CN114679268A - Method for mutual authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles and storable medium - Google Patents
Method for mutual authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles and storable medium Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
The invention provides a method for mutual authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles, which comprises the following steps: s1, generating system public parameters and a private key of a ground station; s2, registering the unmanned aerial vehicles at the ground station, and generating authentication information for each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station according to the public parameters and the private keys of the ground station; and S3, the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle carry out mutual authentication and negotiate a session key. The authentication and key agreement method between unmanned aerial vehicles provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises the following steps: the ground station is a system which can provide registration service for the unmanned aerial vehicle and generate parameters required by authentication. In addition, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is embedded in the unmanned aerial vehicle, so that the safety of authentication information stored by the unmanned aerial vehicle is ensured.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a method, computing equipment and a storage medium for mutual authentication and key agreement among multiple unmanned aerial vehicles.
Background
As an unmanned micro-aircraft, an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is an unmanned aerial vehicle operated by a radio remote control technology and a control device embedded in the UAV, and is widely applied to the fields of remote sensing surveying and mapping, express transportation, pipeline inspection, environmental detection, military reconnaissance and the like.
With the development of unmanned aerial vehicle technology, it has become a reality to collaborate unmanned aerial vehicles to complete designated tasks. A plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles are combined according to a certain scale and structure, and a cooperation effect is generated through information sharing among the unmanned aerial vehicles so as to realize intelligent cooperation to execute tasks. The mode of cooperation between this kind of unmanned aerial vehicle is extensive in many fields applications, like in the aspect of the disaster rescue, when unmanned aerial vehicle carries out search and rescue work in the mountain area, because the environment in region is complicated changeable, the problem that communication signal can appear sheltering from. Adopt unmanned aerial vehicle cooperative mode, different unmanned aerial vehicles can be each other for communication relay, carry out data sharing, and the communication that can effectively avoid appearing shelters from the problem to promote search and rescue efficiency.
The mode of drone collaboration provides many benefits for production and life, but presents some security issues. Since communication between drones is performed over a common channel, an attacker can eavesdrop communication information within the network, tamper information, or forge fake information to inject into the communication. Therefore, ensuring secure communication between drones and drones is an aspect that needs to be considered, namely how to perform identity authentication and key agreement between drones. Finally, considering that the unmanned aerial vehicle is easily attacked by physical capture, how to ensure that the unmanned aerial vehicle is captured and steals internal data has no influence on the security of the authentication scheme is also a problem that needs to be studied in depth.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for mutual authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles, where mutual authentication and key agreement between an unmanned aerial vehicle and an unmanned aerial vehicle are performed, so as to ensure security and efficiency of implementing cooperation by the unmanned aerial vehicle; meanwhile, under the condition that an attacker is prevented from capturing the unmanned aerial vehicle and stealing internal data, the safety of authentication and key agreement is not influenced.
In order to achieve the above object, an embodiment of the present invention provides a method for authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles, where the method includes:
s1, generating system public parameters and a private key of a ground station;
s2, registering the unmanned aerial vehicles at the ground station, and generating authentication information for each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station according to the public parameters and the private keys of the ground station;
and S3, the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle carry out mutual authentication and negotiate a session key.
In another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium, where at least one instruction, at least one program, a code set, or a set of instructions is stored in the storage medium, and the at least one instruction, the at least one program, the code set, or the set of instructions is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the method for authentication and key agreement between drones as described above.
In yet another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computing device, where the computing device includes a processor and a memory, where the memory stores at least one instruction, at least one program, a set of codes, or a set of instructions, and the at least one instruction, the at least one program, the set of codes, or the set of instructions is loaded and executed by the processor to implement the method for authentication and key agreement between drones as described above.
The authentication and key agreement method between unmanned aerial vehicles provided by the embodiment of the invention comprises the following steps: the unmanned aerial vehicle is an unmanned aerial vehicle for executing corresponding tasks; the ground station is a system which can provide registration service for the unmanned aerial vehicle and generate parameters required by authentication, and an elliptic curve, a base point, two hash functions, a ground station public key and a pseudonym are required to be used as public parameters. The embodiment of the invention realizes mutual authentication and key agreement between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle, and ensures future safe communication between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle. In addition, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is embedded in the unmanned aerial vehicle, so that the safety of authentication information stored by the unmanned aerial vehicle is ensured.
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The following description of the embodiments of the present invention will be made with reference to the accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of unmanned aerial vehicle registration according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a flowchart of authentication between the drones according to the embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 3 is a new unmanned aerial vehicle addition flow chart according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 4 is a block diagram of a computing device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following description will be made with reference to the accompanying drawings. It is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some examples of the invention, and that for a person skilled in the art, other drawings and embodiments can be derived from them without inventive effort. For the sake of simplicity, the drawings only schematically show the parts relevant to the present invention, and they do not represent the actual structure as a product.
In order to solve the technical problem of the embodiment of the present invention, the embodiment of the present invention provides the following technical solutions:
an authentication and key agreement method between unmanned aerial vehicles comprises the following steps:
s1, generating system public parameters and a private key of a ground station;
s2, registering the unmanned aerial vehicles at the ground station, and generating authentication information for each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station according to the public parameters and the private keys of the ground station;
and S3, the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle carry out mutual authentication and negotiate a session key.
Preferably, the S1 includes the following steps:
s1.1: let GF (q) be a finite field, where q is a large prime number representing the size of GF (q), and the ground station selects the elliptical curve E over GF (q)q(a,b):y2=x3+ ax + b (mod q), where (a, b) E GF (p) and U is EqA base point on (a, b);
performing dot product operation on the private key s and the base point U to obtain a ground station public key Ppub;
Namely, calculating Ppub=s·U;
S1.3: the ground station selects its pseudonym SID and two hash functions h1(. cndot.) and h2(. wherein h) is1(. h) mapping strings of arbitrary length to an integer, h2() mapping a string of arbitrary length to a fixed length string;
s1.4: the ground station saves the private key s and discloses the elliptic curve Eq(a, b), large prime number q, base point U and ground station public key PpubA ground station pseudonym SID and two Hash functions h1(. and h)2(·)。
As shown in fig. 1, preferably, the S2 includes the following steps:
s2.1: assuming a total of n drones, the ground station selects a second random number for each droneThe random number diPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtainWhereinAndare respectively a point DiThe abscissa and ordinate of (a);
S2.2: the ground station converts the self pseudonym SID and point DiAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. o) generating a first hash value of the product of the first hash value and the ground station private key s plus the second random number diThe results obtained are then modulo q to give Fi. Ground station point DiAnd FiSending the data to a corresponding unmanned aerial vehicle through a safety channel;
S2.3: unmanned aerial vehicle receives DiAnd FiThen, a challenge C is selectediThe challenge is the input of a PUF embedded in the drone, outputting a corresponding response Ri=PUFi(Ci);
S2.4: the response R of the PUF is used by the unmanned aerial vehicleiAnd received point DiOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. The) the generated second hash value with the received FiXOR to Gi. Then the unmanned aerial vehicle authenticates the information point Di、GiAnd CiIs stored in the internal memory of the computer,
As shown in fig. 2, preferably, the S3 includes the following steps:
s3.1: challenge C stored in memory by unmanned aerial vehicle alpha (alpha is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n)αAs an input to the PUF, the PUF outputs a corresponding response Rα=PUFα(Cα) Then outputs the response RαAnd a point D stored in the memoryαOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. G) generating a third hash value, stored in memoryαXOR'd with the third hash value to yield Fα;
S3.2: unmanned plane alpha generates third random numberThe random number k is addedαPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtainWhereinAndare respectively a point KαThe abscissa and the ordinate. Then the unmanned plane alpha will FαPlus a third random number kαThe result of the addition is modulo q to yield Jα;
S3.3: point D stored in memory of unmanned aerial vehicle alpha handleαThe point KαAnd JαSending to the unmanned plane beta (beta is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, alpha is not equal to beta) through a public channel;
s3.4: after the unmanned aerial vehicle beta receives the information, J is receivedαPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtain Zα1And using said pseudonym SID of the ground station and the received point DαAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. The fourth hash value generated with the ground station public key PpubPerforming dot product operation to obtain Zα2Then receiving the point DαCalculated Zα2And received KαAdding, the result modulo q after adding to obtain Zα3Is a reaction of Zα1And Zα3Make a comparison, i.e.
If the two are equal, the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha passes through the authentication of the unmanned aerial vehicle beta, S3.5 is continued, otherwise, the authentication is terminated;
s3.5: drone beta challenge C to be stored in memoryβInput into the PUF, which outputs a corresponding response Rβ=PUFβ(Cβ) Then outputs the response RβAnd a point D stored in the memoryβOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. G) generating a fifth hash value, stored in memoryβXOR'd with the fifth hash value to yield Fβ;;
S3.6: unmanned aerial vehicle beta generates fourth random numberThe random number k is divided intoβPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtainCenter point KβAbscissa ofAnd ordinate are respectivelyAndthen unmanned plane beta will FβAnd a fourth random number kβThe result after addition modulo q yields JβIs then reused as theAndafter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. h) the sixth hash value generated with the calculated JβXOR is carried out to obtain L;
s3.7: point D stored in memory of unmanned aerial vehicle beta handleβThe point KβAnd L is sent to the unmanned plane alpha through a public channel;
s3.8: after receiving the information, the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha sends the informationAnd received point DβAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. h) generating a seventh hash value, XOR-ing the received L with the seventh hash value to obtain Jβ,
Will JβPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtain Zβ1And using said pseudonym SID of the ground station and the received point DβAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. h) the generated eighth hash value with the ground station public key PpubPerforming dot product operation to obtain Zβ2Then receiving the point DβCalculated Zβ2And received KβThe result of the addition modulo q yields Zβ3A 1 is formed ofβ1And Zβ3A comparison is made, namely:
if the two are equal, the unmanned plane beta passes the authentication of the unmanned plane alpha, and S3.9 is continued, otherwise, the authentication session is terminated;
s3.9: the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha sends the third random number kαAnd point KβPerforming dot product operation to obtain V ═ V (V)x,Vy) In which V isxAnd VyRespectively the abscissa and ordinate of the point V, and calculating the obtained Vx、VyThe point DαOrdinate ofAnd point DβOrdinate of (2)After merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. to) generate a ninth hash value SK as the negotiated first session key, and then use the ninth hash value SKAndafter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. to) generate a tenth hash value W;
s3.10: the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha sends the tenth hash value W to the unmanned aerial vehicle beta through a public channel;
s3.11: after receiving the information, the unmanned aerial vehicle beta sends the fourth random number kβAnd point KαPerforming dot product operation to obtain V ═ V (V)x,Vy) Then the calculated V is calculatedx、VyThe point DαOrdinate ofAnd point DβOrdinate of (2)After merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. to) generate an eleventh hash value SK;
s3.12: comparing by drone β whether the received tenth hash value W is equal to the eleventh hash value SK,Andafter merging, utilizing the hash functionNumber h2(. the twelfth generated hash valueAnd if the session key and the session key are not equal, terminating the session, otherwise, taking the eleventh hash value SK as a negotiated second session key, and then, using the session key SK to communicate between the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha and the unmanned aerial vehicle beta until the authentication and key negotiation are finished.
As shown in fig. 3, further, the method includes adding a new drone, and specifically includes the following steps:
s4.1: the ground station selects a fifth random number for a new pre-registered droneThe fifth random numberPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtainWhereinAndare respectively pointsThe abscissa and ordinate of (a);
S4.2: the ground station adds the self pseudonym SID and the pointAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. generating a thirteenth hash value of the product of the thirteenth hash value and the ground station private key s plus the fifth random numberThe results obtained are then modulo q to give Fi newGround station, point ofAnd Fi newSending the information to a new unmanned aerial vehicle through a safety channel;
S4.3: after receiving the information, the new drone selects a challengeAs an input to a PUF embedded in a drone, the PUF outputs a corresponding response
S4.4: new drone uses the response from the PUFAnd received pointOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. The fourteenth Hash value generated and F receivedi newXOR to getThen the unmanned aerial vehicle authenticates the information pointAndis stored in the internal memory of the computer,
Referring to fig. 4, a schematic structural diagram of a computing device 1500 according to an embodiment of the present application is shown. The computing device 1500 may be used to implement the method for mutual authentication and key agreement between drones provided in the embodiments described above.
Specifically, the method comprises the following steps:
the computing device 1500 includes a Central Processing Unit (CPU)1501, a system memory 1504 including a Random Access Memory (RAM)1502 and a Read Only Memory (ROM)1503, and a system bus 1505 connecting the system memory 1504 and the central processing unit 1501. The computing device 1500 also includes a basic input/output system (I/O system) 1506 for facilitating information transfer between devices within the computer, and a mass storage device 1507 for storing an operating system 1513, application programs 1514, and other program modules 1515.
The basic input/output system 1506 includes a display 1508 for displaying information and an input device 1509 such as a mouse, keyboard, etc. for a user to input information. Therein, the display 1508 and the input device 1509 are connected to the central processing unit 1501 through an input output controller 1510 connected to the system bus 1505. The basic input/output system 1506 may also include an input/output controller 1510 for receiving and processing input from a number of other devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, or electronic stylus. Similarly, the input-output controller 1510 also provides output to a display screen, a printer, or other type of output device.
The mass storage device 1507 is connected to the central processing unit 1501 through a mass storage controller (not shown) connected to the system bus 1505. The mass storage device 1507 and its associated computer-readable media provide non-volatile storage for the computing device 1500. That is, the mass storage device 1507 may include a computer-readable medium (not shown) such as a hard disk or CD-ROM drive.
Without loss of generality, the computer-readable media may comprise computer storage media and communication media. Computer storage media includes volatile and nonvolatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storage of information such as computer readable instructions, data structures, program modules or other data. Computer storage media includes RAM, ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other solid state memory technology, CD-ROM, DVD, or other optical storage, magnetic cassettes, magnetic tape, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices.
Of course, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the computer storage media is not limited to the foregoing. The system memory 1504 and mass storage device 1507 described above may be collectively referred to as memory.
According to various embodiments of the present application, the computing device 1500 may also operate as a remote computer connected to a network via a network, such as the Internet. That is, the computing device 1500 may be connected to the network 1512 through the network interface unit 1511 connected to the system bus 1505 or may alternatively be connected to other types of networks or remote computer systems (not shown) using the network interface unit 1511.
The memory also includes one or more programs stored in the memory and configured to be executed by one or more processors. The one or more programs include methods for enabling mutual authentication and key agreement between the drones.
In an exemplary embodiment, a computing device is also provided that includes a processor and a memory having at least one instruction, at least one program, set of codes, or set of instructions stored therein. The at least one instruction, the at least one program, the set of codes, or the set of instructions is configured to be executed by the processor to implement a method for mutual authentication and key agreement between the drones.
In an exemplary embodiment, there is also provided a computer readable storage medium having at least one instruction, at least one program, a set of codes, or a set of instructions stored therein, which when executed by a processor of a terminal, implement the method for mutual authentication and key agreement between drones of the above-described embodiments. Alternatively, the computer-readable storage medium may be a ROM (Read-Only Memory), a RAM (Random Access Memory), a CD-ROM (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), a magnetic tape, a floppy disk, an optical data storage device, and the like.
In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, which when executed, is configured to implement the above-described method for mutual authentication and key agreement between drones.
More than two "and/or" describing the association relationship of the associated objects, meaning that there may be three relationships, e.g., a and/or B, may mean: a exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone. The character "/" generally indicates that the former and latter associated objects are in an "or" relationship.
In addition, the step numbers described herein only exemplarily show one possible execution sequence among the steps, and in some other embodiments, the steps may also be executed out of the numbering sequence, for example, two steps with different numbers are executed simultaneously, or two steps with different numbers are executed in a reverse order to the order shown in the figure, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present application.
The above description is only exemplary of the present application and should not be taken as limiting the present application, and any modifications, equivalents, improvements and the like that are made within the spirit and principle of the present application should be included in the protection scope of the present application.
The foregoing is only a partial embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that, for those skilled in the art, various modifications and decorations can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention, and these modifications and decorations should also be regarded as the protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. A method for authentication and key agreement between unmanned aerial vehicles is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, generating system public parameters and a private key of a ground station;
s2, registering the unmanned aerial vehicles at the ground station, and generating authentication information for each unmanned aerial vehicle by the ground station according to the public parameters and the private keys of the ground station;
and S3, the unmanned aerial vehicle and the unmanned aerial vehicle carry out mutual authentication and negotiate a session key.
2. The method for authentication and key agreement between drones, according to claim 1, characterized in that said S1 comprises the steps of:
s1.1, setting GF (q) as a finite field, wherein q is a large prime number and represents the size of GF (q), and selecting an elliptical curve E on GF (q) by a ground stationq(a,b):y2=x3+ ax + b (mod q), where (a, b) E GF (p) and U is EqA base point on (a, b);
performing dot product operation on the private key s and the base point U to obtain a ground station public key PpubI.e. Ppub=s·U;
S1.3, the ground station selects the pseudonym SID of the ground station and two hash functions h1(. and h)2(. wherein h) is1(. mapping character strings of arbitrary lengthIs an integer, h2() mapping a string of arbitrary length to a fixed length string;
s1.4: the ground station saves the private key s and discloses the elliptic curve Eq(a, b), large prime number q, base point U and ground station public key PpubA ground station pseudonym SID and two Hash functions h1(. and h)2(·)。
3. The method for authentication and key agreement between drones according to claim 2, wherein the S2 includes the steps of:
s2.1, assuming that n unmanned aerial vehicles are in total, the ground station selects a second random number for each unmanned aerial vehicle
S2.2, the ground station carries out the self pseudonym SID and point DiAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. o) generating a first hash value of the product of the first hash value and the ground station private key s plus the second random number diThe results obtained are then modulo q to give FiGround station node DiAnd FiSent to the corresponding drone through a secure channel, i.e.
S2.3, unmanned aerial vehicle receives DiAnd FiThen, a challenge C is selectediThe challenge is the input of a PUF embedded in the drone, outputting a corresponding response Ri=PUFi(Ci);
S2.4, using response R of the PUF by the unmanned planeiAnd the received point DiOrdinate ofMergingThen using the hash function h2(. The) the generated second hash value with the received FiXOR to GiAnd the unmanned aerial vehicle authenticates the information point Di、GiAnd CiStored in a memory, i.e.
4. The method for authentication and key agreement between drones according to claim 3, wherein the S3 includes the following steps:
s3.1, storing challenge C in memory by unmanned aerial vehicle alpha (alpha is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n)αAs an input to the PUF, the PUF outputs a corresponding response Rα=PUFα(Cα) Then outputs the response RαAnd a point D stored in the memoryαOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. G) generating a third hash value, stored in memoryαXOR'd with the third hash value to yield FαI.e. by
Abscissa and ordinate, drone α will again said FαPlus a third random number kαThe result of the addition is modulo q to yield JαI.e. byAnd Jα=Fα+kαmod q;
S3.3, storing the point D in the memory by the unmanned aerial vehicle alphaαThe point KαAnd JαSending to the unmanned plane beta (beta is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n, alpha is not equal to beta) through a public channel;
s3.4, after receiving the information sent by the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha, the unmanned aerial vehicle beta receives JαPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtain Zα1Then the pseudonym SID of the ground station and the received point DαAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1(. The fourth hash value generated with the ground station public key PpubPerforming dot product operation to obtain Zα2Then receiving the point DαCalculated Zα2And received KαAdding, the result modulo q after adding to obtain Zα3Is a reaction of Zα1And Zα3Make a comparison, i.e.If the two are equal, the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha passes through the authentication of the unmanned aerial vehicle beta, S3.5 is continued, otherwise, the authentication is terminated;
s3.5, storing challenge C in memory by unmanned aerial vehicle betaβInput into the PUF, which outputs a corresponding response Rβ=PUFβ(Cβ) Then outputs the response RβAnd a point D stored in the memoryβOrdinate of (2)After merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. G) generating a fifth hash value, stored in memoryβXOR'd with the fifth hash value to yield FβI.e. by
Are respectivelyAndthen unmanned plane beta will FβAnd a fourth random number kβThe result after addition modulo q yields JβIs then reused as theAndafter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. preparation) is prepared from
S3.7, unmanned aerial vehicle beta is the point D of storage in the memoryβThe point KβAnd L is sent to the unmanned plane alpha through a public channel;
s3.8, after the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha receives the information, the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha sends the informationAnd received point DβAbscissa of (2)After merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. h) generating a seventh hash value, XOR-ing the received L with the seventh hash value to obtain JβI.e. by
Will JβPerforming point multiplication operation with the elliptic curve base point U to obtain Zβ1And using said pseudonym SID of the ground station and the received point DβAbscissa ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h1Eighth Ha of (v)His value and said ground station public key PpubPerforming dot product operation to obtain Zβ2Then receiving the point DβCalculated Zβ2And received KβThe result of the addition modulo q yields Zβ3Is a reaction of Zβ1And Zβ3A comparison is made, namely:
if the two are equal, the unmanned plane beta passes the authentication of the unmanned plane alpha, S3.9 is continued, otherwise, the authentication session is terminated;
s3.9, enabling the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha to use the third random number kαAnd point KβPerforming a dot product operation to obtain V ═ V (V)x,Vy) In which V isxAnd VyRespectively the abscissa and ordinate of the point V, and calculating the obtained Vx、VyThe point DαOrdinate ofAnd point DβOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. to) generate a ninth hash value SK as the negotiated first session key, and then use the ninth hash value SKAndafter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. to) generate a tenth hash value W;
s3.10, the unmanned aerial vehicle alpha sends the tenth hash value W to the unmanned aerial vehicle beta through a public channel;
s3.11, after receiving the information, the unmanned aerial vehicle beta sends the fourth random number kβAnd point KαPerforming dot product operation to obtain V ═ V (V)x,Vy) Then the calculated V is calculatedx、VyThe point DαOrdinate ofAnd point DβOrdinate ofAfter merging, utilizing the hash function h2(. o) generating an eleventh hash value SK;
s3.12, comparing whether the received tenth hash value W is equal to the eleventh hash value by the unmanned aerial vehicle betaThe eleventh hash value SK is used as the negotiated second session key, and then the drone α and the drone β communicate with each other by using the second session key SK.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method further comprises:
s4.1, the ground station selects a fifth random number for the new unmanned aerial vehicle which is registered in advance The hash function h1(. generating a thirteenth hash value of the product of the thirteenth hash value and the ground station private key s plus the fifth random numberThe results obtained are then modulo q to give Fi newGround station, point of contactAnd Fi newSending the information to a new unmanned aerial vehicle through a safety channel;
6. A computing device comprising a processor and a memory, the memory having stored therein at least one instruction, at least one program, a set of codes, or a set of instructions, the at least one instruction, the at least one program, the set of codes, or the set of instructions being loaded and executed by the processor to implement the method of mutual authentication and key agreement between drones as claimed in any of claims 1 to 5.
7. A computer readable storage medium having stored therein at least one instruction, at least one program, a set of codes, or a set of instructions, which is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the method of mutual authentication and key agreement between drones as claimed in any of claims 1 to 5.
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