EP0910839B1 - Verfahren zum gesicherten speichern von werteinheiten in einer chipkarte und geldüberweisungssystem zur dessen verwendung - Google Patents

Verfahren zum gesicherten speichern von werteinheiten in einer chipkarte und geldüberweisungssystem zur dessen verwendung Download PDF

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Publication number
EP0910839B1
EP0910839B1 EP97926064A EP97926064A EP0910839B1 EP 0910839 B1 EP0910839 B1 EP 0910839B1 EP 97926064 A EP97926064 A EP 97926064A EP 97926064 A EP97926064 A EP 97926064A EP 0910839 B1 EP0910839 B1 EP 0910839B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
value
transaction
active area
area
card
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Expired - Lifetime
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EP97926064A
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English (en)
French (fr)
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EP0910839A1 (de
Inventor
Jean-Paul Kirik
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Gemplus SA
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Gemplus SCA
Gemplus Card International SA
Gemplus SA
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Publication of EP0910839A1 publication Critical patent/EP0910839A1/de
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
    • G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
    • G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
    • G07F7/0866—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means by active credit-cards adapted therefor

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to methods which allow secure storage of value in a smart card and systems monetary transaction using these cards.
  • the invention applies more particularly to smart cards with an EEPROM type memory area not protected.
  • an EEPROM area not protected by a card is accessible by anyone with a simple card reader and read and write commands in memory.
  • This type of memory area does not allow to record sensitive data since no matter who can read and modify them.
  • the process also applies to smart cards with protected memory in order to raise the level of security.
  • Microprocessor cards are capable of contain and prohibit value units access. Only the operating system of the card can access and increase or decrease these units decrease the number. Secure and managed orders by the operating system therefore allow the management of the area containing the units of value, allowing the use of these value units as well that reloading them safely.
  • a memory card does not include a microprocessor, nor a fortiori of operating system but simply some commands allowing access to memory areas from the menu. However, some areas of the map may have features allowing the secure storage of value units. This is the case of some memory cards with a protected area by a secret code. Only a payment terminal having this secret code will be able to access the area containing the value units and may modify the number of units with write commands in memory. By definition, a fraudster does not know the secret code, so it is not able to recharge a card in value units. Other features linked to the card can allow secure storage of value units.
  • An application or recommendation note describes the mechanisms to be implemented at the card level and the terminal and defines how the terminal must use the card.
  • mapping in Anglo-Saxon terminology, this mapping being obtained by computer software taking note into account application.
  • the mechanism to be implemented consists to include in the calculation of this certificate data varying with each transaction.
  • transaction is meant a change in the number of value units of a menu.
  • a first mechanism in use is the use a certificate associated with the number of units. This certificate guarantees the integrity of the information to which it relates.
  • a terminal of a payment application can read the number of units of value present in a smart card. The certificate present in the map and associated with the number of units of stored value should be read and verified. This certificate is calculated using a mathematical function. It is calculates from the number of units in the card, data identifying the card and with a secret only known to the terminal. The terminal is therefore able to check or calculate such certificate. Another solution is to share the secret between cards and a central server. The application terminals will therefore have to connect to the server for any verification.
  • the number of units of value present in the card is considered valid.
  • This mechanism consists in including in the calculation of this certificate data varying with each transaction.
  • This data which can be a transaction counter ensures that we have a different certificate each time.
  • a map has a number of value units at a time t given.
  • time t + n i.e. after a certain number n of transactions, if this card contains again the same number of units of value as at time t, the associated certificate will still be different.
  • the counter value transaction is changed for each transaction.
  • This mechanism consists of duplicating information sensitive before a transaction takes place.
  • the duplicate data is stored in the card, in the unprotected EEPROM memory.
  • the unprotected EEPROM memory is therefore divided into two zones which we will call throughout active area and copy area. These two areas have a number of value units and the certificate corresponding.
  • the card If the card is torn off, if the data in modification courses in the active area are corrupted or altered, the data duplicated in the copy area will be retrieved and transferred to the active area. The card thus remains in a state stable. In the event of a card being torn off, the certificate present in the copy area must match the value of the card transaction counter. This allows to verify the authenticity of the certificate of the copy area and therefore the integrity of the number of units of value of the copy area. Therefore, the counter card transaction must be changed at the end of transaction.
  • the fraud consists in modifying the number of units present in the map and try different values of certificate.
  • a fraudster with a small number of units present in the card will therefore replace it with the maximum number of units a card can hold.
  • certificates are stored on a few bits.
  • the probability of finding the certificate by chance corresponding to the number of card units is high.
  • the card cannot be considered from a point of cryptographic view as a value unit holder secure. This fraud makes it possible to reload illegally a card in units of value.
  • the card In the case of a debit of value units in the card, and in case of tearing, the card is found with a possibly corrupt active area and a copy area containing a number of units of value. In addition, the copy area contains the number value units preceding the debit.
  • a fraudster can also read the content of his card before a transaction. It writes the content of the active area on a sheet of paper without even understand the meaning. Then he performs a transaction. In the event of a card being torn off, the transaction will not be completed. The counter value card transaction will not be changed. The fraudster can simply rewrite in the active area from his card the data written on his sheet paper. This fraud also makes it possible to recover units of value used.
  • the present invention overcomes these problems.
  • the subject of the present invention is a method of storing units of value in a smart card for carrying out transactions from a terminal according to claim 1.
  • the present invention also relates to a terminal as defined by claim 9.
  • the encryption operations are carried out by means of an encryption algorithm E K and a secret key K by the transaction terminal.
  • the process generally consists in calculating a certificate intended for the active area using a first function, and at calculate the certificate for the copy area, by using another function. So, in case the copy area certificate would be copied to the active area, it would no longer be valid.
  • the calculation of the certificate for the copy area is made from the number value units, but also the value of a transaction counter.
  • the initialization phase of a transaction we calculates the certificate from the number of units of value present in the active area and a value of transaction counter incremented at its next value, the data obtained is encrypted and recorded in the copy area, the transaction counter is then incremented to this new value so that at this time, the certificate of the active zone is not more in line with the counter value, only the backup data being correct. In this way, the terminal marks in the map the beginning of a transaction.
  • a characteristic of the invention distinguishes a card accidentally torn from a card fraudulently removed by checking the parity of the transaction counter in the initialization phase of the transaction.
  • a value of odd transaction counter indicates that the card has was torn off before the end of the transaction. So in the initialization phase of a new transaction, the terminal checks the parity of the transaction counter. A value odd transaction counter therefore tells him that the card has been ripped off. Terminal does not check the integrity of the active area and directly checks the integrity of the copy area. The fraudster no longer has way to test the random values he writes in the active area.
  • the parity of the value of the transaction counter used in the calculation of certificates is identical at the beginning and at the end of transaction, and the value of the transaction counter is incremented twice during the transaction, each increment being of a single unit.
  • the content of the active areas ZA is encrypted and ZC copy area of EEPROM not protected 103 shown in Figure 1.
  • This encryption is carried out by a terminal 100 of the application using the cards, using an encryption algorithm E K and a key from the terminal K.
  • This encryption key is known by the terminals accepting the cards of the application.
  • a terminal that knows how to encrypt will also be able to decrypt the content of the card using a decryption algorithm D K.
  • a fraudster knowing the principles of the invention detailed below and which attempts increasing the number of value units on a card does will be more able to set the maximum number of units valuable. He can only try to recharge randomly his card. So it will write data in the active area of his card. It exists a probability that by deciphering the active area a randomly modified card, a terminal get a number of credits and the certificate corresponding. But the number of value units obtained may be less than the number of value units previously contained in the card. The probability obtain a number of value units greater than number of value units initially present in the the lower the number of units initial value is great.
  • the size of the certificate To make fraud even more difficult consisting of randomly finding a certificate corresponding to a large number of value units, according to the method, the size of the certificate.
  • the number of units value saved in the card does not match to the number of value units for the application, but the number of value units that have been the subject of a transaction (zero for a full card units).
  • An application terminal reading the content of a card obtains the number of value units in subtracting from the maximum number of value units of the application the number of units of value contained in the map.
  • the calculation of the certificate of the active area is carried out from different way of calculating the zone certificate copy.
  • a terminal checking a card with the contents of the area copy has been transferred to the active area will able to detect fraud.
  • the certificate that the terminal will read in the active area will not match the calculation made in the case of the active area, and will correspond to the calculation made for the copy area.
  • the card transaction counter is also modified at the very beginning of the transaction.
  • the copy area is initialized with the number of value units contained in the active area and with a certificate taking into account the next value of the counter transaction. Then, the transaction counter is changed to this new value. At this precise moment, the content of the active area is no longer reusable, the transaction counter no longer corresponds to its certificate. However, the copy area is valid.
  • the transaction counter is changed again at the end of the transaction to prevent this transaction cannot be redone, as indicated above.
  • the process can also relate to the verification of the parity of the data varying with each transaction.
  • This data which can be a transaction counter is incremented twice during a transaction complete, one unit each time.
  • the parity of the value of the transaction counter is therefore identical start of transaction and end of transaction. If the first value of the transaction counter is even, the value of the transaction counter is even at the start and at the end of the transaction.
  • the parity of the transaction counter must be checked at the start of the transaction, the value of the counter transaction must be even. In case the transaction counter value is odd at the start the integrity of the zone information copy of the card should be directly verified. Yes the verification is successful, the terminal transfers the data from the copy area in the active area.
  • terminal 100 being a money terminal and the card 103, an electronic purse card.
  • the data structure of memory 103 is such that shown in Figure 2. This structure or organization is of course given as an example. Other organizations can be adapted.
  • this CTC counter is divided into 5 sub-counters of 8 bits (five counting stages) with an abacus type operation as described for example in patent FR 93 10477 published on March 10, 1995 under the No. 2,709,582.
  • the five sub-counters are referenced C1, C8, C64, C512, C4096.
  • the first four floors are of the type erasable, i.e. you can erase bits who are registered there and then re-write to the same locations.
  • the fifth stage C4096 is on the other hand writing only. Only 4 bits of this last stage are used for counting. Among the 4 bits remaining, 1 bit is used as fuse and the three other bits like fraud counter.
  • this type of counter will allow to count 10239 transactions [7 + 7x8 + 7x8 2 + 7x8 3 + 4x8 4] / 2.
  • This area cannot be deleted and is used to CER certification registration allowing card authentication.
  • the certificate authentication is saved after the circuit configuration for the end user and is checked by the terminal each time the menu.
  • the active area contains according to a characteristic of the invention an encrypted datum of the Bal balance and of the corresponding certificate Cert.
  • Balance information of value units corresponds to coding on a first constant number of bits, and the information representative of the certificate is coded on a second constant number of bits.
  • the calculation of the certificate ensures data integrity of the electronic purse.
  • F A and F B being different functions held by the terminal.
  • This sequence avoids any loss information in the event of the card being torn off or power cut.
  • the method includes an initialization phase of the transaction and a phase corresponding to the transaction itself.
  • the initialization phase includes a verification the fraud zone corresponding to steps 50, 51, 52 detailed below.
  • This initialization phase also includes a verification of the parity of the data varying at each corresponding transaction in the diagram in Figure 3 in steps 400, 401, 203A, 204A, 205A, 207A.
  • the value of the transaction counter is pair at the start and end of the transaction.
  • Parity of transaction counter is checked at the start of transaction steps 400, 401, the value of transaction counter must be even.
  • the terminal transfers data from the copy area to the area active step 205A. Then the terminal marks the start of a transaction in the card by incrementing the CTC counter. After that the terminal returns to step 401.
  • step 206 namely incrementing the card fraud counter and card ejection.
  • the terminal After checking the parity, the terminal reads the content of the active area of the card (electronic purse PM) 150, which includes the data ⁇ Bal1, Cert1 A >. Ball is the number of value units initially stored in the card, and Cert1A is the certificate initially stored in the card.
  • the terminal checks the integrity of this data, step 200. For this, it decrypts this following data steps 20 to 22 detailed in Figure 4. If the certificate he calculated corresponds to the certificate of the card, then the verification was successful. The transaction continues 201, 202, 300.
  • the terminal updates the balance in the card and calculates a new data item 301 and 302.
  • the update is carried out according to steps 30 to 35 illustrated in figure 6.
  • the terminal reads the copy area which contains ⁇ Bal1, Cert1 B > 203.
  • the terminal checks the integrity of the backup 204 by decrypting this data in operating steps 20, 21 and 22 of FIG. 4 on these data.
  • the terminal restores this data from backup in the active area that contained nothing or erroneous data 205.
  • the terminal In case the data contained in the area are not intact, then the terminal enters a bit in fraud area 206.
  • one or more attempts to fraud can be accepted before refusing definitely the card.
  • the card When the fraud area is full, the card is swallowed.
  • the fraud zone is checked during a step prior to the transaction at the very beginning of initialization of transaction 50, 51, 52.
  • FIG. 5 illustrates the preliminary steps 200, 201 and 202 to the implementation of a transaction.
  • step 200 the terminal performs the operations developed in Figure 4.
  • the terminal operates the decryption of the content of the active (or copy) area.
  • step 200 In the case of step 200,
  • the terminal then calculates the Cert 1B certificate corresponding to the Ball balance in this area (21). He performs the verification of integrity (22).
  • the terminal calculates the certificate Cert 1A for the active area (23), it encrypts the data Ball, Cert 1A (24), it saves in the active zone of the card the encrypted value (25).
  • the terminal increments the CTC counter (26) and erases the content of the copy area (27).
  • Figure 6 illustrates the steps for updating the balance (301) during a transaction and the end of transaction (302).
  • the old Ball balance is modified by a value x (in more or less depending on the transaction made) for give the new Bal2 balance such as:
  • Bal2 Bal1 ⁇ x (30), x being the value of the transaction.
  • the terminal registers in the active area of the map this new encrypted data. (33)
  • the card copy area contains the old data, i.e. ⁇ Bal1, Cert1 B >.
  • the terminal increments the card's CTC transaction counter by toasting a second bit to validate the transaction.
  • the terminal clears the copy area (35) and controls the ejection of the card.

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Claims (9)

  1. Speicherverfahren von Werteinheiten in einer Chipkarte zur Durchführung von Transaktionen von einem Terminal aus, wobei die Karte einen nicht flüchtigen Speicher des Typs EEPROM (103) umfasst, mit einem aktiven Bereich (ZA), der Informationen bezüglich der Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich eines Zertifikats enthalten kann, das für den aktiven Bereich bestimmt ist und vom Terminal ab dieser Anzahl berechnet wird, wobei der Speicher ebenfalls einen Kopiebereich (ZC) umfasst, der Sicherungsinformationen des aktiven Bereichs enthalten soll, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass es aus den folgenden Schritten besteht:
    Aufzeichnen in dem Kopiebereich (ZC) während der Initialisierungsphase einer Transaktion der Information bezüglich der im aktiven Bereich vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und einer ab dieser Anzahl berechneten Information bezüglich eines Zertifikats für den Kopiebereich, wobei die Informationen bezüglich der im aktiven Bereich vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten und bezüglich des Zertifikats für den Kopiebereich verschlüsselt und im Kopiebereich (ZC) verschlüsselt eingetragen werden;
    Aufzeichnen in dem aktiven Bereich (ZA) während der Transaktion von Informationen bezüglich einer neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich eines neuen Zertifikats für den aktiven Bereich, das vom Terminal ab dieser neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten berechnet wird, wobei die Informationen bezüglich der neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten und des neuen Zertifikats für den aktiven Bereich verschlüsselt und im aktiven Bereich verschlüsselt eingetragen werden.
  2. Speicherverfahren nach Anspruch 1, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Verschlüsselungsoperationen anhand eines Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus Ek und eines Geheimschlüssels K vom Transaktionsterminal durchgeführt werden.
  3. Speicherverfahren nach einem der vorangehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Zertifikat für den aktiven Bereich (CertA) unter Verwendung einer ersten Funktion (FA) berechnet wird, und dass das Zertifikat für den Kopiebereich (CertB) unter Verwendung einer anderen Funktion (FB) berechnet wird.
  4. Speicherverfahren nach Anspruch 3, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass:
    während der Initialisierungsphase der Transaktion die Informationen bezüglich der im aktiven Bereich vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich des ab dieser Anzahl berechneten Zertifikats (CertB) für den Kopiebereich gemäß einer ersten Verschlüsselungsoperation verschlüsselt werden,
    während der Transaktion die Informationen bezüglich der neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich des neuen Zertifikats (CertA) für den aktiven Bereich, das vom Terminal ab dieser neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten berechnet wurde, gemäß einer zweiten Verschlüsselungsoperation verschlüsselt werden.
  5. Verfahren nach einem der vorangehenden Ansprüche, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass während der Initialisierungsphase der Transaktion:
    das Zertifikat für den Kopiebereich ab der im aktiven Bereich vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten und ab einem Wert eines um seinen nächsten Wert inkrementierten Transaktionszählers berechnet wird,
    der Transaktionszähler dann um diesen neuen Wert inkrementiert wird, so dass nach dem Aufzeichnen der Informationen im Kopiebereich das Zertifikat des aktiven Bereichs nicht mehr mit dem Wert des Zählers übereinstimmt, wobei nur die Sicherungsinformationen richtig sind.
  6. Verfahren nach dem vorangehenden Anspruch, nach dem der Wert des Transaktionszählers für die Berechnung der Zertifikate verwendet wird, wobei die Parität des Werts des Transaktionszählers während der Initialisierungsphase und am Ende der Transaktion identisch ist, und wobei der Wert des Transaktionszählers während der Transaktion zwei Mal inkrementiert wird, wobei jede Inkrementierung um eine einzige Einheit erfolgt.
  7. Verfahren nach dem vorangehenden Anspruch, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass man während der Initialisierungsphase der Transaktion den Wert des Transaktionszählers der Karte liest, wenn der gelesene Wert gerade ist, man die Informationen des aktiven Bereichs (ZA) liest, man die Unversehrtheit der Informationen des aktiven Bereichs überprüft, die Unversehrtheit der Informationen des aktiven Bereichs überprüft wird, man die Werteinheiten in der Chipkarte speichert.
  8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 6, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass man während der Initialisierungsphase einer Transaktion den Wert des Transaktionszählers der Karte liest, wenn der gelesene Wert ungerade ist, man die Informationen des Kopiebereichs (ZC) liest, man die Unversehrtheit der Informationen des Kopiebereichs liest, die Unversehrtheit der Informationen des Kopiebereichs überprüft wird, man ein Zertifikat berechnet ab der im Kopiebereich (ZC) vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten und ab dem um seinen nächsten geraden Wert inkrementierten Wert des Transaktionszählers, die erhaltene Information verschlüsselt und im aktiven Bereich (ZA) aufgezeichnet wird, der Zähler dann um diesen neuen Wert inkrementiert wird, so dass das Zertifikat des Kopiebereichs (ZC) nicht mehr mit dem Wert des Zählers übereinstimmt, wobei nur die Information des aktiven Bereichs richtig ist.
  9. Transaktionsterminal, das Chipkarten benutzt, die einen nicht flüchtigen Speicher des Typs EEPROM (103) umfassen, mit einem aktiven Bereich (ZA), der Informationen bezüglich der Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich eines Zertifikats enthalten kann, das für den aktiven Bereich bestimmt ist und vom Terminal ab dieser Anzahl berechnet wird, wobei der Speicher ebenfalls einen Kopiebereich (ZC) umfasst, der Sicherungsinformationen des aktiven Bereichs enthalten soll, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass das Terminal ein Verschlüsselungsmittel umfasst, um während der Initialisierungsphase einer Transaktion die Information bezüglich der im aktiven Bereich vorhandenen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und eine Information bezüglich eines ab dieser Anzahl erechneten Zertifikats für den Kopiebereich zu 0erschlüsseln, und um während der Transaktion Informationen bezüglich einer neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten der Karte für eine bestimmte Applikation und bezüglich eines neuen Zertifikats für den aktiven Bereich, das vom Terminal ab dieser neuen Anzahl von Werteinheiten berechnet wird, zu verschlüsseln, sowie ein Mittel zum Aufzeichnen im Kopierbereich der während der Initialisierungsphase verschlüsselten Daten und zum Aufzeichnen im aktiven Bereich der während der Transaktion verschlüsselten Informationen.
EP97926064A 1996-05-31 1997-05-30 Verfahren zum gesicherten speichern von werteinheiten in einer chipkarte und geldüberweisungssystem zur dessen verwendung Expired - Lifetime EP0910839B1 (de)

Applications Claiming Priority (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
FR9606705 1996-05-31
FR9606705A FR2749413B1 (fr) 1996-05-31 1996-05-31 Procede de stockage des unites de valeur dans une carte a puce de facon securisee et systeme de transaction monetaire avec de telles cartes
PCT/FR1997/000947 WO1997045815A1 (fr) 1996-05-31 1997-05-30 Procede de stockage des unites de valeur dans une carte a puce de facon securisee et systeme de transaction monetaire avec de telles cartes

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
EP0910839A1 EP0910839A1 (de) 1999-04-28
EP0910839B1 true EP0910839B1 (de) 2003-10-22

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EP97926064A Expired - Lifetime EP0910839B1 (de) 1996-05-31 1997-05-30 Verfahren zum gesicherten speichern von werteinheiten in einer chipkarte und geldüberweisungssystem zur dessen verwendung

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EP (1) EP0910839B1 (de)
DE (1) DE69725723T2 (de)
ES (1) ES2212102T3 (de)
FR (1) FR2749413B1 (de)
WO (1) WO1997045815A1 (de)

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
RU2231825C2 (ru) * 1999-11-29 2004-06-27 Инфинеон Текнолоджиз Аг Способ и устройство для эксплуатации многоступенчатого счетчика в одном направлении счета
FR2873471B1 (fr) * 2004-07-26 2006-10-13 Ascom Sa Systeme a carte a memoire sans contact a mot de passe

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* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
FR2618002B1 (fr) * 1987-07-10 1991-07-05 Schlumberger Ind Sa Procede et systeme d'authentification de cartes a memoire electronique
FR2653248B1 (fr) * 1989-10-13 1991-12-20 Gemolus Card International Systeme de paiement ou de transfert d'information par carte a memoire electronique porte monnaie.
FR2689662B1 (fr) * 1992-04-01 1994-05-20 Gemplus Card International Procede de protection d'une carte a puce contre la perte d'information.
FR2704081B1 (fr) * 1993-04-16 1995-05-19 France Telecom Procédé de mise à jour d'une carte à mémoire et carte à mémoire pour la mise en Óoeuvre de ce procédé.

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FR2749413A1 (fr) 1997-12-05
ES2212102T3 (es) 2004-07-16
WO1997045815A1 (fr) 1997-12-04
DE69725723T2 (de) 2004-07-22
DE69725723D1 (de) 2003-11-27
EP0910839A1 (de) 1999-04-28
FR2749413B1 (fr) 1998-07-10

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