CN114384878A - Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) - Google Patents
Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- CN114384878A CN114384878A CN202111655544.8A CN202111655544A CN114384878A CN 114384878 A CN114384878 A CN 114384878A CN 202111655544 A CN202111655544 A CN 202111655544A CN 114384878 A CN114384878 A CN 114384878A
- Authority
- CN
- China
- Prior art keywords
- network
- signal
- case
- logic
- function
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Pending
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 33
- 230000001960 triggered effect Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 11
- 230000000116 mitigating effect Effects 0.000 claims description 12
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000001105 regulatory effect Effects 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000009499 grossing Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 230000004069 differentiation Effects 0.000 claims description 4
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 claims description 3
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 abstract description 20
- 230000007547 defect Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 230000008030 elimination Effects 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000003379 elimination reaction Methods 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000011084 recovery Methods 0.000 abstract description 3
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 7
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000001052 transient effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 206010033799 Paralysis Diseases 0.000 description 2
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000015572 biosynthetic process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000011160 research Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000002411 adverse Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000013307 optical fiber Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000010355 oscillation Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000008439 repair process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/418—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM]
- G05B19/4184—Total factory control, i.e. centrally controlling a plurality of machines, e.g. direct or distributed numerical control [DNC], flexible manufacturing systems [FMS], integrated manufacturing systems [IMS] or computer integrated manufacturing [CIM] characterised by fault tolerance, reliability of production system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B2219/00—Program-control systems
- G05B2219/30—Nc systems
- G05B2219/31—From computer integrated manufacturing till monitoring
- G05B2219/31088—Network communication between supervisor and cell, machine group
-
- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02P—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE PRODUCTION OR PROCESSING OF GOODS
- Y02P90/00—Enabling technologies with a potential contribution to greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions mitigation
- Y02P90/02—Total factory control, e.g. smart factories, flexible manufacturing systems [FMS] or integrated manufacturing systems [IMS]
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Manufacturing & Machinery (AREA)
- Quality & Reliability (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of system control, and particularly relates to a method for relieving network fault consequences of a DCS. The present invention includes the following cases: case 1, the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network has the condition of inverting not gate in the interlocking protection logic; case 2, a logic interlock protection function is triggered by the low level of the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network; case 3, the case that the closed-loop regulator modulated quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 4, the case where the important closed-loop regulator feed-forward quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 5, where the analog signal transmitted over the network participates in an important computational function in the logic. The invention can ensure that the running state of the equipment and the unit is not influenced, and win defect elimination time for the recovery of the network communication function.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of system control, and particularly relates to a method for relieving network fault consequences of a DCS.
Background
A Distributed Control System (DCS) is currently widely used in the nuclear power industry, and in recent years, an unplanned shutdown event occurs when a unit generates an unplanned shutdown event due to a DCS network fault. Theoretically, it is analyzed that, regardless of the network structure, the probability of network failure (network outage or network storm) due to network equipment failure always exists. At present, no measure and method for realizing consequence relieving through soft logic after a layer of network fault of a DCS is available at home and abroad, and in order to relieve or avoid adverse effects of the network fault on the operation of a unit, a network fault consequence relieving method independent of a network structure needs to be researched.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a method for relieving the network fault consequence of a DCS, which can ensure that the running states of equipment and units are not influenced under the condition of network fault, and win defect elimination time for the recovery of a network communication function.
The invention is suitable for logic design of a new unit and reconstruction of an operating unit.
The technical scheme adopted by the invention is as follows:
a method for relieving the network fault consequence of a DCS system comprises the following conditions: case 1, the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network has the condition of inverting not gate in the interlocking protection logic; case 2, a logic interlock protection function is triggered by the low level of the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network; case 3, the case that the closed-loop regulator modulated quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 4, the case where the important closed-loop regulator feed-forward quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 5, where the analog signal transmitted over the network participates in an important computational function in the logic.
For the situation 1, the logic of inverting the interlock protection in the non-fault AP is moved forward to the source AP where the digital quantity signal is collected or generated, so that it can be ensured that the signal output to other APs is still 0 after the network fault occurs, and the interlock protection function of the device cannot be triggered by mistake.
And aiming at the condition 2, an RS trigger is added, the high-level network signal keeps the high-level signal after the network fault by triggering a set end of the RS trigger, and a signal with a function opposite to that of the S end is introduced into a reset end for resetting.
In case 3, when a network failure occurs, the signal of the controlled variable of the regulator transmitted through the network becomes 0, and the regulator loses the control function due to the loss of the feedback variable.
The relieving measure is to change the analog quantity regulated signal from the network to the AP where the regulator is located into hard wiring to the AP where the regulator is located.
For the case 4, for the case that the feedforward quantity does not change drastically, a quality bit (a digital quantity representing whether the analog quantity signal is valid or not) of the analog quantity signal is introduced into the differential soft functional block, and the feedforward effect is eliminated when the analog quantity signal fails.
For the situation 4, the feedforward quantity passes through the smoothing function block controlled by the mass position of the feedforward quantity and then is calculated through the differentiation link, namely when the mass position of the feedforward analog quantity signal is effective, the smoothing function block does not work, when the mass position is invalid, the feedforward quantity slowly attenuates to 0 through the first-order inertia link with preset inertia time constant, and the output of the differentiation link is a very small numerical value, so that step-like disturbance cannot be generated on the closed-loop regulator.
For the case 5, a plurality of analog quantity network signals participate in the calculation of the average value and the calculation of the target set value function of the closed-loop regulator.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) after the actual verification on the set (the set artificially makes a network storm fault during a hot state), the method provided by the invention can effectively avoid the disturbance of the network fault on the running states of equipment and the set after relieving the control logic, the set is in a hot state working condition at the last stage of 11 th major repair of the set No. 1, all main equipment of the set is in a running state (except that a high-voltage system is not put into the system), and when an instrumentation and control person processes the communication fault between a side-emission control system and a main instrumentation and control system, the network storm is triggered, a two-layer network of the non-safety instrumentation and control system is completely paralyzed within 3 seconds, all measuring point information on a monitoring picture of a main control room is lost, and the whole process lasts for about 7 minutes. After the instrument control personnel recover the normal functions of the network, all the equipment are in the normal running state, and the running state of each system of the unit is stable.
(2) The method for relieving the network fault consequence of the DCS provided by the invention can ensure that the running states of equipment and units are not influenced under the condition of network fault, and win defect elimination time for the recovery of the network communication function.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a non-safety level DCS;
FIG. 2 is a schematic illustration of the mechanism of web break formation;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a digital quantity signal transmitted through a network in the presence of an inverted (NOT gate) in the interlock protection logic;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a logic interlock protection function triggered by a low level of a digital quantity signal transmitted through a network;
FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a closed-loop regulator with a modulated signal transmitted through a network;
FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of closed loop control logic;
FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of the transmission of an important closed-loop regulator feedforward quantity signal through a network;
FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of the situation where analog signals transmitted through the network participate in important computing functions in the logic;
in the figure: 1-operator terminal; 2-a server unit; 3-a communication processing unit; a 4-2 layer network; 6-DCS control cabinet; 7-1 layer network; 8-instrument; 9-a valve; 10-an electric pump; 11-a switch; 12-a switch in communication with the main network; 13-a switch in communication with the main network; 14-communication link (optical fiber); 15-breakpoint (failed switch); 16-breakpoint (failed switch); 17-a digital quantity signal; 18-NOT gate (NOT gate); 19-network communication path; 20-an intra-AP signal path of the cabinet; 21-interlock protection logic; 22-high level digital quantity signal; 23-a signal with a function opposite to that of the high-level switching value signal; 24-network communication path; a 25-RS flip-flop (RS Flipflop); 26-interlock protection logic; 27-analog meters; 28-target value; 29-a subtractor; 30-a PID regulator; 31-analog feedforward signal transmitted through network; 32-analog feedforward quantity signal quality bit; 33-a differential function block; 34-participating closed-loop regulator master bias calculation logic; 35-a feed forward signal; 36-feedforward signal quality bits; 37-pulse generator (Pulser); 38-constant value; 39-Analog switch function block (Analog switch function block); 40-smoothing function block (smoothening function block); 41-a differential function block; 42-participating closed-loop regulator master bias calculation logic; 43-network transmitted signals; 44-analog 1 signal; 45-analog 2 signal; 46-analog 3 signal; 47-analog 1 signal quality bits; 48-analog 2 signal quality bits; 49-analog 3 signal quality bits; 50-analog mean calculation function block; 51-OR gate (Joint gate); 52-Analog switch function block (Analog switch function block).
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that the terms "center", "upper", "lower", "left", "right", "vertical", "horizontal", "inner", "outer", etc., indicate orientations or positional relationships based on the orientations or positional relationships shown in the drawings, and are only for convenience of description and simplicity of description, but do not indicate or imply that the device or element being referred to must have a particular orientation, be constructed and operated in a particular orientation, and thus, should not be construed as limiting the present invention. Furthermore, the terms "first," "second," and "third" are used for descriptive purposes only and are not to be construed as indicating or implying relative importance.
In the description of the present invention, it should be noted that, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning either a fixed connection, a removable connection, or an integral connection; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood in specific cases to those skilled in the art.
In the prior art, the non-security LEVEL DCS may be divided into three layers as a whole in the structure, which are a local equipment layer 0 (LEVEL 0), a control layer 1 (LEVEL 1), and an operation and display layer 2 (LEVEL 2), where the 0-layer equipment and the 1-layer control cabinet are connected by hard wires, the 1-layer cabinet is connected by a network, and the 2-layer equipment is connected by a network, as shown in fig. 1. Although the layer 1 control cabinet and the layer 2 device are connected by the network, from the view of the use of the layer 1 and the layer 2 network signals, the layer 1 network signal mainly participates in the interlocking and protection use of each device, and the layer two network signal mainly is the monitoring and control signal of the operator terminal, therefore, when the unit is in stable operation, if the operator does not send a control instruction, the layer 2 network signal is the monitoring signal of the machine-to-group state. In summary, when a fault occurs in the layer 1 network, the control and protection functions of some devices will be affected by network signals to change the operating state of the device or the unit, while when a fault occurs in the layer 2 network, an operator cannot monitor or operate some or all devices, and the existing operating state of the device is not affected. Therefore, the research of the DCS network fault consequence relieving method mainly aims at the research of a 1-layer network fault mode, a fault consequence and a relieving method.
From the analysis of the network structure, the network failure mode is divided into network disconnection and data congestion of the network (network storm).
The mechanism of the broken network is that two switches on the network simultaneously have faults to form two breakpoints (as shown in fig. 2), one network segment is cut into two network segments, the communication function between the cabinets connected on each segment of network is still normal, but the communication function between the two segments of network is lost, so that the communication signal between partial control cabinets on the network is lost; meanwhile, because one network section cannot perform data interaction with the two network sections, an operator cannot monitor data on the network section.
The formation mechanism of the network storm is that a looped network is physically formed on the network due to the fault of a certain switch, so that data on the network in a short time is increased in a geometric grade to form a data storm, and finally the network is broken down due to data blockage. Practice proves that the whole network can be paralyzed within 3 seconds after the network storm is generated.
From the consequences of network storms and network-down failures, the communication is interrupted due to network link failure, but the network storms belong to the most serious network failures.
After a network breaking fault occurs, communication cannot be established at the breakpoint, so that communication signals received by control cabinets on two sides of the breakpoint are changed into 0; after the network storm fault occurs, the network signals received by all the cabinets become 0.
Because the communication signal characteristics after the network is disconnected and the network storm are the same, the mitigation principle and the mitigation measure aiming at the mitigation of the consequences of the network disconnection and the network storm are also the same, namely, the influence of the communication signal characteristics after the network fault on the logic control function is combed, and the signal which influences the running state of the equipment or the unit is combed and mitigated on the premise of not changing the signal control function, so that the change of the running state of the equipment or the unit can not be caused under the condition that the network fault (the network storm) occurs.
Specifically, the method for relieving the network fault consequence of the DCS system provided by the present invention includes the following conditions:
1. the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network has the condition of inverting (not gate) in the interlocking protection logic;
because the communication signals between the cabinets finally become 0 after the network fault, if the digital quantity is inverted, the digital quantity participates in the interlocking protection function, and the interlocking protection function is triggered by mistake.
The logic of inverting the interlock protection in the non-failure AP is moved forward to the source AP where the digital quantity signal is collected or generated, so that it can be ensured that the signal output to other APs is still 0 after the network failure occurs, and the interlock protection function of the device is not triggered by mistake, as shown in fig. 3.
2. The condition that the logic interlocking protection function is triggered by the low level of a digital quantity signal transmitted through a network;
the high level digital signal transmitted through the network will become 0 after the network failure, thus causing the protection function to be triggered by mistake.
An RS (Reset and Set) trigger is added, a high-level network signal keeps a high-level signal after the network fault through triggering the S (Set: Set end) end of the RS trigger, and a signal with a function opposite to that of the S end is introduced into the R (Reset: Reset end) end for resetting. For example, if the trigger signal of the RS trigger is an automatic signal for the regulator, the trigger signal of the R trigger is an automatic signal for the regulator; the end S is the on feedback signal of the valve and the pump, and the end R is the off feedback signal of the valve and the pump, as shown in fig. 4.
3. The condition that the regulated quantity signal of the closed-loop regulator is transmitted through the network;
after the network fault, analog quantity communication signals among all the cabinets are all changed into 0, at the moment, if the closed-loop regulator is not automatically withdrawn, the regulating valve is fully opened or fully closed, step-like disturbance is caused to a process system, and transient state of a unit and even shutdown and shutdown of the unit can be caused.
When a network failure occurs, the signal of the regulated quantity of the regulator transmitted through the network becomes 0, and the regulator loses the regulation function because of the loss of the feedback quantity. The mitigation measure is to change the analog quantity regulated signal from the network to the AP where the regulator is located to be hard-wired to the AP where the regulator is located, as shown in fig. 5.
4. The situation where the important closed-loop regulator feed-forward quantity signal is transmitted through the network;
like the regulated signal, when the network fails, the feedforward signal of the closed-loop regulator transmitted through the network becomes 0, which causes step-like disturbance to the process system, and causes transient state of the unit and even shutdown and shutdown of the unit.
In the closed-loop control logic, the feedforward quantity generally participates in the total deviation calculation of the closed loop after passing through a differential link. Two types of mitigation measures are provided, one is that aiming at the condition that the feedforward quantity is not changed violently, a quality bit of an analog quantity signal (representing whether the analog quantity signal is effective or not) is introduced into a differential soft functional block, and the feedforward action is eliminated when the analog quantity signal is invalid, as shown in fig. 6; secondly, under the condition that the change of the feedforward quantity is severe, the feedforward quantity has a large influence on the total deviation quantity of the closed loop after passing through the differential function block, if the feedforward action is directly eliminated after the network fault, the total deviation of the closed loop is introduced into step disturbance, and the instantaneous large fluctuation or oscillation of the valve regulation can be caused, so that the relieving measure aiming at the condition is that the feedforward quantity passes through the smooth function block controlled by the quality bit and then is calculated through the differential link, namely when the quality bit of the feedforward analog quantity signal is effective, the smooth function block does not work, when the quality bit fails (the network fault or the transmitter fault), the feedforward quantity slowly attenuates to be 0 through a first-order inertia link with preset inertia time constant, and the output of the differential link is a very small numerical value at the moment, so that the similar step disturbance can not be generated on the closed loop regulator, as shown in fig. 7.
5. The analog quantity signal transmitted through the network participates in the condition of an important calculation function in the logic;
in the DCS control logic, a large number of analog quantity signals transmitted through a network participate in an important logic calculation function, and most of results after logic calculation participate in interlocking protection of equipment or a system, such as a plurality of analog quantity network signals participate in average value calculation, participate in target set value function calculation of a closed-loop regulator, and the like. If a network fault occurs, the logic calculated value is seriously deviated from an actual value, and the unit is easy to generate transient state and even shut down and shutdown.
After the network failure occurs, the output value of the selector switch is maintained as the analog signal value before the quality bit fails by the analog signal quality bit interlock selector switch, as shown in fig. 8.
It will be evident to those skilled in the art that the invention is not limited to the details of the foregoing illustrative embodiments, and that the present invention may be embodied in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential attributes thereof. The present embodiments are therefore to be considered in all respects as illustrative and not restrictive, the scope of the invention being indicated by the appended claims rather than by the foregoing description, and all changes which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims are therefore intended to be embraced therein. Any reference sign in a claim should not be construed as limiting the claim concerned.
Furthermore, it should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment may contain only a single embodiment, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should integrate the description, and the embodiments may be combined as appropriate to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
Claims (8)
1. A method for relieving the network fault consequence of a DCS is characterized in that: the method comprises the following conditions: case 1, the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network has the condition of inverting not gate in the interlocking protection logic; case 2, a logic interlock protection function is triggered by the low level of the digital quantity signal transmitted through the network; case 3, the case that the closed-loop regulator modulated quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 4, the case where the important closed-loop regulator feed-forward quantity signal is transmitted through the network; case 5, where the analog signal transmitted over the network participates in an important computational function in the logic.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: for the situation 1, the logic of inverting the interlock protection in the non-fault AP is moved forward to the source AP where the digital quantity signal is collected or generated, so that it can be ensured that the signal output to other APs is still 0 after the network fault occurs, and the interlock protection function of the device cannot be triggered by mistake.
3. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: and aiming at the condition 2, an RS trigger is added, the high-level network signal keeps the high-level signal after the network fault by triggering a set end of the RS trigger, and a signal with a function opposite to that of the S end is introduced into a reset end for resetting.
4. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: in case 3, when a network failure occurs, the signal of the controlled variable of the regulator transmitted through the network becomes 0, and the regulator loses the control function due to the loss of the feedback variable.
5. The method of claim 4, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of the DCS system network fault comprises: the relieving measure is to change the analog quantity regulated signal from the network to the AP where the regulator is located into hard wiring to the AP where the regulator is located.
6. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: for the case 4, for the case that the feedforward quantity does not change drastically, a quality bit (a digital quantity representing whether the analog quantity signal is valid or not) of the analog quantity signal is introduced into the differential soft functional block, and the feedforward effect is eliminated when the analog quantity signal fails.
7. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: for the situation 4, the feedforward quantity passes through the smoothing function block controlled by the mass position of the feedforward quantity and then is calculated through the differentiation link, namely when the mass position of the feedforward analog quantity signal is effective, the smoothing function block does not work, when the mass position is invalid, the feedforward quantity slowly attenuates to 0 through the first-order inertia link with preset inertia time constant, and the output of the differentiation link is a very small numerical value, so that step-like disturbance cannot be generated on the closed-loop regulator.
8. The method of claim 1, wherein the method for mitigating consequences of a DCS system network failure comprises: for the case 5, a plurality of analog quantity network signals participate in the calculation of the average value and the calculation of the target set value function of the closed-loop regulator.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202111655544.8A CN114384878A (en) | 2021-12-31 | 2021-12-31 | Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202111655544.8A CN114384878A (en) | 2021-12-31 | 2021-12-31 | Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CN114384878A true CN114384878A (en) | 2022-04-22 |
Family
ID=81200353
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN202111655544.8A Pending CN114384878A (en) | 2021-12-31 | 2021-12-31 | Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN114384878A (en) |
Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102291255A (en) * | 2011-07-22 | 2011-12-21 | 中国电力科学研究院 | Communication network node device for wide-area protection of electric power system and realizing method thereof |
| CN104065515A (en) * | 2014-07-03 | 2014-09-24 | 上海自仪泰雷兹交通自动化***有限公司 | Multi-loop system for DCS system |
| CN108733021A (en) * | 2017-11-20 | 2018-11-02 | 江苏核电有限公司 | The method of the double AP failure risks dispersions of DCS system |
| CN113037540A (en) * | 2017-08-09 | 2021-06-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | Communication method, device and storage medium |
| CN113688521A (en) * | 2021-08-25 | 2021-11-23 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Design method and system for test allowable function of high-reliability reactor protection system |
-
2021
- 2021-12-31 CN CN202111655544.8A patent/CN114384878A/en active Pending
Patent Citations (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN102291255A (en) * | 2011-07-22 | 2011-12-21 | 中国电力科学研究院 | Communication network node device for wide-area protection of electric power system and realizing method thereof |
| CN104065515A (en) * | 2014-07-03 | 2014-09-24 | 上海自仪泰雷兹交通自动化***有限公司 | Multi-loop system for DCS system |
| CN113037540A (en) * | 2017-08-09 | 2021-06-25 | 华为技术有限公司 | Communication method, device and storage medium |
| CN108733021A (en) * | 2017-11-20 | 2018-11-02 | 江苏核电有限公司 | The method of the double AP failure risks dispersions of DCS system |
| CN113688521A (en) * | 2021-08-25 | 2021-11-23 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Design method and system for test allowable function of high-reliability reactor protection system |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| US20230335991A1 (en) | Proactive intelligent load shedding | |
| KR102218268B1 (en) | Substation Automation Operating Device Equipped with Automatic Generation of Failure Judgment and Failure Recovery Scenarios | |
| CN101951025B (en) | Energy management system of offshore grid | |
| CN101710400B (en) | Method and device for evaluating risk of nuclear power station | |
| Zhao et al. | Review and prospect of hidden failure: protection system and security and stability control system | |
| CN102255309B (en) | Self-healing control method of centralized distribution network | |
| CN207588558U (en) | Intelligent substation fiber failure on-line early warning system | |
| CN112736866B (en) | Relay protection self-adaptive real-time evaluation method and system based on wide area information | |
| CN108011699A (en) | reactor computer monitoring system network architecture method | |
| CN201781325U (en) | Energy management system for offshore power grid | |
| Begovic et al. | System integrity protection schemes (SIPS) | |
| CN114384878A (en) | Method for relieving network fault consequence of DCS (distributed control system) | |
| Kjølle et al. | Fault statistics as a basis for designing cost-effective protection and control solutions | |
| CN110767338A (en) | DCS (distributed control system) architecture for nuclear power reactor | |
| KR100850484B1 (en) | Method and apparatus for adjusting trip set values of programmable logic controller based digital reactor protection system | |
| Xue | Towards space-time cooperative defence framework against blackouts in China | |
| CN112506169B (en) | DCS real-time health degree assessment method based on state supervision | |
| CN114513053A (en) | Comprehensive intelligent anti-misoperation system and anti-misoperation method thereof | |
| CN109787834B (en) | Calculation method for non-independent fault probability of nuclear power unit considering power grid operation parameters | |
| Yao et al. | Optimization measures to reduce the influence of the network failure in DCS system of power plant | |
| Madani et al. | Application considerations in system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) | |
| CN107909275A (en) | A kind of state evaluation computational methods suitable for Intelligent substation merging unit | |
| CN110708198B (en) | Data acquisition system and method for nuclear power plant emergency command system | |
| CN114294637B (en) | Low-temperature economizer state monitoring system and method based on machine learning | |
| CN218767897U (en) | Control system for steam turbine of nuclear power station |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| PB01 | Publication | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination | ||
| SE01 | Entry into force of request for substantive examination |