CN117440372B - Zero trust authentication method and device for wireless network - Google Patents
Zero trust authentication method and device for wireless network Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
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- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/08—Randomization, e.g. dummy operations or using noise
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/34—Encoding or coding, e.g. Huffman coding or error correction
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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Abstract
The invention provides a zero trust authentication method and device for a wireless network, which relate to the technical field of information security, and the method comprises the following steps: adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix; sending the signature message to a first user terminal; and receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain the decrypted message. The invention optimizes the encryption flow by combining the forms of the secret key, the random matrix and the index array, and ensures the security of zero trust information transmission.
Description
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of information security technologies, and in particular, to a method and an apparatus for zero trust authentication of a wireless network.
Background
Because of the rapid popularization of networks, the rapid development of digital technology and the problem of network space safety, people gradually get into the field of vision, and are paid attention to. Facing complex and changeable network environments, potential network threats and attacks, IT organizations need to dynamically update the network threat environments of network security parties according to real time. Network security professionals need to operate on a zero trust principle, employing a zero trust security design and operating system with the required models and thinking patterns to ensure security of sensitive data, systems and services become more and more decentralized and complex with enterprise networks.
Currently, an RSA public key cryptographic algorithm is mostly adopted by a zero trust mechanism, and an RSA public key and a private key shared value held by each participant are mainly generated by the cooperation of the participants. However, existing methods and techniques are expensive in terms of both computation and communication and cannot be key split for RSA modes larger than a particular bit.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a zero trust authentication method and device for a wireless network, which are used for solving the defect of huge calculation and communication expenditure in the prior art, optimizing an encryption flow and ensuring the security of zero trust information transmission.
In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network, including: adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix; sending the signature message to a first user terminal; and receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by utilizing the previously acquired public key, the random matrix and the index array to obtain a decrypted message.
The invention provides a wireless network zero trust authentication method, which utilizes a key generated in advance to combine a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array to add a signature to an original message to obtain a signed message, and comprises the following steps: for each original character in the original message, determining the position of each original character in the preset coding alphabet respectively to obtain a corresponding first character; determining second characters corresponding to the first characters in the random matrix by combining the random matrix and the index array according to the positions of the original characters relative to the original message and the first characters corresponding to the original characters; and according to the second characters, combining the public key in the secret key to obtain a signature message.
According to the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network provided by the invention, the determining of the second character corresponding to each first character in the random matrix comprises the following steps: determining a first target index position in the index array according to the position of the original character relative to the original message and the line number of the random matrix; obtaining a target element in the corresponding random matrix according to the first target index position; and obtaining a second character corresponding to the first character in the target element according to the target element and the first character.
The invention provides a zero trust authentication method of a wireless network, which further comprises the following steps: sending the original message to the first user terminal; and receiving a message verification result returned by the first user side, wherein the message verification result is obtained after the first user side determines that the decrypted message is matched with the original message.
In a second aspect, the present invention provides a method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network, including: receiving a signature message sent by a second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to an original message by the second user side based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix; decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message; and generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user terminal.
According to the method for authenticating zero trust of a wireless network provided by the present invention, the method for decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side acquired in advance, to obtain a decrypted message, includes: for each signature character in the signature message, determining the position of each signature character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by a second user side obtained in advance, and obtaining a corresponding third character; obtaining a predicted private key according to a public key disclosed by a second user terminal which is obtained in advance; according to each third character, combining the public key and the predicted private key to obtain a corresponding decryption character; and obtaining the decryption information according to each decryption character and the preset coding alphabet, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side.
According to the method for authenticating zero trust of a wireless network provided by the invention, the method for obtaining the decrypted message according to each decrypted character and the preset coding alphabet, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side comprises the following steps: according to each decryption character, combining a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side to obtain a coding character corresponding to the decryption character in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; determining a second target index position in an index array disclosed by the second user side according to the position of the signature character relative to the signature message and the number of rows of the random matrix disclosed by the second user side; obtaining decryption elements in the random matrix corresponding to the second user side disclosure according to the second target index position; obtaining decryption information corresponding to the coding character in the decryption element according to the decryption element and the coding character corresponding to the decryption character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; and obtaining the decryption information corresponding to the signature information according to the decryption information corresponding to all the coding characters.
The invention provides a zero trust authentication method of a wireless network, which comprises the following steps: receiving an original message sent by the second user side; matching the decrypted message with the original message; and generating a message verification result based on successful matching, and returning the message verification result to the second user terminal.
In a third aspect, the present invention also provides a zero trust authentication device of a wireless network, including: the signature module is used for adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix; the signature message sending module is used for sending the signature message to a first user terminal; the feedback result receiving module receives a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain a decrypted message.
In a fourth aspect, the present invention also provides a zero trust authentication device of a wireless network, including: the signature message receiving module is used for receiving the signature message sent by the second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to an original message by the second user side based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix; the message decryption module decrypts the signature message by utilizing the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message; and the feedback message sending module is used for generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message and sending the message feedback result to the second user terminal.
In a fifth aspect, the present invention also provides an electronic device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network according to any one of the first or second aspects described above when the program is executed by the processor.
In a sixth aspect, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the zero trust authentication method of a wireless network according to any one of the first or second aspects above.
In a seventh aspect, the present invention also provides a computer program product comprising a computer program which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the zero trust authentication method of a wireless network according to any one of the first or second aspects above.
The second user side adds the signature to the original message by utilizing the random matrix, the index array and the secret key which are generated in advance, and receives the message feedback result generated by the first user side after decrypting the received signature message based on the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are correspondingly disclosed, so that the safe transmission of a zero trust mechanism of the message is realized; in addition, the encryption flow is optimized by combining the key, the random matrix and the index array, so that the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the invention or the technical solutions of the prior art, the following description will briefly explain the drawings used in the embodiments or the description of the prior art, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the invention, and other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.
Fig. 1 is a schematic flow diagram of a method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network according to the present invention;
Fig. 2 is a second flow chart of a zero trust authentication method of a wireless network according to the present invention;
Fig. 3 is a third flow chart of a zero trust authentication method of a wireless network according to the present invention;
Fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a zero trust authentication device of a wireless network according to the present invention;
fig. 5 is a second schematic structural diagram of a zero-trust authentication device of a wireless network according to the present invention;
fig. 6 is a schematic architecture diagram of a zero trust authentication device of a wireless network according to the present invention;
Fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
For the purpose of making the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings, and it is apparent that the described embodiments are some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be made by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the invention without making any inventive effort, are intended to be within the scope of the invention.
Fig. 1 depicts a flow diagram of a method for zero trust authentication for a wireless network according to the present invention, the method comprising:
S11, adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a key generated in advance and combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix;
S12, sending the signature message to a first user terminal;
S13, receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user terminal, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user terminal decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain the decrypted message.
It should be noted that, the execution main body of the method is the second user side, step number S1N in the present specification does not represent the sequence of the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network, and the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network of the present invention is specifically described below.
Step S11, signature is added to the original message by utilizing a key generated in advance and combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array, so as to obtain a signed message; wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix.
In this embodiment, signature is added to an original message by using a key generated in advance in combination with a preset encoding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance, and an index array, so as to obtain a signed message, which includes:
S111, for each original character in the original message, determining the position of each original character in a preset coding alphabet, and obtaining a corresponding first character. To be added, the first character, expressed as:
wherein, Representing a first character, namely a character of an original character at a corresponding position of a preset coding alphabet; /(I)Representing a preset coding alphabet; /(I)Representing the i-th original character in original message msj.
S112, according to the position of each original character relative to the original message and the first character corresponding to each original character, combining the random matrix and the index array, and determining the second character corresponding to each first character in the random matrix.
Specifically, determining the second character corresponding to each first character in the random matrix includes: determining a first target index position in an index array according to the position of the original character relative to the original message and the line number of the random matrix; obtaining target elements in the corresponding random matrix according to the first target index position; and obtaining a second character corresponding to the first character in the target element according to the target element and the first character.
Further, determining a first target index position in the index array includes: and (3) modulus the position of the original character relative to the original message and the line number of the random matrix to obtain a first target index position in the index array.
In addition, the second character position is expressed as:
wherein, Representing a second character; i represents the position of the original character relative to the original message; k represents the number of rows of the random matrix; /(I)Representing a first target index position in the index array; /(I)Representing a random matrix; /(I)Representing the target element in the random matrix corresponding to the first target index position.
S113, according to the second characters, combining the public key in the secret key to obtain the signature message.
In this embodiment, obtaining the signed message includes: according to each second character, encrypting each second character by using a public key in the secret key to obtain encryption information corresponding to each second character; and obtaining the signature message according to the encryption information corresponding to all the second characters.
The key generated by the second user terminal in advance comprises a public key and a private key, wherein the public key is public, and the private key is reserved.
The encryption information corresponding to each second character is expressed as:
wherein x represents encryption information corresponding to the second character; a represents a second character; z represents the key length in the public key, P and q represent selected two prime numbers, neither of which exceeds UTF-8 (Universal CHARACTER SET/Unicode Transformation Format, abbreviated as 8 bits); n represents a prime number in the public key such that/>,/>Representing Euler functions,/>。
In an alternative embodiment, before signing the original message with the previously generated key in combination with the pre-set encoding alphabet, the previously generated random matrix and the index matrix to obtain the signed message, the method comprises: and carrying out hash processing on the original message by using a first preset hash algorithm. It should be noted that the first preset hash algorithm may be an existing hash algorithm, which is not further limited herein.
Step S12, the signature message is sent to the first user terminal.
Step S13, receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user terminal, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user terminal decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain the decrypted message.
The first user side obtains the decryption information according to each decryption character and a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix and an index array disclosed by the second user side; the decryption character is obtained according to a third character corresponding to the signature character in the signature message, the predicted private key and the previously obtained public key; the third character is determined according to the signature character of the signature message and a preset coding alphabet disclosed by a second user side, which is acquired in advance; the predicted private key is obtained according to a public key disclosed by a second user terminal which is obtained in advance. In addition, the message feedback result is used for informing the second user side that the message decryption is successful.
Further, the decryption information is obtained according to the decryption information corresponding to all the coding characters in the decryption element; the corresponding decryption information of the coding character in the decryption element is determined according to the decryption element and the corresponding coding character of the decryption character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; the decryption element is obtained according to the second target index position and the random matrix disclosed by the second user side; the second target index position is determined according to the position of the signature character relative to the signature message, the number of rows of the random matrix disclosed by the second user side and the index array disclosed by the second user side; the corresponding coding characters of the decryption characters in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side are obtained according to the decryption characters and the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side.
In an alternative embodiment, the method further comprises: sending the original message to a first user terminal; and receiving a message verification result returned by the first user side, wherein the message verification result is obtained after the first user side determines that the decrypted message is matched with the original message.
It should be noted that, if the second user side hashes the original message by using a first preset hash algorithm before obtaining the signed message, the message verification result is obtained after the first user side decrypts the signed message by using the public key and determines that the decrypted message matches the hash value; the hash value is obtained by carrying out hash processing on the original message by utilizing a second preset hash algorithm after the first user terminal receives the original message. It should be noted that, the second preset hash algorithm adopted by the first user side should be consistent with the first preset hash algorithm adopted by the user side corresponding to the obtained public key, so as to ensure that the message is accurately confirmed when the signature message, the original message and the public key are sent by the same user side, avoid the condition that other people steal the user identity to send the message, and realize safe transmission of the message.
In summary, the second user side of the embodiment of the present invention adds a signature to the original message by using the previously generated random matrix, index array and key, and receives the message feedback result generated by the first user side after decrypting the received signature message based on the corresponding public key, random matrix and index array, thereby realizing the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; in addition, the encryption flow is optimized by combining the key, the random matrix and the index array, so that the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Fig. 2 depicts a flow diagram of a method for zero trust authentication for a wireless network according to the present invention, the method comprising:
S21, receiving a signature message sent by a second user terminal; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by a second user terminal based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index position of an element in any row in the random matrix;
S22, decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message;
s23, generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user terminal.
It should be noted that, the execution main body of the method is the first user terminal, step number S2N in the present specification does not represent the sequence of the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network, and the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network of the present invention is specifically described below.
Step S21, receiving a signature message sent by a second user terminal; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by the second user terminal based on a previously generated key in combination with a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix.
It should be noted that, the signature message is generated by the second user side according to each second character and the public key in the previously generated secret key; each second character is obtained by combining a random matrix and an index array according to the position of each original character relative to the original message and the first character corresponding to each original character; the first character corresponding to each original character in the original message is obtained according to the position of each original character in a preset coding alphabet.
Further, the second character is determined based on the position of the corresponding first character relative to the target element in the random matrix; the target element in the random matrix is determined according to the first target index position; the first target index position is based on the position of the original character relative to the original message, the number of rows of the random matrix, and the index array.
In an alternative embodiment, the second user side hashes the original message by using a first preset hash algorithm before generating the signed message according to the second character corresponding to each character in the original message and the public key in the previously generated key.
Step S22, the signature message is decrypted by utilizing the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and are acquired in advance, and a decrypted message is obtained.
In this embodiment, decrypting the signature message by using the public key disclosed by the previously acquired second user side to obtain a decrypted message includes:
S221, for each signature character in the signature message, determining the position of each signature character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by a second user side obtained in advance, and obtaining a corresponding third character. To be added is a third character, expressed as:
Wherein a' represents a third character; representing a preset coding alphabet disclosed at a second user side acquired in advance; /(I) Representing the ith signature character in the signed message msjc.
S222, obtaining a predicted private key according to the public key disclosed by the second user side obtained in advance.
In this embodiment, obtaining the predicted private key according to the public key disclosed by the second user terminal obtained in advance includes: and according to the key length, the prime number and the preset constraint condition, combining with the Euler function to obtain the predicted private key.
Note that the predictive private key is expressed as:
Wherein s represents the predictive private key; n' represents the public key disclosed by the second user side, so that 、Prime number of/>Representing an euler function. It should be noted that the preset constraints are:,/> wherein a 'represents a third character, and z' represents the key length in the public key disclosed by the acquired second user side.
In an alternative embodiment, the predictive private key may be determined from the prime number in the public key and the modulo reciprocal of the euler function, and there is a constraint between the prime number and the euler equation:。
S223, according to each third character, combining the public key and the predictive private key to obtain the corresponding decrypted character. In this embodiment, the decrypted character is represented as:
Wherein x' represents a decryption character; a' represents a third character; s' represents the predictive private key; z' represents the key length in the public key disclosed by the acquired second user side.
S224, obtaining the decryption information according to each decryption character and the preset coding alphabet, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side.
Specifically, according to each decryption character and a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix and an index array disclosed by the second user side, obtaining a decryption message, including: according to each decryption character, combining a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side to obtain a corresponding coding character of the decryption character in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; determining a second target index position in an index array disclosed by a second user side according to the position of the signature character relative to the signature message and the number of rows of the random matrix disclosed by the second user side; obtaining decryption elements in the random matrix corresponding to the second user side disclosure according to the second target index position; obtaining decryption information corresponding to the coding character in the decryption element according to the decryption element and the coding character corresponding to the decryption character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; and obtaining the decryption information corresponding to the signature information according to the decryption information corresponding to all the coding characters.
It should be added that the corresponding decryption information of the encoded character in the decryption element is expressed as:
wherein, Decryption information corresponding to the coded character in the decryption element; cod' represents a random matrix disclosed by the second user side acquired in advance; /(I)A second target index position of the index array disclosed by the second user side is represented; decryption elements corresponding to the second target index position in the random matrix disclosed by the second user side are represented; and indicating the corresponding coding character of the decryption character in the preset coding alphabet.
Step S23, a message feedback result is generated according to the decrypted message, and the message feedback result is sent to the second user terminal. It should be noted that, the message feedback result is used to inform the second ue that the message decryption is successful.
In an alternative embodiment, the method further comprises: receiving an original message sent by a second user side; matching the decrypted message with the original message to obtain a matching result; and generating a message verification result based on the successful matching, and returning the message verification result to the second user side.
It should be noted that, if the second ue hashes the original message with the first preset hash algorithm before obtaining the signed message, the first ue after receiving the original message sent by the second ue includes: and carrying out hash processing on the original message by using a second preset hash algorithm to obtain a corresponding hash value. Accordingly, matching the decrypted message with the original message includes: and matching the decrypted message with the hash value, if the matching is successful, confirming that the message is sent by the second user terminal, and sending a message verification result to the second user terminal.
In summary, the first ue in the embodiment of the present invention decrypts the received signed message by obtaining the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the corresponding second ue, where the signed message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by using the random matrix, the index array and the key that are previously generated by the second ue, so as to realize the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; in addition, the encryption flow is optimized by combining the key, the random matrix and the index array, so that the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Fig. 3 depicts a flow diagram of a method for zero trust authentication for a wireless network according to the present invention, the method comprising:
S31, the second user terminal adds a signature to the original message by utilizing a key generated in advance and combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array to obtain a signature message, and sends the signature message to the first user terminal; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix;
S32, the first user terminal receives the signature message sent by the second user terminal, decrypts the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user terminal which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message, generates a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sends the message feedback result to the second user terminal;
S33, the second user terminal receives the message feedback result returned by the first user terminal.
In an alternative embodiment, the method further comprises: the second user side sends the original message to the first user side; the first user terminal receives the original message sent by the second user terminal, matches the decrypted message with the original message to obtain a matching result, generates a message verification result based on successful matching, and returns the message verification result to the second user terminal; and the second user side receives the message verification result returned by the first user side. It should be noted that, specific steps may refer to the above method embodiments, and are not repeated here.
In summary, in the embodiment of the present invention, the second user adds a signature to the original message by using the previously generated random matrix, index array and key, and the first user decrypts the received signed message by obtaining the public key, random matrix and index array disclosed by the corresponding second user, so as to realize the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; by combining the forms of the secret key, the random matrix and the index array, the encryption flow is optimized, and the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
The zero trust authentication device of the wireless network provided by the invention is described below, and the zero trust authentication device of the wireless network described below and the zero trust authentication method of the wireless network described above can be correspondingly referred to each other.
Fig. 4 shows a schematic structural diagram of a zero-trust authentication device of a wireless network, where the device, i.e. a second user side, includes:
the signature module 41 adds a signature to the original message by using a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix;
A signature message sending module 42 for sending the signature message to the first user terminal;
the feedback result receiving module 43 receives a message feedback result returned by the first user terminal, where the message feedback result is returned after the first user terminal decrypts the signature message by using the previously obtained public key, the random matrix and the index array, and obtains the decrypted message.
In the present embodiment, the signature module 41 includes: the first character acquisition unit is used for respectively determining the positions of the original characters in a preset coding alphabet aiming at each original character in the original message to obtain a corresponding first character; the second character acquisition unit is used for determining second characters corresponding to the first characters in the random matrix according to the positions of the original characters relative to the original message and the first characters corresponding to the original characters by combining the random matrix and the index array; and the signature message acquisition unit is used for acquiring the signature message according to the second characters and combining the public key in the secret key.
Specifically, the second character acquisition unit includes: an index position determining subunit, configured to determine a first target index position in the index array according to a position of the original character relative to the original message and a line number of the random matrix; an element acquisition subunit, for obtaining a target element in the corresponding random matrix according to the first target index position; and the second character acquisition subunit acquires a second character corresponding to the first character in the target element according to the target element and the first character.
Further, an index position determination subunit for: and (3) modulus the position of the original character relative to the original message and the line number of the random matrix to obtain a first target index position in the index array.
Further, the signature message acquisition unit includes: the encryption subunit is used for respectively encrypting each second character by utilizing the public key in the secret key according to each second character to obtain encryption information corresponding to each second character; and the message acquisition subunit acquires the signature message according to the encryption information corresponding to all the second characters.
In an alternative embodiment, the apparatus further comprises: the first hash processing module is used for carrying out hash processing on the original message by utilizing a first preset hash algorithm before signing the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index matrix to obtain a signed message.
In an alternative embodiment, the signature messaging module 42 is further configured to: sending the original message to a first user terminal; accordingly, the feedback result receiving module 43, number is used for: and receiving a message verification result returned by the first user side, wherein the message verification result is obtained after the first user side determines that the decrypted message is matched with the original message.
In summary, the second user side of the embodiment of the present invention adds a signature to the original message by using the previously generated random matrix, index array and key, and receives the message feedback result generated by the first user side after decrypting the received signature message based on the corresponding public key, random matrix and index array, thereby realizing the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; in addition, the encryption flow is optimized by combining the key, the random matrix and the index array, so that the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Fig. 5 shows a schematic structural diagram of a zero-trust authentication device of a wireless network, where the device, i.e. a first user side, includes:
A signature message receiving module 51, configured to receive a signature message sent by the second user terminal; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by a second user terminal based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index position of an element in any row in the random matrix;
The message decryption module 52 decrypts the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message;
The feedback message sending module 53 generates a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sends the message feedback result to the second user terminal.
In this embodiment, the message decryption module 52 includes: the third character acquisition unit is used for respectively determining the position of each signature character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by a second user side which is acquired in advance aiming at each signature character in the signature message to obtain a corresponding third character; the private key acquisition unit is used for acquiring a predicted private key according to a public key disclosed by a second user terminal acquired in advance; the character decryption unit is used for obtaining corresponding decrypted characters by combining the public key and the predicted private key according to each third character; and the message decryption unit obtains a decrypted message according to each decrypted character and the preset coding alphabet, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side.
Specifically, the private key acquisition unit is configured to: and according to the key length, the prime number and the preset constraint condition, combining with the Euler function to obtain the predicted private key.
A message decryption unit comprising: the coding character determining subunit is used for obtaining coding characters corresponding to the decryption characters in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side according to the decryption characters and by combining the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; a second target index position determining subunit, configured to determine a second target index position in the index array disclosed by the second user side according to the position of the signature character relative to the signature message and the number of rows of the random matrix disclosed by the second user side; a decryption element determining subunit, configured to obtain, according to the second target index position, a decryption element in the random matrix disclosed by the corresponding second user terminal; the information decryption subunit obtains decryption information corresponding to the coding character in the decryption element according to the decryption element and the coding character corresponding to the preset coding character in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side; and the decryption information acquisition subunit acquires decryption information corresponding to the signature information according to the decryption information corresponding to all the coding characters.
In an alternative embodiment, the signed message receiving module 51 is further configured to: and receiving the original message sent by the second user side. Correspondingly, the device further comprises: and the message matching module is used for matching the decrypted message with the original message to obtain a matching result. Accordingly, the feedback message sending module 53 is further configured to: and generating a message verification result based on the successful matching, and returning the message verification result to the second user side.
It should be noted that, if the second ue hashes the original message with the first preset hash algorithm before obtaining the signed message, the apparatus further includes: and the second hash processing module is used for carrying out hash processing on the original message by utilizing a second preset hash algorithm after receiving the original message sent by the second user terminal, so as to obtain a corresponding hash value.
In summary, the first ue in the embodiment of the present invention decrypts the received signed message by obtaining the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the corresponding second ue, where the signed message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by using the random matrix, the index array and the key that are previously generated by the second ue, so as to realize the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; in addition, the encryption flow is optimized by combining the key, the random matrix and the index array, so that the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Fig. 6 shows a schematic architecture diagram of a zero-trust authentication device of a wireless network, the device comprising a first user side and a second user side, wherein:
The second user side adds a signature to the original message by utilizing a key generated in advance and combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array to obtain a signature message, and sends the signature message to the first user side; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix;
The first user terminal receives the signature message sent by the second user terminal, decrypts the signature message by utilizing the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user terminal which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message, generates a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sends the message feedback result to the second user terminal;
And the second user side receives the message feedback result returned by the first user side.
In an alternative embodiment, the apparatus further comprises: the second user side sends the original message to the first user side; the first user terminal receives the original message sent by the second user terminal, matches the decrypted message with the original message to obtain a matching result, generates a message verification result based on successful matching, and returns the message verification result to the second user terminal; and the second user side receives the message verification result returned by the first user side. It should be noted that, specific steps may refer to the above device embodiments, and are not repeated here.
In summary, in the embodiment of the present invention, the second user adds a signature to the original message by using the previously generated random matrix, index array and key, and the first user decrypts the received signed message by obtaining the public key, random matrix and index array disclosed by the corresponding second user, so as to realize the secure transmission of the zero trust mechanism of the message; by combining the forms of the secret key, the random matrix and the index array, the encryption flow is optimized, and the security of zero trust information transmission is ensured.
Fig. 7 illustrates a physical schematic diagram of an electronic device, as shown in fig. 7, which may include: processor (processor) 71, communication interface (Communications Interface) 72, memory (memory) 73 and communication bus 74, wherein processor 71, communication interface 72, memory 73 accomplish the communication between each other through communication bus 74. Processor 71 may invoke logic instructions in memory 73 to perform a zero trust authentication method for a wireless network, the method comprising: adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix; sending the signature message to a first user terminal; receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain a decrypted message; or receiving a signature message sent by a second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by a second user terminal based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index position of an element in any row in the random matrix; decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message; and generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user side.
Further, the logic instructions in the memory 73 described above may be implemented in the form of software functional units and may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium when sold or used as a stand-alone product. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art or in a part of the technical solution, in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, comprising several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a usb disk, a removable hard disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a random access Memory (RAM, random Access Memory), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, or other various media capable of storing program codes.
In another aspect, the present invention also provides a computer program product, the computer program product including a computer program, the computer program being storable on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, the computer program, when executed by a processor, being capable of executing the method of zero trust authentication of a wireless network provided by the methods described above, the method comprising: adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix; sending the signature message to a first user terminal; receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain a decrypted message; or receiving a signature message sent by a second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by a second user terminal based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index position of an element in any row in the random matrix; decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message; and generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user side.
In yet another aspect, the present invention also provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by a processor, is implemented to perform a method of zero trust authentication for a wireless network provided by the methods described above, the method comprising: adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein, the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of the elements in any row of the random matrix; sending the signature message to a first user terminal; receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain a decrypted message; or receiving a signature message sent by a second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to the original message by a second user terminal based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index position of an element in any row in the random matrix; decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message; and generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user side.
The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the elements illustrated as separate elements may or may not be physically separate, and the elements shown as elements may or may not be physical elements, may be located in one place, or may be distributed over a plurality of network elements. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art will understand and implement the present invention without undue burden.
From the above description of the embodiments, it will be apparent to those skilled in the art that the embodiments may be implemented by means of software plus necessary general hardware platforms, or of course may be implemented by means of hardware. Based on this understanding, the foregoing technical solution may be embodied essentially or in a part contributing to the prior art in the form of a software product, which may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, such as ROM/RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., including several instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the method described in the respective embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.
Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only for illustrating the technical solution of the present invention, and are not limiting; although the invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, it will be understood by those of ordinary skill in the art that: the technical scheme described in the foregoing embodiments can be modified or some technical features thereof can be replaced by equivalents; such modifications and substitutions do not depart from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims (9)
1. A method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network, comprising:
adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix;
Sending the signature message to a first user terminal;
Receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by utilizing a public key, a random matrix and an index array which are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message;
The method for adding signature to original message by using the key generated in advance and combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array to obtain signature message comprises the following steps:
for each original character in the original message, determining the position of each original character in the preset coding alphabet respectively to obtain a corresponding first character;
Determining second characters corresponding to the first characters in the random matrix by combining the random matrix and the index array according to the positions of the original characters relative to the original message and the first characters corresponding to the original characters;
and according to the second characters, combining the public key in the secret key to obtain a signature message.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein said determining a corresponding second character of each of the first characters in the random matrix comprises:
Determining a first target index position in the index array according to the position of the original character relative to the original message and the line number of the random matrix;
obtaining a target element in the corresponding random matrix according to the first target index position;
And obtaining a second character corresponding to the first character in the target element according to the target element and the first character.
3. The method of zero trust authentication of a wireless network of claim 1, the method further comprising:
sending the original message to the first user terminal;
and receiving a message verification result returned by the first user side, wherein the message verification result is obtained after the first user side determines that the decrypted message is matched with the original message.
4. A method for zero trust authentication of a wireless network, comprising:
Receiving a signature message sent by a second user side; the signature message is obtained by adding a signature to an original message by the second user side based on a previously generated key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array, wherein the random matrix is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix;
decrypting the signature message by using the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message;
generating a message feedback result according to the decrypted message, and sending the message feedback result to the second user terminal;
The signature message is generated by the second user side according to each second character and a public key in the keys generated in advance; the second characters are obtained by combining the random matrix and the index array according to the position of each original character relative to the original message and the first character corresponding to each original character; the first character corresponding to each original character in the original message is obtained according to the position of each original character in the preset coding alphabet.
5. The method for zero-trust authentication of a wireless network according to claim 4, wherein decrypting the signed message using the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array disclosed by the second ue to obtain a decrypted message comprises:
for each signature character in the signature message, determining the position of each signature character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by a second user side obtained in advance, and obtaining a corresponding third character;
obtaining a predicted private key according to a public key disclosed by a second user terminal which is obtained in advance;
according to each third character, combining the public key and the predicted private key to obtain a corresponding decryption character;
And obtaining the decryption information according to each decryption character and the preset coding alphabet, the random matrix and the index array disclosed by the second user side.
6. The method for zero-trust authentication of a wireless network according to claim 5, wherein obtaining the decrypted message according to each decrypted character and the preset encoding alphabet, random matrix and index array disclosed by the second user terminal comprises:
According to each decryption character, combining a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side to obtain a coding character corresponding to the decryption character in the preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side;
Determining a second target index position in an index array disclosed by the second user side according to the position of the signature character relative to the signature message and the number of rows of the random matrix disclosed by the second user side;
Obtaining decryption elements in the random matrix corresponding to the second user side disclosure according to the second target index position;
Obtaining decryption information corresponding to the coding character in the decryption element according to the decryption element and the coding character corresponding to the decryption character in a preset coding alphabet disclosed by the second user side;
and obtaining the decryption information corresponding to the signature information according to the decryption information corresponding to all the coding characters.
7. The method of zero trust authentication of a wireless network of claim 4, further comprising:
Receiving an original message sent by the second user side;
matching the decrypted message with the original message;
and generating a message verification result based on successful matching, and returning the message verification result to the second user terminal.
8. A zero-trust authentication apparatus for a wireless network, comprising:
The signature module is used for adding a signature to the original message by utilizing a previously generated secret key and combining a preset coding alphabet, a previously generated random matrix and an index array to obtain a signed message; wherein the random matrix is a message according to the original message
The length is generated, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix;
The signature message sending module is used for sending the signature message to a first user terminal;
The feedback result receiving module is used for receiving a message feedback result returned by the first user side, wherein the message feedback result is returned after the first user side decrypts the signature message by utilizing the previously acquired public key, random matrix and index array to obtain a decrypted message;
the signature module comprises:
The first character acquisition unit is used for respectively determining the position of each original character in the preset coding alphabet aiming at each original character in the original message to obtain a corresponding first character;
A second character acquisition unit, configured to determine, according to a position of each original character relative to the original message, a first character corresponding to each original character, and combine the random matrix and the index array, a second character corresponding to each first character in the random matrix;
And the signature message acquisition unit is used for acquiring the signature message by combining the public key in the secret key according to each second character.
9. A zero-trust authentication apparatus for a wireless network, comprising:
The signature message receiving module is used for receiving the signature message sent by the second user side; the signature message is generated by the second user side based on a key generated in advance, and the random matrix obtained by adding a signature to an original message by combining a preset coding alphabet, a random matrix generated in advance and an index array is generated according to the message length of the original message, and the index array is determined according to the index positions of elements in any row of the random matrix;
the message decryption module decrypts the signature message by utilizing the public key, the random matrix and the index array which are disclosed by the second user side and are acquired in advance to obtain a decrypted message;
The feedback message sending module generates a message feedback result according to the decrypted message and sends the message feedback result to the second user terminal;
The signature message is generated by the second user side according to each second character and a public key in the keys generated in advance; the second characters are obtained by combining the random matrix and the index array according to the position of each original character in the original message relative to the original message and the first character corresponding to each original character; the first character corresponding to each original character in the original message is obtained according to the position of each original character in the preset coding alphabet.
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