EP1653415A1 - Verfahren und Ausrüstung zur Verwaltung von Zugangskontrollkarten - Google Patents

Verfahren und Ausrüstung zur Verwaltung von Zugangskontrollkarten Download PDF

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Publication number
EP1653415A1
EP1653415A1 EP05292321A EP05292321A EP1653415A1 EP 1653415 A1 EP1653415 A1 EP 1653415A1 EP 05292321 A EP05292321 A EP 05292321A EP 05292321 A EP05292321 A EP 05292321A EP 1653415 A1 EP1653415 A1 EP 1653415A1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
badge
data
chip
access control
database
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Withdrawn
Application number
EP05292321A
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
Rémi Jonquieres
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Immotec Systems
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Immotec Systems
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Application filed by Immotec Systems filed Critical Immotec Systems
Publication of EP1653415A1 publication Critical patent/EP1653415A1/de
Withdrawn legal-status Critical Current

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/21—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass having a variable access code
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/22—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check of the pass holder
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/27—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass with central registration
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/20—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass
    • G07C9/28—Individual registration on entry or exit involving the use of a pass the pass enabling tracking or indicating presence
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00857—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed
    • G07C2009/0088—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the data carrier can be programmed centrally
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
    • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
    • G07C9/00174—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys
    • G07C9/00817—Electronically operated locks; Circuits therefor; Nonmechanical keys therefor, e.g. passive or active electrical keys or other data carriers without mechanical keys where the code of the lock can be programmed

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to access control, and more particularly to a method and an equipment for managing access control badges by using read-write phases.
  • non-contact tags have appeared read-write that can both be read remotely by a reader device but also likely under certain conditions to be reprogrammed.
  • Changes in the programming of badges can be made using the Residor software from Immotec Systèmes and terminals such as the Palm Pilot or other PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) or the Mifare® contactless badge encoder.
  • Document WO 02/091311 also discloses a method for controlling access to smart cards making it possible to prevent the access terminals from communicating with a central computer and to minimize the cost and management of the computer. whole system.
  • the access terminals use a lot of information that has to be regularly updated, such as identification data and black lists of prohibited access cards. The invalidation of smart cards can not then be performed very efficiently without the need for sophisticated smart card readers.
  • the present invention therefore aims to overcome one or more of the disadvantages of the prior art by defining a method of managing contactless access control badges offering optimum security and making it possible to easily modify the information of the badge, in particular relating to access permissions.
  • card data changes for example to update or invalidate an active badge used in an access control system.
  • the badge authentication step comprises a reading step using the access control terminal communication means for reading identification data associated with a signature on the chip of the access control terminal.
  • each of the contactless badges is initialized by a badge encoding apparatus during a personalization step, the encoder apparatus transmitting in a non-volatile memory reprogrammable of the badge chip at least one identification data of the badge and profile data representative of a badge usage profile.
  • an encryption step is performed by the badge encoder apparatus for storing at least one identification data of the badge in the form of an encrypted signature in a memory area of the contactless badge.
  • said badge authentication step comprises a prior transmission from the control terminal to the badge of a request to send a badge identification data, the contactless communication being established between terminal and contactless badge in case of receipt by the badge of said request.
  • the authentication step of the badge then comprises the reception of said identification data with its associated signature, the reading of the identification data of the badge by the management module of the access control terminal, at least one key associated with said identification data being used by the management module for firstly calculating said signature calculated from the transmitted signature by the badge in response to said request, and secondly compare said calculated signature with the signature transmitted by the badge with said identification data in response to said request.
  • the method according to the invention comprises an encryption step using a read key stored in a sector of the memory of the badge for encrypting information of said sector before the transmission of this information to an access control terminal and a decryption step using a write key stored in a sector for decrypting the information received from a terminal and intended for said sector, the memory of the badge comprising a determined number of sectors each including a read key and a key of writing.
  • a stopping of the contactless communication is triggered via the management module and the communication means of the terminal when the comparison between signatures gives no result.
  • each data modification step on the chip comprises a step of transmission by the terminal to the chip of the badge of an encrypted information with a key corresponding to a determined sector of the memory of the badge then a decryption step using a write key associated with the determined sector of the badge memory to decode the information corresponding to this sector.
  • the profile data of the database is updated through a profile data update module.
  • the update module provides, for each of the contactless badges, badge identification data and profile data to a local database of at least one access control terminal.
  • the communication is of the radio type and is carried out at a determined frequency in a restricted area having a radius less than 12 meters around the communication means of the access control terminal.
  • Another object of the invention is to provide a solution to one or more of the problems encountered in the prior art by defining a contactless access control card management equipment enabling the parameters of the badges to be modified automatically. .
  • the badge data includes profile data representative of a badge usage profile.
  • a badge encoder apparatus for initializing and personalizing each of the contactless badges, the encoder apparatus having transmitting means for transmitting to a memory of the chip of a badge at least one data item. identification of the badge and profile data representative of a profile of use of the badge.
  • the communication means are connected to the management module for, on the one hand, transmitting via said transmission means a badge identification request, and on the other hand receiving at least one piece of data. identification of a badge.
  • the management module comprises decryption and reading means of the type using at least one key for decrypting data of an encrypted sector received by the communication means of the terminal.
  • interactive means including an input interface are connected to the update module to enable the input of access data
  • the update module comprising in storage means, for each of the badges managed by equipment, a table access data representative of access authorizations corresponding specifically to defined terminals of the equipment.
  • the update module is provided with storage means for storing a central database gathering for each of the contactless badges badge identification data and profile data, said central database. being connected to a plurality of access control terminals.
  • each of the access control terminals comprises a local database, the update module being connected to each of said local databases.
  • the type of frequency used for radio communications is preferably that specified in ISO 14443, amounting to 13.56 MHz.
  • the badge is powered by the energy of the message transmitted at such a frequency, no battery being then necessary.
  • the invention can also be transposed to other radio frequencies for which badges have been designed or for optical communication modes.
  • the method for managing access control badges has the particular feature of facilitating the invalidation of lost badges as well as the updating of information on contactless badges (4) by using a read-write functionality. writing available for these badges.
  • Each of these badges (4) comprises in a chip (40) a memory (44) non-volatile reprogrammable type EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) or a flash memory. At least one identification data of the badge (4) and profile data representative of a profile of use of the badge (4) are stored in this memory (44) of the chip (40).
  • the card management equipment (1) has several access control terminals (2, 3, 10, 20, 30) each equipped with radio communication means (11). for reading data from the chip (40) of a badge (4).
  • a badge data update module (13) is provided for providing at least one database (14) including updated profile data.
  • the profile data representative of a badge usage profile as well as identification and badge loss index data can be stored in the same way in the database, with an update carried out by the user. module (13) update. It is therefore permissible with this module (13) to update, for example, access data to some of the terminals (10, 20, 30).
  • a single set of profile data is associated with each badge (4) managed by said equipment (1).
  • the update module (13) may be provided with storage means (130) for storing a database gathering for each of the contactless badges (4) badge identification data and profile data.
  • This database can be central and connected to a plurality of access control terminals (10, 20, 30), which makes it possible to focus, for example in the same place, a plurality of access control terminals (10, 20, 30).
  • each access control terminal (10) can be provided with a management module (12) associated with the radio communication means (11). With this management module (12) installed in the terminal (10), it is possible to compare profile data of a badge (4) read by the radio communication means (11) with profile data associated with it. badge (4) stored in said database (14).
  • the access control terminals (2, 3, 10, 20, 30) comprise a local database (14) including said profile data as well as data enabling identify the badges (4), for example in the form of an authentication table.
  • the equipment (1) may also comprise a single centralized database comprising a list of identification data badges (4) of the serial number type or the like and a table of correspondence between these numbers and authorizations for different checks of access (A1, A2, A3). This centralized database is stored in the storage means (130) of the updating module (13).
  • each zone (101, 102, 103) each have a different access (A1, A2, A3).
  • the use of the equipment (1) makes it possible to assign to a user access authorizations for one or more of these zones (101, 102, 103).
  • Each terminal (2, 3, 10) assigned to one of these zones may have, for example, a local database (14).
  • the accesses (A1, A2, A3) are used for the control of the same zone (100) as illustrated in FIG. 2, it may be envisaged either to connect by a network (6) the terminals (10, 20, 30) to the update module (13), or to connect one or a few terminals (10) controlling a main access (main access door).
  • the interactive means (15) illustrated in FIGS. 1 and 2 allow the input of access data, an operator being able to use an interface for inputting these interactive means (15) to modify certain data or to delete / create new rights of access. 'access.
  • These interactive means (15) are connected to the updating module (13).
  • the storage means (130) of this module (13) store, for each of the badges (4) managed by the equipment (1), an access data table representative of access authorizations. For each badge (4), the authorizations then specifically correspond to well-defined accesses controlled by defined terminals of the equipment (1). The access possibilities may therefore vary according to the profile of the user.
  • the management module (12) of each terminal (10, 20, 30) comprises selection means for selecting in the database (14) available to the terminal, the data associated with a given badge.
  • the module (12) further comprises decision means for replacing at least part of the data of said determined badge (4).
  • an access control terminal (10) equipped with the management module (12) and having an updated database (14). by the update module (13) can be used to selectively modify the data of an old badge (4).
  • the equipment (1) according to the invention is able to selectively erase the data of the badge (4) or perform a loss index regression .
  • transmission means are provided in the radio communication means (11) of each access control terminal, in particular for transmitting to the chip (40) a replacement data badge selected via of the management module (12).
  • the radio communication means (11) connected to the management module (12) transmit via said transmission means a badge identification / authentication request (4).
  • Such a request can be sent every 2 to 7 seconds.
  • One or more identification data of a badge (4) can be received via these communication means (11) and transmitted to the management module (12).
  • the radio communication (5) is carried out at a determined frequency in a restricted area having for example a radius less than 12 meters around the radio communication means (11) of the access control terminal (10, 20, 30) .
  • the principle of the loss index is illustrated to represent a known way of invalidating a badge, by taking the example simple of a user having lost a badge (4) which allowed him to access several buildings (B1, B2).
  • the manager uses interactive means (15) and an encoder apparatus (17) to provide another (4 ') which has a loss index incremented by one.
  • the user passes his new badge (4 ') on the readers (R) most used, indicating that the previous badge (4) has been lost.
  • the equipment (1) of the invention implements a different process: indeed, the loss index is automatically erased and the old badge (4) can not open any of the other access attributed to him, even those that the user had not validated with his new badge (4 ').
  • the invention consists in providing access control terminals (10, 20, 30) not only of the reading function of the badge but also of the writing function, the terminals (10, 20, 30) memorizing association with the identifier of the badge the associated data (name of the bearer, right of access, profile of the users including a time profile, etc.) and the loss index.
  • This information contained in the terminals (10, 20, 30) is used during the presentation of a badge, and if the loss index read in the badge (4) reveals that the number of loss declarations announced by the badge (4) is less than that predicted according to the index of loss of the database available to the terminal, the terminal erases for example the loss index. If, on the other hand, this number of loss declarations is greater than that predicted according to the index of loss of the database, the database (14) is modified to take into account the loss index. read on the authenticated badge.
  • the equipment (1) may comprise conventional readers (R) and access control terminals (10, 20, 30) provided with the management module (12) allowing the data replacement functionality on the chip (40) of the badge (4).
  • These terminals (10, 20, 30) can be installed in priority to the places most likely to be used by the person who would have recovered the old badge (4): for example a main access door (A1).
  • the equipment (1) can use a technology of MIFARE® type conforming to ISO 14443 for reading either the serial number of the badge, or a badge number contained in one of the 16 sectors (S) of the memory (44, FIG. 5) of the badge (4). In the latter case, the badge number can be encrypted for more security.
  • Each of the contactless badges (4) is initialized by a badge encoder apparatus (17) during a personalization step which may include an encryption phase.
  • the encoder apparatus (17) transmits in a reprogrammable non-volatile memory (44) of the chip (40), via radio transmission means, at least one identification data of the badge (4) and data representative of a profile of use of the badge (4).
  • the badge encoder apparatus (17) comprises for example an encryption module and is arranged to transmit in the form of an encrypted signature at least one identification data of the badge (4) to a memory zone (442). , Figure 3) of the contactless badge (4).
  • Non-contact badges (4) for reading and writing integrate, in association with their radio communication device (41), writing means (42) arranged in the electronic chip (40).
  • New profile data can be transmitted to the chip (40) of the badge (4) and stored in memory (44) through these write means (42) so as to replace obsolete profile data.
  • a data field may be provided to represent the loss index of the badge (4).
  • the management module (12) is able to erase this data field to invalidate the badge (4) by transmission among said replacement data of a data field representing the data field. erasure of the badge loss index.
  • a memory zone (442) of the contactless badge (4) can store an encrypted signature.
  • the protection of the data of the badge (4) by using an authentication procedure of an encrypted signature provides a strong security.
  • Each badge (4) has a memory zone (441) for the data (name of the bearer, access rights, etc.) and another (442) for an encrypted signature.
  • This signature is a code generated using an RSA algorithm or other signature algorithm from the badge identification data (these data being recorded in the badge).
  • the RSA algorithm is a complex process that uses the data of the badge (4), a public key stored in a central system of the equipment (1) and a secret key that only the provider of the equipment (1) has.
  • the management module (12) of this terminal (10) decrypts the signature by inverse algorithm, and compares this which is obtained with the data actually recorded in the badge (4). If the two pieces of information are not strictly identical, the terminal (10) denies access to the user.
  • the management module (12) can have decryption and reading means of the type using at least one key for decrypting an encrypted identification data item received by the radio communication means (1).
  • the decryption means may be included in the management module (12) or provided from a central system.
  • the management module (12) compares, during the radio communication (5), the decrypted identification data with badge identification data associated with said access control terminal (10) in the database (14).
  • each badge for example of the EEPROM type, may be composed of 16 sectors (S) as shown in FIG. 5.
  • Each of the sectors (S) is provided with a coded key (Kr) on for example 6 bytes in reading and another key (Kw) in writing.
  • Kr coded key
  • Kw key
  • the badges (4) contain in memory (44) the information necessary for an optimal access control and can be of several types (Resident, Pass, Tertiary) each having their own characteristics: as a non-limitative example, some of them, such as the number of the site or sites, the name of the user, the apartment number, the category of the staff or the hierarchical level, the access rights, the number badge, loss index, validity dates. Each of these pieces of information is intended for a sector (S) specific to the memory (44) of the badge (4) using an associated write (Kw) or read (Kr) key.
  • Badges data (4) mainly user profile data, time profiles and door access rights, are commonly modified. The modification operations are simplified thanks to the invention.
  • the step (50) of authentication of the badge (4) by the access control terminal (10) starts with a prior transmission (500) from the control terminal (10) to the badge (4) of a request to send at least one identification data of the badge (4), the radio communication (5) being established between terminal (10) and contactless badge (4) in case receipt by the badge (4) of said request.
  • the badge authentication step (50) continues with the receipt (502) of said data item. identification with its associated signature, and the reading (503) of the identification data of the badge (4) by the management module (12) of the access control terminal (10).
  • At least one key associated with said identification data is used by the management module (12) to first calculate (504) said signature calculated from the signature transmitted by the badge (4) in response to said request , And on the other hand comparing (505) said calculated signature with the signature transmitted by the badge (4) with said identification data in response to said request.
  • the comparison (505) by the management module (12) completes the authentication step (50).
  • a stop (506) of the radio communication (5) is triggered via the management module (12) and radio communication means (11) of the access control terminal (10).
  • the unlocking of an access (A1, A2, A3) can be actuated via a control signal coming from the management module (12) to an access blocking / unlocking device. Otherwise, no command signal is sent and access is denied.
  • the method according to the invention provides a step (51) of reading the loss index declared by the badge (4).
  • the management module (12) can erase the data field corresponding to the badge loss index during a badge invalidation step (54) (4) if a prior comparison step (52) reveals a difference for this data field.
  • a step (53) of memorizing a new loss index is performed when the terminal (10) reads for the first time a replacement badge of a lost badge.
  • the communication (5) continues with a step (510) of reading, by the means communicating (11) the access control terminal (10), profile data stored in the chip (40).
  • a comparison step (520) is then performed by the management module (12) of the access control terminal (10) to compare the read profile data with profile data corresponding to the identification data in the database. data (14).
  • this comparison step (520) reveals at least one difference, there follows a step (540) of data modification on the chip (40) using firstly the management module (12) and the radio communication means (11) to transmit (541) at the chip (40) of the badge of the profile data considered as new and secondly the writing means (42) of said chip (40) for replacing (542) profile data stored in a memory (44) of the chip (40) by the new data transmitted via the radio communication means (11) of the access control terminal (10).
  • the database used to store the data associated with the badges (4) can be local or remote (centralized database).
  • said comparison step (520) may consist in the consultation by the management module (12) of an indication data of the need to modify the data of the badge (4).
  • This indication data can be, for example, a 0 bit if the central system has not noticed any update made since the last "badging" and a 1 bit if, on the contrary, new data has been entered in the database. storing profile data.
  • the update module (13) makes it possible to modify parameters on the number of badges (4) desired using dedicated Residor software or similar reprogramming software. .
  • the modifications are taken into account for example by wired network (6) or by means of an intermediate badge programmed with said software and the encoder apparatus (17).
  • the update module (13) transfers the information to the access control terminal equipped with the management module (12).
  • each data modification step (54, 540) on the chip (40) includes a step of transmission by the terminal (10) to the chip of the badge (4) of an encrypted information with a key corresponding to a sector (S) determined from the memory (44) of the badge (4) and a decryption step using a key writing (Kw) associated with the determined sector (S) of the memory (44) of the badge (4) for decrypting the information corresponding to this sector (S).
  • Kw key writing
  • the use of encryption / decryption keys provides security of the communication protocol between an access control terminal (10) and a badge (4).
  • the comparison step (520) is followed by an end of communication step (55) accompanied, for example, by the unblocking of an access (A1, A2). , A3).
  • the management module (12) can for example control an electromagnet (40) of an electric strike to unlock an access door.
  • the management module (12) can also control, in another example, a remote control, an actuator, etc.
  • at least one radio receiver of the radio communication means (11) of the terminal (10) is associated with a clock recording the hours of arrival and departure of the users and makes it possible to manage the working hours.
  • One of the advantages of the invention lies in the simplicity of implementation, the updates being performed automatically.
  • the management of the badge park is thus simplified and the users are no longer obliged to return their badge when the manager has to make changes.
  • security of the identification data can be ensured since a lost or stolen badge can not be used fraudulently.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
EP05292321A 2004-10-29 2005-10-28 Verfahren und Ausrüstung zur Verwaltung von Zugangskontrollkarten Withdrawn EP1653415A1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR0411585A FR2877468B1 (fr) 2004-10-29 2004-10-29 Procede et equipement de gestion de badges de controle d'acces

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EP1653415A1 true EP1653415A1 (de) 2006-05-03

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US11339589B2 (en) 2018-04-13 2022-05-24 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US11466473B2 (en) 2018-04-13 2022-10-11 Dormakaba Usa Inc Electro-mechanical lock core
FR3132373A1 (fr) * 2022-02-03 2023-08-04 Cogelec Procédé de contrôle d’accès à des bâtiments
US11913254B2 (en) 2017-09-08 2024-02-27 dormakaba USA, Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US11933076B2 (en) 2016-10-19 2024-03-19 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US12031357B2 (en) 2019-10-09 2024-07-09 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core

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WO2003056511A1 (en) * 2001-12-24 2003-07-10 Safecab Pty Limited Vehicle security methods and apparatus
EP1450312A2 (de) * 2003-02-18 2004-08-25 Computerized Security Systems, Inc. Elektronisches Zugangskontrollsystem

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WO2008045918A3 (en) * 2006-10-10 2008-07-17 Honeywell Int Inc Decentralized access control framework
WO2008045918A2 (en) * 2006-10-10 2008-04-17 Honeywell International Inc. Decentralized access control framework
EP2043055A1 (de) * 2007-09-28 2009-04-01 iLoq Oy Sperrverwaltungssystem
WO2009040470A2 (en) * 2007-09-28 2009-04-02 Iloq Oy Lock administration system
WO2009040470A3 (en) * 2007-09-28 2009-05-28 Iloq Oy Lock administration system
CN101855653A (zh) * 2007-09-28 2010-10-06 伊洛克公司 锁管理***
JP2010540802A (ja) * 2007-09-28 2010-12-24 イロク オサケ ユキチュア 錠管理システム
US8516250B2 (en) 2007-09-28 2013-08-20 Iloq Oy Lock administration system
US11933076B2 (en) 2016-10-19 2024-03-19 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US11913254B2 (en) 2017-09-08 2024-02-27 dormakaba USA, Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US11339589B2 (en) 2018-04-13 2022-05-24 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
US11466473B2 (en) 2018-04-13 2022-10-11 Dormakaba Usa Inc Electro-mechanical lock core
US11447980B2 (en) 2018-04-13 2022-09-20 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Puller tool
US12031357B2 (en) 2019-10-09 2024-07-09 Dormakaba Usa Inc. Electro-mechanical lock core
FR3132373A1 (fr) * 2022-02-03 2023-08-04 Cogelec Procédé de contrôle d’accès à des bâtiments
EP4224443A1 (de) 2022-02-03 2023-08-09 Cogelec Verfahren zur steuerung des zugangs zu gebäuden

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FR2877468A1 (fr) 2006-05-05

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