EP1941588A2 - Systeme et procede de protection contre les impulsions electromagnetiques et rfi pouvant recevoir l'agrement, faisant intervenir des enceintes et des locaux blindes fabriques en serie - Google Patents

Systeme et procede de protection contre les impulsions electromagnetiques et rfi pouvant recevoir l'agrement, faisant intervenir des enceintes et des locaux blindes fabriques en serie

Info

Publication number
EP1941588A2
EP1941588A2 EP06846175A EP06846175A EP1941588A2 EP 1941588 A2 EP1941588 A2 EP 1941588A2 EP 06846175 A EP06846175 A EP 06846175A EP 06846175 A EP06846175 A EP 06846175A EP 1941588 A2 EP1941588 A2 EP 1941588A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
shielding
emp
shielded
electromagnetic
chips
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP06846175A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Other versions
EP1941588A4 (fr
Inventor
Charles L. Manto
Joseph R. Child
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Individual
Original Assignee
Individual
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Individual filed Critical Individual
Publication of EP1941588A2 publication Critical patent/EP1941588A2/fr
Publication of EP1941588A4 publication Critical patent/EP1941588A4/fr
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H05—ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05K—PRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K9/00—Screening of apparatus or components against electric or magnetic fields
    • H05K9/0069—Methods for measuring the shielding efficiency; Apparatus therefor; Isolation container for testing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H05—ELECTRIC TECHNIQUES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • H05K—PRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS; MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS
    • H05K9/00—Screening of apparatus or components against electric or magnetic fields
    • H05K9/0007—Casings
    • H05K9/0052—Shielding other than Faraday cages

Definitions

  • the present invention relates in general to the field of computing, controls based on integrated circuits, and voice and data communications, and in particular to a novel system for providing certifiable shielded cabinets and rooms (or pods) to protect devices, equipment and people from electromagnetic interference such as electromagnetic pulse, and directed energy attack.
  • electromagnetic pulse including high altitude electronic magnetic pulse, RFI, attack from directed energy weapons, or unusual natural events such as extreme solar flares, that is lighter weight, affordable, certifiable, monitorable and controllable.
  • the invention provides identifiable inspection chips that would be certified to have withstood a certain level of EMP test pulses and capable of providing on-going testing.
  • these chips such as radio frequency identification (RFID) chips optical identification (OTD) chips, are built into the shielding systems, and may also serve supervisory control and data acquisition
  • SCADA SCADA purposes complemented by built-in SCADA chips, hardware and software.
  • OrD chips and optical SCADA devices can be designed to be immune from electromagnetic interference.
  • SCADA devices embedded into the shielding systems make it possible to control heat by either increasing cooling activities as power is available, or scale down heat producing activities when cooling capabilities reach their peak ability to cool down the shielded equipment.
  • the invention in certain embodiments may further include test chips that can show EMI impact upon visual inspection.
  • the invention in certain embodiments uses simulation techniques to assess the different magnetic and electronic shielding capabilities separately in order to discover novel combinations of materials that would provide superior overall shielding effectiveness at a lesser weight and provides an example in thin layers of aluminum and a weave of steel threads.
  • FIG. 1 a front cross-sectional view of a shielded hinged container in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 2 shows a front elevational view of a shielded rack with SCADA
  • FIG. 3 shows a plan view of a pulse shielded universal room in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIG. 4 shows a plan view of an EMP shielded vehicle with vestibule in accordance with an embodiment of the invention.
  • FIGS. 5-9 show optical ID sensor embodiments of the invention.
  • FIGS. 10-17 show EMP sensor embodiments of the invention.
  • FIG. 1 shows an enclosure designed for EMP shielded storage and transportation.
  • the enclosure includes shielding such as aluminum plated surfaces, with steel thread weaves sandwiched between them. Gaskets may be provided around the lid. Test chips may be provided on or in the enclosure. Sizes may range from brief-case-sized to larger shipping container.
  • the enclosure may be coated as necessary with protective polymers or steel threaded tapes.
  • FIG. 2 shows a shielded rack of computing and communications gear that provides protection while operating. Filtered honeycombed air ducts are provided, and filtered power and communication lines pass through the shield without compromising the protection. SCADA and RFID/OID chips and other devices allow for confirmation of test results, controls and maintenance information. Maintenance racks that require opening of the doors can be provided in shielded rooms.
  • the enclosures and rooms for working equipment could include anterooms or vestibules that would provide the equivalent of a sally-port ensuring that egress into the shielded working area does not compromise the shielded equipment since one shielded doorway will always be shut, with the doors preferably at right angles to each other. See, e.g., FIG. 3.
  • each of the walls may be comprised of layered aluminum plates with steel thread weaves therebetween, with welded seams between sections of the layers needed for long runs of the shielding material.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates how shielded rooms can be used on a vehicle, demonstrating access with a vestibule. This is possible since the invention can reduce the weight of a shield by more than half so that the vehicles would be lighter weight, need less carrying capacity and fuel.
  • any conducting wires for power or communications that come through the shield can be filtered for pulses with rise times as fast as a nanosecond.
  • Power line filters can be provided prior to the sally-port entrance for further protection.
  • a non-conducting fiber optic line can be run through the wave guide.
  • Any small device or chip level connectivity can be further protected by means known to those skilled in the art, including the use of nanotechnology such as Ovshinsky effect materials including selenium and tellurium in which the resistance of the material drops rapidly when a specific voltage is applied across it thus producing a break in the conducting path of an integrated circuit element.
  • Airways can be similarly protected through the use of honeycombed airways and pathways that are angled, turned and protected with metal inserts acting as waveguides that will reflect and absorb electromagnetic pulse enabling air flow while shielding the equipment from the electromagnetic pulse.
  • optical identification and SCADA devices can be protected by converting signals to optical signals and brought into the shielded rooms or containers through optical fibers, as discussed in further detail below. See FIGS. 5 through 9, which illustrate embodiments of optical ID and SCADA devices.
  • the present invention includes one or more sensor devices that detect EMP and record the level of EMP signals impinging on the sensor. Sensors are attached to the outside and inside of tested enclosures prior to testing. Once testing is accomplished, the sensors report the level of EMP outside and inside. This allows determination of the performance of the enclosure.
  • the senor is a very low cost passive device. Many sensors can be placed on a single enclosure, thereby providing detection of an EMP regardless of its direction. See FIGS. 10 through 17, which illustrate embodiments of EMP sensors.
  • the shielded container, rack or room can also be ruggedized to protect against shock and other environmental hazards as required by the application.
  • the present invention provides an integrated approach to shielding systems in such a way as to provide universally applicable shielding systems for a combination of uses. Such uses include storage, transportation, and usage for equipment that would work in a rack or cabinet, or a universal shielded pod or room that could also be combined with other pods or rooms to make a larger shielded room or data or communications center environment.
  • the system can provide pre-tested shielded environments that can meet worst-case scenarios of equipment and staff demand so that cost-effective shielding can be mass produced and deployed quickly.
  • This requires integrated shielding systems that take into account potential applications that work around weight, power and cooling issues while providing testing data that would provide users the confidence of the capability of the universal shielding with the least amount of customized product and work.
  • shielding materials are provided that reduce weight and cost.
  • the invention can separately analyze and account for the electrical fields and magnetic field properties of different materials under electromagnetic interference and then assessing various combinations.
  • the best combination of materials can be used to produce the lightest weight and most cost effective combination of shielding instead of just one material such as steel which might not provide the ideal combination of electrical and magnetic properties from a weight and cost perspective.
  • the present invention can use a combination of 1) far lighter weight metals such as aluminum or copper alloys to handle electrical fields with 2) ferrous metal foils, threads, nanostrands, or impregnated polymer coatings to handle magnetic fields along with additional materials as appropriate to make up for the lack of strength of heavier single metal shields made from material such as steel, 3) test chips such as RFID (and their radio frequency emitters) and, when necessary, SCADA chips or devices to demonstrate the tested or simulated capabilities of the shielding, and 4) SCADA controlled environmental factors such as heating, cooling and moisture.
  • RFID chips include optical ID chips and optical SCADA devices, which are described in a further embodiment of the invention below.
  • lighter metal such as aluminum
  • properties of the lighter metal such as aluminum also provide benefits as a heat sync along with various methods to cool the system though encased in a shielded environment.
  • These enclosures or rooms could also include test chips which would demonstrate electromagnetic interference on the outside and inside of the shield. This method and procedures of combining these capabilities represents a novel approach to the problem of EMP shielding without which widespread deployment will not be possible.
  • Shielding material may include any of a number of known conductive metals such as highly-conductive AA3003 and AAl 100 grade seam welded aluminum sheets or plates of various thicknesses such as .040 inches to as much as 1/4-inch thick for optimum performance; or, alternating layers of ferromagnetic shielding materials that significantly enhance the HEMP shielding response especially to highly destructive magnetic field pulses.
  • conductive metals such as highly-conductive AA3003 and AAl 100 grade seam welded aluminum sheets or plates of various thicknesses such as .040 inches to as much as 1/4-inch thick for optimum performance
  • alternating layers of ferromagnetic shielding materials that significantly enhance the HEMP shielding response especially to highly destructive magnetic field pulses.
  • Such ferromagnetic materials may include non- oriented and oriented silicon-iron steel sheets (known as grades M-6 to M-47), low- carbon steel sheets (ultra low carbon and grades 1006) and more esoteric shielding materials composed of cobalt-iron (known as METGLAS) paper-thin shielding film or thin threads of higher carbon steel or other ferrous metals weaved to create additional Faraday Cage effects especially with magnetic field properties while varied in cases for strengthening effects.
  • a sandwiched shield (aluminum 0.040" — steel 0.050" — aluminum 0.040") may provide the best shielding performance in many applications. Shields with variations in thickness of the outer layer of aluminum are also good performers; a triplet (insulated) aluminum shield also provides good performance.
  • the thin brass coated steel threaded cables (composed of multiple threads totaling a width of approximately .040 in) laid side by side (at roughly 20-23 woven strands per inch) and fixed to a backing can have the face of the steel threads laid against another layer run at right angles to the other threads to it so that the connections between the threads can be increased for the maximum amount of conductivity for both the magnetic and electronic shielding effects.
  • the conductivity has been shown to be significantly enhanced either with solder threads laid between the layers of steel threads facing each other. Conductivity could also be enhanced by applying a layer of conductive foil, such as copper or a metglass solder foil.
  • one such simulated combination of thin aluminum sheets and a thin cross weave of steel threads provided a combined magnetic field shield many times more effective than either of the layers alone.
  • the layers of steel threaded cables provide roughly ten times the tensile strength of steel sheets and the crossed layers of the threaded cables provide protection against projectiles and blast.
  • the electric fields will be effectively maintained across the shielded room by welding any seams required by the manufacturing process (as opposed to bolting plates together).
  • the layers of the nonferrous and ferrous materials can be in direct contact with each other or, separated by insulating materials, including fiber glass in which the steel weaves can be situated.
  • Additional use of nanotechnology such as nanostrands of shielding material and special composites may also be used for portions of the shield. This may include the use of viruses and other organic materials that can be manufactured, arranged and manipulated to absorb the exact metallic formulation in any given layer of material to meet the requirement of the environment that is simulated, prototyped and then tested.
  • Some of these systems can be used merely to store and transport equipment in a safe manner. Other systems provide protection for equipment while being used under power considering power lines, communication lines and honeycombed heat dissipation ducts that will penetrate the shields. Other systems in the form of rooms provide protection for users and the equipment. Wires and conduits that could act as antennae can be properly filtered in order to eliminate any magnetic or electrical penetration.
  • the protective methods in certain embodiments assume a broadband array of electromagnetic interference and thus provides protection from the widest array of potential threats.
  • the invention can provide significant value by meeting the military spec range of frequency values known to be of concern.
  • frequencies should be simulated from 1000 Hz to 1 GHz to establish that shields diminish a field hitting the outside of the shield by 100 decibels (dB) by the time the field is measured at the inside of the shield.
  • dB decibels
  • the environment in which the electronics equipment will be protected can be designed in such a way to minimize required shielding by minimizing the number and type of conductors penetrating the shielded areas.
  • One primary means to do this is to first convert power from alternating current to direct current so that only direct current lines need to be filtered, thus reducing the cost of the filtering and the type and amount of electromagnetic interference.
  • Communications lines can also be converted to fiber optic communications to eliminate lines that use conductors. Examples will be shown in the conversion of RFID to optical ID chips.
  • power transformers have conducting cables bringing power into and out of the coils that are used to transform the power. These coils are comprised of smaller wound coils that are insulated from each other in order to minimize wasted power and eddy currents within the coil itself since power will flow in the paths with least resistance.
  • the amount of power introduced into these coils from the lines leading in and out of them could destroy the protective insulators and minimize the effectiveness or damage the coil portion of the transformer.
  • More susceptible are the electronic controls of the transformer, especially those made from integrated circuits.
  • the conductors bringing power into the transformer coils can be filtered while the electronics of the transformer and power sub station equipment can be housed in the alternative materials shielding, using the heat sync or wave guide air filters to maintain cooling.
  • the SCADA chips can also be protected within the shielded areas sending information and alarms back to network 06
  • Fiber optic lines can also be used to relay information through the shield from test and monitoring chips immune to electromagnetic interference, namely, optical identification chips.
  • optical ID and SCADA chips A further description of the invention regarding the use of optical ID and SCADA chips is as follows.
  • RFID radio frequency based identification
  • the shielding prevents external communications with the device via radio waves. Furthermore, EMP shielded racks or rooms would be enhanced by having
  • EMP immune device to facilitate communications between a user on the outside of a particular EMP shielded facility and users or equipment within a particular EMP shielded facility would be very helpful.
  • a device that is immune to EMP and can provide the monitoring capability desired does not exist in the market.
  • RFID chips typically do not contain batteries or any other type of internal power source. They must be energized by some external means. Illuminating an
  • RFID with RF energy is a common means to activate an RFID chip's internal circuitry.
  • EMP shielding that blocks an EMP also blocks the RF power signal, preventing the RFID from powering up.
  • Exemplary steps for the development of a shielded container or room include:
  • Step 1 Determine maximum number of devices within a container including communications, power and heat dissipation requirements.
  • Heat requirements can include formulas that calculate air movement and temperature for people and equipment.
  • the formula for air quantity is:
  • Step 2 Simulate the predicted electromagnetic interference (EMI) effect of the range of electromagnetic interference from sources such as extreme solar flares, high altitude electromagnetic pulse (as much as 200,000 volts/meter with the first of three pulses as fast as a nanosecond), directed energy weapons, or interference from other emitting equipment, through both the electrical and the magnetic fields on (2a) each type of material of each shielded container along with filtered lines and air vents so that the proper amount of electrical shielding and magnetic shielding can be separately accounted for in their respective and different shielding materials and filtering methods. Simulate the benefit of (2b) the combination of multiple layers of shielding of different materials and thicknesses in order to provide the best shielding protection along with the other environmental protection that a given environment may need at appropriate cost levels. Simulation can be done by using software and models such as the Ansoft Maxwell ® 3-dimensional field simulation software, preferably using both time-transient and single frequency numerical finite element analysis.
  • EMI electromagnetic interference
  • Step 3 Deploy shielding material capable of protecting against the same range of electromagnetic interference as described in step 2.
  • Electrical field shielding may include aluminum plates welded when plates are needed to be joined and the appropriate amount of magnetic shielding from ferrous foils, steel threads or other materials with magnetic properties layered in between the aluminum sheets or plates. If a room in which people work, provide protected doorways, preferably shielded ante-rooms or vestibules so that a shielded door is closed at all times.
  • Step 4 Determine structural needs for surfaces needing to fasten equipment so that surface shields are not compromised. For example, sandwiched layers of AL and steel thread may be embedded in a layer of protective materials such as fiberglass.
  • Step 5 Add polymer coatings to exposed sides of the container as needed for blast, corrosive or other environmental protection as needed.
  • Step 6 Minimize the power lines coming into the shielded area by converting alternating current sources into one or more direct current sources outside of the main shielded area thus reducing the number of lines needing to be filtered and reducing the extra power needed to be converted from alternating current to direct current and reducing the heat generated by that conversion process so that cooling requirements can be minimized
  • Step 7 Minimize the number of conducting communications lines by converting as many communications lines to fiber optics outside of the main shielded area so that fewer conducted lines would need to be filtered and that the overall impact to the shields would be reduced.
  • Step 8 Provide filters for lines coming through the shields. Provide filtering at the outside of the shields for incoming power lines to be conditioned and converted before or within the anteroom prior to entry to the protected interior room so that fast pulses as quickly as a nanosecond can be filtered.
  • Step 9 Provide filtered honeycombed air passage-ways with wave guides and pieces of material used to reflect and absorb EMP waves that would otherwise pass through air passageways.
  • Step 10 Place EMP measuring devices, such as RFID chips, throughout the interior of filtered lines and spaces to provide preliminary and on-going test results to prospective users of the system.
  • RFK radio frequency
  • RFE Radio Fidelity
  • Step 11 Place SCADA devices or chips with appropriate software or firmware, throughout the enclosures or rooms to monitor and control environmental elements such as internal temperature, EMI, and other effects of environmental contamination (that could include chemical, biological and radiological contamination) to maximize performance though shielded enclosures or rooms.
  • environmental elements such as internal temperature, EMI, and other effects of environmental contamination (that could include chemical, biological and radiological contamination) to maximize performance though shielded enclosures or rooms.
  • Step 12 Test the shielded containers and rooms and place test data within the RFID chips and or SCADA chips or devices along with information demonstrating proper use and maintenance including business rules for the orderly shutdown or use of equipment as the environment requires ⁇
  • Step 13 Build in external testing capabilities such as FM signal generators to provide at least minimal on-going testing to verify shielding effectiveness by receivers placed on the inside of the shields. If the FM signals are received on the inside of the shield, that would provide an indication that the shield has been compromised and breached. Those signals generate alarms back to the system administrators within or outside of the shielded room.
  • external testing capabilities such as FM signal generators to provide at least minimal on-going testing to verify shielding effectiveness by receivers placed on the inside of the shields. If the FM signals are received on the inside of the shield, that would provide an indication that the shield has been compromised and breached. Those signals generate alarms back to the system administrators within or outside of the shielded room.
  • prototyping and testing of a shielded room can be done to validate specific manufacturing techniques most effective in producing mass produced quantities of these rooms.
  • Industry-standard EMP shielding is used to shield devices, buildings, vehicles, and other forms of electronic containment, and filters are used to allow passage of signals and power into and out of an EMP protected area. For example, incoming power lines are filtered to reject an EMP from entering the protected space.
  • Similar filtration is required for the passage of communications signals into and out of the protected space.
  • EMP filtration is also used to allow passage of coolant for continuous cooling or heating of the protected space.
  • One of the means for allowing signals to enter and exit is through the use of fiber optics cable.
  • Optical fiber does not transmit radio waves and therefore does not provide a conduit for EMP to enter a protected area as long as it passes through a wave guide protected passageway.
  • the embodiments using optical ID devices provide for the passage of signals using optical fiber 3.
  • Optical energy is emitted by device 4 and passes through space as a beam 25 to device 5.
  • An optical antenna, or wide angle lens 1 is used to connect signals to and from devices external to the protected area. This enables communications with an ID device 6 inside the EMP protected area 5 from outside the protected space.
  • the protected space 5 could be a cargo carrier or just the devices of the present invention, in which case the device 5 would nominally be mounted on the outside of another items being tracked.
  • the optical fiber 3 interconnects the lens antenna 1 with the optical identification (OID) device 6 inside the EMP protected space 5 via interface device 13. Fiber 3 is passed through an EMP filter such as the "S" shaped tunnel 2.
  • optical energy used to power the device 6 is modulated in order to carry signals to the protected OID device 6.
  • OID 6 optical energy is aimed at the lens antenna 1.
  • Interface device 13 converts photonic energy into electrical power. Photons enter the protected space via the lens antenna and optical fiber 3 and are detected by a solar cell like device 9 inside the protected space. The device 9 converts the photons to electricity. This electricity is then used to power the OID device 6.
  • the optical energy entering space 5 via fiber 3 is divided by a partially reflecting mirror 8. Most of the energy may be allowed to pass through 8 to reach the photovoltaic converter 9. The balance of the photons are directed by mirror 8 to lens 10, which connects the modulated photon signal to device 6.
  • splitting mirror 8 such as prisms. This can be achieved using different optical wavelengths for the power and communications signals.
  • the OID device 6 detects and demodulates incoming optical signals via lens 10 to receive the desired information.
  • the OID emits modulated optical signals that travel back out the optical cable, through the external lens 1 to the external interrogating device 4.
  • This reverse path can be implemented using the same optical path as the incoming photons or a separate fiber path 11.
  • this alternative path can be equipped with a separate external lens rather than passing the signal through lens 1.
  • To communicate as noted typically requires use of an external device 4. This external device can be EMP protected itself. External device 4 uses lens-antenna 12 to send and receive signals and to emit optical power used to power the OID 6.
  • an optical/RF converter 15 is used.
  • the optical/RF converter 15 is located inside the protected space and is connected to the external lens antenna 3 via the fiber 3.
  • the converter 15 is powered by the incoming optical energy and demodulates that same optical input to extract desired information.
  • the modulated optical signal is connected to converter 15 via optical fiber 19.
  • the electrical power derived from the incoming photonic energy is sent to 15 via electrical wiring 18.
  • the optical/RF converter 15 uses the power derived from the incoming optical energy, the optical/RF converter 15 generates an RF signal, modulating it with information demodulated from the incoming optical signal.
  • the resulting RF signal is then coupled to the existing RFID chip 16 via RF antenna 17.
  • This antenna is used to couple signals into RFID device 16 and to receive signal emitted by the device 16.
  • the RF signal is detected by the optical/RF converter 15, which generates a corresponding modulated optical signal that is then passed to outside the protected space via the optical cable and lens antenna. That is, converter 15 contains an RF receiver that converts the modulation on the RF signal received from device 16 to an optical signal that is send to external device 4 via a fiber and lens such as 3 and 1 respectively.
  • the RF coupling of the RFID device 16 and the converter 15 is done by placing them in close proximity to each other. This is indicated by antenna 17 being wrapped around device 16. This ensures effective transfer of RF power to the RFID device 16.
  • the amount of RF power that is coupled from converter 15 to device 16 must be sufficient to power device 16 as well as carry signal information to device 16.
  • the intensity of the optical power required to power the multiple forms of this invention requires more energy than is required to communicate alone. Coupling enough optical energy into lens 1 requires taking into account the size of the lens aperture. This is typically 15 degrees of beam width versus the nearly omnidirectional nature of most RFID devices.
  • optical scanning can be used to determine the location of, or direction to, an OID.
  • Device 4 emits multiple beams 20 sequentially in various directions. For example, device 4 could be located along a railroad track scanning passing cargo. The scanning device 4 6 060306
  • the monitoring can be done using a second optical lens 21.
  • a passive reflector 22 bounces back some of the optical energy in beam 20. This is detected by the scanning device as a potential location of an OID.
  • the scanning device 4 can then dwell on the spot long enough to effect communications with the OID.
  • False reflections can occur from a number of surfaces unrelated to the use of OIDs. Therefore, the scanning device can use an initiate protocol at the start of the dwell period. The OID detects an optical signal and sends back a response. If the scanning device does not detect a response, it assumes the reflection is false and continues to scan.
  • two independent optical frequencies can be emitted by the scanning device.
  • the external surface of the OID's lens antenna or surrounding material is coated with a material that, reflects one of the two optical frequencies and not the other.
  • the scanning devices monitor for the reflections of the one frequency and not the other to determine the presence of an OID. This reduces the dependency of the scanning device on the functioning of the OID to detect the OID's presence.
  • the intense optical power required to power the OID means addressing the issue of eye safety. For this reason, infrared energy is preferred.
  • the scanning signal does not have to be as intense, however. Therefore, visible signals can be used e.g. green and red. This means visible reflection colors can be used, which make the presence of the OID more easily located.
  • ultraviolet phonic signals can be used in scanning via beams 20.
  • the reflector 22 would be a reflector that reflects UV. In this respect, common objects do not reflect UV effectively. By using UV reflectors 22, false reflections are less likely.
  • the geometry of the passive reflections can be selected to improve the desired detectability of suitable reflections. Also, various other forms of passive barcode reading can be used to detect the presence of an OID.
  • An RFID normally communicates omnidirectionally or nearly so. An OID's directionality is more constrained as governed by physical laws related to frequency and the need for line-of-sight to communicate.
  • the field of view for an optical system is affected by the angular aperture of a fiber optic cable ends. Therefore, multiple lenses and fiber cables can be used to enhance the field of view.
  • the ends of fibers can also we formed to create lens geometries for gathering photons. Using fiber material with a graded index can also ensure increased capture of the photons. Many of the optical fiber characteristics such, as diameter, that have a profound impact on long haul transmission of data over optical cable do not apply in the case of an OID where the distances are short and the data rate requirements are far less than typical telecommunications links.
  • the OID electronics can be housed in its own EMP protection. When combining the OID with an RFID chip as noted above, the RFID and OID's electronics can all be included within the one EMP shielding. The assembly can then be attached to the outside of the item being tracked.
  • the information received or created can be sent through a fiber cable that connects to a receiver within another EMP protected environment for processing. Since the fiber cable is not a conductor, it is less difficult and less expensive to allow that fiber line into the other EMP shielded environment since the an electromagnetic pulse would not be conducted into that other EMP shielded environment and filtering requirements would be minimized.
  • the OID In the direction from the OID to the scanner, the OID is not aware of what direction the scanner is located. When the OID emits optical power, very little of it may exit the lens antenna in the desired direction. The ability of the scanner to receive and suitably demodulate information coming from the OID will therefore be critically dependent on the distance between the two devices.
  • the OID initiates dialog with the scanner at a low data rate.
  • the two devices then handshake and increase the data rate as a function of the optical link's signal performance.
  • the effective angle of view by device 5 via its lens can be enhanced by using multiple lens oriented in contiguous directions.
  • Another embodiment of the invention uses an internal battery 23 to power the OID.
  • the OID may contain existing RPID technology 16 or simply use electronics based device 6 with optical interfaces shown in device 13. Using the battery 23 would reduce or obviate the need for power via incoming optical energy.
  • the battery would be sized for the service life of the OID.
  • the useful life of battery 23 can be enhanced by operating the OID in a low power consumption mode until activated by an external optical signal.
  • the battery 23 can also be used in an OID as a supplement or backup to the power derived from the external optical energy by device 13. This would also assist the OID to function when the incoming optical energy is not sufficient to power the OID, but is strong enough to effect communications.
  • EMP sensor chips detect EMP and record the level of EMP signals impinging on the sensor. Sensors are attached to the outside and inside of tested enclosures prior to testing. Once testing is accomplished, the sensors report the level of EMP outside and inside. This allows determination of the performance of the enclosure.
  • the sensor is a very low cost passive device. Many sensors can be placed on a single enclosure. This ensures detection of an EMP regardless of its direction.
  • FIG. 10 there is a conductive fuse-antenna 101 made of a resistive material. When an EMP arrives at this fuse-antenna, an electric current is induced.
  • the electrical circuit carrying the current includes conductive mounts 105 and 106 as well as conductive base 107.
  • the fuse-antenna 101 is constructed with a narrowing at point 108. When electrical current is induced by the EMP, the current along fuse- antenna 101 will be of sufficient magnitude to heat the resistive material at point 108 to cause it to melt. That is, the size of the narrowed material at point 108 is so small as to "fuse" when a small current is induced the EMP.
  • sensor arm 102 is raised by pressure from spring 109. This raises the wide portion 3 of sensor arm 2 whereby observer 110 is able to see a visible marker 104. This allows the observer to determine the fuse-antenna 101 and point 108 has fused, indicating the experience of an EMP.
  • FIG. 12 an alternative means of spring loading the fuse-antenna 101 is shown where pressure is applied via spring 111 from above the end of the sensor arm 102 cantilevered on standoff 112. There are many other means of spring loading the sensor arm.
  • the amount of current induced in the sensor arm 101 depends on the strength of the EMP and the length of the sensor fuse-antenna.
  • the sensitivity to EMP can be modified by using a thicker fuse point 108 such as point 113 in FIG. 13.
  • a wide spring 114 which has a different effective antenna performance than a thin sensor arm 117.
  • the length of the fuse- antenna 116 can be elongated to change the sensitivity to an EMP.
  • the visible blocker 115 is shown enlarged which allows use of a larger visible spot 104 in FIG. 12.
  • FIG. 14 shows an area of fuse-antennas 123 through 134. These fuse-antennas are all electrically connected to conductive mounts 121 and 122. The various orientation of the fuse-antennas 123 through 134 support detection of EMPs from various directions. [0097] Fuse-antennas 123 through 126 are shown with longer sensor arms 131 through 134. This is an indication that multiple shape and size fuse-antennas can be mounted in the same sensor device.
  • FIG. 15 fuse points 141 and 42 are shown with different thicknesses. This allows for fusing under different EMP induced current levels. This allows for detection of EMPs and simultaneously determining relative strength of the EMPs.
  • FIG. 16 shows a more complex mixture of different size sensor arms 151, visible block 152 sizes, and fuse points 153 and well as multiple orientations.
  • FIG. 17 shows sensor devices 162, 163, and 164 mounted on different sides of EMP enclosure 161. Sensor devices are similarly mounted on the inside of the enclosure 161. The sensor devices 162, 163, and 164 can be used to record the impact of EMPs during production testing of enclosure 161. After this testing, additional sensors 165, 166, and 167 can be applied to the enclosure for future detection of EMPs.
  • US Patent No. 6,584,183 may be used in combination with the present invention.
  • the invention of claims 14-21 thereof which relate to provisioning of data services and the use of secure identifiers, may be combined with the present teachings.
  • the teachings of US Patent No. 6,788,771 may also be used in combination with the present invention.
  • the invention of claims 1, 3, 7 and 8 thereof which relate to using a calling number or identifier to determine the quality level of sponsored services, and using a calling number to provide free security services, may be combined with the present teachings.
  • Each of these two patents illustrate how a sponsor can be contacted to provide either a service or quality of service based on the request of the user.
  • the invention in certain embodiments provides a monitorable, testable and mass producible EMI/EMP shielding solution for rooms and enclosures that protects critical infrastructure and is lighter weight and less costly than other approaches using single material solutions that are custom built.

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système et un procédé qui permettent d'obtenir des armoires et des locaux, ou des modules, blindés susceptibles de recevoir l'agrément et destinés à protéger aussi bien l'équipement que les personnes de l'interférence électromagnétique telle que l'impulsion électromagnétique et l'attaque par énergie dirigée. Ce procédé simule les exigences et les capacités de blindage électrique et magnétique distinctes de chaque type de matériau ; il simule celles-ci séparément et conjointement pour former un ensemble combiné de matériaux stratifiés et permettre d'obtenir un blindage électromagnétique amélioré plus léger et moins cher. Par ailleurs, l'invention concerne un système et un procédé de surveillance et de commandes SCADA, RFID, et OID permettant le déroulement des essais et des contrôles au stade initial et pendant la marche normale.
EP06846175A 2005-10-27 2006-10-27 Systeme et procede de protection contre les impulsions electromagnetiques et rfi pouvant recevoir l'agrement, faisant intervenir des enceintes et des locaux blindes fabriques en serie Withdrawn EP1941588A4 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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US73039505P 2005-10-27 2005-10-27
PCT/US2006/060306 WO2007051165A2 (fr) 2005-10-27 2006-10-27 Systeme et procede de protection contre les impulsions electromagnetiques et rfi pouvant recevoir l'agrement, faisant intervenir des enceintes et des locaux blindes fabriques en serie

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FR2985059B1 (fr) * 2011-12-21 2014-01-10 Oberthur Technologies Dispositif de securisation d'un document electronique
NL2009582C2 (en) * 2012-10-08 2014-04-14 Nl Forensisch Inst Electromagnetic shielding system and method.
ITTO20130334A1 (it) * 2013-04-23 2014-10-24 Kgr Spa Perfezionamenti relativi alle pinze di saldatura per resistenza sospendibili.
HU4443U (en) * 2013-11-19 2014-11-28 Molnár Marianna Juhászné Energy-conversion equipment
CN104535868B (zh) * 2015-01-09 2018-07-10 中国人民解放军军械工程学院 电磁脉冲辐射环境下静电放电试验装置
CN108614944A (zh) * 2018-05-10 2018-10-02 西安电子科技大学 一种盾构轨迹轴线纠偏参数预测方法

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EP1941588A4 (fr) 2011-03-16
WO2007051165A2 (fr) 2007-05-03

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