CN117284355A - Double-master mutual exclusion circuit based on track traffic safety computing platform and judging method - Google Patents
Double-master mutual exclusion circuit based on track traffic safety computing platform and judging method Download PDFInfo
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- CN117284355A CN117284355A CN202311016016.7A CN202311016016A CN117284355A CN 117284355 A CN117284355 A CN 117284355A CN 202311016016 A CN202311016016 A CN 202311016016A CN 117284355 A CN117284355 A CN 117284355A
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- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 52
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/40—Handling position reports or trackside vehicle data
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/30—Trackside multiple control systems, e.g. switch-over between different systems
- B61L27/33—Backup systems, e.g. switching when failures occur
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B61—RAILWAYS
- B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
- B61L27/00—Central railway traffic control systems; Trackside control; Communication systems specially adapted therefor
- B61L27/50—Trackside diagnosis or maintenance, e.g. software upgrades
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/18—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits
- G06F11/187—Voting techniques
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
- G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
- G06F11/2038—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant with a single idle spare processing component
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Abstract
The invention discloses a double-master mutual exclusion circuit based on a track traffic safety computing platform and a judging method, wherein the double-master mutual exclusion circuit comprises the following components: the system comprises an A system calculation module, a B system calculation module, an A system relay and a B system relay; wherein, the A-series relay corresponds to the A-series computing module, and the B-series relay corresponds to the B-series computing module; the system A calculating module and the system B calculating module start to work after being electrified, the pair system relays are driven to be closed, the two relays are in an interlocking state, and only the coil of one relay is electrified at the same time; and determining a main system and a standby system by judging the working states of the two relays after power-on. The invention effectively distinguishes the main and standby positions of the double-system module.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the field of track traffic signal control systems, in particular to a track traffic safety computing platform-based double-master mutual exclusion circuit and a judging method.
Background
The domestic general safety computing platform (hereinafter referred to as a safety computing platform) is a general computer system suitable for rail transit ground, trackside and vehicle-mounted interlocking systems (CBI), automatic train protection systems (ATP), automatic train operation systems (ATO) and train control systems (TCC) of subways, high-speed rails and the like. The safe computing platform is generally composed of a computing system and an executing system, wherein the computing system and the executing system are connected through a communication subsystem in the system, the computing system adopts a two-by-two-out architecture and is composed of two identical systems, the two systems are main and standby, each system is an independent two-out-of-two computer and is composed of a computing unit, a communication unit and a switching unit, and a synchronization/voting channel is arranged between computing modules in the computing system, so that soft and hard collaborative system synchronization and two-out-of-two logic judgment are realized. The computing system has independent fault monitoring capability, monitors the running condition of the system in real time, adopts task level synchronization between the two systems, and realizes the fault undisturbed switching of the task level between the two computing systems through the fault switching logic of hardware so as to complete double-system redundancy hot standby. During normal operation, for two-out-of-two systems, the two systems are primary and standby, the system control right is obtained by competition after the two systems are electrified or user setting, the computing unit for obtaining the system control right controls the executing unit, the computing unit of the other system synchronously works, the information of the executing unit is collected, but the computing result is not output, and as only one system is output, how to determine which system is primary and which system is standby is a problem to be solved in the field.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a double-master mutual exclusion circuit based on a track traffic safety computing platform and a judging method thereof, which can effectively distinguish the master and slave positions of a double-system module.
In order to solve the technical problems, the technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
in a first aspect, a dual-master mutual exclusion circuit based on a track traffic safety computing platform is provided, wherein the dual-master comprises an A system and a B system which are mutually master and slave, and the dual-master mutual exclusion circuit is used for distinguishing the master and the slave of the A system from the slave of the B system; the dual master exclusive circuit includes:
the system comprises an A system calculation module, a B system calculation module, an A system relay and a B system relay; wherein, the A-series relay corresponds to the A-series computing module, and the B-series relay corresponds to the B-series computing module;
the system A calculating module and the system B calculating module start to work after being electrified, the pair system relays are driven to be closed, the two relays are in an interlocking state, and only the coil of one relay is electrified at the same time; and determining a main system and a standby system by judging the working states of the two relays after power-on.
Further, the A-series calculation module comprises a controller and a pulse driving circuit connected with the controller; the structure of the B-series computing module is the same as that of the A-series computing module.
Further, the A-system computing module and the B-system computing module are both provided with a forced main key connected with the controller, and when the main system needs to be reduced to the standby system, the mutual exclusion circuit is controlled by the forced main key to release the main system and the standby system to lift the main.
Further, the A-series relay S1 comprises 2 groups of normally-closed contacts K1 and K3 and 2 groups of normally-open contacts K2 and K4, and the B-series relay S2 and the A-series relay have the same structure; the controller outputs a pulse signal to enable the pulse driving circuit to drive coils of the relays S1 and S2 to be closed; wherein, the A system calculation module, the B system calculation module and the normally open and normally closed contacts of the relays S1 and S2 form a pulse driving loop and a detection loop.
Further, the pulse driving circuit comprises an A-system driving circuit and a B-system driving circuit;
the pulse driving circuit of the A system calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S1 and then connected with the coil of the relay S2, and finally returns to the A system calculating module;
the pulse driving circuit of the B-series calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S2 and then connected with the coil of the relay S1, and finally returns to the B-series calculating module;
the relays S1 and S2 are in an interlocked state, and at the same time, only one relay is in an operating state.
Further, the detection circuit includes: the system driving detection circuit, the system relay opening detection circuit and the system relay closing detection circuit;
the drive train detection circuit includes: a B-series drive detection circuit and an A-series drive detection circuit;
wherein the B-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting an A-series calculation module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S1, and the A-series calculation module logically detects the result of the B-series calculation module driving the relay S1 through the B-series driving detection loop;
wherein the A-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B-series computing module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S2, and the B-series computing module logically detects the result of the A-series computing module driving the relay S2 through the A-series driving detection loop;
the relay disconnection detection circuit includes: a B-series relay disconnection detection circuit and an A-series relay disconnection detection circuit;
wherein, the B series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting the A series calculation module with the normally closed contact K3 of the relay S2;
wherein, the A series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B series calculation module with a normally closed contact K3 of the relay S1;
the relay closed detection loop comprises: b is a closed detection loop of the relay and A is a closed detection loop of the relay;
wherein, the closed detection loop of the B-series relay is a loop formed by connecting the A-series calculation module with the normally open contact K4 of the relay S2;
wherein, the A series relay closed detection loop is a loop formed by connecting the B series calculation module with the normally open contact K4 of the relay S1.
The A series calculating module obtains a driving result of the A series calculating module on the relay S2 through logic states of the B series relay open detection loop and the B series relay closed detection loop; the B series calculating module obtains the driving result of the B series calculating module to the relay S1 through the logic states of the A series relay open detection loop and the A series relay closed detection loop.
Further, the pulse driving circuit is a frequency-voltage conversion circuit, and the controller of the A-system computing module or the B-system computing module generates square wave pulses within a certain frequency range to enable the driving relay;
in the detection loop, the controller of the A system computing module or the B system computing module generates a square wave signal with fixed frequency, and the square wave signal is output through a circuit marked as "+" and then returns to a circuit marked as "-" by the corresponding computing module after passing through a normally open contact or a normally closed contact of the corresponding relay; and detecting whether the acquired signal is a square wave with a set fixed frequency or not in real time to judge the on and off of the channel.
The second aspect provides a master system determination method based on a track traffic safety computing platform dual-master mutex circuit, which is characterized in that the master system determination method based on the track traffic safety computing platform dual-master mutex circuit comprises the following steps:
step S100: judging the driving of the train: judging whether a normally open contact K2 of the system relay is closed or not, and if the fact that the K2 is not closed is detected through a system driving detection loop, not driving the system relay by a system computing module; if K2 is closed, the opposite system calculating module drives the relay of the opposite system;
step S200: the drive relay validity check includes:
step S210: if the relay system does not drive the relay system, the drive result of the calculation module of the relay system is detected through a detection loop for disconnecting the relay system, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be disconnected, the calculation module of the relay system effectively drives the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in a closed state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
step S220: if the relay system is driven, the detection loop is disconnected through the relay system relay, the driving result of the calculation module of the relay system is detected, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be closed, the relay system is not driven by the calculation module of the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in an open state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
step S300: and storing and reporting the result of the generation and judgment of the double-master mutual exclusion circuit.
Further, the master system determination method further includes the following steps before step S100:
step S000: forced main cutting judgment;
first, it is detected whether the forced main key is pressed for a long time, if a long time pressing operation is detected, the pulse driving circuit of the main system is turned off, that is, the relay of the opposite system is not driven by the main system, indicating that the position of the main system is abandoned, and the other system is automatically raised as the main system.
Further, in the step S200, the step S210 further includes the following steps: detecting whether a normally open contact K4 is closed or not through a closed loop of a relay system, if the normally open contact K4 is closed, indicating that a driving result is effective and a judging result of the last step is effective, and then outputting a judging result of a main system and a standby system of a double-main mutual exclusion circuit, namely the main system; if K4 is not closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded;
the step S220 further includes the following steps: detecting whether a normally open contact K4 is closed or not through a closed loop of the relay system, if the normally open contact K4 is opened, the relay system is not driven, the judgment result of the last step is valid, and then outputting the judgment result of the main system and the standby system of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit, namely the main system is the standby system; if K4 is closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
1. the invention can effectively distinguish the primary and secondary positions of the double-system module in a two-out-of-two system architecture of the safe computing platform, has no requirement on the sequence of double-system power-on, can completely and randomly determine the primary and secondary power-on based on a designed mutual exclusion circuit according to the instant random sequence of power-on of the circuit, and leads to the safe side under the condition that the primary power-on abnormality of the circuit can not ensure the single-system output of the system, the system does not output a computing result, and the functional safety is ensured;
2. the mutex circuit structure provided by the invention can be used for detecting the validity of the detection loop in the double-main mutex circuit and judging whether the judgment result cannot be given due to circuit or hardware damage, so that the mutex circuit is guided to a safety side when the mutex circuit is abnormal, and the functional safety is ensured;
3. the detection algorithm provided by the invention simultaneously carries out self-detection of the detection circuit, and each detection circuit and the pulse driving circuit of the relay adopt square wave pulse detection and driving within a specified frequency range, so that the conditions of constant height/constant low caused by abnormality of a controller or a circuit can be effectively avoided, and detection and driving signals are falsely sent to ensure functional safety;
4. the implementation mode of forced change of the main system in the prior art is realized by a knob switch, generally 1 independent hardware module with 1U height connected with the main system and the standby system is provided with independent hardware entities.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a dual-master mutex circuit according to the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a flow chart of the system determination method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention will be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
Referring to FIG. 1, the present invention is a dual-master mutex circuit based on an intersection security computing platform, wherein the dual-master includes a system A and a system B which are master and slave, and the dual-master mutex circuit is used for distinguishing the master and the slave of the system A and the system B; the dual master exclusive circuit includes:
the system comprises an A system calculation module, a B system calculation module, an A system relay and a B system relay; wherein, the A-series relay corresponds to the A-series computing module, and the B-series relay corresponds to the B-series computing module; the system A calculation module comprises a controller, a pulse driving circuit connected with the controller and a forced main key;
the system A calculation module and the system B calculation module start to work after being electrified, the controller FPGA controls the pulse driving circuit to drive the system relays to be closed, the two relays are in an interlocking state, and only the coil of one relay is electrified at the same time; and determining which system is the main system and which system is the standby system by judging the working states of the two relays after power-on, and controlling the execution unit to output a calculation result by the calculation module which obtains the control right. When the master system needs to be reduced to the standby system, the master system is released and the standby system rises by forcedly switching the master key to control the mutex circuit.
The A-series relay S1 comprises 2 groups of normally-closed contacts K1 and K3 and 2 groups of normally-open contacts K2 and K4, and the B-series relay S2 and the A-series relay have the same structure; the controller outputs a pulse signal to enable the pulse driving circuit to drive coils of the relays S1 and S2 to be closed; wherein, the A system calculation module, the B system calculation module and the normally open and normally closed contacts of the relays S1 and S2 form a pulse driving loop and a detection loop.
Specifically, the pulse driving circuit comprises an A-system driving circuit and a B-system driving circuit; the pulse driving circuit of the A system calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S1 and then connected with the coil of the relay S2, and finally returns to the A system calculating module; the pulse driving circuit of the B-series calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S2 and then connected with the coil of the relay S1, and finally returns to the B-series calculating module; the relays S1 and S2 are in an interlocked state, and at the same time, only one relay is in an operating state.
The pulse driving circuit is a frequency-voltage conversion circuit, in order to ensure the absolute safety of driving the relay, the controller FPGA generates square wave pulses within a certain frequency range to enable the driving circuit, and if the FPGA generates square waves exceeding a set frequency range or other waveforms due to abnormality, the driving circuit cannot be enabled.
Specifically, the detection circuit includes: the system driving detection circuit, the system relay opening detection circuit and the system relay closing detection circuit;
the drive train detection circuit includes: a B-series drive detection circuit and an A-series drive detection circuit;
wherein the B-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting an A-series calculation module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S1, and the A-series calculation module logically detects the result of the B-series calculation module driving the relay S1 through the B-series driving detection loop;
wherein the A-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B-series computing module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S2, and the B-series computing module logically detects the result of the A-series computing module driving the relay S2 through the A-series driving detection loop;
the relay disconnection detection circuit includes: a B-series relay disconnection detection circuit and an A-series relay disconnection detection circuit;
wherein, the B series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting the A series calculation module with the normally closed contact K3 of the relay S2;
wherein, the A series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B series calculation module with a normally closed contact K3 of the relay S1;
the relay closed detection loop comprises: b is a closed detection loop of the relay and A is a closed detection loop of the relay;
wherein, the closed detection loop of the B-series relay is a loop formed by connecting the A-series calculation module with the normally open contact K4 of the relay S2;
wherein, the A series relay closed detection loop is a loop formed by connecting the B series calculation module with the normally open contact K4 of the relay S1.
The A series calculating module obtains a driving result of the A series calculating module on the relay S2 through logic states of the B series relay open detection loop and the B series relay closed detection loop; the B series calculating module obtains the driving result of the B series calculating module to the relay S1 through the logic states of the A series relay open detection loop and the A series relay closed detection loop.
In the detection loop, the controller of the A system computing module or the B system computing module generates a square wave signal with fixed frequency, and the square wave signal is output through a circuit marked as "+" and then returns to a circuit marked as "-" by the corresponding computing module after passing through a normally open contact or a normally closed contact of the corresponding relay; and detecting whether the acquired signal is a square wave with a set fixed frequency or not in real time to judge the on and off of the channel.
In another embodiment, referring to fig. 2, the present invention further includes a master system determining method based on a dual-master mutex of a track traffic security computing platform, where the master system determining method based on the dual-master mutex of the track traffic security computing platform includes:
step S000: forced main cutting judgment; firstly, detecting whether a forced main key is pressed for a long time, if a long-time pressing action is detected, closing a pulse driving circuit of a system, namely, the system does not drive a relay of a counter system, which means that the position of the main system is abandoned, the other system is automatically lifted to be the main system, only the main system is lowered to be the standby system, and the standby system cannot be lifted to be the main system;
step S100: judging the driving of the train: judging whether a normally open contact K2 of the system relay is closed or not, and if the fact that the K2 is not closed is detected through a system driving detection loop, not driving the system relay by a system computing module; if K2 is closed, the opposite system calculating module drives the relay of the opposite system;
step S200: the drive relay validity check includes:
step S210: if the relay system calculating module does not drive the relay system, the drive result of the relay system calculating module is detected through a relay system relay disconnection detection loop, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be disconnected, the relay system calculating module effectively drives the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in a closed state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
in order to further check the driving result of the opposite relay by the opposite relay calculation module, whether the normally open contact K4 is closed or not needs to be detected through the closed loop of the opposite relay, if the normally open contact K4 is closed, the driving result is effective and the judging result of the previous step is effective, and then the main and standby system judging result of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is output, namely the opposite system is the main system; if K4 is not closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded;
step S220: if the relay system calculating module drives the relay system, the driving result of the relay system calculating module is detected through a relay system relay opening detection loop, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be closed, the relay system calculating module does not drive the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in an open state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
in order to further check the driving result of the opposite system relay by the opposite system calculation module, whether the normally open contact K4 is closed or not needs to be detected through the closed loop of the opposite system relay, if the normally open contact K4 is opened, the opposite system relay is not driven, the judgment result of the previous step is valid, and then the main system and the standby system judgment result of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is output, namely the opposite system is the standby system; if K4 is closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded.
The invention is not related in part to the same or implemented in part by the prior art.
The foregoing is a further detailed description of the invention in connection with specific embodiments, and it is not intended that the invention be limited to such description. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that several simple deductions or substitutions may be made without departing from the spirit of the invention, and these should be considered to be within the scope of the invention.
Claims (10)
1. A double-master mutual exclusion circuit based on a track traffic safety computing platform comprises an A system and a B system which are mutually master and slave, and the double-master mutual exclusion circuit is used for distinguishing the master and slave of the A system from the master and slave of the B system; the method is characterized in that: the dual master exclusive circuit includes:
the system comprises an A system calculation module, a B system calculation module, an A system relay and a B system relay; wherein, the A-series relay corresponds to the A-series computing module, and the B-series relay corresponds to the B-series computing module;
the system A calculating module and the system B calculating module start to work after being electrified, the pair system relays are driven to be closed, the two relays are in an interlocking state, and only the coil of one relay is electrified at the same time; and determining a main system and a standby system by judging the working states of the two relays after power-on.
2. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 1, wherein: the system A calculation module comprises a controller and a pulse driving circuit connected with the controller; the structure of the B-series computing module is the same as that of the A-series computing module.
3. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 2, wherein: the A-series computing module and the B-series computing module are both provided with a forced main cutting button connected with the controller, and when the main system needs to be reduced to the standby system, the mutual exclusion circuit is controlled by the forced main cutting button to release the main system and the standby system to lift the main system.
4. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 2, wherein: the relay S1 comprises 2 groups of normally closed contacts K1 and K3 and 2 groups of normally open contacts K2 and K4, and the relay S2 and the relay A have the same structure; the controller outputs a pulse signal to enable the pulse driving circuit to drive coils of the relays S1 and S2 to be closed;
wherein, the A system calculation module, the B system calculation module and the normally open and normally closed contacts of the relays S1 and S2 form a pulse driving loop and a detection loop.
5. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 4, wherein: the pulse driving circuit comprises an A system driving circuit and a B system driving circuit;
the pulse driving circuit of the A system calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S1 and then connected with the coil of the relay S2, and finally returns to the A system calculating module;
the pulse driving circuit of the B-series calculating module is connected with the normally closed contact K1 of the relay S2 and then connected with the coil of the relay S1, and finally returns to the B-series calculating module;
the relays S1 and S2 are in an interlocked state, and at the same time, only one relay is in an operating state.
6. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 4, wherein: the detection circuit includes: the system driving detection circuit, the system relay opening detection circuit and the system relay closing detection circuit;
the drive train detection circuit includes: a B-series drive detection circuit and an A-series drive detection circuit;
wherein the B-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting an A-series calculation module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S1, and the A-series calculation module logically detects the result of the B-series calculation module driving the relay S1 through the B-series driving detection loop;
wherein the A-series driving detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B-series computing module with a normally open contact K2 of the relay S2, and the B-series computing module logically detects the result of the A-series computing module driving the relay S2 through the A-series driving detection loop;
the relay disconnection detection circuit includes: a B-series relay disconnection detection circuit and an A-series relay disconnection detection circuit;
wherein, the B series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting the A series calculation module with the normally closed contact K3 of the relay S2;
wherein, the A series relay disconnection detection loop is a loop formed by connecting a B series calculation module with a normally closed contact K3 of the relay S1;
the relay closed detection loop comprises: b is a closed detection loop of the relay and A is a closed detection loop of the relay;
wherein, the closed detection loop of the B-series relay is a loop formed by connecting the A-series calculation module with the normally open contact K4 of the relay S2;
wherein, the closed detection loop of the A relay is a loop formed by connecting a B calculation module with a normally open contact K4 of the relay S1;
the A series calculating module obtains a driving result of the A series calculating module on the relay S2 through logic states of the B series relay open detection loop and the B series relay closed detection loop; the B series calculating module obtains the driving result of the B series calculating module to the relay S1 through the logic states of the A series relay open detection loop and the A series relay closed detection loop.
7. The track-cross security-based computing platform dual master mutex circuit of claim 6, wherein: the pulse driving circuit is a frequency-voltage conversion circuit, and the controller of the A-system computing module or the B-system computing module generates square wave pulses within a certain frequency range to enable the driving relay;
in the detection loop, the controller of the A system computing module or the B system computing module generates a square wave signal with fixed frequency, and the square wave signal is output through a circuit marked as "+" and then returns to a circuit marked as "-" by the corresponding computing module after passing through a normally open contact or a normally closed contact of the corresponding relay; and detecting whether the acquired signal is a square wave with a set fixed frequency or not in real time to judge the on and off of the channel.
8. The master system judging method based on the track crossing safety computing platform double-master mutual exclusive circuit is characterized by adopting the track crossing safety computing platform double-master mutual exclusive circuit as set forth in any one of claims 4-7, and the master system judging method includes:
step S100: judging the driving of the train: judging whether a normally open contact K2 of the system relay is closed or not, and if the fact that the K2 is not closed is detected through a system driving detection loop, not driving the system relay by a system computing module; if K2 is closed, the opposite system calculating module drives the relay of the opposite system;
step S200: the drive relay validity check includes:
step S210: if the relay system does not drive the relay system, the drive result of the calculation module of the relay system is detected through a detection loop for disconnecting the relay system, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be disconnected, the calculation module of the relay system effectively drives the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in a closed state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
step S220: if the relay system is driven, the detection loop is disconnected through the relay system relay, the driving result of the calculation module of the relay system is detected, and if the normally closed contact K3 of the relay system is detected to be closed, the relay system is not driven by the calculation module of the relay system; if the normally closed contact K3 is still in an open state, the fault of the relay system is indicated, and the fault is recorded as the abnormality of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit;
step S300: and storing and reporting the result of the generation and judgment of the double-master mutual exclusion circuit.
9. The method for master system determination based on a dual master mutex of a track traffic security computing platform according to claim 8, wherein: the master system determination method further includes the following steps before step S100:
step S000: forced main cutting judgment;
first, it is detected whether the forced main key is pressed for a long time, if a long time pressing operation is detected, the pulse driving circuit of the main system is turned off, that is, the relay of the opposite system is not driven by the main system, indicating that the position of the main system is abandoned, and the other system is automatically raised as the main system.
10. The method for master system determination based on a dual master mutex of a track traffic security computing platform according to claim 8, wherein: in the step S200 of the above-mentioned process,
the step S210 further includes the following steps: detecting whether a normally open contact K4 is closed or not through a closed loop of a relay system, if the normally open contact K4 is closed, indicating that a driving result is effective and a judging result of the last step is effective, and then outputting a judging result of a main system and a standby system of a double-main mutual exclusion circuit, namely the main system; if K4 is not closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded;
the step S220 further includes the following steps: detecting whether a normally open contact K4 is closed or not through a closed loop of the relay system, if the normally open contact K4 is opened, the relay system is not driven, the judgment result of the last step is valid, and then outputting the judgment result of the main system and the standby system of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit, namely the main system is the standby system; if K4 is closed, the judgment result of the last step is invalid, the relay has a fault, and the abnormity of the double-main mutual exclusion circuit is recorded.
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