CN115686898A - Multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis method and system - Google Patents
Multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis method and system Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method and a system for analyzing a multistage fault mode and influence. The method comprises the steps of obtaining a multilevel FMEA relation, and determining the fault influence or fault reason of a top-level target to which a target to be analyzed belongs according to the multilevel FMEA relation. Therefore, the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed can be obtained in any multi-stage FMEA relation, designers can carry out hazard analysis in a cross-layer mode, and reasonable decision is made on the design priority.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quality and reliability analysis, in particular to a method and a system for analyzing a multistage fault mode and influence.
Background
Under a traditional working scenario, a development process of a system (especially a complex system) is generally carried out in a mode of gradually refining development in stages (such as conceptual design, basic design, detailed design and the like). The phase demand weights are the same by default. In the actual development process, due to various limiting conditions, it is a common working scenario that requirements at a certain stage cannot be completely realized or satisfied, and it is difficult for a designer to make a decision to accept or reject (or delay to the next stage) requirements with the same weight. Meanwhile, a method such as a brainstorm or HAZOP scene recurrence is usually adopted to form a hazard list of each stage, but the conditions of missed and incomplete hazard definition often occur. In addition, during the damage analysis, the logic and iterative relationship between the damages (failure modes, or called fault modes) of different levels of the system are unclear, information among levels is split, and designers are difficult to intuitively judge the influence of low-level failures on the functions of the top-level system. However, the existing Failure Mode and impact Analysis (FMEA for short) is only based on the Failure Mode of the target in a certain level, and obtains the Failure impact of the target in the previous level, and the Failure cause in the next level cannot obtain the Failure impact and Failure cause across multiple levels. In addition, because designers have different identities, the FMEA analyst only pays attention to the FMEA analysis of the corresponding level of the responsibility range of the analyst. For example: the card manufacturer only pays attention to the card level FMEA; system integrators only focus on system level FMEA, and designers have neither focused nor motivated to cross-level FMEA due to excessive manufacturer variation.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to solve the technical problems that in the prior art, damage definition omission and incompleteness occur, logic and iteration relations among defects of damage among different levels among multi-level systems are unclear, information among levels is split, and designers are difficult to visually judge the influence of low-level failure on functions of a top-level system, and provides a multi-level fault mode and influence analysis method and system.
The invention solves the technical problems through the following technical scheme: a multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method, the method comprising the steps of:
acquiring a multilevel FMEA relation;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multistage FMEA relationships comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, a higher-stage target and a lower-stage target, the fault mode of the current-stage target, the fault influence of the current-stage target on the higher-stage target and the fault reason of the lower-stage target causing the fault mode of the current-stage target;
the fault mode of a current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is a fault reason of a corresponding lower-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault influence of a higher-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the current-level target corresponding to the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault influence of a corresponding higher-level target in the next-level FMEA relation, and the fault reason of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation;
and determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relation.
Preferably, the step of obtaining multi-level FMEA relationships is preceded by:
acquiring the design priority of any target according to the requirement, and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected target with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design with the current priority is finished, the target design task with the next priority is started.
Preferably, the multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis method is applied to the technical field of nuclear power;
the design priority of the acquired target is determined according to the damage degree of the selected target to the nuclear power plant when the selected target fails;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
Preferably, the hazard level further comprises a third hazard level;
the third hazard level includes a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
Preferably, the step of determining the fault influence or fault cause of the target to be analyzed according to the fault mode of the selected target and the multistage FMEA relationship comprises:
when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is finished, determining a verification result of the selected target on the target to be analyzed so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target on the target to be analyzed.
As a second aspect of the present invention, the present invention provides a multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system, which includes a multi-stage FMEA relationship obtaining module and a target impact or cause determining module to be analyzed;
the multistage FMEA relation acquisition module is used for acquiring multistage FMEA relations;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multistage FMEA relationships comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, higher-stage targets and lower-stage targets, the fault mode of the current-stage targets, the fault influence of the current-stage targets on the higher-stage targets and the fault reason of the lower-stage targets causing the fault mode of the current-stage targets;
the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault reason of the corresponding lower-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation, and the fault influence of the higher-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation; the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault influence of the corresponding higher-level target in the next-level FMEA relation, and the fault cause of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation;
and the influence or reason determining module of the target to be analyzed is used for determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relation.
Preferably, the multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system further comprises a design priority module;
the design priority module is used for acquiring the design priority of any target and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected targets with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design of the current priority is finished, the target design task of the next priority is started.
Preferably, the multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis system is applied to the technical field of nuclear power;
the design priority module is specifically used for determining the design priority according to the damage degree of the selected target fault to the nuclear power plant;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
Preferably, the hazard level further comprises a third hazard level;
the third hazard level includes a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
Preferably, the multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system further comprises a verification module;
the verification module is used for determining a verification result of a selected target on the target to be analyzed when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is completed so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target on the target to be analyzed.
The positive progress effects of the invention are as follows: and determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the fault mode of the selected target and the multi-stage FMEA relation by using the obtained multi-stage FMEA relation. Therefore, personnel can carry out hazard analysis across levels and make reasonable decisions on design priorities.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a multilevel FMEA relationship in embodiment 1 of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a first flowchart of a multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a second flowchart of a multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method according to embodiment 1 of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system according to embodiment 2 of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further illustrated by the following examples, which are not intended to limit the scope of the invention.
Example 1
Referring to fig. 1 and fig. 2, the present embodiment provides a method for analyzing a multi-stage failure mode and influence, the method includes the steps of:
s1, acquiring a multilevel FMEA relation;
s2, determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relation.
Referring to fig. 2, each stage of FMEA relationship in the multi-stage FMEA relationship includes a plurality of targets of the current stage, targets of a higher stage, and targets of a lower stage, and a failure mode of a target of the current stage corresponds to a failure effect of a target of a higher stage corresponding to the target of the current stage and a failure cause of a target of a lower stage corresponding to the target of the current stage;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multi-stage FMEA relationship comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, a higher-stage target and a lower-stage target, the fault mode of the current-stage target, the fault influence of the current-stage target on the higher-stage target and the fault reason of the lower-stage target causing the fault mode of the current-stage target.
The failure mode of the current-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relation is the failure influence of the corresponding higher-stage target in the next-stage FMEA relation, and the failure cause of the lower-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relation is the failure mode of the corresponding current-stage target in the next-stage FMEA relation.
Taking fig. 2 as an example, in fig. 2, levels b, c, and d are set as the current-level FMEA relationship, that is, the target c1, the target c2, and the target c3 in the level c are set as the current-level targets, the target d1, the target d2, and the target d3 in the level d are set as the lower-level targets, and the target b in the level b is set as the higher-level target. According to the failure mode of the target c2 in the hierarchy c, the failure reasons of the target d1, the target d2 and the target d3 in the hierarchy d corresponding to the failure mode are further decomposed and determined, and the failure influence on the target b in the hierarchy b can also be deduced. In the previous FMEA relationship, the target in level a is regarded as the higher level target, the target in level b is regarded as the current level target, and the target in level c is regarded as the lower level target.
In the next-level FMEA relationship, the target d1, the target d2 and the target d3 of the level d are used as the current-level target, the target e of the level e is used as the lower-level target, and the target c2 of the level c is used as the higher-level target. The same applies to the previous FMEA relationship. That is, the target c1, the target c2, and the target c3 are the target of the current stage in the current stage FMEA relationship, are also the target of the lower stage in the previous stage FMEA, and are also the target of the higher stage in the next stage FMEA relationship. That is, the failure mode of the target of the current stage in the FMEA relationship of the current stage is the failure cause of the target of the lower stage in the FMEA relationship of the previous stage, and is also the failure influence in the FMEA relationship of the next stage. Further, the present stage FMEA relationships, the previous stage FMEA relationships, and the next stage FMEA relationships referred to herein are relative. Therefore, the fault reason of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation; the failure mode of the target at the current level in the FMEA relation at the previous level is the failure reason of the target at the higher level in the FMEA relation at the current level.
In this embodiment, a plurality of targets of different levels may be included in one object to be analyzed. For example, taking a power plant as an example, please refer to the following table, the multi-stage FMEA relationship from high to low may include: system level, cabinet level, and card level. The high-to-low in the target in the multilevel FMEA relationship may include: station level, system level, cabinet level, card level, and component level.
In the top-level FMEA relationship (i.e., the system-level FMEA relationship), the current level of targets is the power plant protection system, the higher level of targets includes the power plant, and the lower level of targets includes the logic processing cabinet. When the plant protection system loses the regulator pressure signal (i.e., the failure mode of the present stage target), the plant may stop operating (i.e., the effect of the failure of the one stage higher target), possibly due to the loss of the regulator pressure analog input signal of the logic processing cabinet (i.e., the cause of the failure of the one stage lower target).
In a next-to-higher level FMEA relationship (i.e., a cabinet level FMEA relationship), the present level of targets includes a logic processing cabinet, the higher level of targets includes a power plant protection system, and the lower level of targets includes an analog input card. When the logic processing cabinet loses the input signal of the pressure mode of the voltage stabilizer (the failure mode of the target at the current stage), the loss of the pressure signal of the voltage stabilizer (namely, the failure influence of the target at the higher stage) of the power plant protection system can be caused by knowing through the relationship of the next-higher-level FMEA, and the possible reasons are the failure of the analog input card and the loss of the output signal (namely, the failure reason of the target at the lower stage).
The card level FMEA relationship and the component level FMEA relationship are also shown in the table and will not be described herein.
In this embodiment, when the "analog input card fails and loses the output signal" is obtained, the fault influence or fault cause of the object to be analyzed in the power plant (which object in which hierarchy the object to be analyzed is, is selected by a specific situation, for example, may cause "power plant stop work", that is, the fault influence of the highest-level object, and possibly cause "fuse blowing current is lower than the rated value, and does not meet the specification requirement") can be obtained by knowing the relationship of the multiple levels of FMEA.
Through the multi-stage FMEA relationship, the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed can be known as long as the fault mode (fault influence and fault reason) of any one target is known. The fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed can be selected according to specific conditions.
It should be noted that, in this embodiment, the failure mode of the current-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relationship is the failure cause of the corresponding lower-stage target in the previous-stage FMEA relationship, the failure influence of the higher-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relationship is the failure mode of the corresponding current-stage target in the previous-stage FMEA relationship, the failure mode of the current-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relationship is the failure influence of the corresponding higher-stage target in the next-stage FMEA relationship, and the failure cause of the lower-stage target in the current-stage FMEA relationship is the failure mode of the corresponding current-stage target in the next-stage FMEA relationship. That is, the fault reason for selecting the corresponding lower-level target in the upper-level FMEA relationship or the fault influence for selecting the corresponding higher-level target in the lower-level FMEA relationship is the same as the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relationship, and is within the protection scope of the present invention.
Specifically, the step of obtaining a multi-level FMEA relationship may be preceded by:
acquiring the design priority of any target, and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected target with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design with the current priority is finished, the target design task with the next priority is started.
In the present embodiment, the design order in designing the targets can be determined according to the design priority by the design priority of the targets. The higher the design priority, the more important it represents to the top level of the target, and the design will need to be designed first. In the specific implementation process, after the target design which needs to strictly meet the current priority is completed, the target design task of the next priority is started. For safety reasons, otherwise unimportant design tasks (e.g. lighting systems) for top level targets (i.e. failure impact of higher level targets in the highest level FMEA relationship, e.g. power stations) may occur before important design tasks (power station protection systems).
In addition, in this embodiment, the design priority of the target in the multi-level FMEA relationship may be determined by the fault influence of the target on the top-level target, so that the design priority of different targets may be more accurate.
Specifically, the multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis method can be applied to the technical field of nuclear power;
acquiring the design priority of a target, and specifically determining the design priority according to the damage degree of the selected target to the nuclear power plant when the target fails;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
In this embodiment, when a nuclear safety accident or a personal safety accident occurs in the nuclear power plant, it is absolutely not allowed. And the target failure of the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident is monitored or the target failure of the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident is tested, so that the hidden danger of the nuclear safety accident or the personal safety accident occurs, and the damage degree of the hidden danger is considered to be second to the occurrence of the nuclear safety accident or the personal safety accident. Based on the design, the design priority of the target which is related to the possible occurrence of the nuclear safety accident or the personal safety accident of the nuclear power plant is designed with the highest priority, and then the design priority of the target which is related to the monitoring of the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target which is related to the testing of the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident is designed with the second highest priority. Thus, the safety of the nuclear power plant (namely, the highest-level target) can be ensured to the greatest extent from the design process.
Specifically, the degree of harm may also include a third degree of harm, the third degree of harm including a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
In this embodiment, the third hazard level is only second to the first hazard level and the second hazard level, and based on the above embodiment, the nuclear power plant can maintain the generating power at the target power to the maximum extent (the target power may be specifically determined according to actual conditions) on the basis of ensuring safety.
Further, in embodiments, the hazard level may also include others, for example, may include a fourth hazard level comprising a lighting system failure. Other levels of hazard may be specifically set as the case may be.
Specifically, before determining the fault influence or fault cause of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relationship, the method may include:
when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is finished, determining a verification result of the selected target on the target to be analyzed so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target on the target to be analyzed.
In this embodiment, when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is completed, the selected target and the target to be analyzed are verified. For example, the selected design target is a power supply module of the analog input card, and when the analog input card and the power supply module thereof are designed, the influence on the analog input card (i.e. the fault mode of the current-level target in the card-level FMEA relationship, i.e. the target to be analyzed) caused by the fault of the power supply module of the analog input card (i.e. the fault cause of the lower-level target in the card-level FMEA relationship, i.e. the selected target above) can be verified.
Referring to fig. 3, the present invention can also implement the following embodiment, first setting each design target according to the product setting required by the customer according to the hierarchy (i.e. defining the criticality rating of the demand + the severity rating of the hazard), and determining the hazard level of each target to the product (i.e. the definition/liter version of the demand at each stage). And determining the fault influence of the fault mode of the current-level target on the higher-level target and the fault reason of the lower-level target, and establishing the FMEA relation of the current level (namely establishing/updating the FMEA relation). The target of each layer is the same, and finally, a multi-level FMEA relation is established. At this time, at each design stage (i.e. each stage of design task), according to each stage of design analysis, test and verification, the selected target is found to be a problem (i.e. problem finding) for different levels of targets, so as to correct the multi-level FMEA relationship ((i.e. multi-level FMEA relationship built/updated)). And determining the hazard severity (namely, problem severity grading) of each target through the corrected multistage FMEA relationship, and determining whether the target design task in the current design stage needs to be carried out in the next design stage (namely, whether to delay repairing the problem) according to the hazard severity.
Example 2
Referring to fig. 4, the system includes a multistage FMEA relationship obtaining module 201 and a target influence or reason determining module 202 to be analyzed;
the multistage FMEA relationship acquisition module 201 is configured to acquire a multistage FMEA relationship;
the target influence or reason determining module 202 is configured to determine a fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relationship;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multistage FMEA relationships comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, higher-stage targets and lower-stage targets, the fault mode of the current-stage targets, the fault influence of the current-stage targets on the higher-stage targets and the fault reason of the lower-stage targets causing the fault mode of the current-stage targets;
the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault reason of the corresponding lower-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation, and the fault influence of the higher-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation; the failure mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the failure influence of the corresponding higher-level target in the next-level FMEA relation, and the failure reason of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the failure mode of the corresponding current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation.
Specifically, the multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system may further include a design priority module;
the design priority module is used for acquiring the design priority of any target and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected target with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design with the current priority is finished, the target design task with the next priority is started.
Specifically, the multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis system can be applied to the technical field of nuclear power;
the design priority module may be specifically configured to determine a design priority according to a degree of damage to the nuclear power plant when the selected target fault occurs;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
Specifically, the degree of harm may also include a third degree of harm, which may include a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
Specifically, the multi-stage failure mode and influence analysis system further comprises a verification module;
the verification module is used for determining a verification result of the selected target to the target to be analyzed when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is completed so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target to the target to be analyzed.
The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system in this embodiment corresponds to the multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method in embodiment 1, and therefore is not described herein.
While specific embodiments of the invention have been described above, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that this is by way of example only, and that the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims. Various changes or modifications to these embodiments may be made by those skilled in the art without departing from the principle and spirit of this invention, and these changes and modifications are within the scope of this invention.
Claims (10)
1. A multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method, the method comprising the steps of:
acquiring a multilevel FMEA relation;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multistage FMEA relationships comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, higher-stage targets and lower-stage targets, the fault mode of the current-stage targets, the fault influence of the current-stage targets on the higher-stage targets and the fault reason of the lower-stage targets causing the fault mode of the current-stage targets;
the fault mode of a current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is a fault reason of a corresponding lower-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault influence of a higher-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the current-level target corresponding to the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault influence of a corresponding higher-level target in the next-level FMEA relation, and the fault reason of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation;
and determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relation.
2. The multi-level failure mode and impact analysis method of claim 1, wherein the step of obtaining a multi-level FMEA relationship is preceded by:
acquiring the design priority of any target according to the requirement, and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected target with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design with the current priority is finished, the target design task with the next priority is started.
3. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method of claim 2, wherein the failure mode and impact analysis method is applied to the technical field of nuclear power;
the design priority of the acquired target is determined according to the damage degree of the selected target to the nuclear power plant when the selected target fails;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
4. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method of claim 3, wherein the hazard levels further comprise a third hazard level;
the third hazard level includes a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
5. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis method of claim 2, wherein the step of determining the failure impact or cause of failure of the target to be analyzed based on the multi-stage FMEA relationship comprises:
when the design of a selected target and the target to be analyzed is finished, determining the verification result of the selected target on the target to be analyzed so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target on the target to be analyzed.
6. A multi-stage fault mode and influence analysis system is characterized by comprising a multi-stage FMEA relation acquisition module and a target influence or reason determining module to be analyzed;
the multistage FMEA relation acquisition module is used for acquiring multistage FMEA relations;
each stage of FMEA relationship in the multistage FMEA relationships comprises a plurality of current-stage targets, higher-stage targets and lower-stage targets, the fault mode of the current-stage targets, the fault influence of the current-stage targets on the higher-stage targets and the fault reason of the lower-stage targets causing the fault mode of the current-stage targets;
the fault mode of a current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is a fault reason of a corresponding lower-level target in the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault influence of a higher-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the current-level target corresponding to the previous-level FMEA relation, the fault mode of the current-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault influence of a corresponding higher-level target in the next-level FMEA relation, and the fault reason of the lower-level target in the current-level FMEA relation is the fault mode of the corresponding current-level target in the next-level FMEA relation;
and the target influence or reason determining module is used for determining the fault influence or fault reason of the target to be analyzed according to the multistage FMEA relation.
7. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system of claim 6, further comprising a design priority module;
the design priority module is used for acquiring the design priority of any target and determining the design sequence of the target during design according to the design priority;
determining a new design priority according to the fault influence on a higher-level target in the highest-level FMEA relation when the target fails so as to correct the original design priority of the target;
and the design sequence of the selected target with higher design priority is more preferred, and after the target design with the current priority is finished, the target design task with the next priority is started.
8. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system of claim 7, applied in the field of nuclear power technology;
the design priority module is specifically used for determining the design priority according to the damage degree of the selected target fault to the nuclear power plant;
the hazard level comprises a first hazard level and a second hazard level, the first hazard level comprises the occurrence of a nuclear safety accident and the occurrence of a personal safety accident, and the second hazard level comprises the target failure of monitoring the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident or the target failure of testing the nuclear safety accident and the personal safety accident.
9. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system of claim 8, wherein the hazard levels further comprise a third hazard level;
the third hazard level includes a reduction in nuclear power plant power generation.
10. The multi-stage failure mode and impact analysis system of claim 6, further comprising a verification module;
the verification module is used for determining a verification result of a selected target on the target to be analyzed when the design of the selected target and the target to be analyzed is finished so as to determine the fault influence or fault reason of the selected target on the target to be analyzed.
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| CN116719664A (en) * | 2023-08-09 | 2023-09-08 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司信息通信分公司 | Application and cloud platform cross-layer fault analysis method and system based on micro-service deployment |
| CN116719664B (en) * | 2023-08-09 | 2023-12-05 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司信息通信分公司 | Application and cloud platform cross-layer fault analysis method and system based on micro-service deployment |
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