DK148049B - RADIO TELEPHONE SYSTEM - Google Patents
RADIO TELEPHONE SYSTEM Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- DK148049B DK148049B DK585277AA DK585277A DK148049B DK 148049 B DK148049 B DK 148049B DK 585277A A DK585277A A DK 585277AA DK 585277 A DK585277 A DK 585277A DK 148049 B DK148049 B DK 148049B
- Authority
- DK
- Denmark
- Prior art keywords
- subscriber
- code
- exchange
- cipher
- subscribers
- Prior art date
Links
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K1/00—Secret communication
- H04K1/02—Secret communication by adding a second signal to make the desired signal unintelligible
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Description
U8049U8049
Opfindelsen angår et radiotelefonisystem for et større antal abonnenter, ved hvilket information overføres ved hjælp af et chiffrerings- eller sløringsapparat navnlig ved hjælp af digitale signaler eksempelvis 5 med en bestemt for hver abonnent individuel rækkefølge, dvs. med en bestemt for hver abonnent individuel chiffrering.The invention relates to a radiotelephone system for a large number of subscribers, by which information is transmitted by means of a ciphering or blurring apparatus, in particular by means of digital signals, for example 5, with a specific order for each subscriber, ie. with a specific for each subscriber individual cipher.
I forbindelse med sådanne radiotelefonisystemer, hvor der i hovedsagen benyttes mobile stationer, f.eks.In connection with such radiotelephone systems, where in the main case mobile stations are used, e.g.
10 offentlige eller ikke-offentlige radioforbindelser mellem bevægelige landstationer (ObL eller NObL), skal man på en eller anden måde sikre informationen mod uvedkommende medhør, hvilket vil sige, at de signaler, som transmitteres igennem den pågældende radiokanal, skal 15 chiffreres eller sløres på hensigtsmæssig måde. Hertil har de indbyrdes korresponderende stationer for det meste én eller flere identiske koder, der som indstillingsvarianter er tilvejebragt i det pågældende udstyr, og i hvilke koder informationsoverføringen kan gennem-20 føres efter aftale. Til militære og andre særlige net er det kendt, hvordan sådanne koder fordeles og oplagres, f.eks. ved hjælp af elektroniske komponenter eller f.eks. også ved hjælp af hulkort. I forbindelse med abonnenter, der er tilsluttet et offentligt radionet, f.eks. én af 25 de ovennævnte radioforbindelser mellem landstationer, svigter sådanne fremgangsmåder som følge.af, at på grund af det store antal abonnenter, der findes selv i en transferstations forholdsvis begrænsede radiodæknings-område, er enten en mod aflytning sikret transmission 30 ikke mulig, eller også skulle transferstationen ved individuel indstilling af koderne være bekendt med og lagre samtlige abonnenternes chiffreringsindstillinger (personlig kode); også alle de, som gælder for alle andre transferstationer i det samlede net. Da der i et net med 35 flere transferstationer, som er fordelt geografisk, normalt skal betjenes flere tusind abonnenter, ville et kendskab til chiffreringsindstillingen ikke blot gøre en 1Λ8049 2 aflytning mulig, men også muliggøre et opkald under et falsk nummer, hvilket medfører fejlagtige gebyrberegninger.10 public or non-public radio links between mobile land stations (ObL or NObL), the information must somehow be secured against unauthorized listeners, which means that the signals transmitted through the radio channel must be encrypted or blurred on appropriate way. To this end, the corresponding stations usually have one or more identical codes provided as tuning variants in the respective equipment and in which codes the information transfer can be carried out by arrangement. For military and other special networks it is known how such codes are distributed and stored, e.g. using electronic components or e.g. also using hole cards. For subscribers connected to a public radio network, e.g. one of the aforementioned radio links between terrestrial stations, such methods fail as a result of the large number of subscribers found even in the relatively limited radio coverage area of a transfer station, either an intercepted transmission 30 is not possible, or also, the transfer station, by individually setting the codes, should be familiar with and store all subscriber encryption settings (personal code); also all those that apply to all other transfer stations in the entire network. Since in a network with 35 more transfer stations, which are geographically distributed, usually several thousand subscribers have to be served, a knowledge of the cipher setting would not only enable a 1 80 80 2 interception, but also enable a call under a false number, resulting in erroneous fee calculations. .
Det tilsigtes med opfindelsen at tilføre den på-5 viste problemstilling en løsning, der er så enkel som mulig, og hvorved ulemperne af ovenfor beskrevne art er undgået.SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION It is an object of the present invention to provide the problem shown as simple as possible and thereby avoiding the disadvantages of the kind described above.
Dette opnås med et radiotelefonisystem for et større antal abonnenter, ved hvilket information overføres 10 ved hjælp af et chiffrerings- eller sløringsapparat navnlig ved hjælp af digitale signaler eksempelvis med en bestemt for hver abonnent individuel rækkefølge, dvs. med en bestemt for hver abonnent individuel chiffrering, hvilket system ifølge opfindelsen er ejendommeligt ved, 15 at der foruden den bestemte individuelle chiffrerings-indstilling hos hver abonnent er oplagret selve abonnentnummeret eller tillige en særlig kode, og at der mellem abonnentnummeret eller koden og den individuelle chiffreringsindstilling består en funktionel sammenhæng, 20 som kun kendes af den overordnede central (radiotransmissionsstation) , at endvidere ved opbygning af en forbindelse mellem to abonnenter den kaldende abonnent først overfører sit nummer hhv. den specielle kode samt den opkaldte abonnents nummer til centralen, at denne kon-25 staterer den opkaldte abonnent og foranlediger, at denne overfører sit nummer hhv. den specielle kode, at endvidere centralen ud fra disse modtagne informationer beregner abonnenternes individulle chiffreringsindstillinger og programmerer chiffrerings- hhv. sløringsapparatet, 30 og at den chiffrerede overføring mellem de to abonnenter derefter gennemføres over centralen med samtidig omsætning af den sendende abonnents kode til den modtagende abonnents kode på centralen.This is achieved with a radiotelephone system for a large number of subscribers, by which information is transmitted by means of a ciphering or blurring apparatus, in particular by means of digital signals, for example with a specific order for each subscriber, ie. with a specific individual cipher for each subscriber, the system of the invention being characterized in that in addition to the particular individual cipher setting of each subscriber, the subscriber number itself or a particular code is stored and that between the subscriber number or code and the individual encryption setting consists of a functional connection, which is known only by the parent central (radio transmission station), that in addition, when establishing a connection between two subscribers, the calling subscriber first transmits his number or the other. the special code as well as the number of the called subscriber to the exchange, that it establishes the called subscriber and causes it to transmit its number respectively. the special code that, furthermore, from the information received, the control panel calculates the subscriber's individual cipher settings and programs the cipher, respectively. and the encrypted transmission between the two subscribers is then carried over the exchange with simultaneous conversion of the sending subscriber's code to the receiving subscriber's code on the exchange.
Det er i denne forbindelse en fordel, at den ved 35 hjælp af en passende datamat på centralen før begyndelsen af hver informationsoverføring separat bestemte chiffreringsindstilling slettes efter samtalens afslutning.In this connection, it is an advantage that the encryption setting determined separately by the appropriate computer on the control panel before the beginning of each information transfer is deleted after the end of the call.
148049 3148049 3
Desuden er det til sikring af opkoblingsdataene en fordel, såfremt overføringen af abonnentnummeret eller koden sker redundant før hver samtales begyndelse.In addition, it is an advantage to secure the connection data if the transfer of the subscriber number or code occurs redundantly before the beginning of each call.
Opfindelsen forklares nærmere nedenfor under hen-5 visning til tegningen, hvor fig. 1 viser sender- og modtagersiden af en radioforbindelse, og .The invention is explained in more detail below with reference to the drawing, in which fig. 1 shows the transmitter and receiver side of a radio connection, and.
fig. 2 skematisk princippet for informationsoverføringen mellem to abonnenter.FIG. 2 schematic the principle of information transfer between two subscribers.
10 Fig. 1 viser en abonnent Tn1, hvis talesignal NF omsættes (A/D) til en digital klartekst KT, hvorefter det i en blander M underkastes en chiffrering med chiffreringsteksten ST - styret fra en chiffre-ringsgenerator SG - til dannelse af den hemmelige tekst 15 GT. Denne hemmelige tekst transmitteres herefter fra en sende/modtageindretning S/E. På modtagesiden foregår den omvendte proces. Til optagelse af forbindelsen skal chiffreringsindretningen SG+M først være koblet fra.FIG. 1 shows a subscriber Tn1 whose speech signal NF is converted (A / D) to a digital clear text KT, after which, in a mixer M, it is subjected to a cipher with the ciphertext ST - controlled from a cipher generator SG - to form the secret text 15 GT . This secret text is then transmitted from a sending / receiving device S / E. On the receiving side, the reverse process takes place. To record the connection, the cipher device SG + M must first be disconnected.
På et tidspunkt vil abonnenten Tn1 optage forbindelse 20 med den ham lokalt tildelte radiotransferstation, dvs. radiocentralen V. Radiotransferstationen spørger ham om hans abonnentnummer og eventuelt om, hvem han ønsker forbindelse med. Allerede på dette tidspunkt kunne chiffreringsindretningen træde i funktion for ved til-25 bagekald at sikre, at abonnenten har meldt sig under sit rigtige kaldenummer.At some point, the subscriber Tn1 will record connection 20 with the locally assigned radio transfer station, i.e. radio station V. The radio transfer station asks him about his subscriber number and possibly who he wants to connect with. Already at this point, the encryption device could function to ensure that the subscriber has registered under his or her real nickname by calling-25.
Selve chiffreringen beror på følgende grundtanke.The cipher itself depends on the following basic thought.
Normalt skal samtlige koder for alle abonnenter være kendt af centralen. Da imidlertid i et større net med 30 flere centraler og eventuelt med adskillige abonnenter under hver central alle sådanne koder skal være lagret, hvilket ville være forbundet med et stort teknisk og organisatorisk opbud, går man imidlertid ifølge opfindelsen frem på følgende måde. Mellem abonnentnummeret 35 eller en hver abonnnent særskilt tildelt kode og den individuelle chiffreringsindstilling består der en funktionel sammenhæng svarende til en eller anden matema- 148049 4 tisk. funktion, der dog kun kendes af en kodeberegner SC på centralen. Denne kodeberegner meddeles abonnentnumme-ret, på grundlag af hvilket den ved hjælp af en regneenhed på meget kort tid bestemmer den individuelle abon-5 nentkode for den kaldende abonnent og oplagrer denne i en indretning S-Sp/V så længe forbindelsen er etableret. Centralen kalder nu, allerede chiffreret, tilbage til abonnenten, og hvis nu denne abonnent Tnl har meldt sig korrekt, så må forståeligheden af samtlige herpå 10 følgende informationsoverførsler mellem abonnenten og radiotransferstationen V være sikret også efter indkobling af abonnentens chiffreringsgenerator SG, der fra abonnentens kodelager S-Sp/F modtager koden. I andre tilfælde vil abonnenten ikke modtage noget tilbage-15 kald, da han på grund af en anden kode ikke forstår opkaldet fra centralen V, og herigennem bliver informationsoverførslen over et forkert opkaldsnummer, som indebærer en forkert gebyrberegning, gjort umulig. Abonnenten kan heller ikke fremkalde denne tilstand kunstigt 20 ved manipulationer i sin egen kodegenerator eller sit eget kodelager, fordi den funktionelle sammenhæng mellem hans abonnentnummer, hans specielle vælge- og opkaldskode og koden til chiffreringsindretningen nemlig er u-kendt for ham. Denne allokering kendes kun af radio-25 transferstationen V, hvor den er lagret i en særlig regneenhed.Normally, all codes for all subscribers must be known by the exchange. However, since in a larger network with 30 more exchanges and possibly with several subscribers under each exchange all such codes must be stored, which would be associated with a large technical and organizational supply, the invention is carried out as follows. Between the subscriber number 35 or each subscriber separately assigned code and the individual cipher setting, there is a functional relationship corresponding to some mathematical. function that is known only by a code calculator SC on the control panel. This code calculator is communicated to the subscriber number, on the basis of which it determines by means of a calculator in a very short time the individual subscriber code for the calling subscriber and stores it in a device S-Sp / V as long as the connection is established. The exchange now calls, already encrypted, back to the subscriber, and now that this subscriber Tnl has registered correctly, then the intelligibility of all the following information transfers between the subscriber and the radio transfer station V must be ensured even after switching on the subscriber's encryption generator SG, which from the subscriber's code store S-Sp / F receives the code. In other cases, the subscriber will not receive a call back, because due to a different code, he does not understand the call from the central V, thereby making the information transfer over a wrong dialing number which involves a wrong charge calculation. Also, the subscriber cannot artificially induce this state by manipulations in his own code generator or his own code store because the functional relationship between his subscriber number, his special dialing and dialing code and the code of the encryption device is unknown to him. This allocation is known only by the radio transfer station V, where it is stored in a special unit of calculation.
Når abonnenten Tnl ønsker at etablere forbindelse, f.eks. med abonnent Tn3, vil centralen nu søge abonnenten Tn3, jf. fig. 2, såfremt denne befinder sig i el-30 ler kan nås i sit lokale net, og nu iværksættes på den opkaldte abonnents side den samme procedure med den kode, som den pågældende abonnent Tn3 har fået tildelt.When the subscriber Tnl wants to establish a connection, e.g. with subscriber Tn3, the exchange will now search the subscriber Tn3, cf. 2, if it is located or otherwise reachable in its local network, and now on the called subscriber's side the same procedure is initiated with the code assigned to that subscriber Tn3.
I centralens chiffreringsindretning SC foretages der senest til det tidspunkt, hvor der foregår en ægte in-35 formationsoverførsel imellem abonnent Tnl og abonnent Tn3, en omkodning af koderne, hvilket vil sige, at de fra begge abonnenter modtagne informationer bliver de-In the central encryption device SC, at the latest until a genuine information transfer takes place between subscriber Tn1 and subscriber Tn3, a transcoding of the codes is made, which means that the information received from both subscribers is decrypted.
Claims (2)
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE2659622A DE2659622C2 (en) | 1976-12-30 | 1976-12-30 | Radiotelephony system |
DE2659622 | 1976-12-30 |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
DK585277A DK585277A (en) | 1978-07-01 |
DK148049B true DK148049B (en) | 1985-02-11 |
Family
ID=5997076
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
DK585277AA DK148049B (en) | 1976-12-30 | 1977-12-29 | RADIO TELEPHONE SYSTEM |
Country Status (10)
Country | Link |
---|---|
JP (1) | JPS5826864B2 (en) |
AT (1) | AT360593B (en) |
BE (1) | BE862540A (en) |
CH (1) | CH625650A5 (en) |
DE (1) | DE2659622C2 (en) |
DK (1) | DK148049B (en) |
FR (1) | FR2376574A1 (en) |
GB (1) | GB1584579A (en) |
IT (1) | IT1089194B (en) |
NL (1) | NL176823C (en) |
Families Citing this family (12)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE2927885A1 (en) * | 1979-07-11 | 1981-01-29 | Bosch Gmbh Robert | Radio communication security system - has mobile transceivers, each using dedicated code which is decoded at main station from call number |
DE3150254A1 (en) * | 1981-04-13 | 1983-07-14 | Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München | DEVICE FOR ENCRYPTED DIGITAL INFORMATION TRANSFER |
US4549308A (en) * | 1982-07-12 | 1985-10-22 | At&T Bell Laboratories | Secure mobile radio telephony |
DE3335672A1 (en) * | 1983-09-30 | 1985-04-04 | Siemens AG, 1000 Berlin und 8000 München | ENCRYPTED MESSAGE TRANSMISSION METHOD |
DE3402467A1 (en) * | 1984-01-25 | 1985-08-01 | Philips Kommunikations Industrie AG, 8500 Nürnberg | Dialling method protected against fraudulent use, for the subscribers of a radio network, in particular a mobile radio network |
DE3439159A1 (en) * | 1984-01-25 | 1986-04-30 | Philips Kommunikations Industrie AG, 8500 Nürnberg | Dialling method secured against fraudulent use |
DE3410936C2 (en) * | 1984-03-24 | 1997-09-18 | Philips Patentverwaltung | Method for recognizing the unauthorized use of an identification assigned to a mobile radio station in a radio transmission system |
DE3420874A1 (en) * | 1984-06-05 | 1985-12-05 | Licentia Patent-Verwaltungs-Gmbh, 6000 Frankfurt | Method and arrangement for monitoring network access in telecommunications networks |
DE3439120A1 (en) * | 1984-10-25 | 1986-05-07 | Philips Kommunikations Industrie AG, 8500 Nürnberg | Method for identifying a subscriber station of a telecommunications network |
JPS61199342A (en) * | 1985-02-28 | 1986-09-03 | Tamura Electric Works Ltd | Cordless telephone set |
DE4242151C1 (en) * | 1992-12-14 | 1994-03-24 | Detecon Gmbh | Protecting mobile radio, e.g. telephone, against unauthorised use - comparing authentication parameter from input code to stored parameter, only allowing use if they match. |
DE4336995A1 (en) * | 1993-10-29 | 1995-05-04 | Sel Alcatel Ag | Method and device for determining the assignment of a mobile radio device to device lists |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
SE371064B (en) * | 1973-03-09 | 1974-11-04 | Philips Svenska Ab |
-
1976
- 1976-12-30 DE DE2659622A patent/DE2659622C2/en not_active Expired
-
1977
- 1977-12-05 CH CH1481177A patent/CH625650A5/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1977-12-19 FR FR7738247A patent/FR2376574A1/en active Granted
- 1977-12-22 IT IT31081/77A patent/IT1089194B/en active
- 1977-12-26 JP JP52157173A patent/JPS5826864B2/en not_active Expired
- 1977-12-29 DK DK585277AA patent/DK148049B/en not_active Application Discontinuation
- 1977-12-29 NL NLAANVRAGE7714545,A patent/NL176823C/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1977-12-29 AT AT938977A patent/AT360593B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1977-12-29 GB GB54071/77A patent/GB1584579A/en not_active Expired
- 1977-12-30 BE BE184023A patent/BE862540A/en not_active IP Right Cessation
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
BE862540A (en) | 1978-04-14 |
DE2659622B1 (en) | 1978-05-11 |
NL176823C (en) | 1985-06-03 |
FR2376574B1 (en) | 1980-08-22 |
JPS5826864B2 (en) | 1983-06-06 |
NL7714545A (en) | 1978-07-04 |
IT1089194B (en) | 1985-06-18 |
DK585277A (en) | 1978-07-01 |
ATA938977A (en) | 1980-06-15 |
GB1584579A (en) | 1981-02-11 |
JPS5384602A (en) | 1978-07-26 |
NL176823B (en) | 1985-01-02 |
DE2659622C2 (en) | 1979-01-04 |
CH625650A5 (en) | 1981-09-30 |
AT360593B (en) | 1981-01-26 |
FR2376574A1 (en) | 1978-07-28 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US4182933A (en) | Secure communication system with remote key setting | |
US4920567A (en) | Secure telephone terminal | |
US4815128A (en) | Gateway system and method for interconnecting telephone calls with a digital voice protected radio network | |
US4555805A (en) | Secure mobile telephone system | |
DK148049B (en) | RADIO TELEPHONE SYSTEM | |
WO1989012944A1 (en) | Wide band communication system | |
NO177449B (en) | Duplex analog scrambler | |
US6621514B1 (en) | Video conferencing system | |
EP0110933A1 (en) | Apparatus for through-connection testing in a digital telecommunication network. | |
US4603415A (en) | System for linking channel group in digital communication network | |
US3513264A (en) | Controlled random multiple access communication system | |
US4766592A (en) | Broadcast conferencing arrangement | |
KR100215971B1 (en) | Method of tapping | |
US2057680A (en) | Receiving channel assigner | |
Griffin | Facsimile network interface | |
JPS5927658A (en) | Transfer system of caller number | |
US2638497A (en) | Telegraph call transferring system | |
Goode | New developments in data and voice security | |
US1979273A (en) | Telegraph exchange system | |
US2267178A (en) | Telephone system | |
JPH0211061B2 (en) | ||
Duncan et al. | Telegraphy in the bell system | |
DK9500171U3 (en) | System for transmitting correction signals in the GPS system | |
Morton | The use of telemetry in tactical network management | |
JPS6093868A (en) | Data telephone terminal test equipment |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
PTS | Application withdrawn |