CN112950338A - Block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method - Google Patents

Block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method Download PDF

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CN112950338A
CN112950338A CN202110222627.1A CN202110222627A CN112950338A CN 112950338 A CN112950338 A CN 112950338A CN 202110222627 A CN202110222627 A CN 202110222627A CN 112950338 A CN112950338 A CN 112950338A
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domain name
function
bidding
bidder
auction
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张艺
陆根花
陆忠祥
邵俊
魏贵义
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Zhejiang Gongshang University
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Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to a block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method, which comprises the following steps: in a block chain, a domain name owner creates a domain name auction contract, and adopts a consensus mechanism to check the validity of the domain name auction contract and record the information of bidders; when the bidders find out the domain name auction contract existing on the block chain, the bidders call and verify the commitment, and participate in bidding after the verification is passed; after the bidding time is over, each bidder finishes uncovering after passing the checking of the consensus mechanism; after the bidding is uncovered, anyone can view the bidding records, bidders complete bidding according to respective states, and the auction is ended. The invention realizes the transaction fairness, the competitive bidding fairness, the fund guarantee and the fund privacy in the domain name auction transfer process.

Description

Block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of block chains, in particular to a block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method.
Background
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the important infrastructures of the internet. Because of its advent, people no longer use IP addresses that are difficult to remember to access websites, but use domain names that are easy to understand and remember. The basic function of DNS is to manage root and top domain names, which are currently mainly maintained by the internet name and number assignment authority (ICANN), so that such a centralized architecture is vulnerable to attacks such as single point of failure and power abuse. A well-known DNS single point failure event is the 2016 Dyn network attack event. Com, GitHub, Twitter and Reddit are converted to inaccessible when accessing their corresponding domain names by many web sites due to DNS failures provided by Dyn. The idea to solve the above problem is naturally to introduce a decentralized architecture into the DNS. Meanwhile, over the past decade, blockchains have become the most famous and successful decentralized architecture. Thus, many scholars suggest introducing blockchains into DNS. In DNS, domain name auction is the main way to acquire domain names, however, the existing block chain based DNS system cannot provide corresponding functions, and cannot achieve the expected effect:
namecoin, Consortium DNS, EmerDNS and Blockstack focus primarily on domain name registration, ignoring the process of domain name auctions;
ethereum Name Service (ENS) implements the auction function for cryptocurrency addresses, but does not provide the auction function for domain names;
handshake implements a domain name auction that seals bids and does not reveal any one person's bid until all bids are committed. The main advantage of sealed bid domain auctions is that bidders are more willing to bid according to the true value of the asset. However, since the current highest bid is predictable, the last bidder in the Handshake can always win the auction with a reasonable bid.
Therefore, the existing block chain based DNS scheme lacks the process of domain name auction or cannot guarantee fairness during the process of domain name auction.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to solve the technical problems in the prior art, the invention provides a block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method, which has the following specific technical scheme:
the sealed bidding domain name auction method based on the block chain comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps that firstly, in a block chain, a domain name owner creates a domain name auction contract, a consensus mechanism is adopted to carry out validity check on the domain name auction contract, and information of bidders is recorded;
the second stage, when the bidder finds out the domain name auction contract existing on the block chain, the bidder calls and verifies the commitment, and participates in bidding after the verification is passed;
in the third stage, after the bidding time is cut off, each bidder finishes uncovering after passing the check of the consensus mechanism;
and fourthly, after the bidding is uncovered, anyone can view the bidding records, bidders complete bidding according to respective states, and the auction is ended.
Further, the domain owner calls the function Create (T)1，T2Name, delta) to Create a domain name auction contract, the function Create (T)1，T2T in name, delta)1Indicates the deadline of the bid, T2Indicating an unmarked deadline, name referring to a domain name to be auctioned by a domain name owner, and delta being a signature of an account owner owning the domain name on the intelligent contract by using a public key of the account owner;
the adoption of the consensus mechanism to carry out validity check on the domain name auction contract specifically comprises the following steps: consensus node checks (T) when a consensus node in a blockchain receives a Create function call1，T2Name, delta), and whether the auction contract corresponding to the name is set in the block chain, when the check is passedIf so, the consensus node continues to run the Create function, otherwise, the consensus node stops running the function;
and recording information related to the bidder by adopting a bidder [ ] array, wherein the information comprises a public key corresponding to a certain account of the bidder, the commitment of the bidder to the bid amount and data used for uncovering the bid by the bidder.
Further, bidders call the commitment function
Figure BDA0002953759880000021
To participate in bidding, wherein pk is a public key corresponding to a certain account of a bidder;
Figure BDA0002953759880000022
representing bids
Figure BDA0002953759880000023
The commitment of (a); σ is the signature of the smart contract using pk; ZKP is to
Figure BDA0002953759880000024
Figure BDA0002953759880000025
Wherein c refers to the balance in the account corresponding to pk;
when the consensus node in the block chain receives the call of the Commit function, the consensus node checks whether the array bidider [ ] does not contain pk, whether the time T for calling the function is in the validity period, and the validity of (sigma, ZKP), and when the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Commit function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the function.
Further, the third stage specifically includes: when the bidding time is over, the bidding phase is stopped and each bidder calls the unmasking function
Figure BDA0002953759880000026
Uncovering the bid, wherein pk is the same public key used by the bidder when invoking the Commit function,
Figure BDA0002953759880000031
for opening commitments
Figure BDA0002953759880000032
When the consensus node receives a call to the recent function, the consensus node checks whether the time T of the call is within the validity period, in the number of sets of bidider 2]Whether there is a commitment corresponding to pk in
Figure BDA0002953759880000033
And
Figure BDA0002953759880000034
if the promise can be opened, when the check is passed, the consensus node will run the function of the Reveal function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the Reveal function.
Further, the fourth stage specifically includes: after the bidding is uncovered, anyone can judge who is the winner according to the record in the array bid [ ], the winner calls a Finailize function, when the consensus node receives the function call, the consensus node checks whether the auction completion time is up or not according to the deadline of the uncovering, and checks whether the current intelligent contract is in a running state or not, when the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Finailize function, the fund with the second highest bid amount is transferred to the domain name owner, and the domain name is transferred to the winner from the domain name owner; otherwise, stopping running; when the bidder fails to uncover the bid, the bidder is penalized by deducting part of the funds; when the bidder is a miss bid, the system is inoperative.
All fund operations on the blockchain of the invention are account-based, and the funds in the system are anonymous; the auction function for the domain name is realized, and the domain name owner can obtain corresponding funds once the domain name is transferred to the winner, and vice versa; the bidding probability of the auction is irrelevant to the bidding time, namely bidders bidding later are not more advantageous than bidders bidding first out; no one can infer from the auction process how much funds a bidder has in the blockchain system, but one can verify during the auction whether the bidder has sufficient funds to bid on.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system model diagram of an embodiment of the invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and technical effects of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
The invention constructs an account-based blockchain system which supports intelligent contracts, funds in the system are anonymous, and a consensus mechanism is not limited to PoW any more, but can be realized through a alliance chain. Meanwhile, an account-based alliance chain is combined with anonymous fund, an intelligent contract, zero-knowledge proof and a ring signature, so that a block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method is provided, and transaction fairness, bidding fairness, fund guarantee and fund privacy are realized.
The block chain system comprises: the system comprises an account structure module, a transaction propagation module and a transaction packaging module.
The account structure module is provided with:
account ID: the public key of the user or the hash function of the public key;
fund fand: the amount of funds the address has, recorded in anonymous form;
domain name list name: storing the domain name owned by the account.
The transaction structure module has the following data messages:
transaction source: an account ID of the transaction initiator;
transaction amount: a numerical value expressed in anonymous or clear form;
the transaction is going to: an account ID of the transaction recipient;
signature: the initiator needs to sign the whole message by using a private key of the initiator;
zero knowledge proves that: the transaction initiator's zero knowledge demonstrates that the account amount is greater than the transaction amount.
The zero knowledge proof is specifically: the invention uses proof of zero knowledge about the inequality between two positive integers, assuming
Figure BDA0002953759880000041
Where g and h are as defined in the Pedersen commitment and l is a large integer greater than all possible funds in the system. Knowing x1、r1And
Figure BDA0002953759880000042
certifying that
Figure BDA0002953759880000043
The whole process comprises the following two parts.
In the first part, given c,
Figure BDA0002953759880000044
and
Figure BDA0002953759880000045
the prover corresponds to the public key by providing
Figure BDA0002953759880000046
To prove
Figure BDA0002953759880000047
If it is not
Figure BDA0002953759880000048
The prover knows
Figure BDA0002953759880000049
Figure BDA00029537598800000410
Otherwise the prover is unknown because loghg is agnostic to anyone.
In the second part, the prover proves that all aiAnd biAll belong to {0, 1 }. With aiFor example, the prover only needs to provideIs prepared from (h, c'2i) And
Figure BDA00029537598800000411
a ring signature for a public key.
The ring signature scheme allows a verifier to check the validity of a signature without exposing a public key corresponding to a true signature key. If a isiLog is known to the prover as 0hc′2i＝r′2i(ii) a If a isiWhen 1, the verifier knows
Figure BDA00029537598800000412
For other cases, because loghg is agnostic to anyone, so the prover does not know loghc′2iOr
Figure BDA00029537598800000413
Finally, the verifier can check ai∈{0，1}。
The Pedersen commitment is a cryptology commitment which is widely used at present, and the construction of the Pedersen commitment is divided into 3 stages:
an initialization stage: selecting multiplicative groups G, G and h of order large prime q as two generators within the cyclic group, the public tuple (G, h, q);
committed stage camm: the committer selects a random number r as a blind factor and calculates a committed value comm ═ g for the message mmhrmod q, then send comm to the recipient;
opening phase open: the committer sends (m, r) to the receiver, which verifies if camm equals gmhrmod q, accept if equal, otherwise deny commitment.
The transaction propagation module is specifically as follows: the transaction initiator submits the transaction to the consensus nodes, each consensus node immediately verifies the validity of the transaction after receiving the transaction, the validity comprises the validity of zero knowledge proof and the validity of the digital signature, if the consensus nodes are valid, the consensus nodes store a copy and transmit the copy to all neighbor nodes, and meanwhile, the amount of the corresponding account is updated.
The transaction packaging module is used for finally containing the valid transaction in a transaction block and permanently recording the transaction in the block chain.
As shown in fig. 1, the system model of the embodiment of the present invention can obtain a block chain-based auction method for sealed bid domain names, which specifically includes the following steps:
first phase, creating an auction:
after deploying the smart contract, the domain owner calls the function Create (T)1，T2Name, delta) creates an auction, where T1、T2Two time points, T, specified for the system1Indicates the deadline of the bid, T2Indicating a de-branding deadline; name refers to the domain name that the domain owner is about to auction for; δ is the signature of the account owner owning the domain name on the smart contract using its public key. When a consensus node in the blockchain system receives the function call, the consensus node checks (T)1，T2Name, delta), and whether an auction contract corresponding to the name is set in the blockchain. If the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Create function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the function. Then, the bidder bid is used]The array records information related to the bidders, including public keys pk corresponding to certain accounts of the bidders, and commitment commit of the bidders to the bid amount, wherein m and r correspond to data used for uncovering the bids by the bidders. The state of the intelligent contract comprises: an active state and an off state.
And in the second stage, submitting bids:
when a bidder discovers an auction contract for a certain domain name on a blockchain, the bidder may call a function
Figure BDA0002953759880000051
To participate in the bidding. Where pk is a public key corresponding to a certain account of the bidder;
Figure BDA0002953759880000061
representing bids
Figure BDA0002953759880000062
The commitment of (a); σ is the signature of the smart contract using pk; ZKP is to
Figure BDA0002953759880000063
Wherein c refers to the balance in the account corresponding to pk;
when the consensus node receives the call of the Commit function, the consensus node checks whether the array bidider [ ] does not contain pk, whether the time T of calling the function is within the validity period, and the validity of (σ, ZKP). If the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Commit function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the function.
And a third stage, revealing a bid:
when T is1After the time for bidding expires, the bidding phase is stopped and each bidder can call a function
Figure BDA0002953759880000064
Uncovering the bid, wherein pk is the same public key used by the bidder when invoking the Commit function,
Figure BDA0002953759880000065
for opening commitments
Figure BDA0002953759880000066
When the consensus node receives a call to the recent function, the consensus node checks whether the time T of the call is within the validity period, in the number of sets of bidider 2]Whether there is a commitment corresponding to pk in
Figure BDA0002953759880000067
And
Figure BDA0002953759880000068
whether the commitment can be opened. If the check is passed, the consensus node runs the function of the Reveal function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the Reveal function.
The fourth stage, the auction ends:
after the third stage, anyone canCan be according to the array bidider [, [ 2 ]]The record in (1) judges who is the winning bid, under the condition, the winning bid will call the Finailize function, and when the consensus node receives the function call, the consensus node receives the function call according to the T2And (4) uncovering the deadline, checking whether the time for completing the auction is up, and checking whether the current intelligent contract is in a running state. If the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Finailize function; otherwise, the operation will be stopped.
Wherein, different processing methods are proposed according to three states of bidders: the first is the case where a bidder is unable to uncover the bid in the third stage, the bidder will be penalized by deducting some of the funds. The second is for the case of the winning bidder, where funds with the second highest bid amount will be transferred to the domain owner, from which the domain name is transferred to the winning bidder. The last case corresponds to a person following the agreement but not winning the bid, in which case we do nothing.
And finally, closing the intelligent contract.

Claims (5)

1. The block chain-based sealed bidding domain name auction method is characterized by comprising the following steps of:
the method comprises the following steps that firstly, in a block chain, a domain name owner creates a domain name auction contract, a consensus mechanism is adopted to carry out validity check on the domain name auction contract, and information of bidders is recorded;
the second stage, when the bidder finds out the domain name auction contract existing on the block chain, the bidder calls and verifies the commitment, and participates in bidding after the verification is passed;
in the third stage, after the bidding time is cut off, each bidder finishes uncovering after passing the check of the consensus mechanism;
and fourthly, after the bidding is uncovered, anyone can view the bidding records, bidders complete bidding according to respective states, and the auction is ended.
2. The block chain based sealed bid domain name auction method of claim 1, wherein the domain name owner calls the function Create (T)1，T2Name, delta) to Create a domain name auction contract, the function Create (T)1，T2T in name, delta)1Indicates the deadline of the bid, T2Indicating an unmarked deadline, name referring to a domain name to be auctioned by a domain name owner, and delta being a signature of an account owner owning the domain name on the intelligent contract by using a public key of the account owner;
the adoption of the consensus mechanism to carry out validity check on the domain name auction contract specifically comprises the following steps: consensus node checks (T) when a consensus node in a blockchain receives a Create function call1，T2Name, delta), and whether an auction contract corresponding to the name is set in the block chain, when the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Create function, otherwise, the consensus node stops running the function;
and recording information related to the bidder by adopting a bidder [ ] array, wherein the information comprises a public key corresponding to a certain account of the bidder, the commitment of the bidder to the bid amount and data used for uncovering the bid by the bidder.
3. The method of block chain based sealed bid domain auction of claim 2, characterized in that bidders call the commitment function
Figure FDA0002953759870000011
To participate in bidding, wherein pk is a public key corresponding to a certain account of a bidder;
Figure FDA0002953759870000012
representing bids
Figure FDA0002953759870000013
The commitment of (a); σ is the signature of the smart contract using pk; ZKP is to
Figure FDA0002953759870000014
Wherein c refers to the balance in the account corresponding to pk;
when the consensus node in the block chain receives the call of the Commit function, the consensus node checks whether the array bidider [ ] does not contain pk, whether the time T for calling the function is in the validity period, and the validity of (sigma, ZKP), and when the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Commit function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the function.
4. The method for sealed bid domain name auction based on block chain according to claim 2, characterized by the third stage being specifically: when the bidding time is over, the bidding phase is stopped and each bidder calls the unmasking function
Figure FDA0002953759870000021
Uncovering the bid, wherein pk is the same public key used by the bidder when invoking the Commit function,
Figure FDA0002953759870000022
for opening commitments
Figure FDA0002953759870000023
When the consensus node receives a call to the recent function, the consensus node checks whether the time T of the call is within the validity period, in the number of sets of bidider 2]Whether there is a commitment corresponding to pk in
Figure FDA0002953759870000024
And
Figure FDA0002953759870000025
if the promise can be opened, when the check is passed, the consensus node will run the function of the Reveal function; otherwise, the consensus node will stop running the Reveal function.
5. The block chain-based sealed bid domain name auction method of claim 2, wherein the fourth stage is specifically: after the bidding is uncovered, anyone can judge who is the winner according to the record in the array bid [ ], the winner calls a Finailize function, when the consensus node receives the function call, the consensus node checks whether the auction completion time is up or not according to the deadline of the uncovering, and checks whether the current intelligent contract is in a running state or not, when the check is passed, the consensus node continues to run the Finailize function, the fund with the second highest bid amount is transferred to the domain name owner, and the domain name is transferred to the winner from the domain name owner; otherwise, stopping running; when the bidder fails to uncover the bid, the bidder is penalized by deducting part of the funds; when the bidder is a miss bid, the system is inoperative.
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