EP1975885A1 - Système et procédé de certification et d'authentification électronique - Google Patents

Système et procédé de certification et d'authentification électronique Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1975885A1
EP1975885A1 EP07006416A EP07006416A EP1975885A1 EP 1975885 A1 EP1975885 A1 EP 1975885A1 EP 07006416 A EP07006416 A EP 07006416A EP 07006416 A EP07006416 A EP 07006416A EP 1975885 A1 EP1975885 A1 EP 1975885A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
client
data
biometric data
biometric
key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP07006416A
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German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Mohammed A. Geoffrey
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Individual
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Individual
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Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Priority to EP07006416A priority Critical patent/EP1975885A1/fr
Publication of EP1975885A1 publication Critical patent/EP1975885A1/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
    • G07C9/35—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check by means of a handwritten signature
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
    • G07C9/37—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition

Definitions

  • the invention relates to electronic document security systems and in particular to user authentication and to the certification and secure transfer of sensitive document information of various type, like whole documents, certificates, signatures, stamps, etc., especially by verifying its correctness and safety / immunity from fraud.
  • EP 1 688 891 describes an electronic certification and authentication system comprising a plurality of hierarchically structured modules which can be accessed by entering an enrolled identity and a corresponding passwords and/or a corresponding signature. Document information can be entered, certified, and saved in and, at a later date, read out from a system database by an authorized person.
  • a system for electronic certification and authentication comprising a main module, a first subordinate module, a database for storing personal data and biometric data, and a biometric device for capturing biometric data, wherein the main module is configured to:
  • a method for electronic certification and authentication for use in a system comprising a main module, first subordinate module, a second subordinate module, a database for storing biometric data, and a biometric device for capturing biometric data; wherein the method comprises the following steps carried out by the main module:
  • FIG.1 shows a simplified exemplary schematic diagram of a system according to an embodiment of the invention implemented in a communication network.
  • the system according to the invention comprises a plurality of hierarchically structured modules.
  • the embodiment shown in Figure 1 includes three hierarchically structured modules, main module 11, first subordinate module 12, and second subordinate module 13, but other embodiments comprising four or more hierarchically structured modules are also possible.
  • the modules run on a server connected to a database 14.
  • a computer 21 is connected, e.g. by an internet connection with the server 10. Further, the computer 21 is connected to a biometric device 22, a scanner 23, and a printer 24.
  • a further computer 31 which is connected to a further biometric device, a further scanner 33, and a further printer 34.
  • the further computer 31 is not connected to the server 10 and is therefore also called "stand alone computer” in the following.
  • the server 10 is preferably placed in a trusted environment (e.g. a trust center), as for example in the data centre of certification offices.
  • a trusted environment e.g. a trust center
  • the main module 11 updates its data by connecting to the database 14 and/or by connecting to one of the subordinate modules 12 and 13.
  • the main module 11 is preferably accessed by means of an internet browser plug-in from a computer having an internet browser installed.
  • the process to use the system usually starts with an authorized person causing the main module to generate three asymmetric key pairs.
  • a first asymmetric key pair will be used to certify biometric data of clients of the first subordinate module 12 and members of the second subordinate module 13, respectively, a second asymmetric key pair will be used to authenticate identity data of clients and members, respectively, and a third asymmetric key pair will be used to authenticate document data.
  • the system may generate these key pairs at the first time the system is used, but authorized persons may generate a new set of key pairs at a later time.
  • Each key pair set may be assigned a name and a number which identifies the generation number of the respective set.
  • the authorized person may enrol a client for the first subordinate module 12 to grant a further person, the client, access to the first subordinate module 12.
  • personal data of the client is entered, encrypted with a first key of the second asymmetric key pair, and stored in the database 14.
  • biometric data of the client is captured by the biometric device 22, encrypted with a first key of the first asymmetric key pair, and stored in the database 14.
  • a client identity and password is assigned to the client for accessing the first subordinate module 12.
  • a 2D barcode of the client identity data may be generated.
  • a 2D barcode usually has bars placed on the horizontal and the vertical dimensions and is generated using a 2D barcode generation program which transfers information into bars form. To be able to transform longer documents in barcode form, the document information is compressed.
  • the personal data and the biometric data of the client are compressed and encrypted with a system generated random key
  • the system generated random key is encrypted with a first key of the second asymmetric key pair
  • the 2D barcode is then generated from the encrypted system generated random key concatenated with the compressed personal and biometric data of the client.
  • the 2D barcode serves as a sort of "certificate of authenticity" for confirming that the associated data of the client is authentic to the system.
  • a client identity card comprising the 2D barcode may be printed.
  • the first subordinate module 12 which preferably runs on the server 10 in a trusted environment can be accessed by clients which have been enrolled for the first subordinate module 12 in two different ways:
  • the first subordinate module 12 may be preferably accessed by means of a plug-in for an internet browser which will be described in detail with reference to Figure 2 .
  • the client then enters his client identity and password to be granted access to the first subordinate module 12.
  • the client may scan his client identity card by means of the scanner 23 and 33, respectively, and enter his client password to be granted access to the first subordinate module 12.
  • the first subordinate module 12 may be used by a certified client to enrol a further person, a so-called member, for the second subordinate module 13.
  • biometric data of the client is captured by means of the biometric device 22 and biometric data of the client which is stored in the database 14 is decrypted with a second key of the first asymmetric key pair and, as last step, the biometric data captured by the biometric device 22 is compared with the decrypted biometric data stored in the database 14. If the comparison is accepted the identity of the client is certified.
  • biometric data of the client captured by the biometric device 22 can be compared with the biometric data of the client stored on his client identity card.
  • biometric data of the member is captured by the biometric device 22, encrypted with the first key of the first asymmetric key pair, and stored in the database 14.
  • a member identity and password is assigned to the member for accessing the second subordinate module 13.
  • a 2D barcode of the member identity data may be generated: The personal data and the biometric data of the member are compressed and encrypted with a system generated random key, the system generated random key is encrypted with the first key of the second asymmetric key pair, and the 2D barcode is then generated from the encrypted system generated random key concatenated with the compressed personal and biometric data of the member.
  • a member identity card comprising the 2D barcode may be printed.
  • the second subordinate module 13 which preferably runs on the server 10 in a trusted environment (but which can also run on a further server or computer connected to the server 10) can be accessed by members enrolled for the second subordinate module 13 in two different ways:
  • the second subordinate module 13 may be used by a member to authenticate data and print the data or authorize a further member to print the data.
  • document data may be entered and uploaded, respectively, and an identity of the member has to be certified.
  • biometric data of the member is captured by means of the biometric device 22, and biometric data of the member which is stored in the database 14 is decrypted with the second key of the first asymmetric key pair, and the biometric data captured by the biometric device 22 is compared with the decrypted biometric data stored in the database 14. If the comparison is accepted the identity of the member is certified.
  • biometric data of the member captured by the biometric device 22 can be compared with the biometric data of the member stored on his client identity card.
  • the certified member can cause the second subordinate module 13 to generate a document 2D barcode for document data.
  • the second subordinate module 13 generates a data hash code from the document data, encrypts the data hash code with a first key of the third asymmetric key pair, compresses the document data, and generates the document 2D barcode from the encrypted hash code concatenated with the compressed document data.
  • the certified member can print the document data together with the generated document 2D barcode or can authorize a further member to print the document data together with the generated document 2D barcode by assigning a member identity and password to the further member.
  • Some of the functionalities of the system 10, which are often used, may be implemented as separate modules, which may be called by the main module or one of the subordinate modules. This is especially advantageous for systems comprising a plurality of subordinate modules.
  • the functionalities of enrolling a client, member and/or user for a further subordinate module and/or of certifying an identity of a client, member of a further subordinate module may be implemented as respective modules.
  • the computer 21 is connected to the server 10, preferably by an internet connection.
  • a plug-in module may be implemented in the computer 21 of a client/member to secure transfer of sensitive data (especially captured biometric data), between the server 10, the computer 21, and the biometric device 22.
  • a client/member downloads, 200, the signed plug-in module with a signed first asymmetric key pair from the server 10 and installs it on e.g. computer 21.
  • the client/member requests, 201, the server 10 to send a server time stamp to the plug-in module.
  • the plug-in module checks, 202, its own signature. If it is ok, the client/member can transfer, 203, biometric data captured by the biometric device 22 to a trusted memory (TM) by means of the plug-in module.
  • TM can be encrypted memory, a trusted platform module or protected memory and may be part of the database 14.
  • the plug-in module generates, 204, a random symmetric key and stores it in the TM.
  • the plug-in module encrypts, 205, the captured client/member biometric data and the server time stamp with the symmetric key.
  • the plug-in module reads and stores, 206, the first asymmetric key pair in the TM.
  • the plug-in module checks, 207, the signature of the first asymmetric key pair. If it is ok, the plug-in module encrypts, 208, the symmetric key with the first asymmetric key pair.
  • the plug-in module sends, 209, all the encrypted data to the server 10.
  • the server 10 decrypts, 210, the symmetric key with the first asymmetric key pair and decrypts, 210, the biometric data and the server time stamp with the symmetric key.
  • the server 10 finally checks, 211, the server time stamp and if it is ok, accepts the biometric data captured by the biometric device 22.
  • the plug-in module may certainly be used for secure transfer of any kind of sensitive data.
  • Figure 3 refers to an example of a separate module having a special functionality, the certification of document and/or identity data.
  • a simplified exemplary flowchart illustrating steps for providing a certificate of authenticity for data entered or uploaded on a document or an identity card.
  • a 2D barcode is generated, 301, from the hash code of the data, the hash code is encrypted, 302, with a document private key, the data is compressed, 303, and a hash code is generated, 304, from the encrypted hash code and the compressed data.
  • the identity data is compressed, 311, encrypted, 312, with a symmetric key randomly generated, the symmetric key is encrypted, 313, with an identity private key, and a 2D barcode is generated, 314, from the encrypted symmetric key and the encrypted compressed data.
  • the 2D barcode respectively serves as a "certificate of authenticity" which marks the associated data as authentic to the system and created by a certified client/member.
  • the system shown in Figure 1 further provides a facility to verify document data and identity data of clients and members offline on the "stand-alone" computer 31.
  • Figure 4 shows a simplified exemplary flowchart illustrating steps for certifying identity data offline carried out by a offline verification module implemented in the computer 31.
  • a printed 2D barcode comprising client/member identity data, i.e. personal and biometric data of the client/member
  • client/member identity data i.e. personal and biometric data of the client/member
  • the scanner 33 reads, 401, for example from a client/member identity card, and the client/member enters, 402, his password.
  • the second asymmetric key pair also referred to as "identity public key”
  • the second asymmetric key pair is decrypted 403 with the client/member password, if necessary, i.e. if the identity public key has been encrypted with the client/member password before.
  • the encrypted system generated random key is decrypted, 404, with the second key of the second asymmetric key pair and the decrypted system generated random key is used for decrypting the identity data and the decrypted identity data which comprises the biometric data of the client/member is decompressed, 405.
  • biometric data of the client/member to be certified is captured, 406, by means of the biometric device 32 connected to the computer 31.
  • the biometric data from the 2D barcode of the e.g. identity card of the client/member is compared, 407, with the biometric data of the client/member captured by means of the biometric device 32. If the comparison is acceptable, 408, the identity of the client/member is certified offline, 409.
  • Figure 5 shows a simplified exemplary flowchart illustrating steps for verifying document data carried out offline by the offline verification module or a further separate module implemented in the computer 31.
  • a document 2D barcode is scanned by means of the scanner 33 and read out, 501, for example from a print-out comprising document data and the corresponding document 2D barcode.
  • the encrypted hash code is decrypted, 502, with a second key of the third asymmetric key pair (also referred to as "system public key"), the data is decompressed, 503, and a hash code is generated, 504, from the decompressed data.
  • the just generated hash code is compared, 505, with the decompressed hash code. If both hash codes match, 506, the document data can be displayed, 507, for verification purposes.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
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  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
EP07006416A 2007-03-28 2007-03-28 Système et procédé de certification et d'authentification électronique Withdrawn EP1975885A1 (fr)

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EP07006416A EP1975885A1 (fr) 2007-03-28 2007-03-28 Système et procédé de certification et d'authentification électronique

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EP07006416A EP1975885A1 (fr) 2007-03-28 2007-03-28 Système et procédé de certification et d'authentification électronique

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Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012089533A1 (fr) * 2010-12-31 2012-07-05 Gemalto Sa Système fournissant une résistance à l'écumage améliorée pour un document d'identité électronique

Citations (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2001035348A1 (fr) * 1999-11-09 2001-05-17 Iridian Technologies, Inc. Systeme et procede d'authentification de transactions d'expedition a l'aide de donnees biometriques imprimables et lisibles
US6317834B1 (en) * 1999-01-29 2001-11-13 International Business Machines Corporation Biometric authentication system with encrypted models
WO2002032308A1 (fr) * 2000-10-17 2002-04-25 Kent Ridge Digital Labs Procede et systeme d'authentification biometrique
DE10103044A1 (de) * 2001-01-24 2002-07-25 Bosch Gmbh Robert Vorrichtung zur benutzerspezifischen Aktivierung von Fahrzeugfunktionen
DE10138763A1 (de) * 2001-08-07 2003-02-27 Bosch Gmbh Robert Personenidentifizierungssystem für die Zugangsberechtigung von Personen zu einem Sicherheitsbereich
US20030044050A1 (en) * 2001-08-28 2003-03-06 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for biometric identification and response
DE10154956A1 (de) * 2001-11-11 2003-05-22 Rene Baltus Biometrische Zugangssicherung, Ingangsetzungs- und Wegfahrsperre für Fahr- und Flugzeuge
US20040015704A1 (en) * 2000-05-18 2004-01-22 Stefaan De Schrijver Smartchip biometric device
US6910129B1 (en) * 1999-12-24 2005-06-21 Kent Ridge Digital Labs Remote authentication based on exchanging signals representing biometrics information

Patent Citations (9)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US6317834B1 (en) * 1999-01-29 2001-11-13 International Business Machines Corporation Biometric authentication system with encrypted models
WO2001035348A1 (fr) * 1999-11-09 2001-05-17 Iridian Technologies, Inc. Systeme et procede d'authentification de transactions d'expedition a l'aide de donnees biometriques imprimables et lisibles
US6910129B1 (en) * 1999-12-24 2005-06-21 Kent Ridge Digital Labs Remote authentication based on exchanging signals representing biometrics information
US20040015704A1 (en) * 2000-05-18 2004-01-22 Stefaan De Schrijver Smartchip biometric device
WO2002032308A1 (fr) * 2000-10-17 2002-04-25 Kent Ridge Digital Labs Procede et systeme d'authentification biometrique
DE10103044A1 (de) * 2001-01-24 2002-07-25 Bosch Gmbh Robert Vorrichtung zur benutzerspezifischen Aktivierung von Fahrzeugfunktionen
DE10138763A1 (de) * 2001-08-07 2003-02-27 Bosch Gmbh Robert Personenidentifizierungssystem für die Zugangsberechtigung von Personen zu einem Sicherheitsbereich
US20030044050A1 (en) * 2001-08-28 2003-03-06 International Business Machines Corporation System and method for biometric identification and response
DE10154956A1 (de) * 2001-11-11 2003-05-22 Rene Baltus Biometrische Zugangssicherung, Ingangsetzungs- und Wegfahrsperre für Fahr- und Flugzeuge

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2012089533A1 (fr) * 2010-12-31 2012-07-05 Gemalto Sa Système fournissant une résistance à l'écumage améliorée pour un document d'identité électronique
EP2474931A1 (fr) * 2010-12-31 2012-07-11 Gemalto SA Système fournissant une résistance améliorée contre le vol de données pour un document d'identité électronique
US9396506B2 (en) 2010-12-31 2016-07-19 Gemalto Sa System providing an improved skimming resistance for an electronic identity document

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