CN114221765B - Quantum key distribution method for fusion of QKD network and classical cryptographic algorithm - Google Patents

Quantum key distribution method for fusion of QKD network and classical cryptographic algorithm Download PDF

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CN114221765B
CN114221765B CN202210147531.8A CN202210147531A CN114221765B CN 114221765 B CN114221765 B CN 114221765B CN 202210147531 A CN202210147531 A CN 202210147531A CN 114221765 B CN114221765 B CN 114221765B
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access terminal
qkd
domain server
quantum key
server
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CN114221765A (en
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董智超
郑韶辉
王士通
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Zhejiang Quantum Technologies Co ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
    • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

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Abstract

A quantum key distribution method for fusion of a QKD network and a classical cryptographic algorithm comprises the following steps: establishing a mesh topology between the QKD network and the access terminal; issuing public and private key pairs to each QKD node in the mesh topology; the communication QKD nodes mutually initiate a virtual quantum key distribution link establishment request; quantum key encryption and decryption communication processes are realized among the communication QKD nodes. Compared with the prior art, the invention solves the problem of fusion between the quantum key distribution network and the information system based on the classical cryptographic algorithm. By using the safe encryption channel constructed based on the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm key negotiation process, the dynamic key distribution from the quantum backbone network to the terminal equipment is realized, and the problem of inconvenient offline charging is solved. By using the signature algorithm of the bidirectional authentication, the problem of identity authentication between the domain server and the terminal equipment and between the terminal equipment and the terminal equipment is solved. Replay attacks can be effectively prevented by introducing a time parameter into the algorithm.

Description

Quantum key distribution method for fusion of QKD network and classical cryptographic algorithm
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of quantum communication and cryptography, in particular to a quantum key distribution method fusing a QKD network and a classical cryptographic algorithm.
Background
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is based on the uncertainty, inseparable and unclonable principles in Quantum mechanics, and ensures the Distribution security of keys in a network by using Key Distribution protocols such as BB84, B92 and EPR. In recent years, due to the high security feature of the QKD technology, quantum key distribution platforms based on the QKD technology are widely used in fields with high security requirements, such as e-government affairs, finance, energy and the like.
However, in practical applications, the quantum key distribution device can only be deployed in the backbone communication network for cost reasons, and the communication path from the terminal device to the backbone network can only rely on the classical cryptographic algorithm before the quantum key distribution device is miniaturized and the cost is reduced.
The key distribution method of the mainstream quantum key distribution product in the current market for the terminal equipment from the backbone network adopts an off-line charging mode, the quantum key is charged into the secure storage equipment in advance, and the secure storage equipment is installed on the terminal equipment, so that the terminal equipment can obtain the quantum key.
The method combines quantum key offline charging and classical cryptographic algorithm, a secure channel from a terminal to a quantum key distribution backbone network is constructed by using an encryption algorithm by using a quantum key charged in advance, and then the secure channel is used for updating an online quantum key, the secure channel is usually directly protected by using a symmetric encryption algorithm, but the method has the problems that the complexity of a key negotiation process is higher due to the limitation of offline key storage space and the existence of QKD routing between two terminal devices far away from a wide-area quantum key distribution network, the method is lower in fusion degree with the conventional PKI system with a wide application range, and the market popularization difficulty is high. .
Disclosure of Invention
The invention provides a quantum key distribution method fusing a QKD network and a classical cryptographic algorithm, which aims to solve the technical defects that in the prior art, the application of quantum key offline charging from a backbone network to terminal equipment is inconvenient, the process of the current method for combining the quantum key offline charging and the classical cryptographic algorithm is complex, and the fusion degree of the current PKI system is low, and specifically comprises the following steps:
the technical scheme of the invention is realized as follows:
a quantum key distribution method fusing a QKD network and a classical cryptographic algorithm comprises the following steps:
1) establishing a mesh topology between the QKD network and the access terminal, wherein the mesh topology comprises a plurality of QKD nodes;
2) issuing public and private key pairs to each QKD node in the mesh topology;
3) the communication QKD nodes mutually initiate a virtual quantum key distribution link establishment request;
4) and quantum key encryption and decryption communication processes are realized among the communication QKD nodes, and the quantum key distribution method is completed.
Preferably, in the step 1): the QKD network includes a number of QKD servers in one-to-one correspondence with QKD nodes distributed at different geographic locations and interconnected by communication lines consisting of QKD links and classical network links to form a mesh topology in which different QKD nodes divide different network domains.
Preferably, in the step 2): the QKD server is used for realizing asymmetric cryptographic service and QKD service, the public and private key pair of each QKD server is issued by a uniform trusted server, the access terminal is connected to the QKD servers in the QKD network through the network, one access terminal can only be connected to one QKD server at the same time, and the access terminal is provided with the public and private key pair issued by the connected QKD server; the public and private key pair issuing process of each node is as follows:
step 1, a trusted CA server is used for creating domain server certificates for all QKD nodes;
step 2, installing domain server certificates for all QKD nodes and installing CA service;
step 3, the access terminals which are communicated with each other have classical password calculation capacity and support algorithms of SM2, SM3 and SM 4;
step 4, defining the access terminals which are communicated with each other as an access terminal A and an access terminal B, respectively connecting the access terminal A and the access terminal B to different domain servers, correspondingly serving as a domain server i and a domain server j, and allocating IP addresses;
step 5, using respective domain server to issue certificate for terminal connected thereto;
step 6, installing the issued certificates into the equipment respectively;
and 7, sharing the public key in the certificate between the access terminal A and the access terminal B.
Preferably, the specific process of implementing quantum key encryption and decryption communication between two communication QKD nodes in step 4) is as follows:
step 1, generating random number and time parameter information by an access terminal A, calculating request data and sending the request data to an access terminal B, wherein an SM2 standard algorithm is used as an encryption and signature algorithm, and an SM3 is used as a Hash algorithm;
step 2, the access terminal B verifies the request sent by the access terminal A, extracts information, calculates response data and sends the response data back to the access terminal A, wherein the encryption, signature and signature verification algorithm uses an SM2 standard algorithm, and the Hash algorithm uses SM 3;
step 3, the access terminal A verifies the response data sent by the access terminal B and extracts the information;
step 4, the access terminal A calculates request data according to the extracted information and uses a TCP protocol to launch the request data to a domain server i;
step 5, the access terminal B calculates request data according to the extracted information and uses a TCP protocol to start a domain server j;
step 6, the domain server i verifies the identity of the access terminal A and extracts Token;
step 7, the domain server j verifies the identity of the access terminal B and extracts Token;
step 8, the domain server i and the domain server j confirm whether the Token is consistent;
step 9, the domain server uses SM2 algorithm to negotiate session key with the device through TCP connection;
step 10, the domain server i and the domain server j use a decoy state protocol to distribute quantum keys;
step 11, the domain server i encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal A by using the established TCP channel;
step 12, the domain server j encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal B by using the established TCP channel;
step 13, the access terminal A uses the obtained quantum key to encrypt information and sends the information and the key identification to the access terminal B;
and step 14, the access terminal B finds the quantum encryption key according to the identifier and decrypts the information.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the quantum key distribution method based on the fusion of the QKD network and the classical cryptographic algorithm solves the problem of the fusion between the quantum key distribution network and an information system based on the classical cryptographic algorithm. By using the safe encryption channel constructed based on the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm key negotiation process, the dynamic key distribution from the quantum backbone network to the terminal equipment is realized, and the problem of inconvenient offline charging is solved. By using the signature algorithm of the bidirectional authentication, the problem of identity authentication between the domain server and the terminal equipment and between the terminal equipment and the terminal equipment is solved. Replay attacks can be effectively prevented by introducing a time parameter into the algorithm.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a QKD network of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of public and private key pair issuance according to the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a flow chart of virtual quantum key distribution link establishment in accordance with the present invention;
fig. 4 is a network topology diagram according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The present invention will now be described more fully hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which embodiments of the invention are shown.
As shown in fig. 1, a quantum key distribution method with QKD network fused with classical cryptographic algorithm mainly includes: QKD networks and access terminals. The QKD network is comprised primarily of QKD servers distributed at different geographic locations and interconnected by communication lines comprised of QKD links and classical network links to form a mesh topology.
Furthermore, as shown in fig. 2, the QKD server includes two main functions, namely asymmetric cryptographic service and QKD service, public and private key pairs of all the QKD servers are issued by a unified trusted server, the access terminal is connected to the QKD servers in the QKD network through a private network or the internet, one access terminal can only be connected to one QKD server at the same time, and the access terminal is provided with the public and private key pair issued by the QKD server.
Defining a QKD network S consisting of n QKD servers, having:
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two-domain service in optional QKD serverDevice for cleaning the skin
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Domain server
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，
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Defining a set of access terminals
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、
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，
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Respectively, to a domain server
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Domain server
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All access terminals of the domain server
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And
Figure 423525DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
，
Figure 382254DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
the formed network is defined as a key distribution domain, wherein the domain server
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Is a domain server of the key distribution domain, the domain server
Figure 728101DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
Has a public and private key pair
Figure 875049DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
。
The key distribution domain comprises two types of device domain servers and an access terminal, and defines a device identification ID in the key distribution domain, wherein the ID is formed by splicing two parts, one part is a domain identification
Figure 371889DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
And part is node identification
Figure 287893DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
I.e. by
Figure 743145DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
The symbol "|" represents concatenation, the device identifiers of the domain servers are all zero, the access terminal domain identifiers in the same key distribution domain are completely the same, and the node identifiers in different domains may be the same.
Selecting access terminals
Figure 377389DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
、
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Defining the equipment identification of the access terminal A as
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The device identification of the access terminal B is
Figure 58272DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
An access terminal
Figure 445391DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
Has a public and private key pair
Figure 284034DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
And domain server public key
Figure 174629DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
An access terminalTerminal B has public and private key pair
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And domain server public key
Figure 49361DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
。
The encryption algorithm is defined as:
Figure 222854DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
Figure 967956DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
representing a usage key
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The encryption is carried out in such a way that,
Figure 15732DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
representing the plaintext prior to the encryption thereof,
Figure 196178DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
representing the ciphertext after encryption. The decryption algorithm is defined as:
Figure 61366DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
Figure 200223DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
representing usage keys
Figure 518072DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
Decryption is performed. Defining a signature algorithm as
Figure 502208DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
，
Figure 221903DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
Representing the use of private keys
Figure 531661DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
The signature is a signature of the received data,
Figure 336806DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
data representing the use of the signature is stored,
Figure 124634DEST_PATH_IMAGE035
representing the generated signature data. Defining a signature verification algorithm as follows:
Figure 948102DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
Figure 428762DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
public key for indicating usage
Figure 455624DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
The label is checked, and the label is checked,
Figure 47142DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
the signature data which represents the signature needing to be checked, the Text represents the original data used by the signature, and the checking result has two types, namely P passing or F not passing. Defining the HMAC algorithm as:
Figure 741429DEST_PATH_IMAGE040
Figure 127411DEST_PATH_IMAGE041
representing a usage key
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The calculated HMAC algorithms include but are not limited to HMACMD5, HMACSHA256, HMACSM4, etc.,
Figure 36778DEST_PATH_IMAGE042
message data representing the inputs to the algorithm.
Definition is defined by access terminal A, domain server
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Domain server
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The link formed by the access terminal B is a key distribution link between the access terminal A and the access terminal B, and the access terminal A and the domain server are physically connected
Figure 409487DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Access terminal B and domain server
Figure 326497DEST_PATH_IMAGE045
Between them is classical network link, domain server
Figure 995375DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
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The QKD link is established, and the key distribution link establishing process between the access terminal a and the access terminal B is logically connected as follows:
any one of the access terminal a and the access terminal B can be used as an initiator, and assuming that the access terminal a is the initiator, the access terminal a generates a random number
Figure 211910DEST_PATH_IMAGE046
Then, a request for establishing a quantum key distribution link is initiated to the access terminal B, and the request carries data
Figure 214501DEST_PATH_IMAGE047
：
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Figure 370993DEST_PATH_IMAGE049
Wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure 347039DEST_PATH_IMAGE050
for the time parameter to protect against replay attacks, the access terminal B uses the private key
Figure 887742DEST_PATH_IMAGE051
Decrypting the request data sent by the access terminal A, carrying out identity authentication and integrity verification of the access terminal A through the signature data request data, generating a random number after successful verification by adopting a Hash algorithm such as SM3, SHA-1 or SHA-256 and the like
Figure 55DEST_PATH_IMAGE052
And transmits response data to the access terminal a
Figure 318909DEST_PATH_IMAGE053
：
Figure 782252DEST_PATH_IMAGE054
Figure 861066DEST_PATH_IMAGE055
Access terminal a uses the private key
Figure 93464DEST_PATH_IMAGE056
Decrypting the request data sent by the access terminal B, carrying out identity authentication and integrity verification of the access terminal B through the signature data request data, and enabling the access terminal A and the access terminal B to respectively send the request data to the domain server of the domain where the access terminal A and the access terminal B are located
Figure 599532DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
Figure 550170DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Initiating a request, establishing a password distribution link, and defining request data as follows:
Figure 167097DEST_PATH_IMAGE057
Figure 254001DEST_PATH_IMAGE058
Figure 665391DEST_PATH_IMAGE059
domain server
Figure 103326DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
Figure 523943DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Respectively carrying out identity authentication on the access terminal A and the access terminal B, and decrypting the transmitted data to obtain
Figure 714621DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Data, domain server
Figure 828071DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
Figure 487722DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
Secure channel confirmation through QKD
Figure 446451DEST_PATH_IMAGE060
Data consistency, domain server
Figure 773527DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
Figure 792299DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
With access terminal A, connectEstablishing a secure channel between the access terminals B using a DH algorithm or a modified DH algorithm, a domain server
Figure 673667DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
Domain server
Figure 436087DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
The quantum key is negotiated through a QKD protocol and is respectively pushed to an access terminal A and an access terminal B through a secure channel between the access terminal A and the access terminal B, quantum key information comprises two parts, a key identifier and a key value, and the quantum key information is specifically defined as follows:
Figure 352090DEST_PATH_IMAGE061
the access terminal A and the access terminal B use the obtained quantum key to carry out safe communication, and the key identification information is attached to the communication data, and after the session is ended, the access terminal A and the access terminal B are actively disconnected to the domain server
Figure 807342DEST_PATH_IMAGE043
、
Figure 441586DEST_PATH_IMAGE044
And releasing the resources.
Further, when
Figure 991385DEST_PATH_IMAGE062
And then, the access terminal A and the access terminal B are connected to the same domain server, and at this time, a virtual quantum key distribution link does not need to be constructed, the access terminal A and the access terminal B directly use a DH algorithm or an improved DH algorithm to send a request for establishing a secure channel to the domain server, and the quantum key is directly pulled from the domain server.
To ensure the security of the communication between access terminal a and access terminal B, a one-time pad algorithm may be employed.
The key cloud service layer also provides a quantum key management interface, including but not limited to operations of generating, finding, using, destroying, etc. a quantum key, which is derived from the virtual QKD network.
The general method steps of the invention include:
1) establishing a mesh topology between the QKD network and the access terminal, wherein the mesh topology comprises a plurality of QKD nodes;
2) issuing public and private key pairs to each QKD node in the mesh topology;
3) the communication QKD nodes mutually initiate a virtual quantum key distribution link establishment request;
4) and quantum key encryption and decryption communication processes are realized among the communication QKD nodes, and the quantum key distribution method is completed.
Referring to fig. 3-4, the embodiment of the present invention includes the following specific steps:
step 1, constructing a QKD network at least comprising more than two nodes, and carrying out quantum secret communication between the nodes by using a QKD technology;
step 2, dividing different network domains for different nodes in the QKD network;
step 3, using a trusted CA server to create domain server certificates for all QKD nodes;
step 4, installing domain server certificates for all QKD nodes and installing CA service;
step 5, preparing two network access terminals A and B with classical password computing capability, and requiring to at least support SM2, SM3 and SM4 algorithms;
step 6, connecting A, B to different domain servers, domain server i and domain server j respectively as shown in fig. 4, and allocating the IP addresses;
step 7, using the domain server to respectively issue certificates for the access terminal A and the access terminal B connected to the domain server;
step 8, the issued certificates are respectively installed in the access terminal A and the access terminal B;
step 9, sharing the public key in the certificate between the access terminal A and the access terminal B;
step 10, the access terminal a actively initiates a request for establishing a virtual quantum key distribution link to the access terminal B, and the following process is shown in fig. 3;
step 11, generating information such as random numbers, time parameters and the like by the access terminal A, calculating request data by using a formula 1, and sending the request data to the access terminal B, wherein the encryption and signature algorithm uses an SM2 standard algorithm, and the Hash algorithm uses SM 3;
step 12, the access terminal B verifies the request sent by the access terminal A, extracts the information, and uses (formula 2) to calculate response data and sends the response data back to the access terminal A, wherein, the encryption, signature and signature verification algorithms use SM2 standard algorithm, and the Hash algorithm uses SM 3;
step 13, the access terminal A verifies the response data sent by the access terminal B and extracts the information;
step 14, the access terminal A calculates the request data by using (formula 3) according to the extracted information, and starts to a domain server i by using a TCP (transmission control protocol);
step 14, the access terminal B calculates the request data by using (formula 4) according to the extracted information, and starts to a domain server j by using a TCP (transmission control protocol);
step 15, the domain server i verifies the identity of the access terminal A and extracts Token;
step 16, the domain server j verifies the identity of the access terminal B and extracts Token;
step 17, the domain server i and the domain server j confirm whether the Token is consistent;
step 18, the domain server negotiates a session key with the device through the TCP connection using the SM2 algorithm;
step 19, the domain server i and the domain server j use a decoy state protocol to distribute the quantum key;
step 20, the domain server i encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal A by using the established TCP channel;
step 21, the domain server j encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal B by using the established TCP channel;
step 21, the access terminal A uses the obtained quantum key to encrypt information and sends the information and the key identification to the access terminal B;
and step 22, the access terminal B finds the encryption key according to the identifier and decrypts the information.
The invention solves the problem of fusion between a quantum key distribution network and an information system based on a classical cryptographic algorithm by combining the structure and the specific process of the invention. By using the safe encryption channel constructed based on the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm key negotiation process, the dynamic key distribution from the quantum backbone network to the terminal equipment is realized, and the problem of inconvenient offline charging is solved. By using the signature algorithm of the bidirectional authentication, the problem of identity authentication between the domain server and the terminal equipment and between the terminal equipment and the terminal equipment is solved. Replay attacks can be effectively prevented by introducing a time parameter into the algorithm.

Claims (1)

1. A quantum key distribution method for fusing a QKD network and a classical cryptographic algorithm is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) establishing a mesh topology between the QKD network and the access terminal, wherein the mesh topology comprises a plurality of QKD nodes;
2) issuing public and private key pairs to each QKD node in the mesh topology;
3) quantum key distribution link establishment requests are mutually initiated among the communication QKD nodes;
4) the quantum key encryption and decryption communication process is realized among the communication QKD nodes, the quantum key distribution method is completed,
in the step 1): the QKD network comprises a plurality of QKD servers, the QKD servers correspond to the QKD nodes one by one, the QKD servers are distributed at different geographical positions and are connected with each other through a communication line formed by QKD links and classical network links to form a mesh topology, different network domains are divided according to different QKD nodes in the mesh topology,
in the step 2): the QKD server is used for realizing asymmetric cryptographic service and QKD service, the public and private key pair of each QKD server is issued by a uniform trusted server, the access terminal is connected to the QKD servers in the QKD network through the network, one access terminal can only be connected to one QKD server at the same time, and the access terminal is provided with the public and private key pair issued by the connected QKD server; the public and private key pair issuing process of each node is as follows:
step 2-1, a trusted CA server is used for creating domain server certificates for all QKD nodes;
step 2-2, installing domain server certificates for all QKD nodes and installing CA service;
2-3, the access terminals which are communicated with each other have classical password calculation capacity and support algorithms of SM2, SM3 and SM 4;
step 2-4, the access terminals which are communicated with each other are defined as an access terminal A and an access terminal B, the access terminal A and the access terminal B are respectively connected to different domain servers, are correspondingly a domain server i and a domain server j, and are allocated with IP addresses;
step 2-5, using respective domain server to issue certificate for terminal connected thereto;
step 2-6, respectively installing the issued certificates into the equipment;
step 2-7, sharing the public key in the certificate between the access terminal A and the access terminal B,
the specific process of realizing quantum key encryption and decryption communication between the two communication QKD nodes in the step 4) is as follows:
step 4-1, generating random numbers and time parameter information by the access terminal A, calculating request data and sending the request data to the access terminal B, wherein the encryption and signature algorithm uses an SM2 standard algorithm, and the Hash algorithm uses SM 3;
step 4-2, the access terminal B verifies the request sent by the access terminal A, extracts information, calculates response data and sends the response data back to the access terminal A, wherein the encryption, signature and signature verification algorithm uses an SM2 standard algorithm, and the Hash algorithm uses SM 3;
step 4-3, the access terminal A verifies the response data sent by the access terminal B and extracts the information;
step 4-4, the access terminal A calculates request data according to the extracted information and uses a TCP protocol to launch the request data to a domain server i;
step 4-5, the access terminal B calculates request data according to the extracted information and uses a TCP protocol to start a domain server j;
step 4-6, the domain server i verifies the identity of the access terminal A and extracts Token;
step 4-7, the domain server j verifies the identity of the access terminal B and extracts Token;
step 4-8, the domain server i and the domain server j confirm whether the Token is consistent;
step 4-9, the domain server uses SM2 algorithm to negotiate session key with the device through TCP connection;
4-10, the domain server i and the domain server j use a decoy state protocol to distribute the quantum key;
step 4-11, the domain server i encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal A by using the established TCP channel;
step 4-12, the domain server j encrypts the quantum key by using the session key, and sends the encrypted quantum key to the access terminal B by using the established TCP channel;
step 4-13, the access terminal A uses the obtained quantum key encryption information to send the information and the key identification to the access terminal B;
and 4-14, the access terminal B finds the quantum encryption key according to the identifier and decrypts the information.
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