CN117289305A

CN117289305A - Unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method and device and electronic equipment

Info

Publication number: CN117289305A
Application number: CN202311133010.8A
Authority: CN
Inventors: 赵阳; 徐好; 谭清怡; 龚波
Original assignee: Sichuan Jiuzhou Prevention And Control Technology Co ltd
Current assignee: Sichuan Jiuzhou Prevention And Control Technology Co ltd
Priority date: 2023-09-04
Filing date: 2023-09-04
Publication date: 2023-12-26

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and discloses a method, a device and electronic equipment for generating navigation decoy signals of an unmanned aerial vehicle, wherein the method comprises the following steps: obtaining ephemeris data of each visible satellite at a preset deception position, and screening all target satellites meeting preset conditions from all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite; determining the pseudo code phase of a decoy signal of each target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each target satellite and the preset deception position; determining Doppler frequency information of each target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to ephemeris data of each target satellite and position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment; and generating a decoy signal corresponding to each target satellite through a preset generation strategy according to the decoy signal pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of each target satellite. The invention can quickly generate the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal.

Description

Unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method and device and electronic equipment

Technical Field

The invention relates to the technical field of unmanned aerial vehicles, in particular to a method and a device for generating navigation decoy signals of an unmanned aerial vehicle and electronic equipment.

Background

The unmanned aerial vehicle utilizes a satellite navigation system to locate in real time to determine the position of the unmanned aerial vehicle and complete the set flight task. However, with the popularization of unmanned aerial vehicle technology, unmanned aerial vehicle application fields expand rapidly, and safety accidents caused by the phenomenon of black flight are also accompanied, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is reasonably interfered with and decoy to become an important means for slowing down the phenomenon of black flight and messy flight of the unmanned aerial vehicle.

The current mature navigation systems, such as a Beidou system, a Geronas satellite navigation system (GLobal Orbiting NAvigation Satellite System, abbreviated as GLONASS) and a global positioning system (Global Positioning System, abbreviated as GPS) play an important role in various countries and regions, the GPS navigation system is one of the earliest developed and most mature systems, and the real-time three-dimensional positioning function in all-weather global scope of the GPS navigation system plays an extremely important role in various fields, and is loaded and used by unmanned aerial vehicle manufacturers in various regions, so that the navigation decoy technology research on GPS signals is of great significance.

In the flying process of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the unmanned aerial vehicle carries out self-position calibration by means of identifying satellite signals, so that the positioning result of the unmanned aerial vehicle can be modified by changing satellite information, and the unmanned aerial vehicle can obtain false positioning coordinates. In order to reach a flight preset position, the unmanned aerial vehicle can analyze false positioning coordinates according to the currently received decoy signals, and then fly towards the preset position according to the optimal route planned by the false positioning coordinates, in the process, the position deviation of the unmanned aerial vehicle is necessarily inconsistent with the original planned path, from the perspective of the unmanned aerial vehicle, the unmanned aerial vehicle is decoy and pulled, and related personnel can control the positioning signals received by the unmanned aerial vehicle according to own requirements, so that the target unmanned aerial vehicle is forced to be driven away, decoy, disabled to fly, forced to land and the like.

At present, most of main control modes aiming at the black flying phenomenon of the unmanned aerial vehicle are high-power pressing equipment such as an interference gun, a laser gun and the like, aiming at cutting off the connection between the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle and a real satellite, disturbing a navigation positioning system of the unmanned aerial vehicle so as to achieve the aim of preventing the unmanned aerial vehicle from flying normally, and the equipment has the advantages of portability and convenience and simplicity in operation; in addition, because of directly carrying out rough power suppression, the interference decoy command operation center is easy to be hit due to poor concealment of the high power problem in some specific occasions, so that the interference equipment is only used for public security assurance in public places, and an obvious short board exists in the modern military field filled with electronic countermeasure.

In addition to the above-described jamming, the spoofing can avoid some unnecessary hazards while the drone is being controlled. The method is characterized in that the method comprises the steps of carrying out delay processing on a received real satellite signal by forwarding interference, and then forwarding the received real satellite signal, wherein the operation is simpler because the real satellite signal is forwarded, but because the operation on the real signal can only be delayed and cannot be advanced, the generated false positioning coordinates cannot be set arbitrarily, the interference range has a certain limitation, and the real signal is delayed and then is transmitted into a target unmanned aerial vehicle, and in the unmanned aerial vehicle anti-interference measures, the real signal is treated as multipath interference easily by an anti-interference device, and finally interference failure is caused. While most of the generated interference means generate signals more truly, the method is complex in the process of generating the decoy signals, and because relevant simulation is required according to a real signal structure, the response speed is slower than that of the forward interference in the operation processes of the black unmanned aerial vehicle decoy and the like, and the best decoy time of the black unmanned aerial vehicle is easily missed.

Therefore, a new unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generating method is needed to solve the above technical problems.

Disclosure of Invention

Aiming at the problems, the invention provides a method, a device and electronic equipment for generating navigation decoy signals of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which can set the deception position at will and generate the decoy signals rapidly based on the deception position, thereby improving the generation rate of the decoy signals.

The invention provides a method for generating navigation decoy signals of an unmanned aerial vehicle, which comprises the following steps:

demodulating the received real satellite signals to obtain ephemeris data of each satellite;

obtaining ephemeris data of each visible satellite at a preset deception position, and screening all target satellites meeting preset conditions from all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite;

determining the pseudo code phase of a decoy signal of each target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each target satellite and the preset deception position;

determining Doppler frequency information of each target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to ephemeris data of each target satellite and position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment;

and generating a decoy signal corresponding to each target satellite through a preset generation strategy according to the pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of the decoy signal of each target satellite, so as to decoy the target unmanned aerial vehicle through the decoy signal.

Further, according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite, screening all target satellites meeting preset conditions from all visible satellites at a preset deception position, including:

determining all satellites meeting preset health conditions and preset pitch angle conditions from all visible satellites at preset deception positions according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite, and obtaining a target satellite set;

determining all satellites of the target satellite set as a plurality of satellite combinations according to the principle that each preset number of satellites are a group;

and respectively determining the geometric precision factor of each satellite combination in the plurality of satellite combinations, and taking the satellite in the satellite combination with the smallest geometric precision factor as a target satellite.

Further, the step of determining all satellites satisfying the preset health condition and the preset pitch angle condition includes:

establishing a station coordinate system by taking the position of the current moment of the target unmanned aerial vehicle as an origin;

determining a pitch angle of each visible satellite at a position corresponding to the current moment of the target unmanned aerial vehicle under a station center coordinate system according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite; and determining the visible satellites with satellite health parameters in the ephemeris data within a preset range and pitch angles larger than a preset threshold as satellites meeting preset health conditions and preset pitch angle conditions.

Further, the step of determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of any target satellite based on the preset spoofing position includes:

determining a model according to the preset time, and determining the signal transmitting time of the target satellite for transmitting the real satellite signal based on the preset deception position;

acquiring the cross word of each subframe message in the target satellite ephemeris data;

determining the time of week corresponding to each subframe message according to the time of week value in each subframe message handover word;

and determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of the target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the signal transmission time and the final time of week by taking the time of week with the smallest time difference between the signal transmission time and the final time of week as the final time of week and by using a corresponding relation model of the preset transmission time and the pseudo code phase.

Further, the preset time determining model includes:

wherein R is the geometric distance between the preset deception position and the target satellite;

is a time variable;

x _s (t)、y _s (t)、z _s (t) an x-direction coordinate component, a y-direction coordinate component and a z-direction coordinate component of the target satellite at the time t respectively;

x _u (t _r )、y _u (t _r )、z _u (t _r ) Respectively an x-direction coordinate component, a y-direction coordinate component and a z-direction coordinate component at a preset deception position;

t _t Is the signal emission time;

t _r is the signal reception time;

c is the speed of light;

i is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the ionosphere;

t is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the troposphere;

Δt _t is satellite clock error;

Δt _r is the correction amount for relativistic effects.

Further, the step of determining doppler frequency information of any target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle includes:

determining the position coordinates and the running speed of the target satellite at the current moment according to the ephemeris data of the target satellite;

determining the relative positions of a target satellite and a target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment according to the position coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment by taking the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment as a coordinate origin;

according to the relative position and the running speed, determining the radial speed of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle through a preset radial speed determining model;

and determining Doppler frequency information of the target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to the radial speed of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle.

Further, the preset radial velocity determination model includes:

wherein v is _x 、v _y 、v _z The velocity components are respectively an x-direction velocity component, a y-direction velocity component and a z-direction velocity component of the target satellite at the current moment;

For the relative position of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment, < >> Respectively the x-direction coordinate, the y-direction coordinate, the z-direction coordinate and the x-direction coordinate of the target satellite at the current moment _u 、y _u 、z _u Respectively an x-direction coordinate, a y-direction coordinate and a z-direction coordinate of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment;

the difference between the x-direction coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment is obtained;

the difference between the y-direction marks of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment;

the difference between the z-direction coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment.

Further, the step of generating the decoy signal corresponding to any target satellite through a preset generation strategy includes:

determining the generated signal frequency and code rate of the target satellite according to the ephemeris data of the target satellite;

determining a carrier control word according to the generated signal frequency of the target satellite;

determining a code control word according to the code rate of the target satellite;

and generating a decoy signal corresponding to the target satellite according to the carrier control word, the code control word and the decoy signal pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of the target satellite and a preset real satellite signal standard and format.

The invention also provides a device for generating the navigation decoy signal of the unmanned aerial vehicle, which comprises:

The demodulation module is used for demodulating the received real satellite signals to obtain ephemeris data of each satellite;

the screening module is used for acquiring the ephemeris data of each visible satellite at the preset deception position, and screening all target satellites meeting preset conditions from all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite;

the pseudo code phase determining module is used for determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of each target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each target satellite and the preset deception position;

the Doppler frequency information determining module is used for determining Doppler frequency information of each target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to ephemeris data of each target satellite and position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment;

and the decoy signal generation module is used for generating a decoy signal corresponding to each target satellite through a preset generation strategy according to the decoy signal pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of each target satellite respectively so as to decoy the target unmanned aerial vehicle through the decoy signal.

The present invention also provides a computer readable storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by one or more processors, performs the steps of the above method.

The invention also provides an electronic device comprising a memory and one or more processors, the memory having stored thereon a computer program which, when executed by the one or more processors, performs the steps of the above-described method.

The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method, the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation device and the electronic equipment provided by the invention have at least the following beneficial effects:

(1) Can be at black unmanned aerial vehicle invasion in-process, generate the decoy signal fast and cover unmanned aerial vehicle receiver, make unmanned aerial vehicle received the decoy signal after being guided to safe controllable within range, and can not lead to unmanned aerial vehicle out of control crash's condition to take place to avoid unmanned aerial vehicle to the secondary injury that produces house, pedestrian etc. to a great extent.

(2) The position coordinates of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception can be set at will without being limited by the forwarding delay of real satellite signals, so that the problem that certain airspace becomes a decoy dead angle of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the aim of successfully driving away cannot be achieved is avoided.

(3) Because the generated decoy signals are generated according to the standard and format of the real satellite signals, the time delay and other information are set according to the relative distance between the real satellite and the preset deception position, the decoy signals are more real and are easier to be received by the unmanned aerial vehicle, and further the flying condition of the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle is more controllable.

(4) When the decoy signal is generated, all target satellites meeting preset conditions are screened from all visible satellites at preset deception positions, and the pseudo code phase is determined according to the principle of pseudo code phase fixed point reckoning nearby according to the signal emission time, so that the generation rate of the decoy signal is obviously improved, and related measures can be taken for the target black unmanned aerial vehicle more quickly.

Drawings

For a clearer description of embodiments of the invention or of solutions in the prior art, the drawings which are used in the description of the embodiments or of the prior art will be briefly described, it being obvious that the drawings in the description below are only some embodiments of the invention, and that other drawings can be obtained from them without inventive effort for a person skilled in the art.

Fig. 1 is a flowchart of steps of a method for generating a navigation spoofing signal of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to a first embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a RINEX navigation data file.

Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the comparison of the visible satellites before and after screening.

Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of a code phase structure of pilot signal data.

Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of a relative positional relationship between a target satellite and a target unmanned aerial vehicle at a current moment.

Fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of an unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generating device according to a second embodiment of the present invention.

Fig. 7 is a schematic diagram of signal spectrum of each stage of spoofing signals.

Fig. 8 is a schematic diagram of the result of acquisition of a decoy signal of a target satellite with PRN number 1.

Fig. 9 is a schematic diagram of the result of acquisition of the spoofing signal of the target satellite with PRN number 9.

Fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of the result of acquisition of the spoofing signal of the target satellite with PRN number 21.

Fig. 11 is a schematic diagram of the result of acquisition of the spoofing signal of the target satellite with PRN number 27.

Fig. 12 is a schematic diagram of the operation flow of newton's iterative method for solving a quaternary nonlinear equation set.

Fig. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device according to a sixth embodiment of the present invention.

Reference numerals:

in fig. 6: 601-demodulation module, 602-screening module, 603-pseudo code phase determining module, 604-Doppler frequency information determining module, 605-decoy signal generating module;

in fig. 13: 1300-electronic device, 1301-processor, 1302-communication bus, 1303-user interface, 1304-communication interface, 1305-memory.

Detailed Description

The invention will be further described with reference to examples of embodiments shown in the drawings. It should be apparent that the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention and not all embodiments of the present invention, and it should be understood that the present invention is not limited by the example embodiments described herein.

It should be noted that: the relative arrangement of the components and steps, numerical expressions and numerical values set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the present invention unless it is specifically stated otherwise.

It should also be appreciated that any component, data, or structure referred to in an embodiment of the invention may be generally understood as one or more without explicit limitation or the contrary in the context.

It should also be understood that the description of the embodiments of the present invention emphasizes the differences between the embodiments, and that the same or similar features may be referred to each other, and for brevity, will not be described in detail.

The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely exemplary in nature and is in no way intended to limit the invention, its application, or uses.

Embodiments of the invention may not be discussed in detail with respect to techniques, methods and apparatus known to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art, but where appropriate, the techniques, methods and apparatus should be considered part of the specification.

Example 1

In a first embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 1, a method for generating a navigation spoofing signal of an unmanned aerial vehicle is provided, and the method is applied to spoofing equipment, and specifically includes the following steps:

Step S101: and demodulating the received real satellite signals to obtain ephemeris data of each satellite.

Step S102: the ephemeris data of each visible satellite at the preset deception position is obtained, and all target satellites meeting preset conditions are screened out of all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite.

Step S103: and determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of each target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each target satellite and the preset deception position.

Step S104: and determining Doppler frequency information of each target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to the ephemeris data of each target satellite and the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment.

Step S105: and generating a decoy signal corresponding to each target satellite through a preset generation strategy according to the pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of the decoy signal of each target satellite, so as to decoy the target unmanned aerial vehicle through the decoy signal.

Optionally, in step S101, the decoy device may receive the real satellite signal transmitted by the satellite through the GPS receiving antenna, and input the received real satellite signal to the LEA-M8T timing chip in the decoy device, so as to generate UBX format data through internal processing analysis of the LEA-M8T chip, since UBX format data cannot be directly processed generally, it needs to be converted into a RINEX navigation data file as shown in fig. 2, in a subsequent data processing process, each ephemeris data contained in the navigation data file needs to be called to different function positions for parameter calculation, so that each ephemeris data parameter carried by the generated RINEX data file is classified according to the PRN number (satellite number) and the parameter type, and the subsequent direct reading and calling are convenient.

Optionally, in step S102, the preset spoofing position may be set by the technician according to the actual requirement, which is not particularly limited by the present invention. After the preset deception location is set, ephemeris data of each visible satellite at the deception location may be obtained according to the preset deception location.

According to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite, screening all target satellites meeting preset conditions from all visible satellites at preset deception positions, wherein the method comprises the following steps:

step S1021: and determining all satellites meeting the preset health condition and the preset pitch angle condition from all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite, and obtaining a target satellite set.

Wherein, confirm all the step which meets the condition of preserving health and preserving pitch angle of satellite of the condition, comprising:

step S10211: and establishing a station coordinate system by taking the position of the current moment of the target unmanned aerial vehicle as an origin.

The station center coordinate system is also called a station coordinate system and an east-north-sky coordinate system, and is called an ENU coordinate system for short.

Step S10212: and determining the pitch angle of each visible satellite at the position corresponding to the current moment of the target unmanned aerial vehicle under the station center coordinate system according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite.

Specifically, in step S10212, the position coordinate of each visible satellite at the current moment may be determined according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite, and the position coordinate of each visible satellite at the current moment is converted into the position coordinate under the station-core coordinate system, so as to determine the pitch angle of each visible satellite relative to the position of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment according to the position coordinate of each visible satellite under the station-core coordinate system.

Step S10213: and determining the visible satellites with satellite health parameters in the ephemeris data within a preset range and pitch angles larger than a preset threshold as satellites meeting preset health conditions and preset pitch angle conditions.

It should be noted that, the preset range and the preset threshold value may be set by the technician according to the actual requirement, which is not particularly limited in the present invention. For example, the preset threshold may be 5 °.

Step S1022: all satellites of the target satellite set are determined as a plurality of satellite combinations according to the principle that each preset number of satellites is a group.

It should be noted that the preset number may be set by a technician according to actual needs, which is not limited by the present invention.

Preferably, the preset number may be 4. That is, in step S1022, 4 satellites are selected from the target satellite set at a time to perform different permutation and combination, so that all satellites of the target satellite set are determined as a plurality of satellite combinations.

Step S1023: and respectively determining the geometric precision factor of each satellite combination in the plurality of satellite combinations, and taking the satellite in the satellite combination with the smallest geometric precision factor as a target satellite.

The geometric precision factor (Geometric Dilution Precision, abbreviated as GDOP) is a very important coefficient for measuring positioning precision, and represents a distance vector amplification factor between the target unmanned aerial vehicle and the space satellite caused by GP ranging error. In step S1023, the GDOP values of the satellite combinations are calculated, and the satellite combination with the smallest GDOP value is selected as the best visible satellite combination.

Specifically, in step S1023, after establishing a geometric matrix G and a weight coefficient matrix H for a plurality of sets of satellite coordinate information and target unmanned aerial vehicle coordinate information, the geometric matrix G is formed by unit observation vectors I and 1 of the receiver:

in addition, the above unit observation vector I ⁽ⁿ⁾ Is composed of x, y and z components in the ECEF coordinate system (Earth-Centered, earth-Fixed coordinate system):

Wherein r is ⁽ⁿ⁾ Is the length of the observation vector for satellite n at the target drone, and the weight coefficient matrix h= (G) ^T G) ^-1 A 4×4 symmetric matrix, the diagonal elements of which can be expressed in turn as: h is a ₁₁ 、h ₂₂ 、h ₃₃ And h ₄₄ The calculation formula of the geometric accuracy factor GDOP value is:

the result of the satellite screening for a time according to the minimum GDOP criterion is shown in FIG. 3.

In step S102, since the distance between the target drone and the preset spoof position is negligible compared to the distance between satellites, the visible satellites at the preset spoof position and the target drone position may be considered the same.

The core method for screening the target satellites from all the visible satellites is to calculate geometric precision factors (GDOP) of satellite combinations, and in the calculation process, different arrangement and combination are needed to be carried out on all the satellites, so that the calculation amount is large and the calculation complexity is high, and before the GDOP value screening is formally carried out, the visible satellites are initially screened by adopting the pitch angle judgment in the step S1021 and the satellite health condition screening method, so that the number of the satellites participating in the arrangement and combination can be reduced, and the target satellites can be rapidly determined.

Optionally, in step S103, the step of determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of any one of the target satellites based on the preset spoofing position includes:

Step S1031: and determining the signal transmitting time of the target satellite for transmitting the real satellite signal based on the preset deception position according to the preset time determining model.

Specifically, let the signal receiving time of the real satellite signal be t _r The signal transmitting time is t _t Then the following formula is obtained according to the pseudo-range calculation:

wherein ρ is the pseudo range between the target satellite and the preset deception location, c is the speed of light, R is the geometric distance between the preset deception location and the target satellite, Δt _t For satellite clock difference, Δt _r The correction amount of relativistic effect is that the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the ionosphere is I, and the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the troposphere is T; the satellite clock difference and relativistic correction can be obtained by calculation of navigation data parameters, and in addition, the common sky ionosphere delay model and the Hopofeeld model respectively estimate and solve the ionosphere and troposphere delay, and the signal receiving time is t _r May be obtained directly from the receiver of the spoofing device.

Signal transmission time t _t Can be expressed as:

the calculation of the satellite signal transmitting moment is closely related to the geometric distance, and as the signal transmitting and receiving cannot be located at the same moment, the formula is split, and the introduced time variable can be obtained:

The geometric distance R between the preset spoofing location and the target satellite can be expressed approximately as:

in the above formula, x, y, z denote three coordinate components in the ECEF coordinate system, respectively, and subscripts s and u denote the satellite and the receiver (the receiver at the predetermined spoofing location), respectively, i.e., x _s (t)、y _s (t)、z _s (t) the x-direction coordinate component, the y-direction coordinate component, the z-direction coordinate component and the x-direction coordinate component of the target satellite at the time t respectively _u (t _r )、y _u (t _r )、z _u (t _r ) Respectively an x-direction coordinate component, a y-direction coordinate component and a z-direction coordinate component at a preset deception position;

and (5) and (7) of the combined type to obtain a preset time determination model:

the initial value is set as follows:

update t _t Performing iterative calculation, comparing R value results obtained by two adjacent times, if the R value difference value of two adjacent times is less than 10 ^-8 Ending the calculationT at last calculation _t The value is taken as the final signal transmission time.

Step S1032: and acquiring the cross word of each subframe message in the target satellite ephemeris data.

Each subframe message in the ephemeris data contains 10 data words, wherein the second data Word is a handover Word (HOW).

Step S1033: and determining the time of week corresponding to each subframe message according to the time of week value in each subframe message cross word.

Bits 1 to 17 in the cross word are truncated time-of-week values from which the time-of-week (TOW) at which the signal is located can be calculated.

Step S1034: and determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of the target satellite based on the preset deception position according to the signal transmission time and the final time of week by taking the time of week with the smallest time difference between the signal transmission time and the final time of week as the final time of week and by using a corresponding relation model of the preset transmission time and the pseudo code phase.

The corresponding relation model of the preset transmitting time and the pseudo code phase comprises the following steps:

in the formula (9), TOW represents the first 17 bits of the handover word (HOW) in the navigation message in seconds, w represents the word, each word is composed of 30 bits, b is the number of bits, each bit occupies 20 ms, c represents the pseudo code period, each pseudo code period is composed of 1023 chips in the GPS signal, each pseudo code period occupies 1 ms, CP represents the chip information, and the code phase structure of the navigation signal data is shown in fig. 4.

Note that, when TOW in expression (9) is within the final week determined in step S1034.

In step S1035, the signal transmission time and the final intra-week time are carried into equation (9), and the values of the pseudo code period c and the chip information CP corresponding to the signal transmission time can be calculated, thereby determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of the target satellite based on the preset spoofing position.

In the satellite signal receiving process, the signal transmitting time is obtained by analyzing the satellite signal pseudo code phase, namely, the signal transmitting time determines the signal pseudo code phase, so that in order to generate the false satellite signal, pseudo code phase calculation is needed by utilizing the relation (formula 9) between the pseudo code phase and the signal transmitting time, and the formula (9) can find that in the process of generating the decoy signal, the generation of the signal pseudo code phase can be realized quickly through the signal transmitting time.

In the embodiment, step S1031 to step S1034, the intra-week data in the existing electric field are rapidly located by the cross word, the corresponding phase information of the signal transmitting time is searched according to the most recent optimal principle, the code phase calculation time is reduced, the current required code phase information is rapidly obtained, the process of traversing searching in the obtained whole navigation ephemeris data is avoided, and the generation rate of the decoy signals is greatly improved.

Optionally, in step S104, the step of determining doppler frequency information of any target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle specifically includes:

step S1041: and determining the position coordinates and the running speed of the target satellite at the current moment according to the ephemeris data of the target satellite.

Step S1042: and determining the relative positions of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment according to the position coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment by taking the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment as the origin of coordinates.

Step S1043: and determining the radial speed of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle through a preset radial speed determination model according to the relative position and the running speed.

Step S1044: and determining Doppler frequency information of the target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to the radial speed of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle.

Specifically, in step S1042, the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment are taken as the origin of coordinates, and the relative positions of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment are determined according to the following formula:

wherein,respectively the x-direction coordinate, the y-direction coordinate, the z-direction coordinate and the x-direction coordinate of the target satellite at the current moment _u 、y _u 、z _u The coordinate system is respectively an x-direction coordinate, a y-direction coordinate and a z-direction coordinate of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment.

Further, the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment are determined through the radar detection equipment.

The relative positional relationship between the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment is shown in fig. 5.

Further, the preset radial velocity determination model includes:

the difference between the y-direction coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment is obtained;

Specifically, v _x 、v _y 、v _z (the three-dimensional velocity component of the target satellite in the ECEF coordinate system) can be calculated from the ephemeris data of the target satellite.

Equation (11) shows that on the premise of knowing the satellite motion state, the Doppler information received by the unmanned aerial vehicle can be obtained.

Further, if the target unmanned aerial vehicle carries doppler, a similar method may be referred to determine a radial velocity of the target unmanned aerial vehicle relative to the target satellite, and the radial velocity of the target unmanned aerial vehicle relative to the target satellite and the radial velocity of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle are added to obtain a radial velocity value, and then doppler frequency information is determined according to the radial velocity value.

Optionally, in step S105, the step of generating, by a preset generation policy, a decoy signal corresponding to any one of the target satellites includes:

Step S1051: determining the generated signal frequency and code rate of the target satellite according to the ephemeris data of the target satellite;

step S1052: determining a carrier control word according to the generated signal frequency of the target satellite;

step S1053: determining a code control word according to the code rate of the target satellite;

step S1054: and generating a decoy signal corresponding to the target satellite according to a carrier control word, the code control word and the decoy signal pseudo code phase and Doppler frequency information of the target satellite and a preset real satellite signal standard and format.

The GPS signal is mainly composed of three parts, namely carrier frequency, pseudo-random code and navigation message information, wherein the navigation message and the pseudo-random code are subjected to spread spectrum modulation and then are subjected to two-phase code modulation with the carrier. In the process of generating the decoy signal, the carrier control word and the code control word are calculated according to the frequency and the code rate of the generated signal, and the correct control word is obtained before the decoy signal meeting the requirements is generated.

Let the local clock frequency f _c The output frequency of the decoy signal is f ₀ For an N-bit oscillator, the decoy signal output frequency can be expressed as:

where M is a control word, at a known f ₀ 、f _c And N, M can be determined according to the above equation.

Let f ₀ The value is taken to generate signal frequency, then the carrier control word can be obtained according to the formula (12), and f is caused to be ₀ And obtaining the code control word when the value is the code rate.

In the process of generating the navigation signal, except for three major elements (pseudo-random code, data code and carrier wave), the most important time delay parameters are represented by pseudo-code phases, and according to the preset real satellite signal standard and format (decoy signal pattern), the method comprises the following steps:

s＝cos(2π(f _i +f _d )(t-τ))*D(phase) (13)

wherein f _i Is of intermediate frequency, f _d For Doppler frequency, τ is the delay and D (phase) is the pseudo-random code modulated according to the pseudo-code phase.

Performing IQ demodulation on the generated decoy signals, and then performing low-pass filtering processing to generate IQ two paths of signals:

further, in the process of generating the decoy signal, if the generated decoy signal is directly transmitted to the target unmanned aerial vehicle, the self-protection mechanism of the target unmanned aerial vehicle can generate rejection phenomenon due to huge difference values between information such as signal code phase, doppler frequency and the like, and the decoy signal is used as interference to be suppressed, so that in the process of decoy, real satellite signals need to be gradually replaced, specifically, auxiliary facilities such as radar detection equipment and the like can be utilized, real position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle are determined through radar detection, the real coordinates are reported to the decoy equipment, the real receiving signal of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment is firstly generated according to the real position coordinates by the decoy equipment, after the decoy equipment successfully enters the target unmanned aerial vehicle, the real signal transmitted by a satellite is gradually replaced through increasing signal power information, and on the basis, the pseudo phase of the decoy signal and the Doppler frequency information of the real satellite signals are gradually added into the decoy signal, so that position decoy is completed.

According to the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method provided by the embodiment, the decoy signal can be rapidly generated to cover the unmanned aerial vehicle receiver in the invasion process of the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is guided into a safe and controllable range after receiving the decoy signal, the condition that the unmanned aerial vehicle is out of control and crashed is not caused, and secondary damage to houses, pedestrians and the like caused by the unmanned aerial vehicle is avoided to a great extent; the position coordinates of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception can be set at will without being limited by the forwarding delay of real satellite signals, so that the situation that certain airspace becomes a deception dead angle of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the aim of successfully driving away cannot be achieved is avoided; because the generated decoy signals are generated according to the standard and format of the real satellite signals, the time delay and other information are set according to the relative distance between the real satellite and the preset deception position, the decoy signals are more real and are easier to be received by the unmanned aerial vehicle, and the flying condition of the black-flying unmanned aerial vehicle is more controllable; when the decoy signal is generated, all target satellites meeting preset conditions are screened from all visible satellites at preset deception positions, and the pseudo code phase is determined according to the principle of pseudo code phase fixed point reckoning nearby according to the signal emission time, so that the generation rate of the decoy signal is obviously improved, and related measures can be taken for the target black unmanned aerial vehicle more quickly.

Example two

In a second embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 6, there is provided an unmanned aerial vehicle navigation spoofing signal generating apparatus, the apparatus including:

the demodulation module 601 is configured to demodulate a received real satellite signal to obtain ephemeris data of each satellite;

the screening module 602 is configured to obtain ephemeris data of each visible satellite at a preset spoofing location, and screen all target satellites that meet a preset condition from all visible satellites at the preset spoofing location according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite;

the pseudo code phase determining module 603 is configured to determine a pseudo code phase of a decoy signal of each target satellite based on the preset deception position according to ephemeris data of each target satellite and the preset deception position;

the doppler frequency information determining module 604 is configured to determine doppler frequency information of each target satellite received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to ephemeris data of each target satellite and a position coordinate of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at a current moment;

the decoy signal generating module 605 is configured to generate a decoy signal corresponding to each target satellite according to the decoy signal pseudo code phase and the doppler frequency information of each target satellite, so as to decoy the target unmanned aerial vehicle through the decoy signal.

Optionally, the screening module 602 includes:

the primary screening unit is used for determining all satellites meeting the preset health condition and the preset pitch angle condition from all visible satellites at the preset deception position according to the ephemeris data of each visible satellite to obtain a target satellite set;

a combination determining unit, configured to determine all satellites in the target satellite set as a plurality of satellite combinations according to a principle that each preset number of satellites is a group;

and the final screening unit is used for respectively determining the geometric precision factors of each satellite combination in the plurality of satellite combinations, and taking the satellite in the satellite combination with the smallest geometric precision factor as the target satellite.

Optionally, in the preliminary screening unit, the step of determining all satellites satisfying the preset health condition and the preset pitch angle condition includes:

determining a pitch angle of each visible satellite at the position of the station center coordinate system relative to the current moment of the target unmanned aerial vehicle according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite; and determining the visible satellites with satellite health parameters in the ephemeris data within a preset range and pitch angles larger than a preset threshold as satellites meeting preset health conditions and preset pitch angle conditions.

Optionally, the step of determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal based on the preset spoofing position by the pseudo code phase determining module 603 includes:

Optionally, the preset time determining model includes:

is a time variable;

t _t Is the signal emission time;

t _r is the signal reception time;

c is the speed of light;

i is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the ionosphere;

t is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the troposphere;

Δt _t is satellite clock error;

Δt _r is the correction amount for relativistic effects.

Optionally, the doppler frequency information determining module 604 determines doppler frequency information of any target satellite received by the target drone, including:

the method comprises the steps of taking the position coordinates of a target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment as a coordinate origin, and determining the relative positions of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment according to the position coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment;

determining the radial speed of the target satellite relative to the target unmanned aerial vehicle through a preset radial speed determining model according to the relative position and the running speed;

Optionally, the preset radial velocity determination model includes:

wherein v is _x 、v _y 、v _z Respectively the x-direction speed component and the y-direction speed of the target satellite at the current moment A component, a z-direction velocity component;

for the relative position of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment, < >> Respectively the x-direction coordinate, the y-direction coordinate, the z-direction coordinate and the x-direction coordinate of the target satellite at the current moment _u 、y _u 、z _u Respectively an x-direction coordinate, a y-direction coordinate and a z-direction coordinate of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment; />

Optionally, the step of generating, by the decoy signal generating module 605, a decoy signal corresponding to any target satellite through a preset generation policy includes:

According to the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generating device, in the invasion process of the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle, the decoy signal can be rapidly generated to cover the unmanned aerial vehicle receiver, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is guided into a safe and controllable range after receiving the decoy signal, the condition that the unmanned aerial vehicle is out of control and crashed is not caused, and secondary damage to houses, pedestrians and the like caused by the unmanned aerial vehicle is avoided to a great extent; the position coordinates of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception can be set at will without being limited by the forwarding delay of real satellite signals, so that the situation that certain airspace becomes a deception dead angle of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the aim of successfully driving away cannot be achieved is avoided; because the generated decoy signals are generated according to the standard and format of the real satellite signals, the time delay and other information are set according to the relative distance between the real satellite and the preset deception position, the decoy signals are more real and are easier to be received by the unmanned aerial vehicle, and the flying condition of the black-flying unmanned aerial vehicle is more controllable; when the decoy signal is generated, all target satellites meeting preset conditions are screened from all visible satellites at preset deception positions, and the pseudo code phase is determined according to the principle of pseudo code phase fixed point reckoning nearby according to the signal emission time, so that the generation rate of the decoy signal is obviously improved, and related measures can be taken for the target black unmanned aerial vehicle more quickly.

Example III

In the third embodiment of the invention, the generated decoy signal based on the above embodiment is subjected to coarse capturing and then quick positioning verification to determine the positioning quality problem of the generated decoy signal, so that the generated decoy signal is prevented from being poor in quality, and the decoy effect on the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle is not obvious.

After generating IQ two paths of signals corresponding to the decoy signals, respectively performing low-pass filtering processing on the two paths of signals to remove high-frequency components of the signals, and then performing downsampling processing on the signals, wherein the signal spectrum of each stage of satellite signals is shown in fig. 7.

In the acquisition process of the generated spoofing signal, the satellite PRN number, the code phase, and the doppler domain are acquired, thereby determining the satellite number, the phase information, and the doppler information of the spoofing signal.

The CA codes broadcasted by the GPS signals are different, and meanwhile, the CA codes have good auto-correlation and cross-correlation characteristics, according to the characteristics, the signal numbers received by the receivers can be well distinguished, and meanwhile, code phase information of signal arrival time can be read out from the highest peak of the auto-correlation, so that the pseudo-range value between each satellite and the receiver can be calculated.

In the satellite signal processing process, the carrier frequency containing the doppler shift is already down-converted to an intermediate frequency containing the doppler, in other words, the doppler frequency received by the receiver can be captured by searching the intermediate frequency signal. In view of the above, the signal capturing process of the receiver generally performs two-dimensional scanning search on the carrier frequency and the code phase of the satellite signal, the receiver copies the CA code with a carrier frequency and a CA code with a phase, captures the copied signal and the true satellite received signal by two methods of mixing and correlation detection in respective dimensions, and when the signal correlation value is greater than the set threshold, the capturing of the satellite signal is considered to be successful, and the capturing results of the decoy signal generated based on the latitude and longitude of the preset spoofing position are respectively 107.0132 ° and 35.2981 ° are shown in fig. 8 to 11.

The doppler information (generation frequency) of the spoofing signal generated from the satellite transmission timing is shown in table 1 below, and compared with the acquisition results shown in fig. 8 to 11, the doppler bias average value is about 29.2 Hz.

TABLE 1 comparison of Doppler frequency and acquisition results at the time of decoy Signal Generation

After the capturing result is obtained, the transmitting time of the signal can be calculated according to the captured code phase, a pseudo-range positioning equation is established by using the calculated pseudo-range information and satellite coordinates, and the positioning result of the deception signal is solved.

The essence of GPS positioning and timing is to solve the following quaternary nonlinear equation:

each of the equations corresponds to a pseudorange measurement for a satellite in view. In the whole equation set, the position coordinate value of each visible satellite can be obtained by calculation according to the ephemeris data broadcast by each visible satellite, and the pseudo range after error correctionThen it is measured by the receiver so that there are only three coordinate components (x, y, z) and receiver clock differences δt for the remaining receiver positions in the system of equations _u Is the unknown quantity to be solved. The operation flow of the newton iteration method used for solving the above equation set is shown in fig. 12.

And (3) through changing the preset deception position coordinates, positioning and calculating a plurality of groups of pseudo satellite signal capturing results by using a pseudo range positioning algorithm, and then verifying the positioning results to be displayed as follows:

TABLE 2 positioning results of spoofing signals generated in accordance with multiple sets of preset spoofing locations

Sequence number	Presetting deception location (LLA)	Signal resolving position (LLA)	Distance difference (Rice)
				1	(20.2981,15.0132,50)	(20.2984,15.0137,80.0595)	77.4576
2	(18.2981,17.0132,50)	(18.2983,17.0137,76.7120)	64.7676
				3	(30.2981,20.0132,100)	(30.2979,20.0134,90.6370)	30.1528
4	(35.2981,16.0132,200)	(35.2978,16.0133,163.9948)	45.1696
				5	(19.2981,18.0132,300)	(19.2982,18.0137,318.7398)	54.9430
6	(14.2981,40.0132,20)	(14.2983,40.0137,83.1630)	83.8497

As can be seen from the positioning results of the table, after pseudo-range positioning calculation is carried out on pseudo-range estimated quantity obtained only by using the capturing result, the preset deception position is similar to the positioning coordinates analyzed by actually generated signals, and the distance difference value is within an acceptable range.

Example IV

In a fourth embodiment of the present invention, a computer program product is provided, where the computer program product includes a computer program or instructions, and when the computer program or instructions are executed by a processor, all or part of the steps of the method for generating a navigation decoy signal for an unmanned aerial vehicle described in the foregoing embodiment are implemented, and the detailed description of the embodiment is omitted herein.

Further, the computer program product may include one or more computer-executable components configured to perform embodiments when the program is run; the computer program product may also include a computer program tangibly embodied on a medium readable thereby, the computer program including program code for performing any of the methods of the embodiments of the present invention. In such an embodiment, the computer program may be downloaded and installed from a network via a communication portion, and/or installed from a removable medium.

Example five

In a fifth embodiment of the present invention, a computer readable storage medium is further provided, where a computer program stored in the computer readable storage medium, when executed by one or more processors, implements all or part of the steps of the method for generating a navigation decoy signal for an unmanned aerial vehicle described in the above embodiment, and the embodiment is not repeated herein.

The functional units in the embodiments of the present invention may be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated in one unit. The functions, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.

A computer readable storage medium may employ any combination of one or more readable media. The readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. The readable storage medium may include, for example, but is not limited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or a combination of any of the foregoing. More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of the readable storage medium would include the following: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, a random access Memory (Random Access Memory, RAM), a Read-Only Memory (ROM), an erasable programmable Read-Only Memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory, EPROM), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk Read-Only Memory (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory, CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

Example six

In the sixth embodiment of the present invention, an electronic device 1300 is further provided, and the electronic device may be a mobile phone, a computer, or a tablet computer. Fig. 13 is a schematic diagram of a composition structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown in fig. 13, an electronic device 1300 includes: at least one processor 1301, at least one communication bus 1302, a user interface 1303, at least one external communication interface 1304, a memory 1305. Wherein the communication bus 1302 is configured to enable connected communication between these components. The user interface 1303 may include a display screen, and the external communication interface 1304 may include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface, among others. The memory 1205 stores a computer program, and the memory 1305 and the one or more processors 1301 are communicatively connected to each other, and when the computer program is executed by the one or more processors, the processor 1301 is configured to execute the computer program stored in the memory, so as to implement all or part of the steps of the method for generating a navigation decoy signal for an unmanned aerial vehicle in the above embodiment, which is not repeated herein.

The processor may be an application specific integrated circuit (Application Specific Integrated Cricuit, abbreviated as ASIC), a digital signal processor (Digital Signal Processor, abbreviated as DSP), a programmable logic device (Programmable Logic Device, abbreviated as PLD), a field programmable gate array (Field Programmable Gate Array, abbreviated as FPGA), a controller, a microcontroller, a microprocessor, or other electronic components, which are implemented to execute all or part of the steps of the method for generating the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal described in the above embodiments, and the description of the present embodiment is not repeated here.

The Memory may be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile Memory device or combination thereof, such as static random access Memory (Static Random Access Memory, SRAM for short), electrically erasable programmable Read-Only Memory (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EEPROM for short), erasable programmable Read-Only Memory (Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory, EPROM for short), programmable Read-Only Memory (Programmable Read-Only Memory, PROM for short), read-Only Memory (ROM for short), magnetic Memory, flash Memory, magnetic disk, or optical disk.

According to the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method, the unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation device and the electronic equipment, the decoy signal can be rapidly generated to cover the unmanned aerial vehicle receiver in the invasion process of the black flying unmanned aerial vehicle, so that the unmanned aerial vehicle is guided into a safe and controllable range after receiving the decoy signal, the situation that the unmanned aerial vehicle is out of control and crashed is avoided, and secondary damage to houses, pedestrians and the like caused by the unmanned aerial vehicle is avoided to a great extent; the position coordinates of the unmanned aerial vehicle deception can be set at will without being limited by the forwarding delay of real satellite signals, so that the situation that certain airspace becomes a deception dead angle of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the aim of successfully driving away cannot be achieved is avoided; because the generated decoy signals are generated according to the standard and format of the real satellite signals, the time delay and other information are set according to the relative distance between the real satellite and the preset deception position, the decoy signals are more real and are easier to be received by the unmanned aerial vehicle, and the flying condition of the black-flying unmanned aerial vehicle is more controllable; when the decoy signal is generated, all target satellites meeting preset conditions are screened from all visible satellites at preset deception positions, and the pseudo code phase is determined according to the principle of pseudo code phase fixed point reckoning nearby according to the signal emission time, so that the generation rate of the decoy signal is obviously improved, and related measures can be taken for the target black unmanned aerial vehicle more quickly.

The terms and expressions used in the description of the present invention are used as examples only and are not meant to be limiting. It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that numerous changes may be made to the details of the above-described embodiments without departing from the underlying principles of the disclosed embodiments. The scope of the invention is, therefore, to be determined only by the following claims, in which all terms are to be understood in their broadest reasonable sense unless otherwise indicated.

Claims

1. A method for generating a navigation decoy signal for an unmanned aerial vehicle, the method comprising:

2. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method according to claim 1, wherein the screening all target satellites satisfying a preset condition from all visible satellites at the preset decoy position according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite comprises:

determining all satellites meeting preset health conditions and preset pitch angle conditions from all visible satellites at the preset deception positions according to ephemeris data of each visible satellite to obtain a target satellite set;

and respectively determining the geometric precision factor of each satellite combination in the plurality of satellite combinations, and taking the satellite in the satellite combination with the minimum geometric precision factor as a target satellite.

3. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method according to claim 2, wherein the step of determining all satellites satisfying the preset health condition and the preset pitch angle condition comprises:

4. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method of claim 1, wherein the step of determining a decoy signal pseudo code phase of any one of the target satellites based on the preset spoofing position comprises:

determining a model according to preset time, and determining signal transmitting time of a target satellite for transmitting the real satellite signal based on the preset deception position;

and determining the pseudo code phase of the decoy signal of the target satellite based on the preset deception position by using the time in the week with the minimum time difference with the signal transmitting time as the final time in the week and according to the signal transmitting time and the final time in the week through a corresponding relation model of the preset transmitting time and the pseudo code phase.

5. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation spoofing signal generating method of claim 4, wherein the preset time determination model comprises:

is a time variable;

t _r is the signal emission time;

t _r is the signal reception time;

c is the speed of light;

i is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the ionosphere;

t is the time delay of the satellite signal passing through the troposphere;

Δt _t is a sanitationStar clock difference;

Δt _r is the correction amount for relativistic effects.

6. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation spoofing signal generating method of claim 1, wherein the step of determining doppler frequency information for any one of the target satellites received by the target unmanned aerial vehicle comprises:

determining the relative positions of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment according to the position coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment by taking the position coordinates of the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment as a coordinate origin;

7. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation spoofing signal generating method of claim 6, wherein the preset radial velocity determination model comprises:

the difference between the y-direction coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment is obtained;the difference between the z-direction coordinates of the target satellite and the target unmanned aerial vehicle at the current moment.

8. The unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating the decoy signal corresponding to any one of the target satellites by a preset generation policy comprises:

9. An unmanned aerial vehicle navigation decoy signal generation device, characterized in that the device comprises:

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program which, when executed by one or more processors, performs the steps of the method of any of claims 1 to 8.

11. An electronic device comprising a memory and one or more processors, the memory

A computer program is stored on the memory that, when executed by the one or more processors,

the steps of performing the method of any one of claims 1 to 8.