EP1946580B1 - Method of providing security for relay station - Google Patents

Method of providing security for relay station Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1946580B1
EP1946580B1 EP06799309.7A EP06799309A EP1946580B1 EP 1946580 B1 EP1946580 B1 EP 1946580B1 EP 06799309 A EP06799309 A EP 06799309A EP 1946580 B1 EP1946580 B1 EP 1946580B1
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
authentication
relay station
station
relay
base station
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Not-in-force
Application number
EP06799309.7A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
EP1946580A2 (en
EP1946580A4 (en
Inventor
Ki Seon Ryu
Chang Jae Lee
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
LG Electronics Inc
Original Assignee
LG Electronics Inc
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by LG Electronics Inc filed Critical LG Electronics Inc
Publication of EP1946580A2 publication Critical patent/EP1946580A2/en
Publication of EP1946580A4 publication Critical patent/EP1946580A4/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of EP1946580B1 publication Critical patent/EP1946580B1/en
Not-in-force legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B1/00—Details of transmission systems, not covered by a single one of groups H04B3/00 - H04B13/00; Details of transmission systems not characterised by the medium used for transmission
    • H04B1/59—Responders; Transponders
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04B—TRANSMISSION
    • H04B7/00—Radio transmission systems, i.e. using radiation field
    • H04B7/14—Relay systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08—Reselecting an access point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W84/00—Network topologies
    • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
    • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
    • H04W84/042—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems
    • H04W84/047—Public Land Mobile systems, e.g. cellular systems using dedicated repeater stations

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a security providing method applied to a broadband wireless access system, and more particularly, to a method of providing security of a relay station.
  • the present invention is suitable for a wide scope of applications, it is particularly suitable for providing the security of the relay station that relays signals between a mobile station and a base station.
  • FIG. 1 is a structural diagram of a security sublayer applied to a broadband wireless access system.
  • a broadband wireless access system as a security requirement, authentication, privacy of data and integrity of data are provided using a PKM(privacy and key management) protocol.
  • An authentication procedure is carried out via validity update of an authentication key in case that a mobile station enters a network.
  • the authentication procedure can be also carried out using RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) or EAP (extensible authentication protocol) authentication protocol in case that a mobile station performs a handover.
  • the PKM protocol enables protection against threats such as a replay attack by an unauthorized user and the like in a manner of defining an authentication key update procedure via re-authentication and an encryption key update procedure and the like.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram to explain a communication performing method using a relay station according to a related art.
  • a relay station can be used for service coverage extension and data throughput improvement.
  • a relay station plays a role as a relay between a mobile station and a base station, whereby a service area is extended or higher data throughput can be provided.
  • a network including the relay station has a tree structure where a base station is a terminal point of a relayed data path.
  • a relay station includes a relay station 32 for data throughput improvement and a relay station 34 for service coverage extension.
  • SSs subscriber stations
  • BSs base stations
  • PKM privacy key management
  • SAs security associations
  • the present invention is directed to a method of providing security of a relay station that substantially obviates one or more of the problems due to limitations and disadvantages of the related art.
  • a method of providing a security of a relay station which is provided to a mobile communication system to relay a signal transfer between a base station and a mobile station, includes the steps of receiving a master key from an authentication server, deriving an authentication key from the received master key, generating a list of the mobile station relayed by the relay station, transmitting the mobile station list to the relay station, and transmitting uplink and downlink signals via the relay station using the authentication key.
  • the present invention provides the authentication method for the relay station, thereby enabling the relayed data to be safely delivered.
  • the base station receives a master key for the mobile station from the authentication server (S44). And, each of the mobile station and the base station generates an authentication key from the received master key. Each of the mobile station and the base station generates a message authentication code key for integrity of MAC(media access control) management message and a KEK(key encryption key) to encrypt a TEK(traffic encryption key). And, the mobile station and the base station perform 3-way handshake to test validity of the authentication key and then perform mutual authentication (S45).
  • a method of a relay station associated networking is explained as follows.
  • a relay station performs a network registration procedure or a handover procedure to perform communications with a base station. And, the relay station performs an authentication procedure for relay station authentication via an authentication server in the course of performing the network registration procedure or the handover procedure.
  • a message authentication code key to secure integrity of a MAC(media access control) management message exchanged between the base station and the mobile station is derived from an authentication key given by the authentication server through the authentication procedure, by which integrity of control signaling between the relay station and the base station is secured.
  • the relay station plays a role in relaying messages and data between the mobile station and the base station. Yet, separate SA is not established between the relay station and the base station or between the relay station and the mobile station. So, the relay station transmits encrypted media access control (MAC) protocol data unit (PDU) which is received from the mobile station or the base station without additional data encryption or decryption on the MAC PDU.
  • MAC media access control
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • the fixed/nomadic relay station performs operations according to a list configuration of a mobile station performing a network registration procedure and relay, relay execution, re-authentication of relay station and a process for releasing the network registration of the relay station.
  • re-authentication of the relay station and a group handover process for mobile stations to be relayed can be additionally provided as well as the above-explained operations performed by the fixed/nomadic relay station.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a network registration procedure and relaying process of a fixed/nomadic relay station according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • a relay station obtains downlink frame synchronization from a base station to communicate with the base station and receives an uplink/downlink map message and an uplink/downlink channel information message (S501).
  • the relay station adjusts an uplink transmission parameter through a ranging process with the base station (S502).
  • a relay station identifier is delivered to the base station and the base station assigns a management connection ID to the corresponding relay station.
  • the media access control (MAC) management message can be exchanged between the relay station and the base station and the data relay between the mobile station and the base station can be performed.
  • the relay station negotiates with the base station for basic performance.
  • type of the relay station fixed type, a nomadic type or a mobile type
  • security associated basic performance such as an authentication scheme, a message authentication code scheme and the like is negotiated (S503).
  • the relay station performs an authentication procedure for the relay station using the base station, authentication server and authentication protocol (S504).
  • an EAP(extensible authentication protocol) can be used as the authentication protocol.
  • each of the relay station and the base station receives a master key from the authentication server (S505), derives an AK(authentication key) from the received master key (S506), and then derives a message authentication code (MAC) key by a key derivation function based on the derived AK.
  • a master key from the authentication server (S505)
  • AK authentication key
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the base station establishes a list of a mobile station on which a relay will be performed (S507) and then delivers the list of the mobile station on which the relay will be performed to the relay station (S508).
  • information for the mobile station on which the relay will be performed is transmitted to the relay station using an uplink/downlink map (UL/DL MAP) message or another media access control (MAC) management message.
  • the relay station is able to transmit the list of the mobile station on which the relay will be performed to the base station using a media access control (MAC) management message.
  • MAC media access control
  • the authentication of the relay station is performed using the EAP based authentication method.
  • the steps S504 to S506 and the steps S512 to S514 can be replaced by the following procedure.
  • the relay station delivers an authentication request message including the X.509 certificate to the base station.
  • the base station performs authentication of the relay station based on the certificate of the relay station and then delivers an authentication response message including an authentication key to the relay station.
  • the relay station derives a message authentication code (MAC) key by a key deriving function based on the authentication key delivered from the base station.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the relay station performs a message authentication for integrity of a management message exchanged between the base station and the relay station using the derived MAC key.
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a network registration procedure and relaying process of a mobile relay station according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • a relay station obtains a downlink frame synchronization from a base station to communicate with and receives a uplink/downlink map message and an uplink/downlink channel information message (S601).
  • the relay station adjusts an uplink transmission parameter through a ranging process with the base station (S602).
  • a relay station identifier is delivered to the base station and the base station assigns a management connection ID to the corresponding relay station.
  • the media access control (MAC) management message can be exchanged between the relay station and the base station and the data relay between the mobile station and the base station can be performed.
  • the relay station negotiates with the base station for basic performance.
  • type of the relay station (fixed type, a nomadic type or a mobile type) is negotiated, and security associated basic performance such as an authentication scheme, a message authentication code scheme and the like is negotiated (S603).
  • the relay station performs an authentication procedure for the relay station using the base station, authentication server and authentication protocol (S604).
  • an EAP(extensible authentication protocol) can be used as the authentication protocol.
  • each of the relay station and the base station receives a master key from the authentication server (S605), derives an AK(authentication key) from the received master key (S606), and then derives a message authentication code (MAC) key by a key derivation function based on the derived AK.
  • a master key from the authentication server (S605)
  • AK authentication key
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the base station establishes a list of a mobile station on which a relay will be performed (S607) and then delivers the list of the mobile station on which the relay will be performed to the relay station (S608).
  • information for the mobile station on which the relay will be performed is transmitted to the relay station using an uplink/downlink map (UL/DL MAP) message or another media access control (MAC) management message.
  • the relay station is able to transmit the list of the mobile station on which the relay will be performed to the base station using a media access control (MAC) management message.
  • MAC media access control
  • the mobile relay station measures a signal quality of a neighbor base station and is able to carry out a handover associated operation if necessary.
  • the relay station decides to perform a handover (S611)
  • the relay station makes a handover request to a serving base station using a media access control (MAC) management message MOB_RSHO-REQ (S612).
  • MAC media access control
  • MOB_RSHO-REQ MOB_RSHO-REQ
  • the serving base station transmits handover information of the relay station and the relayed mobile stations to a backbone by transmitting security information for the relay station and service operation parameters for the relayed mobile stations to a handover target base station together with a handover notification (S613).
  • the security information includes security capability and authentication key context of the relay station and the service operation parameters includes security and service context information of the relayed mobile stations.
  • the target base station transmits a handover notification response such as a possibility of handover acceptance to the serving base station via the backbone (S614).
  • the serving base station performs a response to the handover request made by the relay station using a handover response message MOB_BSHO-RSP including a target base station identifier (S615). And, the relay station informs the serving base station that the handover into the target base station will be performed using a handover indication message MOB_RSHO-IND (S616).
  • the serving base station releases radio resources associated with mobile stations relayed by the relay station (S617), adjusts a transmission parameter with the target base station via a ranging procedure, and updates a management connection identifier of the relay station and security associated parameters (S618). If a re-authentication procedure needs to be performed via handover, the relay station executes the step S601 to S606 to perform the re-authentication procedure with the base station and the authentication server (S619).
  • the mobile station performs the handover, if a re-authentication procedure for the relayed mobile station entering a new base station needs to be executed, the mobile station performs the steps S42 to S46 shown in Fig. 4 with the authentication server and the base station.
  • the base station performs authentication of the relay station based on the certificate of the relay station and then delivers an authentication response message including an authentication key.
  • the relay station derives a message authentication code (MAC) key by a key deriving function based on the authentication key delivered from the base station.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • the present invention is applicable to a broadband wireless access system.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP06799309.7A 2005-10-18 2006-10-18 Method of providing security for relay station Not-in-force EP1946580B1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR1020050097905A KR101137340B1 (ko) 2005-10-18 2005-10-18 릴레이 스테이션의 보안 제공 방법
PCT/KR2006/004235 WO2007046630A2 (en) 2005-10-18 2006-10-18 Method of providing security for relay station

Publications (3)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1946580A2 EP1946580A2 (en) 2008-07-23
EP1946580A4 EP1946580A4 (en) 2011-07-06
EP1946580B1 true EP1946580B1 (en) 2018-03-28

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EP06799309.7A Not-in-force EP1946580B1 (en) 2005-10-18 2006-10-18 Method of providing security for relay station

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US (1) US8107629B2 (zh)
EP (1) EP1946580B1 (zh)
JP (1) JP4712094B2 (zh)
KR (1) KR101137340B1 (zh)
CN (1) CN101292558B (zh)
CA (1) CA2625085C (zh)
WO (1) WO2007046630A2 (zh)

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US20090074189A1 (en) 2009-03-19
CA2625085C (en) 2015-01-20
WO2007046630A3 (en) 2008-01-24
JP2009512389A (ja) 2009-03-19
CN101292558B (zh) 2011-12-07
KR101137340B1 (ko) 2012-04-19
WO2007046630A2 (en) 2007-04-26
JP4712094B2 (ja) 2011-06-29
CA2625085A1 (en) 2007-04-26
EP1946580A2 (en) 2008-07-23
EP1946580A4 (en) 2011-07-06
CN101292558A (zh) 2008-10-22
US8107629B2 (en) 2012-01-31
KR20070042243A (ko) 2007-04-23

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