the display of a graphical interface component in the interface user, for the input of information by the user; - The main part of the software component is able to validate identification and / or authentication information entered by the user; the information exchanged between the main part of the security component and the front part of this component is secured by means of encryption and / or signature keys; information exchanged between the front part of the security software component and an application of the virtual machine comprising this front part are secured by means of encryption and / or signature keys; the method further comprises the following steps according to which: the application requires the input of a user information, the input request is transmitted to the main part of the software component, a graphical data entry component is displayed under the direct control of the security software component, the user enters a user information, and the user information is validated; the user information is validated by the main part of the security software component, or is sent back to the front part of said component
- FIG. 1 schematically presents the system according to the invention
- FIG. 2 is a diagram which illustrates the various steps of the method according to the invention for the secure entry of information into a graphic component
- FIG. 3 is a diagram which illustrates the various steps of the method according to the invention for the secure display of information.
- the present invention relates to systems for securing a user interface.
- the systems according to the invention are intended to be implemented, in particular, but not exclusively, in devices of the embedded type, which often have limited hardware resources, in comparison with the resources available to computers, particularly of the personal type, for example. They are nevertheless likely to concern such computers.
- the onboard devices particularly targeted in the present invention are portable devices manufactured in series such as smart cards associated with card readers themselves connected to a terminal, mobile phones optionally equipped with subscriber identification modules and having a screen, personal digital assistants, or any other small electronic devices manipulating digital data.
- the embedded devices according to the invention are provided with a processor or no. They include at least one and sometimes several memories.
- the systems of the invention include a user interface comprising one or more hardware devices of the user interface, and one or more applications using the user interface.
- the user interface is the interface through which a user of a computer machine, for example a computer or an embedded system, dialogs with this machine.
- the user interface comprises one of several hardware devices of the interface, which are driven by pilot software.
- the peripherals of the interface are various. Some devices are input devices that allow you to enter information into the machine. Other devices are output devices, which provide information from the machine. Other interface devices still are input / output devices, which allow you to enter information into the machine or output information from it.
- Input devices include keyboards, mice or other pointing devices, pinpad, smart card readers, graphics tablets, microphones.
- output devices include the screens or speakers.
- UI-based applications are various applications that cause UI events for the management of user-entered information and / or the presentation of such information, or other user audit information.
- the information entered by the user includes identification and / or authentication information.
- Applications issue various queries, such as display or input queries.
- an application may be a banking application, which allows a user to access these bank accounts and make transfers.
- Hardware devices in the user interface are devices that allow the user to interact with the interface. They are piloted by pilot software. These devices are for example keyboards, mice, screens including touch.
- the system according to the invention further comprises a hypervisor, one or more virtual machines and a security software component called in this figure Secure UI.
- the hypervisor or privileged domain, is a software layer that allows the execution of one or more virtual machines above said layer.
- the hypervisor has direct access to the hardware resources of the user interface and in particular to the peripherals. In the invention, it is the only entity with such direct access to these resources. Indeed, virtual machines do not have direct access to hardware devices. They do not have this privilege.
- the virtual machines include a guest operating system of their own and at least one application using the user interface. They allow the execution of this or these applications.
- Virtual machines have either indirect access to hardware devices, or access that may appear to be direct, but transiting by the hypervisor. Also, the so-called hardware accesses that virtual machines have, which are indirect accesses to the interface peripherals, are thus controlled and controlled solely by the hypervisor. In addition, virtual machines do not communicate with each other. They are isolated from each other.
- Xen TM virtualization architecture developed by the University of Cambridge (UK) or the VMWare TM virtualization architecture.
- the hypervisor which ultimately is a particular virtual machine, is the zero domain (domO). It ensures separation and isolation of virtual machines, each virtual machine corresponding to a specific domain, domU, which does not have domO privileges. Indeed, the privilege of physical access to devices is delegated by virtual machines from domU to the hypervisor.
- the hardware device drivers of the user interface are split into two parts.
- a significant portion of said drivers is placed and rotates in the hypervisor, under the control of said hypervisor. This is the part that physically manages device access.
- Another part, smaller in size, is placed and rotates in each virtual machine, under the control of each virtual machine.
- This other part serves as a relay to the part of the driver located in the hypervisor.
- the portion of the driver contained in the hypervisor is referred to as the main part of the driver or backend driver in Figure 1.
- the driver portion located in the virtual machines is called the front part of the pilot or frontend driver in Figure 1.
- the security software component according to the invention is a component of the user interface, intended to secure this interface.
- This component comprises a front-end or Secure UI frontend, controlled by the virtual machine (s) as well as a main part, or Secure UI backend, controlled by the hypervisor.
- the front part of the security software is included, that is to say integrated in the virtual machine (s).
- the main part of the security software is included or integrated in the hypervisor.
- This component manages the hardware interface drivers of the interface, that is to say for example the drivers of the keyboard, the screen, the mouse or pinpad.
- This component can be considered as a pilot component of hardware device drivers for the user interface.
- the main part of this driver interacts with the user's interface devices.
- a virtual machine of a system first activates the front part of the security software component.
- a security context is then created and various information is noted such as the identifier of the virtual machine. Therefore, the user interface is in so-called secure mode.
- an application A of the aforementioned virtual machine wishes to authenticate a user, for example by entering a password or a personal identification code (PIN), it notifies the front part of the software component of securing his request. This frontal part of this component transmits the request to the main part of the hypervisor component.
- PIN personal identification code
- the latter can then decide whether or not to display, on the screen, a GUI component, more specifically a confidence window, for entering the password or PIN. If it decides to display this graphic component, the hypervisor directly accesses the card or graphical component of the interface. More particularly, the main part of the security software component retrieves the frame buffer of the virtual machine concerned and inserts the display of the GUI component for entering the password or PIN in calling the driver of the card or graphics component to display. A window will appear on the UI screen. He can enter his password or PIN for example using the keyboard or a pinpad.
- the keyboard or pinpad driver When entering the password or PIN, the keyboard or pinpad driver is used. The entered information is directly sent to the main part of the user interface security software component.
- either the main part of this component validates the pass mode itself, or said password is transmitted to the front part of the security component.
- the main part of the security software component transmits the password to the front of this component, it can, in turn, validate the password / PIN or transmit it to the application so that it validates it.
- the requests and information exchanged in the system are secure because they necessarily pass through the two parts of the security component.
- an application B for example malicious, contained in the virtual machine comprising the application A or else in another virtual machine, can not change the display of the graphical input component password or change the entry of the last.
- the display of the graphic component and the input of information by the user are entirely managed by the security software component, within the hypervisor. It is this component that decides to display a password / PIN entry graphical component and accesses the hardware resources directly for this display. It is this software component that decides the size and shape of this graphical input component. It is this security software component that receives the events entered by the user and manages this information.
- Virtual machines can not access the image buffer and the information entered on hardware devices in the GUI. They can not short-circuit the hypervisor because they do not have direct access to hardware devices. As well, the invention effectively secures the man / machine interactions.
- the security software component is likely to respond to the following commands, which are mostly mentioned in Figures 2 and 3 above.
- the ACTIVATE command issued by an application, which makes it possible to create a security context between a virtual machine, or an application of a virtual machine. This is the command to enter the secure mode.
- the DEACTIVATE command is used to switch from secure mode to non-secure mode. After calling this command, the user interface is no longer secure. It should be noted that the secure context can only be deactivated by the component that has commanded the activation of the secure mode. The authentication of this component can be performed using a signature shared key when creating the context.
- the command GET_DATA is a command that can be issued by the application that requires the input of information such as a PIN, a password, an identifier or various data, and which is intended for the security software component.
- the information obtained following the execution of this command is sent encrypted and signed to the front part of the security software component, or to the requesting application, in the case where keys have been shared.
- the DISPLAY_DATA command which requires the display of information in a trust window.
- the information is transmitted from the front end of the security software component, or application, to the main part of that component, and then displayed in the user interface under the control of the hypervisor.
- the main part the security software component which runs within the hypervisor, controls the formatting of this information.
- the hypervisor can display the source of said information.
- commands specific to entering passwords, PINs or other identification or authentication information are likely to be implemented in the method according to the invention.
- This information is validated by comparison in the main part of the security software component, which runs in the hypervisor.
- the validation or the absence of validation of the authentication is returned, for example, encrypted and signed, to the front part of the security software component, or even to the requesting application, if keys have been shared for this purpose with this application.
- the entry of the information under the control of the security software component, which executes in the hypervisor is likely to be performed by keyboard, by means of a mouse or by clicking on a pinpad including the type comprising a window with visual keys on which the user must click.
- the command SET_PIN according to which an application, which sends the command, requires the updating of identification or authentication information in the memory of the main part of the security software component, which is executes in the hypervisor. Indeed, the identification or authentication information is validated, in the main part of the security software component, against data stored in memory of it.
- This command therefore allows the modification of the data stored in the memory of the main part of the software component. It can be invoked a first time by any application, if the application requires the establishment of a comparison information in the memory of the software component. Then, the modification of the information by this application can be made only on presentation and validation of the information stored in memory.
- the main part of the security software component which executes in the hypervisor, activates a particular device such as a smart card reader, requires the input of an identification code, validates the code entered or not, and returns the validation or non-validation information to the front part of the security software component, or even to the requesting application, if keys have been shared for this purpose.
- the securing of the system according to the invention can advantageously be enhanced by securing the communication channel between the main part of the security software component and its front part.
- signature and / or encryption keys are shared between the main and front parts of the component. These keys are used to secure queries and responses that pass between these parts.
- identification information is validated by the front part of the component, this information will be transmitted securely, encrypted and / or signed in the communication channel. Indeed, if the information and signed and / or encrypted, it can not be modified and / or read by third-party virtual machines.
- Securing the system according to the invention may also advantageously be enhanced by securing communications between the front end of the security software component and the or each of the applications of the virtual machine comprising this part.
- encryption and / or signature keys are shared between this front end and the secure application. These keys make it possible to encrypt and / or sign the messages that transit between the two entities, in particular the identification or authentication information if they must be validated by the application itself.
- the other applications of the virtual machine can not read and / or modify the information intended for the requesting application.
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- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Mathematical Physics (AREA)
- User Interface Of Digital Computer (AREA)
- Stored Programmes (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
FR0804192A FR2934395B1 (en) | 2008-07-23 | 2008-07-23 | SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR SECURING A USER INTERFACE |
PCT/FR2009/000918 WO2010010258A2 (en) | 2008-07-23 | 2009-07-23 | System and method for securing a user interface |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
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EP2316088A2 true EP2316088A2 (en) | 2011-05-04 |
Family
ID=40230045
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP09784296A Withdrawn EP2316088A2 (en) | 2008-07-23 | 2009-07-23 | System and method for securing a user interface |
Country Status (4)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US8874931B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2316088A2 (en) |
FR (1) | FR2934395B1 (en) |
WO (1) | WO2010010258A2 (en) |
Families Citing this family (14)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
IL210169A0 (en) | 2010-12-22 | 2011-03-31 | Yehuda Binder | System and method for routing-based internet security |
WO2012128681A1 (en) | 2011-03-22 | 2012-09-27 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Method for switching between virtualized and non-virtualized system operation |
US8813218B2 (en) * | 2012-02-14 | 2014-08-19 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Security-enhanced computer systems and methods |
US9129124B2 (en) * | 2012-04-12 | 2015-09-08 | Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. | Dynamic provisioning of virtual systems |
US9769123B2 (en) * | 2012-09-06 | 2017-09-19 | Intel Corporation | Mitigating unauthorized access to data traffic |
US9232176B2 (en) | 2013-03-04 | 2016-01-05 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securing computer video and audio subsystems |
US9684805B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2017-06-20 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securing computer interfaces |
US9231921B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2016-01-05 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | System and architecture for secure computer devices |
US11210432B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2021-12-28 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for selectively snooping and capturing data for secure computer interfaces |
US9384150B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2016-07-05 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for performing transparent mass storage backups and snapshots |
US9424443B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2016-08-23 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for securing computer mass storage data |
US9215250B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2015-12-15 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | System and method for remotely managing security and configuration of compute devices |
US9076003B2 (en) | 2013-08-20 | 2015-07-07 | Janus Technologies, Inc. | Method and apparatus for transparently encrypting and decrypting computer interface data |
US9342331B2 (en) | 2013-10-21 | 2016-05-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Secure virtualized mobile cellular device |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7380136B2 (en) * | 2003-06-25 | 2008-05-27 | Intel Corp. | Methods and apparatus for secure collection and display of user interface information in a pre-boot environment |
US20060089992A1 (en) * | 2004-10-26 | 2006-04-27 | Blaho Bruce E | Remote computing systems and methods for supporting multiple sessions |
US7886353B2 (en) * | 2005-03-25 | 2011-02-08 | Microsoft Corporation | Accessing a USB host controller security extension using a HCD proxy |
US7661126B2 (en) * | 2005-04-01 | 2010-02-09 | Microsoft Corporation | Systems and methods for authenticating a user interface to a computer user |
GB0615015D0 (en) * | 2006-07-28 | 2006-09-06 | Hewlett Packard Development Co | Secure use of user secrets on a computing platform |
-
2008
- 2008-07-23 FR FR0804192A patent/FR2934395B1/en active Active
-
2009
- 2009-07-23 EP EP09784296A patent/EP2316088A2/en not_active Withdrawn
- 2009-07-23 US US13/055,454 patent/US8874931B2/en active Active
- 2009-07-23 WO PCT/FR2009/000918 patent/WO2010010258A2/en active Application Filing
Non-Patent Citations (1)
Title |
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See references of WO2010010258A3 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
WO2010010258A3 (en) | 2010-03-18 |
US8874931B2 (en) | 2014-10-28 |
FR2934395A1 (en) | 2010-01-29 |
WO2010010258A2 (en) | 2010-01-28 |
US20110131423A1 (en) | 2011-06-02 |
FR2934395B1 (en) | 2013-01-04 |
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