Classifications

• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N5/00—Systems for controlling combustion
  • F23N5/24—Preventing development of abnormal or undesired conditions, i.e. safety arrangements
  • F23N5/245—Preventing development of abnormal or undesired conditions, i.e. safety arrangements using electrical or electromechanical means
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N5/00—Systems for controlling combustion
  • F23N5/20—Systems for controlling combustion with a time programme acting through electrical means, e.g. using time-delay relays
  • F23N5/206—Systems for controlling combustion with a time programme acting through electrical means, e.g. using time-delay relays using electrical or electromechanical means
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N2223/00—Signal processing; Details thereof
  • F23N2223/22—Timing network
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N2227/00—Ignition or checking
  • F23N2227/04—Prepurge
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N2227/00—Ignition or checking
  • F23N2227/12—Burner simulation or checking
  • F23N2227/16—Checking components, e.g. electronic
• • F—MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; BLASTING
  • F23—COMBUSTION APPARATUS; COMBUSTION PROCESSES
  • F23N—REGULATING OR CONTROLLING COMBUSTION
  • F23N2227/00—Ignition or checking
  • F23N2227/18—Applying test signals, e.g. periodic

Definitions

• Safety device for a boiler comprising a time delay secured by an electronic circuit
• the invention relates to a safety device for an industrial boiler comprising electromechanical relays connected in series to form an electromechanical safety chain, and at least one shunt relay normally open and mounted in parallel with one of said electromechanical relays, said relay shunt being controlled by a PLC to be closed for a time delay.
• the invention applies in particular to industrial boilers comprising for example a gas burner for producing steam or superheated water.
• Such boilers are provided with a safety device of the type indicated above which is interposed between one or more sensors and one or more actuators mounted on the boiler.
• This device is in particular arranged to trigger via the actuators a shutdown of the boiler when at least one sensor detects a malfunction of the boiler. This fault may be excessive pressure, too low water level or a problem in the burner flame.
• Each sensor is for example a pressure switch which supplies an alternating electric current at 230 Volts to keep closed a corresponding electromechanical relay connected in series in the safety chain of the device.
• This safety chain is an electrical circuit comprising several electromechanical relays connected in series to form an electrical circuit which is closed in normal operation, and which is opened on detection of a fault by a sensor.
• the actuators which may for example be solenoid valves, are designed to trigger a shutdown of the boiler as soon as they are no longer supplied with current.
• the safety device comprises for each sensor a relay which is kept closed by the corresponding supply current, and it ensures the electrical supply of the actuators if the safety chain is closed. In the event of a malfunction, one of the sensors ceases to supply its current to open the safety chain, which causes a shutdown of the electrical supply to the actuators to trigger the shutdown of the boiler.
• Some of the sensors are subjected to daily tests to verify that in the event of a fault in the boiler, the sensor tested causes the opening of the corresponding relay. These tests are performed during operation, and the corresponding relay must open, but without stopping the boiler.
• a shunt relay which is normally open is therefore mounted in parallel with the relay corresponding to the sensor tested. This shunt relay is closed by a PLC for a predefined time delay, so that the safety chain remains closed during the opening of the sensor relay generated by the test.
• the test of a pressure switch consists, for example, in temporarily closing an isolation valve of a box comprising the pressure switch and in raising the pressure in this box to verify that the corresponding relay in the safety chain opens on increase in the pressure in the box.
• the isolation valve On closing the isolation valve, the shunt relay is closed by the PLC for the delay time. The increase in pressure causes the sensor relay to open, but the safety chain remains closed by closing the shunt relay. The isolation valve is then opened to end the test by restoring normal pressure in the box. The return to normal pressure in the sensor environment therefore causes the sensor relay to close. Then, the timer is disarmed through the automaton which controls the opening of the shunt relay, which corresponds to a return to the initial state before the test.
• the object of the invention is to remedy these drawbacks.
• the subject of the invention is a safety device for an industrial boiler comprising electromechanical relays connected in series to form an electromechanical safety chain, and at least one shunt relay normally open and mounted in parallel with one of the said electromechanical relays, said shunt relay being controlled by a PLC to be closed for a time delay, characterized in that said shunt relay has a contact connected to an electronic circuit, and in that said electronic circuit controls the opening of an electromechanical relay mounted in series in the safety chain in the event of closure of said shunt relay for a duration greater than said duration
• This construction means that the delay is managed by the electronic circuit and by the automaton to ensure a satisfactory degree of safety of the installation.
• the safety device comprises electromechanical relays connected in series to form an electrical supply circuit for an actuator of the boiler, one of said relays being controlled by a controller for be open during a delay time on receipt of a delay start command
• the electronic circuit controls another electromechanical relay also connected in series in said supply circuit to open said other electromechanical relay during said delay time on reception of said timer start order.
• a minimum delay time such as a minimum pre-sweep duration which must precede commissioning can also be secured.
• said relay which is controlled by the electronic circuit is closed if it is electrically supplied by the electronic circuit and open otherwise.
• the relays and the electronic circuit are mounted on a support in the form of a printed circuit board.
• the safety device can be mounted in a compact unit enclosed by a possibly sealed box to prevent an operator from modifying the configuration.
• the electronic circuit comprises a "PAL" type programmable circuit.
• PAL programmable circuit
• Figure 1 is a very schematic representation of the invention
• Figure 2 is a very schematic representation of a first embodiment of the invention
• FIG. 3 is a very schematic representation of an electronic circuit of the device according to the invention.
• Figure 4 is a very schematic representation of a second embodiment of the invention.
• a safety device is connected to at least one sensor PT n and to at least one actuator EV m which are generally mounted in the industrial boiler CHA.
• the PT n sensor which is here a pressure switch sends an electric current l n to the safety device DS which is here mounted in an electrical cabinet AE. If this current l n is received , the safety device in turn returns a second electric current J m in the direction of the actuator EV m which is here a solenoid valve, in order to maintain this actuator in a normal operating position.
• FIG. 2 very schematically shows the architecture of the security device DS. This comprises several electromechanical relays RE n connected in series to form a safety chain CH1. Each relay RE n is kept closed by a corresponding supply current l n which is supplied by a corresponding sensor PT n .
• the safety chain CH1 thus constitutes an electrical circuit which is closed in normal operation, and which is opened as soon as one of the sensors PT n detects a fault.
• a normally open RT n shunt relay is mounted in parallel with the RE n sensor relay.
• This shunt relay is controlled by a PLC controller to be closed for a time delay from the start of the test. This delay time is for example 30 seconds maximum.
• the test delay is started.
• the isolation valve Vl n is equipped with an electrical contactor connected to the PLC controller to control the closing of the shunt relay RT n as soon as the valve Vl n is closed.
• This shunt relay is then opened on the PLC's order as soon as the delay time has elapsed.
• the RT n shunt relay can therefore remain closed for a period longer than the delay time. In such a case, the corresponding sensor is therefore inhibited since if it detects a fault, the opening of its relay will not cause the safety chain to open, taking into account that its shunt relay is closed. Such a malfunction is therefore not detected by the security device, which constitutes a major risk for the operational safety of the installation.
• the shunt relay RT n which is controlled by the PLC automaton has its time delay secured by an electronic circuit CE n so that the circuit CE n controls an electromechanical relay RS connected in series in the chain CH1 for open the chain CH1 if the relay RE n remains closed for a period longer than the delay time.
• This electronic circuit has an input E connected to a contact of the shunt relay RT n so that as soon as it detects a closure of the relay RT n , it triggers a delay, and if at the end of this delay the relay RT n is still closed, it commands the opening of the RS relay.
• the electronic circuit CE n is capable of triggering a shutdown of the boiler independently of the PLC, and on detection of an overrun of the delay time.
• the timer which is controlled by the PLC controller is therefore also secured by the electronic circuit CE n to form a heterogeneous hardware redundancy in the management of the timer.
• This embodiment is given by way of example for securing a timer corresponding to a sensor test, but it can also be applied to securing other similar timers.
• the flame detection sensor is subject to a similar time delay for which it must detect the presence of a burner flame at the latest five seconds after the start of supply. gas from the burner, otherwise a safety of the boiler or its starting device must be triggered.
• the circuit CE m can be produced in different ways, for example by using capacitors and resistors controlled by a logic integrated circuit to count the delay time on the basis of the charging time of a capacitor.
• An exemplary embodiment of the electronic circuit CE n is shown very diagrammatically in FIG. 3. It comprises a logic integrated circuit CIL having an input E connected to a contact of the shunt relay RT n and an output S for controlling an opening of the relay RS in the event that input E is supplied for a period greater than the time delay.
• This logic integrated circuit is supplied by a direct voltage of 12 Volts, and it is connected to a resistor R and to capacitors C1 and C2 to drive the charges of the capacitor C1 in order to manage the delay time.
• the logic integrated circuit On receipt of a time delay start command at E, the logic integrated circuit triggers a charge of the capacitor C1.
• the logic integrated circuit also has an input connected to a point V situated between the resistor R and the capacitor C1, so that during the charging of the capacitor C1, this input changes state when the delay time has elapsed.
• the logic integrated circuit commands the opening of the relay RS through its output S.
• the CIL logic integrated circuit will advantageously be produced for example with a "PAL” type circuit.
• PAL programmable logic circuits
• These "PAL” circuits operate at 12 Volts and allow logic operators to be made between input channels and output channels at a lower cost. They are permanently configured by electrical breakdown.
• the RS relay is a relay which is closed if it is supplied by the output S, and open otherwise, so that a malfunction of the CE circuit triggers an opening of the RS relay.
• the delay time tends to zero so as to instantly open the safety chain in such a case.
• This provision further increases the operational safety of the timing management.
• the various electronic circuits and the various relays are grouped together in a box containing supports in the form of printed circuit boards on which they are mounted by welding.
• Such a box comprises one or more printed circuits on which the relays forming the electromechanical chain are mounted, so that these relays are not interconnected by wired logic, but by conductive tracks of the printed circuits.
• circuits can thus form a compact assembly enclosed by a possibly sealed box to prevent an operator from modifying the configuration.
• several circuits are pinned into connectors of a card called backplane card and also equipped with connectors ensuring the electrical connection with the sensors and with the actuators.
• the starting of such a boiler is subject to a sequence also implementing timers.
• the ignition of the burner should only be carried out after a pre-sweep operation of the combustion chamber aimed at evacuating any residual gases before the burner is put into service.
• the opening of the burner gas supply solenoid valve must be prohibited until the pre-sweep sequence has been completed.
• Such a start-up sequence is ensured by an automaton which controls the pre-sweep sequence to control the closing of a relay of the electrical supply circuit of the gas supply solenoid valve at the end of the pre-sweep sequence.
• the closing of this relay is only ordered after the minimum delay time corresponding to the pre-sweep has elapsed.
• the automaton can be a programmable microprocessor automaton, or even a "black box" comprising for example a servomotor for controlling the sequence.
• the device according to the invention may have the timings of its start-up sequence also secured by one or more electronic circuits.
• the PLC PLC which is represented in FIG. 4, then manages a time delay which is this time a minimum duration which must elapse before it commands the closing of a relay.
• the chain CA which is secured here is an electrical supply circuit of an actuator EV m which is for example the gas supply solenoid valve of the burner.
• the order to launch the pre-sweep time delay which is received at T is sent in parallel to the PLC controller and to an electronic circuit CE m .
• the electronic circuit CE m controls the opening of another electromechanical relay RS for the minimum duration. Consequently, in the event of a malfunction of the automaton causing an early closure of the relay RE m , the actuator EV m is not supplied since the supply circuit AC is kept open by the relay RS which is controlled by the circuit electronic CE m .
• the RS relay here constitutes a start authorization relay.
• the start-up sequence includes timers which are minimum durations and maximum durations during which relays must be actuated. Securing all of such a start sequence therefore includes several electronic circuits to manage these two types of delay, in parallel with the PLC.
• the electronic circuit CE m managing this pre-sweep time delay which is a minimum duration could for example be a circuit of the type which is shown in FIG. 3, but driven by a logic different from that which has been presented above. This circuit keeps the RS start authorization relay open on receipt of a timeout command and commands the relay to close after the timeout has elapsed.
• the RS relay is a relay which is closed if it is supplied by the output S, and open otherwise, so that a malfunction of the CE circuit triggers an opening of the RS relay.
• the delay time tends to infinity so as to prevent starting of the burner in such a case.
• the security device according to the invention gives rise to an improved degree of security in the management of security timers by forming heterogeneous redundancy for the management of these timers.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Chemical & Material Sciences (AREA)
• Combustion & Propulsion (AREA)
• Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
• General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Safety Devices In Control Systems (AREA)
• Burglar Alarm Systems (AREA)
• Control Of Combustion (AREA)
• Electrophonic Musical Instruments (AREA)
• Cookers (AREA)
• Networks Using Active Elements (AREA)
• Relay Circuits (AREA)
• Regulation And Control Of Combustion (AREA)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Publications (2)

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• 2001
  • 2001-07-06 FR FR0108988A patent/FR2827035B1/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
• 2002
  • 2002-05-17 AT AT02738267T patent/ATE348294T1/de not_active IP Right Cessation
  • 2002-05-17 DE DE60216763T patent/DE60216763T2/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
  • 2002-05-17 CA CA002453077A patent/CA2453077C/fr not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 2002-05-17 US US10/482,307 patent/US7008217B2/en not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 2002-05-17 WO PCT/FR2002/001676 patent/WO2003004936A1/fr active IP Right Grant
  • 2002-05-17 CN CNB02813379XA patent/CN1255648C/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
  • 2002-05-17 EP EP02738267A patent/EP1407191B1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime

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