CN113746823B - Method for constructing cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of distributed power monitoring network - Google Patents

Method for constructing cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of distributed power monitoring network Download PDF

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CN113746823B
CN113746823B CN202110986639.1A CN202110986639A CN113746823B CN 113746823 B CN113746823 B CN 113746823B CN 202110986639 A CN202110986639 A CN 202110986639A CN 113746823 B CN113746823 B CN 113746823B
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node
cluster
cluster head
head node
trust parameter
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CN113746823A (en
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林琳
王文婷
马强
徐征
聂其贵
刘鑫
黄华
李世慈
李建坡
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
Northeast Electric Power University
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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Electric Power Research Institute of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
Northeast Dianli University
Information and Telecommunication Branch of State Grid Shandong Electric Power Co Ltd
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L41/00Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
    • H04L41/14Network analysis or design
    • H04L41/145Network analysis or design involving simulating, designing, planning or modelling of a network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L45/00Routing or path finding of packets in data switching networks
    • H04L45/46Cluster building

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Abstract

The invention discloses a method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network, which is provided by aiming at the problems of incomplete factors and unreasonable calculation of trust values of all nodes in the trust management model construction in the prior art.

Description

Method for constructing cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of distributed power monitoring network
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of network information security, and relates to a method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network.
Background
The trust management model construction is the premise of network security prevention of the distributed power monitoring system, and has very important significance for safe and stable operation of the network. In a network clustering routing protocol of a distributed power monitoring system, cluster member nodes are responsible for collecting data and sending the data to cluster head nodes, the cluster head nodes are responsible for managing and controlling the cluster member nodes to perform data fusion, inter-cluster forwarding and other work, and whether each node is safe and reliable is judged by adopting a trust management model, which is one of key factors for ensuring the safe operation of the whole network.
At present, in order to adapt to a large-scale distributed power monitoring system network, most trust management models adopt fixed trust values when performing trust evaluation on each node, then a trust value interval is divided, and different operations are performed on nodes in different trust value intervals. This trust management model has the following major problems:
(1) In the process of building the trust management model, the different influences of various routing attacks on the nodes are not considered, so that certain routing attack nodes cannot be identified, and the performance of the whole model is influenced finally;
(2) In the process of building a trust management model, each node is evaluated by adopting direct trust, and the trust judgment of the node is too unilateral, so that the safety of each node is influenced;
in the process of building the trust management model, whether the functions of cluster member nodes and cluster head nodes are different or not is not considered, and whether the trust management model is suitable for the structural characteristics of the clustering routing protocol or not is judged. Literature reports and practical application related to the method for constructing the distributed power monitoring network clustering routing comprehensive trust management model are not found so far.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a scientific and reasonable clustering routing trust management model construction method capable of ensuring safe and reliable operation of a distributed power monitoring network, aiming at the problems of incomplete factors and unreasonable trust value calculation of each node during trust management model construction.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: a method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following steps of constructing a direct trust parameter management model between nodes in a cluster and cluster head nodes, and constructing a comprehensive trust parameter management model between the cluster head nodes, wherein the specific contents are as follows:
1) Direct trust parameter management model construction between cluster nodes and cluster head nodes
Defining clusters in a network as C i I =1,2,.., m, each cluster head node is Ch i I =1,2,.., m, and the node in each cluster is C ik I =1,2,.. Multidot.m, k =1,2,. Multidot.n, intra-cluster node C ik At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000021
wherein, s (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini Is a node C ik The cluster head node is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster, whether the cluster node is trusted is judged by comparing the relation between the direct trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster node is trusted, the cluster head node is used for calculating and storing the trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster
Figure BDA0003230900590000022
When the cluster node is in the credible state, when the cluster node is in the credible state
Figure BDA0003230900590000023
When the cluster node is in a suspicious state, the cluster node is classified as a suspicious state
Figure BDA0003230900590000024
Then, the nodes in the cluster are classified as an untrusted state;
2) Construction of comprehensive trust parameter management model among cluster head nodes
Cluster head node Ch j J =1,2.., m, cluster head node Ch i ,i=1,2,...,m;i≠j,Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000025
wherein, s (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch i Initial number of rounds present;
cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The indirect trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000026
wherein,
Figure BDA00032309005900000211
cluster head node Ch for its common neighbor l L =1,2,., m, i ≠ j ≠ l, at cluster head node Ch j Direct trust parameter of (1), R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch j The number of initial rounds of occurrence;
thus, cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The integrated trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000027
wherein eta is 1 Weight, η, for a node directly trusting a parameter 2 The weight of the node indirect trust parameter is the weight of the node direct trust parameter and the weight of the node indirect trust parameter should satisfy eta 12 =1, default case, let
Figure BDA0003230900590000028
The base station is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster head node, whether the cluster head node is trusted or not is judged by comparing the relation between the comprehensive trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster head node is trusted, the base station calculates and stores the trust parameter information of each cluster head node
Figure BDA0003230900590000029
When the cluster head node is in a credible state, when the cluster head node is in a credible state
Figure BDA00032309005900000210
When the cluster head node is in a suspicious state
Figure BDA0003230900590000031
And meanwhile, the cluster head node is classified as an untrusted state.
The invention discloses a method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network, which is provided by aiming at the problems of incomplete factors and unreasonable calculation of trust values of all nodes in the trust management model construction in the prior art.
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Fig. 1 shows a flow chart of a method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network.
Detailed Description
The invention is further illustrated by the following figures and detailed description.
Referring to fig. 1, the method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network of the present invention includes: the method comprises the following steps of constructing a direct trust parameter management model between nodes in a cluster and cluster head nodes, and constructing a comprehensive trust parameter management model between the cluster head nodes, wherein the specific contents are as follows:
1) Direct trust parameter management model construction between cluster nodes and cluster head nodes
Defining clusters in a network as C i I =1,2,.., m, each cluster head node is Ch i I =1,2,.., m, and the node in each cluster is C ik I =1,2., m, k =1,2., n, intra-cluster node C ik At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000032
wherein, s (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini Is node C ik The cluster head node is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster, whether the cluster node is trusted is judged by comparing the relation between the direct trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster node is trusted, the cluster head node is used for calculating and storing the trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster
Figure BDA0003230900590000033
When the cluster node is in the credible state, when the cluster node is in the credible state
Figure BDA0003230900590000034
When the cluster node is in a suspicious state, the cluster node is classified as a suspicious state
Figure BDA0003230900590000035
And meanwhile, the nodes in the cluster are classified as an untrusted state.
2) Construction of comprehensive trust parameter management model among cluster head nodes
Cluster head node Ch j J =1,2.., m, cluster head node Ch i ,i=1,2,...,m;i≠j,Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000036
wherein, s (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch i Initial number of rounds present;
cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The indirect trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000041
wherein,
Figure BDA0003230900590000042
cluster head node Ch for its common neighbor l L =1,2,., m, i ≠ j ≠ l, at cluster head node Ch j Of R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch j Initial number of rounds present;
thus, cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i Integrated letter ofAny parameter is expressed as:
Figure BDA0003230900590000043
wherein eta is 1 Weight, η, for a node directly trusting a parameter 2 The weight of the node indirect trust parameter is the weight of the node direct trust parameter and the weight of the node indirect trust parameter should satisfy eta 12 =1, default case, let
Figure BDA0003230900590000044
The base station is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster head node, whether the cluster head node is trusted or not is judged by comparing the relation between the comprehensive trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster head node is trusted, the base station calculates and stores the trust parameter information of each cluster head node
Figure BDA0003230900590000045
When the cluster head node is in a credible state, when the cluster head node is in a credible state
Figure BDA0003230900590000046
When the cluster head node is in a suspicious state
Figure BDA0003230900590000047
And then, the cluster head node is classified as an untrusted state.
The software routines of the present invention are programmed in accordance with automation, network security, and computer processing techniques, as will be familiar to those skilled in the art.
The description of the present invention is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the scope of the claims, and those skilled in the art will be able to conceive of other substantially equivalent alternatives, without inventive step, based on the teachings of the embodiments of the present invention, within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (1)

1. A method for constructing a cluster routing comprehensive trust management model of a distributed power monitoring network is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following specific steps of constructing a direct trust parameter management model between nodes in a cluster and cluster head nodes, and constructing a comprehensive trust parameter management model between the cluster head nodes, wherein the specific contents are as follows:
1) Direct trust parameter management model construction between intra-cluster node and cluster head node
Defining clusters in a network as C i I =1,2,.., m, each cluster head node is Ch i I =1,2,.., m, and the node in each cluster is C ik I =1,2,.. Multidot.m, k =1,2,. Multidot.n, intra-cluster node C ik At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003230900580000011
wherein, s (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,C ik ) Is node C in the cluster ik To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini Is node C ik The cluster head node is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster, whether the cluster node is trusted is judged by comparing the relation between the direct trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster node is trusted, the cluster head node is used for calculating and storing the trust parameter information of each cluster node in the cluster
Figure FDA0003230900580000012
When the cluster node is in the credible state, when the cluster node is in the credible state
Figure FDA0003230900580000013
When the cluster node is in a suspicious state, the cluster node is classified as a suspicious state
Figure FDA0003230900580000014
Then, the nodes in the cluster are classified as an untrusted state;
2) Construction of comprehensive trust parameter management model among cluster head nodes
Cluster head node Ch j J =1,2.., m, cluster head node Ch i ,i=1,2,...,m;i≠j,Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The direct trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003230900580000015
wherein, s (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of successful data transmissions, f (Ch) i ,Ch j ) As cluster head node Ch j To cluster head node Ch i Number of data transmission failures, R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch i Initial number of rounds present;
cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The indirect trust parameter above is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003230900580000016
wherein,
Figure FDA0003230900580000017
cluster head node Ch for its common neighbor l L =1,2,., m, i ≠ j ≠ l, at cluster head node Ch j Of R now Running the current number of rounds, R, for the network ini As cluster head node Ch j Initial number of rounds present;
thus, cluster head node Ch j At cluster head node Ch i The above integrated trust parameter is expressed as:
Figure FDA0003230900580000021
wherein eta 1 Weight, η, for a node directly trusting a parameter 2 The weight of the node indirect trust parameter is the weight of the node direct trust parameter and the weight of the node indirect trust parameter should satisfy eta 12 =1, default case, let
Figure FDA0003230900580000022
The base station is responsible for calculating and storing trust parameter information of each cluster head node, whether the cluster head node is trusted or not is judged by comparing the relation between the comprehensive trust parameter and a set threshold value, and when the cluster head node is trusted, the base station calculates and stores the trust parameter information of each cluster head node
Figure FDA0003230900580000023
When the cluster head node is in the credible state, when the cluster head node is in the credible state
Figure FDA0003230900580000024
When the cluster head node is classified as a suspicious state, when the cluster head node is classified as a suspicious state
Figure FDA0003230900580000025
And meanwhile, the cluster head node is classified as an untrusted state.
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