CN114389812B - Internet of vehicles lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF - Google Patents
Internet of vehicles lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
- H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/068—Authentication using credential vaults, e.g. password manager applications or one time password [OTP] applications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/08—Access security
- H04W12/084—Access security using delegated authorisation, e.g. open authorisation [OAuth] protocol
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/48—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for in-vehicle communication
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
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Abstract
A vehicle networking lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF (physical unclonable function) is characterized in that based on vehicles, roadside units (RSUs) and a trusted center (TA), the TA selects a private key, a safe one-way hash function and a symmetric key algorithm in an initialization setting stage; calculating and storing secret information for the vehicle and RSU in the registration phase TA for later authentication; in the batch authentication stage TA, RSU and the vehicles use the instant generated random number and the stored secret information to batch authenticate the legal identity of the interactive party, if the authentication is successful, the legal vehicles can establish session keys with the RSU of other vehicles and areas so as to facilitate the subsequent secure communication; the physical unclonable function PUF is utilized to avoid digital signature operation in the information exchange V2X authentication, steps are simplified, and a participant can meet the operation required by the authentication process only by executing hash and exclusive OR operation. The method meets various security properties, realizes the tracing of the false identity of the vehicle, and meets the requirement of conditional anonymity.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of identity verification and encryption, and particularly relates to a vehicle networking lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on a PUF.
Background
The physical unclonable function (Physical Unclonable Function, PUF) is a hardware function implementation circuit which depends on chip characteristics, has uniqueness and randomness, and realizes a function of uniquely corresponding an excitation signal and a Response signal (CRP) by extracting a process parameter deviation necessarily introduced in a chip manufacturing process. The PUF is expressed as: r=puf (C), where C is the stimulus and R is the response to the stimulus.
The authentication is also called authentication, and means that the user identity is confirmed by a certain means, and the authentication method is quite many and can be basically divided into: authentication based on a shared key and authentication based on a public key encryption algorithm. Shared key based authentication refers to the server side and user sharing one or a set of passwords. When the user needs to carry out identity authentication, the user submits the password commonly owned by the user and the server through the device storing the password, the server checks whether the password submitted by the user is consistent with the password stored at the server after receiving the password submitted by the user, if so, the user is judged to be a legal user, and if not, the identity authentication is judged to be failed. The authentication based on the public key encryption algorithm means that both sides in communication respectively hold a public key and a private key, one of the two sides adopts the private key to encrypt specific data, the other side adopts the public key to decrypt the data, if the decryption is successful, the user is considered as a legal user, and otherwise, the user is considered as an authentication failure.
The vehicle networking is based on an in-vehicle network, an inter-vehicle network and a vehicle-mounted mobile network, and is provided with advanced vehicle-mounted sensors, controllers and actuators, and a highly-coordinated vehicle networking ecological system is constructed by integrating a positioning technology, an information processing technology, a wireless communication technology and an intelligent decision control technology. In V2V communication, a vehicle receives running state information from other vehicles while transmitting information such as its own speed and position to other vehicles, and simultaneously combines information collected by devices such as sensors and cameras to realize sensing of surrounding environment conditions and assist a driver in driving safely. V2V communication closely ties independently driven vehicles together to form a vehicle ad-hoc Network (VANET) with information interaction sharing. For V2I communication, the vehicle mainly communicates with a Road Side Unit (RSU) or a base station. In a scene of high vehicle density, the RSU can make path planning and speed advice for the vehicle. Through the V2I technology, the intelligent car and the intelligent road are combined, so that the travel is faster. The cloud platform processes and analyzes the collected mass data and can provide services such as positioning, emergency rescue, information entertainment and the like for the vehicle. In such an ecosystem, identity authentication of legal entities during information interaction is essential, wherein privacy protection for participants is crucial, as most vehicles participating in providing information do not want to expose their own private information.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the characteristics of the prior art, the privacy protection problem, the authentication efficiency problem, the communication safety problem and the like which are easy to occur in the identity authentication of the internet of vehicles, the invention provides an internet of vehicles lightweight privacy protection batch authentication protocol based on a PUF, which comprises an initialization setting stage, a registration stage and a batch authentication stage.
The technical scheme is as follows: in order to achieve the above purpose, the invention adopts the following technical scheme:
a vehicle networking lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF is characterized in that: the participant comprises a vehicle, a roadside unit (RSU) and a trusted center (TA), and the method comprises an initialization setting stage, a registration stage and a batch authentication stage and specifically comprises the following steps of:
step 1, initializing a setting stage;
system initialization, TA selects its key K t Secure Hash function h (·): {1,0} * →{1,0} ln A symmetric key algorithm;
step 2, a registration stage;
step S2.1, vehicle V i Transmitting a true identity ID with itself to the TA over a secure channel i Is a registration request for (a);
step S2.2, TA after receiving the registration request, firstly checking if the database has ID i Rejecting the registration request if the registration request exists; otherwise calculate X i ＝h(ID i ||K t ) Will challenge C i To vehicle V i ；
Step S2.3, vehicle V i Receipt C i Calculating R i ＝PUF i (C i ) And send toTA；
Step S2.4, TA receives R i Post-calculation HLP i ＝BCH Encoder (R i ) Store < C i ,R i ,HLP i In its database, with key K t Encrypting; thereafter TA selects random numbersAnd is V i Calculating its pseudo identityTA will { PID i ,X i Transmitted to vehicle V i ：
Step S2.5, vehicle V i Receipt { PID ] i ,X i After } store it in its own vehicle equipped on board unit OBU;
step S2.6, TA is RSU j Select ID j As its identity and issuing token j As RSU j Token in network activity, after which TA calculates X j ＝h(ID j ||K t ) Will { ID } j ,X j ,token j Send to RSU j ；
Step S2.7, RSU j Received { ID } j ,X j ,token j After } it is saved in its database;
step 3, a batch authentication stage;
step S3.1, a plurality of automobiles move to the area RSU in the public channel in a specific time j Send authentication request for vehicle V i ，V i Selecting random numbersCalculate->m i,2 ＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) Integrate message M i ＝{m i,1 ,m i,2 ,PID i Transmitted to regional RSU j ；
Step S3.2, RSU j Receiving authentication request messages from multiple vehicles and aggregating them to represent them asAfter which a random number is selected +.>Calculation ofRSU j Will->Transmitting to TA;
step S3.3.1, TA receives RSU j After the message of (a), TA first goes to RSU j And (5) authentication: calculation ofObtaining token j Searching the database to verify whether the database is legal, if not, finding the token j Ending the authentication flow, otherwise calculating +.>Ending the authentication flow if the equation is not satisfied, otherwise, will +>Splitting, respectively authenticating vehicle messages in the split messages, and for vehicle V i TA calculationm′ i,2 ？＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) If the equation is satisfied, continuing the authentication flow, otherwise stopping the authentication of the vehicle;
step S3.3.2, after the TA authenticates all vehicles, the TA selectsComputing session keysFor RSU j TA calculation:for vehicle V i TA calculationAfter which the message is aggregated->TA send message->To RSU j ；
Step S3.4, RSU j After receiving the TA message, calculatingSK＝h(ID j ||n j *I R ) Verify equation->If the equation is not satisfied, ending the authentication flow, otherwise, respectively sending the messageTo a designated vehicle;
step S3.5, vehicle V i Received RSU j After the message of (2), calculateC i ，/>HLP i ，SK，R actual ,R i Verify equation->If yes, ending the current flow, otherwise, saving ++>As a new pseudo-identity and calculating +.> Message->To the TA.
Step S3.6, TA receives vehicle V i After the message of (2), calculateAnd generating auxiliary dataWill->Stored in its database for the next authentication.
Further, in step S3.3.2The calculation method comprises the following steps:
further, in step S3.5C i ，/>HLP i ，SK，R actual ,R i The calculation method comprises the following steps:
R actual ＝PUF i (C i )，
R i ＝BCH Decoder (R actual ,HLP i )。
the beneficial effects achieved by the invention are as follows: according to the method, a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is utilized to avoid digital signature operation in vehicle-to-outside information exchange (V2X) authentication, so that communication steps are simplified, and a participant can meet the operation required by the authentication process by only executing hash and exclusive-or operation; the method realizes the tracing of the false identity of the vehicle while meeting various security properties, solves the problem of exposing private information easily occurring in the identity authentication of the internet of vehicles in the prior art, and meets the requirement of conditional anonymity.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a system model diagram provided in an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is an operation flow chart of batch identity authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a flowchart of a PUF-based internet of vehicles lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical scheme of the invention is further described in detail below with reference to the attached drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the internet of vehicles lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method of the present invention includes three main bodies: a trusted center (TA), a roadside unit (RSU), a vehicle.
(1) Trusted center (TA, trusted Authority): the TA has the most powerful communication and computing power and is responsible for registering and verifying all RSUs and vehicles. The procedure of vehicle and RSU registration with TA is sent on a secure channel. The TA is completely trusted and not compromised.
(2) Roadside units (RSUs), road Side units): the RSU is the bridge for communication between the TA and the vehicle. The RSU is connected to the TA through a public channel. Since the RSU is located at the roadside, all vehicles can exchange information with the TA through the RSU.
(3) Vehicle: all vehicles are equipped with On Board Units (OBUs) and exchange information with RSUs with the aid of the OBUs. The OBU is attached to the vehicle and stores confidential information and the true identity of the vehicle to perform encryption functions.
Specific examples of the steps of the present invention are given below:
a vehicle networking lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF comprises the following steps:
(1) And initializing a setting stage.
System initialization, TA selects its key K t A secure Hash function h (.: {1,0 }) * →{1,0} ln And a secure symmetric encryption algorithm, such as the AES algorithm.
(2) Registration stage.
Step S2.1, each vehicle needs to register with TA in interaction with the secure channel. Here in vehicle V i The following are examples: v (V) i Transmitting a true identity ID with itself to the TA i Is a registration request for a mobile terminal.
Step S2.2, TA after receiving the registration request, firstly checking if the database has ID i If (if)Rejecting the registration request if the registration request exists; otherwise calculate X i ＝h(ID i ||K t ) Will challenge C i To vehicle V i 。
Step S2.3, vehicle V i Receipt C i After passing through OBU i Built-in PUF calculation R i ＝PUF i (C i ) And then sent to the TA.
Step S2.4, TA receives R i Thereafter, auxiliary data HLP is generated by BCH encoder circuitry i ＝BCH Encoder (R i ) Store < C i ,R i ,HLP i In its database, with key K t Encryption. Thereafter TA selects random numbersAnd is V i Calculate its pseudo identity->TA will { PID i ,X i Transmitted to vehicle V i 。
Step S2.5, vehicle V i Receipt { PID ] i ,X i After } it is stored in its own OBU.
Step S2.6, TA is RSU j Select ID j As its identity and issuing token j As RSU j Token in network activity, after which TA calculates X j ＝h(ID j ||K t ) Will { ID } j ,X j ,token j Send to RSU j 。
Step S2.7, RSU j Received { ID } j ,X j ,token j After } it is saved in its database.
(3) And a batch authentication stage.
Step S3.1, a plurality of automobiles move to the area RSU in the public channel in a specific time j An authentication request is sent. Here in vehicle V i The following are examples: v (V) i Selecting random numbersCalculate->m i,2 ＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) After that V i Integrating messages as M i ＝{m i,1 ,m i,2 ,PID i Transmitted to regional RSU j 。
Step S3.2, RSU j Receiving authentication request messages M from multiple automobiles 1 ,M 2 ,...,M m After which RSU j Their aggregation is expressed asAfter which a random number is selected +.>Calculation ofRSU j Will->To the TA.
Step S3.3.1, TA receives RSU j After the message of (a), TA first goes to RSU j And (5) authentication: calculation ofObtaining token j Then searching the database to verify whether it is legal, if not, finding the token j Ending the authentication flow, otherwise calculating +.>Ending the authentication flow if the equation is not satisfied, otherwise, will +>Splitting, respectively authenticating the vehicle messages in the split messages to obtain a vehicle V i The following are examples: TA calculationAfter which the equation m 'is verified' i,2 ？＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) If the equation is satisfied, the authentication flow continues, otherwise the authentication of the vehicle is stopped.
Step S3.3.2, after the TA authenticates all vehicles, the TA selectsComputing session keysFor RSU j TA calculation:TA calculates the following for successfully authenticated vehicles, here vehicle V i For example, TA calculation:
thereafter aggregating messagesTA send messageTo RSU j 。
Step S3.4, RSU j After receiving the TA message, calculatingSK＝h(ID j ||n j *I R ) Verify equation->If the equation is not satisfied, ending the authentication flow, otherwise, respectively sending the messageTo a designated vehicle.
Step S3.5, vehicle V i Received RSU j After the message of (2), calculating:
R actual ＝PUF i (C i )，
here first of all the original challenge C is utilized i Generating R actual Then using BCH encoder circuit and TA transmitted auxiliary data to eliminate the influence of temperature and noise, recovering original R i The method comprises the following steps:
R i ＝BCH Decoder (R actual ,HLP i )，
thereafter V i Verification equationIf yes, ending the current flow, otherwise, saving ++>As its new pseudo-identity and calculateMessage->To the TA.
Step S3.6, TA receives vehicle V i After the message of (2), calculateAnd generating auxiliary dataWill->Stored in its database for the next authentication.
The above description is merely of preferred embodiments of the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, but all equivalent modifications or variations according to the present disclosure will be within the scope of the claims.
Claims (3)
1. A vehicle networking lightweight privacy protection batch authentication method based on PUF is characterized in that: the participant comprises a vehicle, a roadside unit (RSU) and a trusted center (TA), and the method comprises an initialization setting stage, a registration stage and a batch authentication stage and specifically comprises the following steps of:
step 1, initializing a setting stage;
system initialization, TA selects its key K t Secure Hash function h (·): {1,0} * →{1,0} ln A symmetric key algorithm;
step 2, a registration stage;
step S2.1, vehicle V i Transmitting a true identity ID with itself to the TA over a secure channel i Is a registration request for (a);
step S2.2, TA after receiving the registration request, firstly checking if the database has ID i Rejecting the registration request if the registration request exists; otherwise calculate X i ＝h(ID i ||K t ) Will challenge C i To vehicle V i ；
Step S2.3, vehicle V i Receipt C i Calculating R i ＝PUF i (C i ) And send to the TA;
step S2.4, TA receives R i Post-calculation HLP i ＝BCH Encoder (R i ) Store < C i ,R i ,HLP i In its database, with key K t Encrypting; thereafter TA selects random numbersAnd is V i Calculate its pseudo identity->TA will { PID i ,X i Transmitted to vehicle V i ：
Step S2.5, vehicle V i Receipt { PID ] i ,X i After } store it in its own vehicle equipped on board unit OBU;
step S2.6, TA is RSU j Select ID j As its identity and issuing token j As RSU j Token in network activity, after which TA calculates X j ＝h(ID j ||K t ) Will { ID } j ,X j ,token j Send to RSU j ；
Step S2.7, RSU j Received { ID } j ,X j ,token j After } it is saved in its database;
step 3, a batch authentication stage;
step S3.1, a plurality of automobiles move to the area RSU in the public channel in a specific time j Send authentication request for vehicle V i ，V i Selecting random numbersCalculate->m i,2 ＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) Integrate message M i ＝{m i,1 ,m i,2 ,PID i Transmitted to regional RSU j ；
Step S3.2, RSU j Receiving authentication request messages from multiple vehicles and aggregating them to represent them asAfter which a random number is selected +.>Calculate-> RSU j Will->Transmitting to TA;
step S3.3.1, TA receives RSU j After the message of (a), TA first goes to RSU j And (5) authentication: calculate X j ＝h(ID j ||K t ),Obtaining token j Searching the database to verify whether the database is legal, if not, finding the token j Ending the authentication flow, otherwise calculating +.>Ending the authentication flow if the equation is not satisfied, otherwise, will +>Splitting, respectively authenticating vehicle messages in the split messages, and for vehicle V i TA calculation->X i ＝h(ID i ||K t )，m′ i,2 ？＝h(ID i ||ID j ||PID i ||X i ||n i ) If the equation is satisfied, continuing the authentication flow, otherwise stopping the authentication of the vehicle;
step S3.3.2, after the TA authenticates all vehicles, the TA selectsComputing session keysFor RSU j TA calculation: /> For vehicle V i TA calculation->After which the message is aggregated->TA send message->To RSU j ；
Step S3.4, RSU j After receiving the TA message, calculatingSK＝h(ID j ||n j *I R ) Validating an equationIf the equation is not satisfied, ending the authentication flow, otherwise, respectively sending the messageTo a designated vehicle;
step S3.5, vehicle V i Received RSU j After the message of (2), calculateC i ，/>HLP i ，SK，R actual ,R i Verify equation->If yes, ending the current flow, otherwise, savingAs a new pseudo-identity and calculating +.> Message->Transmitting to TA;
step S3.6, TA receives vehicle V i After the message of (2), calculateAnd generating auxiliary dataWill->Stored in its database for the next timeAnd (5) authentication.
2. The PUF-based internet of vehicles lightweight privacy preserving batch authentication method as set forth in claim 1, wherein: in step S3.3.2The calculation method comprises the following steps:
3. the PUF-based internet of vehicles lightweight privacy preserving batch authentication method as set forth in claim 1, wherein: in step S3.5C i ，/>HLP i ，SK，R actual ,R i The calculation method comprises the following steps:
R actual ＝PUF i (C i )，
R i ＝BCH Decoder (R actual ,HLP i )。
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