CN115718309A - Satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on passive synthetic aperture - Google Patents
Satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on passive synthetic aperture Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on a passive synthetic aperture, which comprises the following steps: carrying an antenna and a deception jamming signal receiver on a moving carrier and designing the moving carrier to move at a constant speed above a deception jamming source; designing an antenna to continuously receive a deception jamming signal sent by a lower deception jamming source in the horizontal wave beam coverage time; processing the deception jamming signal by using a receiver to obtain a Doppler signal; performing matched filtering on the Doppler signal r' by using a matched filter under the condition of different frequency modulation rates of the matched filter to obtain a frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix; acquiring the modulation frequency of a signal r' based on a modulation frequency-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix; resolving the radial distance between a receiver under a zero Doppler surface and a deception jamming signal source based on the frequency modulation rate of r'; resolving position information of a deception jamming source based on the radial distance; and judging the deception jamming signal according to the position information of the deception jamming source.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of radar and communication signal processing, and particularly relates to a satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on a passive synthetic aperture.
Background
In recent years, "navigation wars" have gradually become a new type of combat, and satellite navigation receivers have become one of the primary goals of enemy electromagnetic interference.
Electromagnetic interference for satellite navigation mainly includes two types, namely suppressed interference and deceptive interference. The United states, russia and China all have strong anti-pressure standard interference technical capacity, and threats brought by the pressure standard interference are gradually reduced. Compared with the suppression type interference, the deception interference can achieve the interference effect with smaller power and is more concealed. There have been many countries, including the united states, in which weaponry has been tricked by an adversary.
The traditional deception jamming detection method based on the array antenna mainly has the following two problems: (1) Limited by the size and the number of array elements, the number of detected deception interferences is limited; (2) The detection probability and the measurement precision of the deception jamming signal with low signal-to-noise ratio are not high.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention is directed to solving at least one of the problems of the prior art or the related art.
Therefore, the invention provides a satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on passive synthetic aperture.
The technical solution of the invention is as follows: a satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on passive synthetic aperture is provided, and the method comprises the following steps:
step one, carrying an antenna and a deception jamming signal receiver on a moving carrier and designing the moving carrier to move at a constant speed above a deception jamming source;
step two, designing an antenna to continuously receive deception jamming signals sent by a deception jamming source below in the horizontal wave beam coverage time;
thirdly, processing the deception jamming signal by using a receiver to obtain a Doppler signal r ', wherein the Doppler frequency of r' presents a linear frequency modulation characteristic;
performing matched filtering on the Doppler signal r' by using a matched filter under the condition of different matched filter frequency modulation rates to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays, and generating a frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix;
step five, acquiring the frequency modulation of the signal r 'based on the frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix, wherein the frequency modulation rate of the matched filter corresponding to the maximum correlation value in the matrix is equal to the frequency modulation of the signal r', and the time delay position where the maximum correlation value appears is the azimuth time t under the zero Doppler plane p ；
Step six, calculating the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler surface and the deception jamming signal source based on the frequency modulation of the r' and the parameters of the deception jamming source and the flight speed of the moving carrier;
seventhly, resolving the position information of the deception jamming source based on the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler surface and the deception jamming signal source, the geographic position of the receiver under the zero Doppler surface, the direct real radial distance between the current receiver and the deception jamming signal source and the real geographic position of the current receiver;
and step eight, comparing the position information of the deception jamming source obtained in the step seven with the position of the real satellite simulated by the deception jamming signal to confirm whether the received signal is the deception jamming signal.
Furthermore, the antenna is a wide beam antenna, and the beam of the antenna is vertically downward; the motion carrier is an unmanned aerial vehicle or a low orbit satellite.
Further, the third step includes:
3.1, filtering, amplifying, down-converting and analog-to-digital converting the interference signals received by the antenna to obtain digital signals;
3.2, performing demodulation and carrier removal processing on the digital signal to obtain a signal subjected to carrier removal;
3.3, intercepting the signal obtained in the step 3.2 in a segmented manner to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix r' (t) intercepted in a segmented manner;
3.4, performing square spectrum, normalization and mean value removal processing on each line of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix;
and 3.5, extracting column signals corresponding to zero frequency in the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix, wherein the column signals are Doppler signals r'.
Further, the de-carrier signal is obtained by:
wherein, ω is 1 The residual frequency offset after carrier removal; omega 0 Carrier frequency of a deception interference source, c is light speed, and theta is an initial phase; t is t p The azimuth time at zero doppler time; j represents a plurality; t is time; v is the moving carrier velocity; r is 0 To trick the radial distance of the interference source from the receiver.
Further, a piecewise-truncated two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix r' (t) is obtained by:
wherein Δ t is a sampling interval; k is the frequency modulation of the frequency modulation signal; q × P represents Q rows × P columns.
Further, the doppler signal r "is obtained by the following formula:
further, in the fourth step, the matched filter structure is designed by the following formula:
where μ is the frequency modulation of the matched filter, T s Is the synthetic aperture time; i =1,2,3,4.
Further, the performing matched filtering on the doppler signal r ″ by using a matched filter under the condition of different matched filter frequency modulation rates to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays includes:
determining a search step Δ μ;
determining the value range of the frequency mu of the matched filter;
determining a plurality of different matched filter tuning frequencies according to the value ranges of the search stepping delta mu and the matched filter tuning frequency mu;
and sequentially bringing different matched filter frequency modulation rates into the matched filter structure to generate a plurality of groups of filters, and respectively performing matched filtering with the received Doppler signals r' to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays.
Furthermore, the value range of the frequency modulation mu of the matched filter is
Are all preset distance threshold values; the search step Δ μ is Δ μ = c μ 2 /ωv 2 ΔR 0 ，ΔR 0 Is a positioning error.
Further, the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler plane and the source of the spoof interference signal is solved based on the tuning frequency of r' and the parameters of the spoof interference source and the flight speed of the moving carrier by the following formula:
2k＝ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 。
the technical scheme includes that a moving carrier is used for carrying an antenna to perform regular movement, the antenna continuously receives signals sent by a deception jamming source in the horizontal beam coverage time in the process that the antenna flies over the deception jamming source, carrier frequency signals are extracted through modulation processing of the deception jamming signals, the Doppler change rate of the carrier frequency signals is approximately linear, long-time coherent accumulation is performed on the phase of the received signals by the aid of the characteristics, the position coordinates of the deception jamming source can be located by means of the combination of terrain data according to the corresponding relation between the zero Doppler plane and the Doppler frequency of the received signals and the target position, and then whether the signal source is the deception jamming signal or not can be judged by comparing the position coordinates with the real satellite position simulated by the deception jamming signal.
Namely, the technical scheme utilizes the small-aperture wide-azimuth antenna beam to carry out long-time coherent accumulation on the carrier phase of the deception jamming source, equivalently synthesizes the large-aperture detection positioning antenna, and further forms the wide-area coverage, high-sensitivity and high-precision multi-deception jamming source identification and positioning capacity, and the technical scheme has wide application prospect.
Drawings
The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this specification, illustrate embodiments of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. It is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the invention, and that for a person skilled in the art, other drawings can be derived from them without inventive effort.
Fig. 1 shows a geometric model of a passive synthetic aperture-based satellite navigation spoofing interference identification and positioning method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
It should be noted that the embodiments and features of the embodiments in the present application may be combined with each other without conflict. The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative in nature and is in no way intended to limit the invention, its application, or uses. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without inventive step based on the embodiments of the present invention, are within the scope of protection of the present invention.
It is noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of exemplary embodiments according to the present application. As used herein, the singular forms "a", "an", and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, and it should be understood that when the terms "comprises" and/or "comprising" are used in this specification, they specify the presence of stated features, steps, operations, devices, components, and/or combinations thereof, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
The relative arrangement of the components and steps, the numerical expressions and numerical values set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the present invention unless it is specifically stated otherwise. Meanwhile, it should be understood that the sizes of the respective portions shown in the drawings are not drawn in an actual proportional relationship for the convenience of description. Techniques, methods, and apparatus known to those of ordinary skill in the relevant art may not be discussed in detail but are intended to be part of the specification where appropriate. In all examples shown and discussed herein, any particular value should be construed as exemplary only and not as limiting. Thus, other examples of the exemplary embodiments may have different values. It should be noted that: like reference numbers and letters refer to like items in the following figures, and thus, once an item is defined in one figure, further discussion thereof is not required in subsequent figures.
As shown in fig. 1, in an embodiment of the present invention, a passive synthetic aperture-based satellite navigation spoofing interference identification and positioning method is provided, the method includes:
firstly, carrying an antenna and a deception jamming signal receiver on a moving carrier and designing the moving carrier to move at a constant speed above a deception jamming source;
step two, designing an antenna to continuously receive deception jamming signals sent by a deception jamming source below in the horizontal wave beam coverage time;
thirdly, processing the deception jamming signal by using a receiver to obtain a Doppler signal r ', wherein the Doppler frequency of r' presents a linear frequency modulation characteristic;
performing matched filtering on the Doppler signal r' by using a matched filter under the condition of different matched filter frequency modulation rates to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays, and generating a frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix;
step five, acquiring the frequency modulation of the signal r 'based on the frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix, wherein the frequency modulation rate of the matched filter corresponding to the maximum correlation value in the matrix is equal to the frequency modulation of the signal r', and the time delay position where the maximum correlation value appears is the azimuth time t under the zero Doppler plane p ；
Step six, calculating the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler surface and the deception jamming signal source based on the frequency modulation of the r' and the parameters of the deception jamming source and the flight speed of the moving carrier;
seventhly, resolving the position information of the deception jamming source based on the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler surface and the deception jamming signal source, the geographic position of the receiver under the zero Doppler surface, the direct real radial distance between the current receiver and the deception jamming signal source and the real geographic position of the current receiver;
and step eight, comparing the position information of the deception jamming source obtained in the step seven with the position of the real satellite simulated by the deception jamming signal to confirm whether the received signal is the deception jamming signal.
In the embodiment of the invention, the real satellite position simulated by the deception jamming signal is satellite position information derived from real satellite ephemeris, and can be obtained by a conventional technical means.
In the embodiment of the invention, the antenna is a wide beam antenna (generally, a half-wave beam is greater than 120 degrees), and a beam of the antenna is directed downwards vertically; the motion carrier is an unmanned aerial vehicle or a low orbit satellite. That is, in the embodiment of the present invention, a wide beam antenna is carried by using a motion platform such as an unmanned aerial vehicle and a low-orbit satellite to perform a uniform linear motion, a beam of the antenna is directed downward from a carrier, and the antenna continuously receives a deception jamming signal sent by a deception jamming source below the carrier within a horizontal beam coverage time in a process that the antenna flies over the deception jamming source. The embodiment of the invention utilizes the movement of the antenna to form the aperture of the virtual antenna so as to identify and position the satellite navigation deception jamming signal.
Assuming that the skew distance of the spoofing interferer from the receiver is R and the radial distance of the interferer from the receiver is R0, as shown in fig. 1, the relationship can be established as follows.
Wherein the velocity of the receiver carrier is v and the azimuth time at zero doppler time is t p 。
Then the receiver receives a spoofed interfering signal model of:
wherein ω is 0 In order to deceive the carrier frequency of the interference source, C (t) is the pseudo code chip of the deception signal, D (t) is the navigation message, C is the speed of light, and theta is the initial phase.
Therefore, the embodiment of the invention carries the antenna by utilizing the motion carrier to carry out regular motion, the antenna continuously receives the signal sent by the deception jamming source in the horizontal beam coverage time in the process that the antenna flies over the deception jamming source, the carrier frequency signal is extracted by carrying out modulation processing on the deception jamming signal, the Doppler change rate of the carrier frequency signal is approximate to linearity, long-time coherent accumulation is carried out on the phase of the received signal by utilizing the characteristic, the position coordinate of the deception jamming source can be positioned by combining topographic data according to the corresponding relation between the zero Doppler surface and the Doppler modulation frequency of the received signal and the target position, and then the position coordinate is compared with the real satellite position simulated by the deception jamming signal to judge whether the signal source is the deception jamming signal or not.
Namely, the embodiment of the invention utilizes the small-aperture wide-azimuth antenna beam to carry out long-time coherent accumulation on the carrier phase of the deception jamming source, equivalently synthesizes the large-aperture detection positioning antenna, further forms the identification and positioning capabilities of the multiple deception jamming sources with wide-area coverage, high sensitivity and high precision, can be used for various scenes such as daily spectrum supervision of the national radio committee, satellite-borne radiation source detection and the like, and has wide application prospect for military and civilian.
In the above embodiment, in order to accurately acquire the doppler signal r ″, the third step includes:
3.1, carrying out filtering, amplification, down-conversion and analog-to-digital conversion on the interference signals received by the antenna to obtain digital signals;
3.2, performing demodulation and carrier removal processing on the digital signal to obtain a signal subjected to carrier removal;
3.3, intercepting the signal obtained in the step 3.2 in a segmented manner to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix r' (t) intercepted in a segmented manner;
3.4, performing square spectrum, normalization and mean value removal processing on each line of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix;
and 3.5, extracting column signals corresponding to zero frequency in the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix, wherein the column signals are Doppler signals r'.
In the embodiment of the invention, the digital signal can be subjected to demodulation and carrier removal processing by utilizing the acquisition tracking loop of the receiver.
In the embodiment of the invention, the signal after carrier removal is obtained by the following formula:
wherein, ω is 1 The residual frequency offset after carrier removal;ω 0 carrier frequency of a deception interference source, c is light speed, and theta is an initial phase; t is t p The azimuth time at zero doppler time; j represents a complex number; t is time; v is the moving carrier velocity; r 0 To trick the radial distance of the interference source from the receiver.
In the embodiment of the invention, a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix r' (t) obtained by segmentation is obtained by the following formula:
wherein Δ t is a sampling interval; k is the frequency modulation of the frequency modulation signal; q × P represents Q rows × P columns.
In the embodiment of the present invention, the doppler signal r ″ is obtained by the following formula:
wherein the Doppler frequency of r' exhibits a chirp characteristic with a frequency of 2k = ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 。
In the above embodiment, in the fourth step, the matched filter structure can be designed by the following formula:
where μ is the matched filter tuning frequency, T s Is the synthetic aperture time; i =1,2,3,4.
In the above embodiment, in order to accurately obtain correlation values of filtering results corresponding to different modulation frequencies and different time delays of the matched filter, the matched filter is used for matched filtering with the doppler signal r ″ under the condition of different modulation frequencies of the matched filter, so as to obtain correlation values of filtering results corresponding to different modulation frequencies and different time delays of the matched filter, including
1) Determining a search step Δ μ;
2) Determining the value range of the frequency modulation mu of the matched filter;
3) Determining a plurality of different matched filter tuning frequencies according to the value ranges of the search stepping delta mu and the matched filter tuning frequency mu;
4) And sequentially bringing different matched filter frequency modulation rates into the matched filter structure to generate a plurality of groups of filters, and respectively performing matched filtering with the received Doppler signals r' to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays.
Wherein, the value range of the frequency modulation mu of the matched filter is
The distance thresholds are preset distance thresholds and can be set according to experience; the search step Δ μ is Δ μ = c μ 2 /ωv 2 ΔR 0 ，ΔR 0 Is a positioning error. When μ = ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 Can be accurately matched with the Doppler signal. The frequency modulation rate of the matched filter corresponding to the maximum correlation value in the two-dimensional search matrix is the frequency modulation rate omega of the Doppler signal 0 v 2 /cR 0 The time delay position where the maximum correlation value appears is the azimuth time t under the zero Doppler surface p . Since the parameters of the deception jamming signal source and the flight speed of the receiver carrying platform are known, the direct radial distance between the receiver and the deception jamming signal source can be obtained by solving the frequency modulation rate.
In the above embodiment, the radial distance between the receiver in the zero doppler plane and the source of the spoof interference signal is solved based on the tuning frequency of r ″ and the parameters of the spoof interference source and the flight speed of the moving carrier by the following formula:
2k＝ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 。
according to a specific embodiment of the present invention, the method specifically comprises the following steps:
carrying a wide beam antenna and a deception jamming signal receiver by using carriers such as an unmanned aerial vehicle and a low-orbit satellite, enabling the antenna beam to face downwards, controlling the unmanned aerial vehicle to perform uniform-speed linear flight or approximate uniform-speed linear flight above a certain area with a deception jamming source, and continuously receiving a navigation deception jamming signal sent by the deception jamming source below the carrier;
assuming that the skew distance between the spoofed interferer and the receiver is R and the radial distance between the interferer and the receiver is R0, a relationship can be established as follows.
Wherein the velocity of the receiver carrier is v and the azimuth time at zero Doppler time is t p 。
Then the receiver receives a spoofed interfering signal model of:
wherein ω is 0 Carrier frequency of a deception interference source, C (t) is a pseudo code chip of a deception signal, D (t) is navigation message, C is light speed, and theta is an initial phase;
and step two, the receiver carries out filtering, amplification, down-conversion and analog-to-digital conversion processing on the interference signals received by the antenna to obtain digital signals, and a capturing and tracking loop of the receiver is utilized to carry out demodulation and carrier removal processing on the digital signals to obtain signals after carrier removal, wherein the signals are shown in a formula.
Wherein omega 1 The residual frequency offset after carrier removal;
step three, carrying out sectional interception on the signals obtained in the step two to obtain a two-dimensional signal matrix of the sectional interception
Where Δ t is the sampling interval;
step four, extracting a square spectrum of each row of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix in the step three to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix;
step five, extracting column signals corresponding to the zero frequency of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix in the step four, wherein the column signals present a linear frequency modulation characteristic, and determining the frequency modulation frequency of the linear frequency modulation signal according to the linear frequency modulation characteristic;
extracting the column signal r 'corresponding to the zero frequency of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix in the step four, wherein the Doppler frequency of the r' shows the linear frequency modulation characteristic, and the frequency modulation rate is
Generating a matched filter locally, performing matched filtering on the matched filter and the received Doppler signal, collecting matched filtering results under different modulation frequencies, recording correlation values corresponding to the different modulation frequencies and different time delays, and generating a frequency-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix;
the structure of the matched filter is shown in the following formula, the matched filter performs matched filtering with a received Doppler signal r', matched filtering results under different modulation frequencies are collected, correlation values corresponding to different modulation frequencies mu and different time delays t are recorded, and a two-dimensional search matrix of modulation frequency-azimuth direction time is generated;
where μ is the frequency modulation of the matched filter, T s The synthetic pore diameter time is obtained, wherein the value range of mu is
Wherein
According to positioning error Δ R 0 Determining search step Δ μ = c μ 2 /ωv 2 ΔR 0 When μ = ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 The time can be accurately matched with the Doppler signal;
sequentially bringing the estimated values of mu into a matched filter to generate a plurality of groups of filters, performing matched filtering with a received Doppler signal r', collecting the results of the matched filters under different modulation frequencies mu, recording correlation values corresponding to different modulation frequencies mu and different time delays t, and generating a modulation frequency-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix M;
step seven, the frequency modulation rate of the matched filter corresponding to the maximum correlation value in the two-dimensional search matrix obtained in the step six is the frequency modulation rate omega of the Doppler signal 0 v 2 /cR 0 The time delay position where the maximum correlation value appears is the azimuth time t under the zero Doppler surface p . Because the parameters of the deception jamming signal source and the flight speed of the receiver carrying platform are known, the direct radial distance R0 between the receiver and the deception jamming signal source can be obtained by solving the frequency modulation rate;
and step eight, deducing the position information of the deception jamming information source by combining the real distance R0 and the geographical position information under the zero Doppler surface and the real distance R0 between the receiver and the deception jamming signals and the geographical position information under the zero Doppler surface of the receiver, which are obtained in the step seven, and comparing the position information with the real satellite position simulated by the deception jamming signals to confirm whether the received deception jamming signals are the deception jamming signals.
Therefore, the satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on the passive synthetic aperture provided by the embodiment of the invention utilizes the uniform relative motion characteristic of the monitoring platform and the deception jamming source, utilizes the small-aperture wide-azimuth antenna beam to carry out long-time coherent accumulation on the carrier phase of the deception jamming source, and equivalently synthesizes the large-aperture detecting and positioning antenna, thereby forming the identification and positioning capabilities of the wide-area coverage, high sensitivity and high precision multi-deception jamming source. The method provided by the embodiment of the invention can be used for various scenes such as daily spectrum supervision of the national radio committee, satellite-borne radiation source reconnaissance and the like, and has a wide application prospect for military and civilian use.
Features that are described and/or illustrated above with respect to one embodiment may be used in the same way or in a similar way in one or more other embodiments and/or in combination with or instead of the features of the other embodiments.
It should be emphasized that the term "comprises/comprising" when used herein, is taken to specify the presence of stated features, integers, steps or components but does not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integers, steps, components or groups thereof.
The above methods of the present invention may be implemented by hardware, or may be implemented by hardware in combination with software. The present invention relates to a computer-readable program which, when executed by a logic section, enables the logic section to implement the apparatus or constituent parts described above, or to implement various methods or steps described above. The present invention also relates to a storage medium such as a hard disk, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a DVD, a flash memory, or the like, for storing the above program.
The many features and advantages of these embodiments are apparent from the detailed specification, and thus, it is intended by the appended claims to cover all such features and advantages of these embodiments which fall within the true spirit and scope thereof. Further, since numerous modifications and changes will readily occur to those skilled in the art, it is not desired to limit the embodiments of the invention to the exact construction and operation illustrated and described, and accordingly, all suitable modifications and equivalents may be resorted to, falling within the scope thereof.
The invention has not been described in detail and is in part known to those of skill in the art.
Claims (10)
1. A satellite navigation deception jamming identification and positioning method based on passive synthetic aperture is characterized by comprising the following steps:
firstly, carrying an antenna and a deception jamming signal receiver on a moving carrier and designing the moving carrier to move at a constant speed above a deception jamming source;
step two, designing an antenna to continuously receive deception jamming signals sent by a deception jamming source below in the horizontal wave beam coverage time;
thirdly, processing the deception jamming signal by using a receiver to obtain a Doppler signal r ', wherein the Doppler frequency of r' shows a linear frequency modulation characteristic;
performing matched filtering on the Doppler signal r' by using a matched filter under the condition of different matched filter frequency modulation rates to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays, and generating a frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix;
step five, acquiring the frequency modulation of the signal r 'based on the frequency modulation-azimuth time two-dimensional search matrix, wherein the frequency modulation rate of the matched filter corresponding to the maximum correlation value in the matrix is equal to the frequency modulation of the signal r', and the time delay position where the maximum correlation value appears is the azimuth time t under the zero Doppler plane p ；
Step six, calculating the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler plane and the deception jamming signal source based on the frequency modulation rate of the r' and the parameters of the deception jamming source and the flight speed of the moving carrier;
seventhly, resolving the position information of the deception jamming source based on the radial distance between the receiver under the zero Doppler surface and the deception jamming signal source, the geographic position of the receiver under the zero Doppler surface, the direct real radial distance between the current receiver and the deception jamming signal source and the real geographic position of the current receiver;
and step eight, comparing the position information of the deception jamming source obtained in the step seven with the position of the real satellite simulated by the deception jamming signal to confirm whether the received signal is the deception jamming signal.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the antenna is a wide beam antenna, the antenna beam pointing vertically downward; the motion carrier is an unmanned aerial vehicle or a low orbit satellite.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein step three comprises:
3.1, filtering, amplifying, down-converting and analog-to-digital converting the interference signals received by the antenna to obtain digital signals;
3.2, performing demodulation and carrier removal processing on the digital signal to obtain a signal subjected to carrier removal;
3.3, intercepting the signal obtained in the step 3.2 in a segmented manner to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix r' (t) intercepted in a segmented manner;
3.4, performing square spectrum, normalization and mean value removal processing on each line of the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal matrix to obtain a two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix;
and 3.5, extracting column signals corresponding to zero frequency in the two-dimensional frequency modulation signal square spectrum matrix, wherein the column signals are Doppler signals r'.
4. A method according to claim 3, wherein the de-carrier signal is obtained by:
wherein, ω is 1 The residual frequency offset after carrier removal; omega 0 Carrier frequency of a deception interference source, c is light speed, and theta is an initial phase; t is t p The azimuth time at zero doppler time; j represents a complex number; t is time; v is the moving carrier velocity; r 0 To trick the radial distance of the interference source from the receiver.
5. Method according to claim 4, characterized in that the piecewise truncated two-dimensional FM signal matrix r' (t) is obtained by:
wherein Δ t is a sampling interval; k is the frequency modulation of the frequency modulation signal; q × P represents Q rows × P columns.
6. The method of claim 5, wherein the doppler signal r "is obtained by:
7. the method according to any of claims 1-6, wherein in step four, the matched filter structure is designed by:
where μ is the matched filter tuning frequency, T s Is the synthetic aperture time; i =1,2,3,4.
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein the performing matched filtering on the doppler signal r "by using a matched filter under the condition of different matched filter modulation frequencies to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter modulation frequencies and different time delays comprises:
determining a search step Δ μ;
determining the value range of the frequency modulation mu of the matched filter;
determining a plurality of different matched filter tuning frequencies according to the value ranges of the search stepping delta mu and the matched filter tuning frequency mu;
and sequentially bringing different matched filter frequency modulation rates into the matched filter structure to generate a plurality of groups of filters, and respectively performing matched filtering with the received Doppler signals r' to obtain filtering result correlation values corresponding to different matched filter frequency modulation rates and different time delays.
9. The method of claim 8, wherein the matched filter tuning frequency μ is in a range of values
Are all preset distance thresholds; the search step Δ μ is Δ μ = c μ 2 /ωv 2 ΔR 0 ，ΔR 0 Is a positioning error.
10. The method of claim 9, wherein the radial distance between the receiver under zero doppler plane and the source of the spoof interference signal is resolved based on the tuning frequency of r "and the parameters of the spoof interference source and the velocity of flight of the moving carrier by:
2k＝ω 0 v 2 /cR 0 。
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| CN116827458A (en) * | 2023-08-24 | 2023-09-29 | 北京理工大学 | Multi-angle-based frequency offset estimation and interference source positioning method |
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Cited By (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN116827458A (en) * | 2023-08-24 | 2023-09-29 | 北京理工大学 | Multi-angle-based frequency offset estimation and interference source positioning method |
| CN116827458B (en) * | 2023-08-24 | 2023-12-05 | 北京理工大学 | Multi-angle-based frequency offset estimation and interference source positioning method |
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