EP1451736A2 - Systeme de traitement de donnees de patients - Google Patents

Systeme de traitement de donnees de patients

Info

Publication number
EP1451736A2
EP1451736A2 EP02774694A EP02774694A EP1451736A2 EP 1451736 A2 EP1451736 A2 EP 1451736A2 EP 02774694 A EP02774694 A EP 02774694A EP 02774694 A EP02774694 A EP 02774694A EP 1451736 A2 EP1451736 A2 EP 1451736A2
Authority
EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
data
patient
health
health data
processing system
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
EP02774694A
Other languages
German (de)
English (en)
Inventor
Christian Thielscher
Martin GÖTTFRIED
Simon Umbreit
Frank Boegner
Jochen Haack
Nikolai Schroeders
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Symbasis GmbH
Original Assignee
Symbasis GmbH
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from DE10209780A external-priority patent/DE10209780B4/de
Application filed by Symbasis GmbH filed Critical Symbasis GmbH
Publication of EP1451736A2 publication Critical patent/EP1451736A2/fr
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q10/00—Administration; Management
    • G06Q10/10—Office automation; Time management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G16—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATION FIELDS
    • G16H—HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, i.e. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF MEDICAL OR HEALTHCARE DATA
    • G16H10/00—ICT specially adapted for the handling or processing of patient-related medical or healthcare data
    • G16H10/60—ICT specially adapted for the handling or processing of patient-related medical or healthcare data for patient-specific data, e.g. for electronic patient records
    • G16H10/65—ICT specially adapted for the handling or processing of patient-related medical or healthcare data for patient-specific data, e.g. for electronic patient records stored on portable record carriers, e.g. on smartcards, RFID tags or CD

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a data processing system for processing patient data, which comprise person-identifying personal data of a respective patient and associated health data, the system containing one or more central points, each with a database storing the health data and terminal devices connected to the database, via the health data can be read by patients from the database and / or read into the same.
  • the invention is therefore based on the technical problem of providing a new type of data processing system for processing patient data, in which the health data are stored in the central database with high protection against unauthorized access.
  • the invention solves this problem by providing a data processing system with the features of claim 1.
  • the health data are stored in the respective central database without being assigned to personal data, so that unauthorized persons cannot read the health data from the database is to assign them to specific people.
  • the authorized retrieval of a patient's health data requires the entry of a data record identification code assigned to him.
  • this code can be used to selectively read an associated health data record from the central database, this code is decoupled from personal data, ie an assignment of the read data record to a specific person is not possible using this code alone. In this way it can be achieved that the assignment of read-out health data to a specific person is not possible without the participation or consent of the person concerned.
  • appropriate authorization means can be made available to the patient, with which they can enable a practitioner, for example, to read the desired health data from the central database with the aid of the associated data record identification code.
  • the data record identification code required for calling up a respective health data record includes a patient card code stored on an electronic patient card and a patient identification code to be entered by the patient.
  • a data retrieval therefore requires both the provision of the electronic patient card by the patient and the input of his patient identification code, i.e. the data retrieval is dependent on the patient's double participation.
  • the data record identification code includes a patient card code stored on an electronic patient card and a practitioner identification code which identifies the querying practitioner. Since the retrieval of health data also requires the entry of the practitioner identification code in this way, the system can monitor which practitioner requested health data and when.
  • an encrypted transmission of the data record identification code and / or an encrypted transmission of the health data retrieved from the central database is provided.
  • This counteracts an unauthorized interception of the data record identification code or the health data retrieved from the database and thus further increases data security.
  • a system developed according to claim 5 gives the terminal user, in particular a treating doctor, a time-limited authorization to read new or updated health data of a patient into the central database following a registration or readout procedure recognized as authorized on the basis of the data record identification code, on the latter Implementation the patient has to participate. This measure enables the practitioner to enter new health data in the central database within a certain period of time, for example a few weeks or months after a treatment appointment, without the patient having to be present for this.
  • the electronic patient card contains a person-identifying picture. The practitioner can compare this image with the person presenting the card to him, which counteracts misuse of the card.
  • a pseudonymization computer is provided in the central location, physically separate from the central database, ie without an online connection to it.
  • the pseudonymization computer contains an allocation table of person-identifying data on the one hand and data record identification codes on the other hand.
  • these, together with person-identifying data are preferably transmitted in encrypted form to the pseudonymization computer of the central office, which then exchanges the person-identifying data for the associated data record identification code and the latter together with the received health data for offline transmission to the provides a central database where they can then be stored and retrieved.
  • the physical separation of the pseudonymization computer and the database makes it possible for unauthorized persons to Chen break in the database of the database impossible to access the health data assigned to certain people.
  • an input computer that is physically separate from the pseudonymization computer is provided in the central office.
  • the end devices on the user side are connected to this via an online connection.
  • the input computer preferably receives encrypted from the terminals and e.g. with the above-mentioned, time-limited read-in authorization sent health data to be stored in the central database together with the associated person-identifying data and makes this available on the output side for offline forwarding to the pseudonymization computer.
  • the pseudonymization computer is completely physically separated from the user-side end devices and the associated data network, so that the assignment table of person-identifying data to data set identification codes stored in it is absolutely secured against unauthorized online access.
  • a certain part of the health data belonging to the patient and stored in the central database is stored on the patient data card so that it can be called up directly on the patient data card. This gives a practitioner e.g. in an emergency, the option of using the card to obtain knowledge of this data about the patient's state of health if the patient's involvement required to query the central database is not possible at that moment.
  • an emergency call center is available according to claim 10, which is authorized to request and read out to the central office in order to carry out emergency readout processes with which health data of a patient can be made available to a practitioner in emergency situations if the patient is unable to perform normal data retrieval with the practitioner.
  • the practitioner must identify himself as authorized to the emergency call center using appropriate authentication means.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic block diagram of the for reading
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic block diagram for a variant of the system of Fig. 1 and
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic block diagram of the for reading
  • FIG. 1 schematically illustrates the components of a data processing system relevant for reading data, for processing patient data, and a data reading process carried out with them.
  • the system includes a data network which comprises a plurality of end devices, typically a plurality of end devices, of which only one end device 1 in the form of a PC is shown in FIG. 1, which are connected to a central office 3 via a respective online connection 2 ,
  • the latter contains an output computer 4, which functions as a central health database.
  • the health data of a respective patient are stored in the health database 4 as a health data record, each of which can be called up together with a respectively assigned data record identification code.
  • the health data can be electronic prescriptions, medical reports, laboratory data, X-rays, etc.
  • the data record identification code is selected in such a way that from its knowledge alone no conclusions can be drawn about the patient's identity. This ensures that it is not possible for an unauthorized person to gain knowledge of the persons for whom health data are stored and which health data belong to a particular person by unauthorized reading of data from the central database 4.
  • the system includes an electronic patient card 5 for each patient, on which a patient card code 5a is stored, which can also be referred to as a card number.
  • a patient card code 5a is stored, which can also be referred to as a card number.
  • every patient as a system user receives a personal identification number (PIN) known only to him, which ensures that the health data retrieved refer to him, i.e. an unauthorized possession of the patient card 5 does not yet enable access to health data.
  • PIN personal identification number
  • another person-specific code can alternatively be used, e.g. one that contains a specific biometric personal characteristic.
  • the card number 5a and the PIN together form the data record identification code DIC, with which the relevant health data record is stored in the central database 4 and which is to be transmitted for successful data retrieval.
  • the patient card 5 is on a terminal 1, for example in a treating Doctor stands, inserted to read card number 5a, and the patient also enters his PIN.
  • the terminal 1 transmits the card number 5a and the PIN as the data record identification code DIC to the central station 3 in order to request the return of the associated health data record.
  • the central office 3 uses its database output computer 4 to check the transmitted DIC for agreement with one of the stored DICs and, if the agreement is found, sends the associated health data record GD (DIC) to the requesting terminal 1. Even if this data transmission were intercepted by an unauthorized person, it would be the latter is unable to assign the intercepted data GD (DIC) to a specific person since it does not contain any personally identifying information. Even an unauthorized interception of the transmission of the DIC would at most enable an unauthorized person to read the associated health data record GD (DIC) from the central database 4, but he would have no information as to which person it belongs to.
  • the patient card 5 can be issued, for example, by a so-called trust center, ie a facility that is authorized to issue safety-critical certificates, by a health insurance company or a public facility. Overall, this consequently implements a data processing system for processing patient data that is adequately secured against unauthorized data access. Depending on requirements, further security enhancing measures can be implemented, some of which are described below. It can be provided as a security-increasing option that the patient card 5 contains a person-identifying image 5b of the patient, so that the practitioner can check whether the card 5 handed over to him by the patient is actually his own, which prevents misuse and confusion.
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a variant of the system from FIG. 1, which additionally comprises an electronic doctor card 6 with a doctor identification code 6a stored thereon for the respective doctor, such as a doctor.
  • a request for health data of a patient from the central database 4 takes place as in the case of FIG. 1, with the exception that the practitioner must also insert his card 6 into the terminal 1, which then reads the practitioner identification code 6a and in addition to the patient identification code 5a and the patient's PIN to the central office 3.
  • This measure enables the system to determine which doctor or other system user, such as a pharmacist or a cost accounting office, accessed soft data at what point in time.
  • the data transmission on the online connection 2 is preferably, although not necessarily, in encrypted form, and preferably both the transmission of the requesting code data 5a, PIN, 6a and the transmitted health data GD.
  • Conventional cryptographic methods can be used for this.
  • a particularly favorable implementation with a very high level of data security for the present application provides for the implementation of an encryption algorithm 5c in the electronic patient card 5, as indicated by the dashed line in FIG. 2 as an option.
  • the patient card 5 is designed such that after it has been plugged into the terminal 1, it reads in the PIN entered by the patient and, if present, the dentist identification code 6a.
  • the encryption algorithm 5c generates, for example, using a random code
  • This is an encrypted piece of information which contains the patient card number 5a, the PIN and the practitioner identification code 6a, for example a patient card number, in encrypted form and which is then transmitted from the terminal 1 to the central point 3.
  • An associated decryption algorithm is implemented there, which decrypts the transmitted information.
  • This system solution has the advantage that the patient card number 5a cannot be read out and can therefore be implemented in the patient card 5 in a manner that remains completely secret. Thus, the patient card number 5a cannot be read by the card reader of the terminal 1, and an improper interception of the patient card number 5a on the terminal 1 is impossible.
  • the central station 3 transmits the health data GD encrypted with the non-secret code key to the requesting terminal 1, which decrypts it with the secret code key, which is e.g. is composed of the secret code keys of the patient card 5 and, if applicable, the treatment card 6, according to which the health data GD can be displayed or evaluated.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates the components of a system solution that is particularly advantageous in terms of high data security for reading new health data from a respective terminal 1 into the central database 4 of the central office 3.
  • a pseudonymization computer 7 also anonymization, called computer, and an input computer 8 is provided.
  • the pseudonymization computer 7 is physically separated both from the input computer 8 and from the output computer 4.
  • Data is transferred from the input computer 8 to the pseudonymization computer 7 or from the pseudonymization computer 7 to the output computer 4 solely via a respective offline connection 10, 11, which are implemented, for example, by a conventional batch or batch operation. This prevents any unauthorized online access to the pseudonymization computer 7.
  • the pseudonymization computer 7 has the main task of exchanging incoming data, which includes person-identifying data and associated health data, for the person-identifying data against the associated data record identification code of the patient and thus on the output side completely pseudonymized or anonymized health data for storage in the central database 4 to provide.
  • the health data can then be assigned to a respective patient again on the basis of the data record identification code stored with them after an authorized data call.
  • new health data of a patient together with personal data identifying him are transmitted by the practitioner via his terminal 1 and an online connection 9 to the central office 3.
  • the online connection 9 can be the online connection 2, which is also used for data retrieval, or another data transmission connection of the network.
  • the input computer 8 receives the incoming personal and health data and makes them available on the output side for offline transmission to the pseudonymization computer 7.
  • the pseudonymization computer 7 receives the patient data transmitted offline and, as already briefly explained above, replaces the personal data contained therein with the data record identification code belonging to the patient concerned, in order to provide the health data together with the associated data record identification code on the output side.
  • an assignment or translation table is implemented in the pseudonymization computer 7, which assigns the personal data of a patient, such as name and date of birth, to the corresponding data record identification code of this patient.
  • the data is transmitted in a format that allows this automatic deletion of the personal data and replacement by the data record identification code.
  • the health data with the code are then fed to the central database 4 via the associated offline connection 11 and read in there, ie stored.
  • the health data for a specific patient can then be called up from the central database 4 by means of an authorized query process which includes the transmission of the correct data record identification code DIC, as described above with reference to FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • the system is designed in a security-enhanced variant in such a way that the central unit 3 together with the health data GD, which the practitioner provides for a Session with the patient during his or her presence, transmits a time-limited read-in authorization code, preferably in encrypted form. It remains valid for a predeterminable period of time of, for example, a few weeks or months, and during this period gives the practitioner the option of transferring health data to the central database 4 in the manner described above for FIG. This procedure differs from the above-described read-in method according to the basic variant of FIG.
  • the read-in authorization code belonging to the patient in question is transmitted from the terminal 1 to the input computer 8 and from there offline to the pseudonymization computer 7 , Using an assignment table stored in it, the latter then replaces the time-limited read-in authorization code with the patient's data record identification code. If the practitioner wants to read health data into the central database after the authorization period has expired, this must be done in another secured form, for example by transmission by post and subsequent electronic processing in the central office 3 or by another, highly secure electronic data transmission.
  • the procedure described for FIG. 3 can be modified in order to achieve increased data security in such a way that the data transmission on the online connection 9 is encrypted, e.g. with one of the encryption algorithms explained above for FIGS. 1 and 2.
  • the system design described so far enables data to be retrieved from the central database 4 only while the patient is at the clinician's.
  • the system comprises one or more suitable emergency measures.
  • a first emergency measure provides for a part of the health data of a patient that is usually required for emergency treatment to be stored and retrievably stored directly on the electronic patient card 5, such as data about the blood group, allergies, currently used medications, emergency-relevant diagnoses, etc. In an emergency, the practitioner can then access the relevant data using the patient card alone.
  • the system can include an emergency call center in the manner of a so-called call center, which has the authorization to access at least one emergency-relevant part of the health data of each patient stored in the central database 4.
  • the practitioner has to authenticate himself to this emergency call center, for which every practitioner receives a corresponding authentication code. After authentication, he then receives the required emergency health data from her. To ensure adequate data security, the patient must expediently agree to this emergency access authorization for his health data and be informed about each such access afterwards.
  • the card holder can block the card in a conventional, e.g. can be initiated to block credit cards in a known manner, for example by calling the central office, which then appropriately checks the authorization of the caller, e.g. by calling back and / or querying security information known only to the card owner.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Entrepreneurship & Innovation (AREA)
  • Human Resources & Organizations (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Marketing (AREA)
  • Operations Research (AREA)
  • Quality & Reliability (AREA)
  • Tourism & Hospitality (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Data Mining & Analysis (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Economics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Epidemiology (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Medical Informatics (AREA)
  • Primary Health Care (AREA)
  • Public Health (AREA)
  • Medical Treatment And Welfare Office Work (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
  • Measuring And Recording Apparatus For Diagnosis (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un système de traitement de données destiné au traitement de données de patients, qui regroupent des données d'identification personnelle d'un patient particulier et des données de santé correspondantes (GD). Ce système comprend un poste central (3), qui contient une banque de données (4) mémorisant les données de santé, et des terminaux (1), qui sont reliés au poste central de manière à permettre l'extraction de données de santé de ladite banque de données et/ou l'introduction de données de santé dans la banque de données centrale. Selon la présente invention, ces données de santé sont mémorisées dans la banque de données centrale sans affectation à des données personnelles. Un code d'identification d'enregistrement (DIC) est attribué à l'enregistrement de santé d'un patient particulier, la saisie de ce code étant nécessaire pour extraire ledit enregistrement de santé. Cette invention concerne également l'utilisation dudit système de traitement de données p. ex. dans un système utilisant des dossiers électroniques de patients.
EP02774694A 2001-10-11 2002-10-09 Systeme de traitement de donnees de patients Ceased EP1451736A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
DE10150008 2001-10-11
DE10150008 2001-10-11
DE10209780 2002-02-27
DE10209780A DE10209780B4 (de) 2001-10-11 2002-02-27 Datenverarbeitungssystem für Patientendaten
PCT/EP2002/011305 WO2003034294A2 (fr) 2001-10-11 2002-10-09 Systeme de traitement de donnees de patients

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP1451736A2 true EP1451736A2 (fr) 2004-09-01

Family

ID=26010338

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
EP02774694A Ceased EP1451736A2 (fr) 2001-10-11 2002-10-09 Systeme de traitement de donnees de patients

Country Status (7)

Country Link
US (1) US20050043964A1 (fr)
EP (1) EP1451736A2 (fr)
JP (1) JP2005505863A (fr)
CN (1) CN1602495A (fr)
CA (1) CA2462981A1 (fr)
TW (1) TWI254233B (fr)
WO (1) WO2003034294A2 (fr)

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
TWI254233B (en) 2006-05-01
CN1602495A (zh) 2005-03-30
JP2005505863A (ja) 2005-02-24
US20050043964A1 (en) 2005-02-24
CA2462981A1 (fr) 2003-04-24
WO2003034294A2 (fr) 2003-04-24
WO2003034294A3 (fr) 2004-06-03

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