EP1177536B1 - Verfahren zur ableitung von identifikationsnummern - Google Patents
Verfahren zur ableitung von identifikationsnummern Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- EP1177536B1 EP1177536B1 EP00926744A EP00926744A EP1177536B1 EP 1177536 B1 EP1177536 B1 EP 1177536B1 EP 00926744 A EP00926744 A EP 00926744A EP 00926744 A EP00926744 A EP 00926744A EP 1177536 B1 EP1177536 B1 EP 1177536B1
- Authority
- EP
- European Patent Office
- Prior art keywords
- digits
- digit
- pin
- group
- decimal
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Lifetime
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
Definitions
- the invention relates to a method for the automatic derivation of personal identification numbers (PINs) for a large number of cash cards or other security-requiring devices, wherein the PINs consist of a number N of decimal numbers, which are each associated with a cash card or a security-requiring device, from a binary number stored on the cash card or device with L digits, in particular a person-specific binary code.
- PINs personal identification numbers
- the PINs may only contain decimal digits for use with numeric keyboards can be entered. Further they should not start with a zero. This results in in four places a range of 9000 different PINs. The theoretically lowest possible probability of a PIN to guess, is thus 1/9000.
- the object of the present invention is a method indicate which probability is as low as possible holds that a PIN can be guessed.
- FR 2 577 704 A1 was This problem has already been mentioned, but not solved.
- a secret Key For personal data of the user can use a secret Key with the help of a Encryption algorithm to generate a binary code.
- a secret Key For personal data of the user can use a secret Key with the help of a Encryption algorithm to generate a binary code.
- a secret Key For personal data of the user can use a secret Key with the help of a Encryption algorithm to generate a binary code.
- PINs for Debit or triple DES algorithm ' becomes from the data with the help of a bank-own key a customer generates a 64-digit binary code. From a Section of 16 digits of this binary code may be the PIN for example, be generated in the following manner:
- the 210 hexadecimal digits In order to get digits whose Probability of occurrence not or imperceptibly 1/10 is proposed, the 210 hexadecimal digits, the for example, by applying the o. DES algorithm generated on the 64-digit binary output number were (hence pseudorandom number, since the number produced by no means coincidental), with one each of the other 210 possible pictures into a decimal number and then all 210 decimal digits with a Group operation of a mathematical group with ten Link elements to a single digit. The Probability of occurrence of each decimal thus generated Digit is close to 1/10.
- the additive group of the integers modulo 10 is used to link the 210 digits.
- 210 decimal digits are combined into a single digit by adding all the digits and taking the remainder of a division of the total by 10 as the result.
- the ten possible results occurring are the elements of the additive group Z 10, + .
- the multiplicative group of integers modulo 11 is used to link the 210 digits.
- This group Z * / 11 also has ten elements and is therefore suitable for linking the numbers to one Decimal digit.
- Z * / 11 one counts, by two elements multiplied and the result divided by 11. The case remaining remnant forms the result of the operation. The zero is excluded from the group.
- the in the numbers occurring 0 indicates element No. 10 of group Z * / 11.
- each of the ten symmetry images of this group is assigned a different decimal digit.
- the numerals 0, the four rotations about the center of the pentagon, the numbers 1 to 4 and the five reflections about the five axes of symmetry of the pentagon, the numbers 5 to 9 are assigned to the identity map. Carrying out two symmetry images one behind the other creates a symmetry image again.
- the following multiplication table can be set up with these assignments: * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8th 9 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8th 9 1 1 2 3 4 0 5 7 8th 9 5 2 2 3 4 0 1 7 8th 9 5 6 3 3 4 0 1 2 8th 9 5 6 7 4 4 0 1 2 3 9 5 6 7 8th 5 6 7 4 4 0 1 2 3 9 5 6 7 8th 5 9 8th 7 6 0 4 3 2 1 6 6 5 9 8th 7 1 0 4 3 2 7 7 6 5 9 8th 2 1 0 4 3 2 7 7 6 5 9 8th 2 1 0 4 3 8th 8th 7 6 5 9 3 2 1 0 4 9 9 8th 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
- the 210 digits become one with the help of this table single digit linked by successive with the result the last operation as a row indicator and with the next digit as a column indicator the next result in the table until all digits are taken into account were.
- the last result forms the number of the PIN CODE.
- Embodiment of the invention is in the drawing shown and in the following Description explained in more detail.
- the figure shows a diagram for generating a PIN by reduction of hexadecimal numbers using mathematical Groups.
- hexadecimal digits are generated, which are each mapped with a different one of the 36 possible figures of the hexadecimal digits in the set of numbers 1 to 9 in a number between 1 and 9.
- the 36 decimal digits are linked to the group operation of any mathematical group of order 9 to the first digit of the PIN. It can thus generate 9000 different PINs, which are distributed approximately evenly.
- the maximum unevenness was about 1.5 percent, which does not significantly increase the probability that a PIN will be randomly guessed against the theoretical minimum value. The process works very reliably.
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Calculators And Similar Devices (AREA)
- Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Complex Calculations (AREA)
- Holo Graphy (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
- Vending Machines For Individual Products (AREA)
Description
- aus der binären Zahl (B) der Länge L wird eine Pseudo-Zufallszahl generiert, welche aus 210 hexadezimalen Ziffern besteht,
- jede hexadezimale Ziffer dieser Zahl wird mit jeweils
einer unterschiedlichen der 210 möglichen mathematischen
Abbildungen hexadezimaler Ziffern in dezimale Ziffern in
eine dezimale Ziffer umgesetzt,
werden zur Vergleichmäßigung der Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit der jeweiligen Ziffer der PIN durch eine Gruppenoperation einer Belizbyen mathematischen Gruppe der Ordnung 10 miteinander zu einer dezimalen Ziffer verknüpft, welche die jeweilige Ziffer der PIN darstellt.
- aus der binären Zahl (B) der Länge L wird eine Pseudo-Zufallszahl generiert, welche aus 36 hexadezimalen Ziffern besteht,
- jede hexadezimale Ziffer dieser Zahl wird mit jeweils einer unterschiedlichen der 36 möglichen mathematischen Abbildungen hexadezimaler Ziffern in die Ziffern 1 bis 9 in eine Ziffer aus den Ziffern von 1 bis 9 umgesetzt,
- die 36 dezimalen Ziffern der somit erzeugten Zahl werden zur Vergleichmäßigung der
* | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 5 |
2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
3 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
5 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
6 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 2 |
7 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 8 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 |
8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
9 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 |
Claims (6)
- Verfahren zur maschinellen Ableitung von Personen-Identifikations-Nummern (PINs) für eine große Anzahl von Geldkarten oder anderen sicherheitsbedürftigen Einrichtungen, wobei die PINs aus einer Anzahl N dezimaler Ziffern bestehen, die jeweils einer Geldkarte oder einer sicherheitsbedürftigen Einrichtung zugeordnet sind, aus einer auf der Geldkarte oder Einrichtung gespeicherten binären Zahl mit L Stellen, insbesondere einem personenspezifischen Binärcode, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß eine statistisch gleichmäßige Verteilung der PINs auf den zur Verfügung stehenden Zahlenbereich dadurch erzielt wird, daß zur Erstellung der Ziffern der PIN folgende Schritte ausgeführt werden:aus der binären Zahl der Länge L wird eine Pseudo-Zufallszahl generiert, welche aus 210 hexadezimalen Ziffern besteht,jede hexadezimale Ziffer dieser Zahl wird mit jeweils einer unterschiedlichen der 210 möglichen mathematischen Abbildungen hexadezimaler Ziffern in dezimale Ziffern, in eine dezimale Ziffer umgesetzt,die 210 dezimalen Ziffern der somit erzeugten Zahl werden zur Vergleichmäßigung der Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit der jeweiligen Ziffer der PIN durch eine Gruppenoperation einer beliebigen mathematischen Gruppe der Ordnung 10 miteinander zu einer dezimalen Ziffer verknüpft, welche die jeweilige Ziffer der PIN darstellt.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß zur Erstellung der ersten Ziffer der PIN folgende Schritte ausgeführt werden:aus der binären Zahl der Länge L wird eine Pseudo-Zufallszahl generiert, welche aus 36 hexadezimalen Ziffern besteht,jede hexadezimale Ziffer dieser Zahl wird mit jeweils einer unterschiedlichen der 36 möglichen mathematischen Abbildungen hexadezimaler Ziffern in die Ziffern 1 bis 9 in eine Ziffer aus den Ziffern von 1 bis 9 umgesetzt,die 36 dezimalen Ziffern der somit erzeugten Zahl werden zur Vergleichmäßigung der Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit der jeweiligen Ziffer der PIN durch eine Gruppenoperation einer beliebigen mathematischen Gruppe der Ordnung 9 miteinander zu einer dezimalen Ziffer ungleich Null verknüpft, welche die erste Ziffer der PIN darstellt.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die additive Gruppe der ganzen Zahlen Modulo 10 zur Verknüpfung der 210 Ziffern verwendet wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die multiplikative Gruppe der ganzen Zahlen Modulo 11 zur Verknüpfung der 210 Ziffern verwendet wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß die Gruppe der Symmetrieabbildungen eines regelmäßigen Fünfecks (Diedergruppe) zur Verknüpfung der 210 Ziffern verwendet wird, wobei jeder der zehn Symmetrieabbildungen dieser Gruppe eine andere dezimale Ziffer zugeordnet wird.
- Verfahren nach Anspruch 5, dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß der Identitätsabbildung die Ziffer 0, den vier Drehungen um den Mittelpunkt des Fünfecks die Ziffern 1 bis 4 und den fünf Spiegelungen um die fünf Symmetrieachsen des Fünfecks die Ziffern 5 bis 9 zugeordnet werden.
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE19914407A DE19914407A1 (de) | 1999-03-30 | 1999-03-30 | Verfahren zur Ableitung von Identifikationsnummern |
DE19914407 | 1999-03-30 | ||
PCT/EP2000/002481 WO2000060551A1 (de) | 1999-03-30 | 2000-03-21 | Verfahren zur ableitung von identifikationsnummern |
Publications (3)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
EP1177536A1 EP1177536A1 (de) | 2002-02-06 |
EP1177536B1 true EP1177536B1 (de) | 2005-08-31 |
EP1177536B9 EP1177536B9 (de) | 2006-05-24 |
Family
ID=7902944
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
EP00926744A Expired - Lifetime EP1177536B9 (de) | 1999-03-30 | 2000-03-21 | Verfahren zur ableitung von identifikationsnummern |
Country Status (7)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US6991176B1 (de) |
EP (1) | EP1177536B9 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2002541518A (de) |
AT (1) | ATE303638T1 (de) |
AU (1) | AU4538900A (de) |
DE (2) | DE19914407A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2000060551A1 (de) |
Families Citing this family (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
EP1240571A4 (de) * | 1999-11-22 | 2004-08-18 | Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys Inc | Erzeugung und verwaltung von kundenidentifikationsnummern |
JP2003108297A (ja) * | 2001-09-28 | 2003-04-11 | Canon Inc | 情報提供装置、情報処理方法、制御プログラム及び記憶媒体 |
US20080126262A1 (en) * | 2006-11-29 | 2008-05-29 | Colin Brady | System and Method for Secure Transactions |
EP2143232B1 (de) * | 2007-04-05 | 2016-07-06 | International Business Machines Corporation | System und verfahren zur verteilung von berechtigungsnachweisen |
US9513870B2 (en) | 2014-04-22 | 2016-12-06 | Dialog Semiconductor (Uk) Limited | Modulo9 and modulo7 operation on unsigned binary numbers |
Family Cites Families (25)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE2108223A1 (de) * | 1971-02-20 | 1972-08-24 | Nsm Apparatebau Gmbh Kg | Verfahren zur Umwandlung der Verteilung einer Zufallsgröße in eine andere Verteilung |
US3846622A (en) * | 1972-09-29 | 1974-11-05 | Mosler Safe Co | Access control apparatus |
US3906447A (en) * | 1973-01-31 | 1975-09-16 | Paul A Crafton | Security system for lock and key protected secured areas |
US4376279A (en) * | 1981-01-28 | 1983-03-08 | Trans-Cryption, Inc. | Personal identification system |
US4605820A (en) | 1983-11-10 | 1986-08-12 | Visa U.S.A. Inc. | Key management system for on-line communication |
US4614861A (en) * | 1984-11-15 | 1986-09-30 | Intellicard International, Inc. | Unitary, self-contained card verification and validation system and method |
FR2577704A1 (fr) | 1985-02-18 | 1986-08-22 | Systemes Sud | Procede et machine pour la verification de cheques bancaires ou postaux |
US4635054A (en) * | 1985-07-10 | 1987-01-06 | Light Signatures, Inc. | Operator interactive device verification system |
JPS62203070U (de) * | 1986-06-17 | 1987-12-24 | ||
DE3927270C2 (de) * | 1989-08-18 | 1996-07-11 | Deutsche Telekom Ag | Verfahren zum Personalisieren von Chipkarten |
FR2662877B1 (fr) * | 1990-05-29 | 1992-08-21 | France Etat | Installation telephonique pour le chargement a distance de donnees d'abonnement telephonique d'une station autonome. |
JP3129490B2 (ja) * | 1991-11-11 | 2001-01-29 | 美和ロック株式会社 | 電気錠の登録暗証コード検索装置 |
US5363449A (en) * | 1993-03-11 | 1994-11-08 | Tandem Computers Incorporated | Personal identification encryptor and method |
US5778071A (en) * | 1994-07-12 | 1998-07-07 | Information Resource Engineering, Inc. | Pocket encrypting and authenticating communications device |
JPH0851421A (ja) * | 1994-08-08 | 1996-02-20 | Matsushita Electric Ind Co Ltd | ビット攪拌器 |
US6324558B1 (en) * | 1995-02-14 | 2001-11-27 | Scott A. Wilber | Random number generator and generation method |
JPH09270053A (ja) * | 1996-03-29 | 1997-10-14 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | 認証番号発行装置および認証番号検証装置 |
US5706218A (en) * | 1996-05-15 | 1998-01-06 | Intel Corporation | Random number generator |
EP0906678A1 (de) * | 1996-08-16 | 1999-04-07 | Bell Communications Research, Inc. | Verbesserter und kryptographisch sicherer pseudozufallsbitgenerator zur schnellen und sicheren verschlüsselung |
JPH10177472A (ja) * | 1996-12-18 | 1998-06-30 | Meteoola Syst Kk | 乱数列の発生方法 |
US5781458A (en) * | 1997-03-05 | 1998-07-14 | Transcrypt International, Inc. | Method and apparatus for generating truly random numbers |
US5971272A (en) * | 1997-08-19 | 1999-10-26 | At&T Corp. | Secured personal identification number |
US6643374B1 (en) * | 1999-03-31 | 2003-11-04 | Intel Corporation | Duty cycle corrector for a random number generator |
EP1240571A4 (de) * | 1999-11-22 | 2004-08-18 | Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys Inc | Erzeugung und verwaltung von kundenidentifikationsnummern |
US6691301B2 (en) * | 2001-01-29 | 2004-02-10 | Celoxica Ltd. | System, method and article of manufacture for signal constructs in a programming language capable of programming hardware architectures |
-
1999
- 1999-03-30 DE DE19914407A patent/DE19914407A1/de not_active Withdrawn
-
2000
- 2000-03-21 DE DE50011069T patent/DE50011069D1/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-03-21 EP EP00926744A patent/EP1177536B9/de not_active Expired - Lifetime
- 2000-03-21 WO PCT/EP2000/002481 patent/WO2000060551A1/de active IP Right Grant
- 2000-03-21 AU AU45389/00A patent/AU4538900A/en not_active Abandoned
- 2000-03-21 AT AT00926744T patent/ATE303638T1/de active
- 2000-03-21 JP JP2000609968A patent/JP2002541518A/ja active Pending
- 2000-03-21 US US09/937,923 patent/US6991176B1/en not_active Expired - Lifetime
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
DE50011069D1 (de) | 2005-10-06 |
EP1177536A1 (de) | 2002-02-06 |
WO2000060551A1 (de) | 2000-10-12 |
US6991176B1 (en) | 2006-01-31 |
AU4538900A (en) | 2000-10-23 |
ATE303638T1 (de) | 2005-09-15 |
EP1177536B9 (de) | 2006-05-24 |
JP2002541518A (ja) | 2002-12-03 |
DE19914407A1 (de) | 2000-10-05 |
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