CN113364600A - Certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity, which comprises the following steps: s1, initializing a system; s2, the user blocks and encrypts the data file to obtain a ciphertext data block, and homomorphic signatures of the ciphertext data block are generated to form a signature set; the user generates integrity audit auxiliary information, sends the ciphertext data block and the signature set to the cloud server, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor; s3, a third party auditor generates challenge information, sends the challenge information to a cloud server and generates a pre-calculated value; s4, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor; and S5, verifying the correctness of the audit certification response information by the third party auditor by using the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity. The invention is designed based on a certificateless cryptosystem, and can effectively avoid key escrow and complex certificate management.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, and particularly relates to a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
Background
In the big data age, data is the most valuable resource. Big data can help us to analyze problems, discover laws about the development of things, and use these laws to solve practical problems. However, if we want to make better use of the data, it is necessary firstly to obtain as much data information as possible, and secondly to process the data efficiently. Due to the wide source, variety of types and large amount of data, data acquisition requires many storage devices to store data and sufficient computing power to perform data processing. Although the terminal device is continuously updated and upgraded, the performance is greatly improved, but the storage capacity and the computing power of the terminal device cannot meet the requirements of mass data storage and processing. Cloud computing technology helps terminal devices to get rid of these limitations, and further development is achieved. Cloud computing and cloud storage services have facilitated our lives to be more intelligent and automated.
All data need to be secured at the beginning of creation, but not at the last stage of data storage, only the security measures to strengthen the latter have been proven to be irreparable. The data leakage event may increase by 100% in the coming years unless the data is secured at its source, so that the confidentiality of the data file needs to be guaranteed. These generated data files typically need to be uploaded to the cloud platform in real time within the administrative scope of the owner, and the cloud server may be untrusted, tamper with the outsourced data or return incorrect query results, which may affect the availability of the outsourced data. In order to save storage space, an economically driven cloud server may delete portions of data content that users rarely access while trying to trick users into keeping their data intact. In addition, an adversary may also tamper with the outsourced data for some malicious economic or political purpose. Therefore, the integrity of the data on the cloud server is important on the basis of ensuring the confidentiality of the data on the cloud server. In most cases, the user does not want the real identity of the user to be mastered by others, and the user is always unwilling to upload some data closely related to the real identity of the user, which affects the use of the cloud storage system by the cloud user, and the user tends to use a pseudo identity to use the cloud storage service.
Most of the current typical cloud storage data integrity auditing systems need expensive computing overhead. In practical applications, an auditor generally needs to complete the public integrity verification quickly and notify the user of the audit result as needed. A severe lag may be unacceptable because audit requests may be concentrated within a particular time period. For example, an auditor is assigned to check multiple files simultaneously, which would be advantageous if the computational costs associated with the auditor-side verification could be reduced. Therefore, the identity privacy protection performance is designed, the data confidentiality and integrity are guaranteed, and the light-weight public auditing method for the cloud storage data integrity has important application value.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to overcome one or more defects in the prior art and provides a certificateless-based public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
The purpose of the invention is realized by the following technical scheme: the certificateless public auditing method for the integrity of cloud storage data comprises the following steps:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user;
s2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage;
s3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; generating a pre-calculated value by a third party auditor according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving audit certification response information returned by the cloud server;
s4, generating audit certification response information: after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor;
s5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
Preferably, the S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirementWherein, in the step (A),all are q factorial cyclic groups;
s102, selecting a q factorial method circulation group by a key generation center PKGAnd generates a primitive g and a finite field from order qA non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculatedWherein, in the step (A),is the system master public key;
s103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKGAndwherein, in the step (A),is a bit string of an arbitrary length,is of fixed lengthA bit string of (a);
s104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash functionWhereinThe following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messagesAnd scalar coefficientsEquation ofIf true;
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q orderA non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated;
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component twoWherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,is the sign of the exclusive or operation,is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,is the true identity of the user;
s108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous identity of the user asAnd using the system master private keyAnd a hash functionComputing a signed first private key;
s110. user receivesThen, the equation is verifiedIf the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signatureOtherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key;
S111, user limited domain from q orderA non-zero random number x is selected as a second private key of the signature, and a verification public key is calculatedAnd obtaining the signature private key of the user。
Preferably, the S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namelyWherein the identity of the data file F is, Representing blocks of data files;
s202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data fileTo aWherein C represents an encrypted data file,representing a ciphertext data block;
s203. the user selects the q-order finite fieldFour different random coefficients are selectedAnd deriving n seeds:user sets integrity audit assistance information ;
S204. forThe user utilizes the private signature keyComputing each ciphertext data blockBased on certificateless homomorphic signaturesAnd sets a signature set;
S205. user sendsAnd storing the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a cloud server, and sending the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a third party auditor TPA for storage.
Preferably, the S3 includes:
s301, after receiving a request of a user for checking the integrity of cloud data, a third party auditor TPA collects the cloud dataRandomly selecting a subset containing c elements;
s304, before the third party auditor TPA returns the audit certification response information, the third party auditor TPA generates a pre-calculated value IAnd a pre-calculated value of two。
Preferably, the S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge informationThen, the cloud server calculates the combined information block of the challenged ciphertext data blockAnd aggregate signatures;
S402, the cloud server sends audit certification response informationAnd giving the third party auditor TPA.
Preferably, the S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response informationThen, the pre-calculated value one is usedAnd a pre-calculated value of twoChecking and validating equationIf the verification formula is established, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns false;
and S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
Preferably, in S2, after the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to the third-party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, the signature sets, and the integrity audit auxiliary information at the local client.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
(1) the method is designed based on a certificateless cipher system, can effectively avoid key escrow, and does not need complex management of public key infrastructure on public key certificates;
(2) the method of the invention designs a certificateless homomorphic signature by combining with a homomorphic hash function, which is beneficial for a third party auditor to carry out public integrity audit on the data file stored in the cloud;
(3) in the signature generation stage, a user needs to design integrity audit auxiliary information, and according to the characteristic of a homomorphic hash function, all index operations in the subsequent integrity audit stage can be optimized into two index operations, so that the calculation cost of a third party auditor is greatly reduced, and a lightweight performance advantage is formed;
(4) the method of the invention effectively ensures the confidentiality of the user data file and simultaneously realizes the conditional anonymity of the user identity;
(5) when the malicious users abuse the cloud storage system, the system can successfully identify the real identities of the malicious users, and further revoke the access authority and the storage service of the malicious users to the cloud storage system.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the following embodiments, and it should be understood that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be obtained by a person skilled in the art without inventive effort based on the embodiments of the present invention, are within the scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, the embodiment provides a certificateless public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data, including:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; and the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user.
Specifically, the S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirementWherein, in the step (A),are all q factorial cyclic groups.
S102. secret keyGeneration center PKG (public key generator) selection q-factorial method cyclic groupAnd generates a primitive g and a finite field from order qA non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculatedWherein, in the step (A),is the system master public key.
S103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKGAndwherein, in the step (A),is a bit string of an arbitrary length,is of fixed lengthThe bit string of (2).
S104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash functionWhereinThe following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messagesAnd scalar coefficientsEquation ofThis is true.
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q orderA non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated。
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component twoWherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,is the sign of the exclusive or operation,is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,is the true identity of the user.
S108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous identity of the user asAnd using the system master private keyAnd a hash functionComputing a signed first private key。
S110. user receivesThen, the equation is verifiedIf the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signatureOtherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key;
S111, user limited domain from q orderA non-zero random number x is selected as a second private key of the signature, and a verification public key is calculatedAnd obtaining the signature private key of the user。
S2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; and the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage.
Specifically, the S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namelyWherein the identity of the data file F is,Representing blocks of data files.
S202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data fileTo aWherein C represents an encrypted data file,representing a block of ciphertext data.
S203. the user selects the q-order finite fieldFour different random coefficients are selectedAnd deriving n seeds:user sets integrity audit assistance information 。
S204. forThe user utilizes the private signature keyComputing each ciphertext data blockBased on certificateless homomorphic signaturesAnd sets a signature set。
S205. user sendsAnd storing the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a cloud server, and sending the integrity audit auxiliary information AAI to a third party auditor TPA for storage.
In some embodiments, in S2, after the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to the third-party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, the signature sets, and the integrity audit auxiliary information at the local client, so as to save the local storage space of the user.
S3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; and the third party auditor generates a pre-calculated value according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving the audit certification response information returned by the cloud server.
Specifically, the S3 includes:
s301, after receiving a request of a user for checking the integrity of cloud data, a third party auditor TPA collects the cloud dataRandomly selecting a subset containing c elements。
S304, before the third party auditor TPA returns the audit certification response information, the third party auditor TPA generates a pre-calculated value IAnd a pre-calculated value of two。
S4, generating audit certification response information: and after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to the third-party auditor.
Specifically, the S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge informationThen, the cloud server calculates the combined information block of the challenged ciphertext data blockAnd aggregate signatures。
S402, the cloud server sends audit certification response informationAnd giving the third party auditor TPA.
S5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
Specifically, the S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response informationThen, the pre-calculated value one is usedAnd a pre-calculated value of twoChecking and validating equationAnd if the verification formula is established, the TPA of the third party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third party auditor returns false.
And S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
The correctness derivation process of this embodiment is as follows:
because of the fact that
And
the integrity audit correctly pushes the process to:
the foregoing is illustrative of the preferred embodiments of this invention, and it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the precise form disclosed herein and that various other combinations, modifications, and environments may be resorted to, falling within the scope of the concept as disclosed herein, either as described above or as apparent to those skilled in the relevant art. And that modifications and variations may be effected by those skilled in the art without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (7)
1. Public auditing method for integrity of cloud storage data based on certificateless is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, initializing a system, namely setting password security parameters by a key generation center, wherein the password security parameters comprise bilinear pairwise mapping, multiplication cycle groups and generation elements defined on the multiplication cycle groups; the key generation center sets two collision-resistant hash functions and a homomorphic hash function, and selects a system master private key and a system master public key; a key generation center publishes system public parameters, and the key generation center generates an anonymous identity and a first signature private key for a user; the user generates another part of private key and part of public key; the key generation center publishes system public parameters and sends a first private key of a signature of a user to the user; the user verifies the validity of the anonymous identity and the signature first private key, and after the verification is passed, the user generates a signature second private key for the user and generates a signature private key and a verification public key of the user;
s2, generating a digital signature: a user blocks a data file to obtain a plurality of data file blocks, and a symmetric encryption algorithm is selected to encrypt each data file block to obtain a ciphertext data block; a user generates a certificateless homomorphic signature of each ciphertext data block by using a signature private key and a homomorphic hash function of the user, and a signature set is formed; a user generates integrity audit auxiliary information according to the number of data file blocks; the user sends all the ciphertext data blocks and the signature set to the cloud server for storage, and sends the integrity audit auxiliary information to a third party auditor for storage;
s3, generating challenge information: the third party auditor generates challenge information and sends the challenge information to the cloud server; generating a pre-calculated value by a third party auditor according to the challenge information and the integrity audit auxiliary information before receiving audit certification response information returned by the cloud server;
s4, generating audit certification response information: after receiving the challenge information, the cloud server generates audit certificate response information based on the challenged ciphertext data block and the digital signature, and returns the audit certificate response information to a third party auditor;
s5, integrity audit: and after receiving the audit certificate response information, the third party auditor verifies the correctness of the audit certificate response information by utilizing the pre-calculated value, the system public parameter, the verification public key of the user and the anonymous identity.
2. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 1 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S1 includes:
s101, selecting a large prime number q by a key generation center PKG, and setting a bilinear pairwise mapping e to meet the requirementWherein, in the step (A),all are q factorial cyclic groups;
s102, selecting a q factorial method circulation group by a key generation center PKGAnd generates a primitive g and a finite field from order qA non-zero random number alpha is selected as a main private key of the system and calculatedWherein, in the step (A),is the system master public key;
s103, selecting two anti-collision hash functions by the key generation center PKGAndwherein, in the step (A),is a bit string of an arbitrary length,is of fixed lengthA bit string of (a);
s104, the key generation center PKG selects a collision-resistant homomorphic hash functionWhereinThe following homomorphism is satisfied: for any two messagesAnd scalar coefficientsEquation ofIf true;
S106, the key generation center PKG is used for generating a finite field from the q orderA non-zero random number k is selected, and an anonymous identity component one is calculated;
S107, the key generation center PKG calculates the anonymous identity component twoWherein T is the effective use period of the anonymous identity of the user,is the sign of the exclusive or operation,is a concatenated symbol that is a symbol of a concatenation,is the true identity of the user;
s108, the key generation center PKG sets the anonymous identity of the user asAnd using the system master private keyAnd a hash functionComputing a signed first private key;
s110. user receivesThen, the equation is verifiedIf the equation is established, the user accepts the anonymous identity ID and the first private key of the signatureOtherwise, the user refuses the anonymous ID and the first private signature key;
3. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 2 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S2 includes:
s201, a user divides a data file F into n data file blocks, namelyWherein the identity of the data file F is, Representing blocks of data files;
s202, a user selects a symmetric encryption algorithm SEA and a symmetric key s to encrypt a data file F, and the data file F is encrypted into a data fileTo aWherein C represents an encrypted data file,representing a ciphertext data block;
s203. the user selects the q-order finite fieldFour different random coefficients are selectedAnd deriving n seeds:user sets integrity audit assistance information ;
S204. forThe user utilizes the private signature keyComputing each ciphertext data blockBased on certificateless homomorphic signaturesAnd sets a signature set;
4. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 3 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S3 includes:
s301, third party auditor TPA receives user checkUpon request for cloud data integrity, from the setRandomly selecting a subset containing c elements;
5. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 4 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S4 includes:
s401, the cloud server receives the challenge informationThe cloud server then computes the number of challenged ciphertextsBlock-based combined information blockAnd aggregate signatures;
6. The certificateless public auditing method according to claim 5 based on cloud storage data integrity, where S5 includes:
s501, third party auditor TPA receives audit certification response informationThen, the pre-calculated value one is usedAnd a pre-calculated value of twoChecking and validating equationIf the verification formula is established, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns true, otherwise, the TPA of the third-party auditor returns false;
and S502, the third party auditor informs the integrity audit result to the user.
7. The certificateless public auditing method for cloud storage data integrity based on claim 1 characterized in that in S2, after the user sends all ciphertext data blocks and signature sets to the cloud server for storage and sends the integrity auditing auxiliary information to the third party auditor for storage, the user deletes the ciphertext data blocks, signature sets and integrity auditing auxiliary information at the local client.
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