CN112862616B - Secure multi-party computing method, device and storage medium supporting block chain - Google Patents

Secure multi-party computing method, device and storage medium supporting block chain Download PDF

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CN112862616B
CN112862616B CN202110444010.4A CN202110444010A CN112862616B CN 112862616 B CN112862616 B CN 112862616B CN 202110444010 A CN202110444010 A CN 202110444010A CN 112862616 B CN112862616 B CN 112862616B
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朱烨东
张京辉
王之瑜
仲丛霞
张旭
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Beijing Sinodata Technology Co ltd
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Abstract

The invention provides a safe multi-party computing method, equipment and a storage medium supporting a block chain, wherein the method comprises the following steps: acquiring a homomorphic public key by a first information holder, and encrypting the data information by using the homomorphic public key to obtain a ciphertext of the data information; storing the ciphertext of the data information to the IPFS network by a first information holder, receiving a hash address returned by the IPFS network, and issuing the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information to a block chain; initiating a secure multi-party computing task to a first MPC node by a first information holder, and selecting a second information holder by using a hub node; performing cooperative calculation by the first MPC node and a second MPC node of a second information holder according to calculation logic transmitted by the hub node and required information inquired from the IPFS network; and the appointed MPC node acquires the calculation result, and the information holder of the appointed MPC node decrypts the calculation result by using the homomorphic private key. By the scheme, the user privacy in the block chain network can be fully protected.

Description

Secure multi-party computing method, device and storage medium supporting block chain
Technical Field
The present invention relates to the field of blockchain technologies, and in particular, to a secure multiparty computing method, device and storage medium supporting blockchains.
Background
In the blockchain technology, in order to solve the security and trust problems, each node in the blockchain network needs to verify the uplink data, transaction and status, and further achieve consensus in the blockchain network, so that the uplink data needs to be public and shared, such as personal sensitive information like transaction amount, public key addresses of both parties of the transaction, and the like. Strictly speaking, blockchain users are not anonymous, and users represent identities using public keys, but can still collect and associate identities with transaction activities through some technique. The user repeatedly uses one public key or a batch of public keys to conduct transactions, association analysis can be established, and the disclosure of accounts, balances and contracts can cause the risk of revealing privacy information of the user.
The privacy protection problem of the blockchain is mainly divided into transaction privacy and identity privacy problems. Transaction privacy refers to some information containing transaction details, for example, an attacker obtains some valuable information by performing deep analysis on a series of transaction records, including the fund balance of a specific account, transaction details, associated accounts, fund flow, and the like. Identity privacy mainly refers to a potential threat of identity leakage of a transactor, and an attacker can obtain identity information of the transactor by combining some background knowledge on the basis of analyzing transaction data. Identity privacy and transaction privacy are contents which need to be protected in key mode when a user uses a blockchain technology, once the information is leaked, damage to the user is possible, and as data stored in a blockchain global ledger cannot be deleted and tampered, even if the user finds that part of addresses or transaction data are exposed, rescue measures cannot be taken. Therefore, the blockchain system should pay more attention to the privacy problem and improve the privacy protection capability.
However, the existing privacy protection technology has many disadvantages in security and expansibility, and cannot meet the application requirements of the blockchain in different scenes, so a method capable of sufficiently protecting the user privacy in the blockchain network is urgently needed.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention provides a secure multiparty computing method, device and storage medium supporting a blockchain, so as to fully protect user privacy in a blockchain network.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention is realized by adopting the following scheme:
according to an aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a secure multiparty computing method supporting a blockchain, including:
acquiring a homomorphic public key by a first information holder, and encrypting data information of the secure multiparty computation task by using the homomorphic public key to obtain a ciphertext of the data information;
storing the ciphertext of the data information to an IPFS network by a first information holder, receiving a hash address returned by the IPFS network according to the ciphertext of the data information, and issuing metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to a block chain;
initiating a secure multi-party computing task to a first MPC node by a first information holder, and selecting at least one second information holder according to the secure multi-party computing task by using a hub node in an SMPC network where the first MPC node is located;
performing cooperative calculation aiming at the safe multi-party calculation task by a first MPC node of a first information holder and at least one second MPC node of a second information holder according to calculation logic transmitted by a hub node and required information inquired from an IPFS network according to metadata and a hash address of ciphertext of data information to obtain a calculation result;
and acquiring the calculation result by using a designated MPC node in the first MPC node and each second MPC node, acquiring a homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key by using an information holder of the designated MPC node, and decrypting the calculation result by using the homomorphic private key.
In some embodiments, before obtaining the homomorphic public key by the first information holder, the method further comprises:
and running a homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key, disclosing the homomorphic public key to the blockchain network, and storing the homomorphic private key to the local part of the third party organization.
In some embodiments, running a homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party authority other than said first information holder and each of said second information holders generates a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key, comprises:
and running a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key.
In some embodiments, before the information holder of the designated MPC node obtains a homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key and decrypts the computation result by using the homomorphic private key, the method further comprises:
and performing MAC verification on the calculation result, and outputting the calculation result to the information holder of the specified node under the condition that the verification is passed.
In some embodiments, the secure multiparty computation method supporting a blockchain further includes:
the first MPC node of the first information holder participates in the cooperative computation of the secure multiparty computation task initiated by the other information holders.
In some embodiments, issuing the metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to a blockchain comprises:
submitting a transaction request to at least one endorsement node by a first information holder;
after receiving the transaction request, the endorsement node simulates and executes the corresponding transaction, and returns the simulated execution result to the application program corresponding to the first information holder after signing;
after the application program collects the signed simulation execution results of all endorsement nodes, the signed simulation execution results are sent to the sequencing node;
and checking the signature, endorsement policy and sorting condition in the simulated execution result after each signature by the sorting node, generating a corresponding block after the checking is passed, broadcasting the block to the accounting node through a message channel, synchronizing to each endorsement node, and updating a corresponding account book under the condition that the execution results of the endorsement nodes are consistent.
In some embodiments, before the computation results are obtained by the first MPC node of the first information holder and the second MPC node of the at least one second information holder performing a collaborative computation for the secure multi-party computation task based on the computation logic transmitted by the hub node and the required information queried from the IPFS network based on the metadata and hash addresses of the ciphertext of the data information, the method further comprises:
a key for MAC verification is generated along with a pair of random numbers and a single random number for coordinated computation.
In some embodiments, the performing, by a first MPC node of a first information holder and a second MPC node of at least one second information holder, a cooperative computation for the secure multi-party computation task based on computation logic transmitted by the hub node and required information queried from the IPFS network based on metadata and hash addresses of ciphertexts of data information, to obtain computation results, comprises:
under the condition of obtaining authorization, a first MPC node of a first information holder and a second MPC node of at least one second information holder acquire metadata and a hash address of a ciphertext of data information, inquire required information from an IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information, and control routing and calculation logic transmission corresponding to the secure multi-party calculation task by a hub node so as to complete cooperative calculation of the secure multi-party calculation task and obtain a calculation result.
According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, the processor implementing the steps of the method according to any of the above embodiments when executing the program.
According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, there is also provided a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, which when executed by a processor implements the steps of the method of any of the above embodiments.
According to the safe multi-party computing method, the computer equipment and the computer readable storage medium supporting the block chain, disclosed by the embodiment of the invention, the computing nodes participating in the multi-party computing task can complete the computing task and obtain a correct and effective computing result under the background that the input of the participants is not known each other through homomorphic encryption; by ensuring that the computing node is unknown to the information of the information holder, high security of the information holder can be ensured. The combination of IPFS and blockchains creates a safer and better performing environment. The private information of the information holder is stored by using the IPFS, so that the reliability, the usability, the access efficiency and the expandability of the system are improved. Furthermore, the calculation result is verified, so that the calculation result is guaranteed not to be tampered, and the calculation process and the result are prevented from being damaged due to the existence of dishonest nodes in the safe multi-party calculation process.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a secure multi-party computing method supporting blockchains according to an embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 2 is a timing diagram for secure multi-party computing with support for blockchains according to one embodiment of the invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a CID generation process in IPFS of a block chain-supporting secure multiparty computation method according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an IPFS data store of a secure multi-party computing method supporting blockchains according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 5 is a block chain transaction flow diagram in the secure multi-party computing method supporting block chains according to an embodiment of the present invention;
fig. 6 is a schematic diagram of an MPC framework for a block chain-supporting secure multi-party computation method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention more apparent, the embodiments of the present invention are further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The exemplary embodiments and descriptions of the present invention are provided to explain the present invention, but not to limit the present invention.
It should be noted in advance that the features described in the following embodiments or examples or mentioned therein can be combined with or replace the features in other embodiments or examples in the same or similar manner to form a possible implementation. In addition, the term "comprises/comprising" as used herein refers to the presence of a feature, element, step or component, but does not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, elements, steps or components.
In order to fully protect the user privacy in the block chain network, the invention provides a safe multi-party computing method supporting a block chain, so that computing nodes participating in a multi-party computing task can complete the computing task and obtain a correct and effective computing result under the background that the input of participants is not known mutually.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a secure multiparty computation method supporting a blockchain according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 1, the secure multi-party computing method supporting block chaining according to the embodiments may include the following steps S110 to S150.
Specific embodiments of steps S110 to S150 will be described in detail below.
Step S110: and the homomorphic public key is obtained by the first information holder, and the homomorphic public key is utilized to encrypt the data information of the secure multiparty computation task to obtain the ciphertext of the data information.
In step S110, a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key may be generated by initializing and using a homomorphic encryption algorithm. The homomorphic public key can be published to the network and the homomorphic private key can be stored locally. The data information is encrypted homomorphically, and collaborative calculation can be performed under the condition that the content of the data information cannot be seen.
In a further embodiment, before the first information holder obtains the homomorphic public key in step S110, the method shown in fig. 1 may further include the steps of: and S160, running a homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key, disclosing the homomorphic public key to the block chain network, and storing the homomorphic private key to the local part of the third party organization.
In this step S160, the third party authority may be a trusted third party authority. The homomorphic private key may be stored at a third party authority or elsewhere and may be provided for decryption as needed by the information holder. And the homomorphic public key is published to the blockchain network, so that the blockchain nodes can obtain the homomorphic public key.
In a specific implementation, in step S160, the step of generating a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key by running a homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each of the second information holders may specifically include the steps of: s161, operating a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key.
In other embodiments, other homomorphic encryption algorithms may be selected to generate homomorphic public keys and homomorphic private keys.
Step S120: and storing the ciphertext of the data information into an IPFS network by a first information holder, receiving a hash address returned by the IPFS network according to the ciphertext of the data information, and issuing the metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to a block chain.
In an embodiment, in the step S120, the issuing the metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to the block chain may specifically include the steps of: s121, submitting a transaction request to at least one endorsement node by a first information holder; s122, after receiving the transaction request, the endorsement node simulates and executes the corresponding transaction, and returns the simulated and executed result to the application program corresponding to the first information holder after signing; s123, after the application program collects the signed simulation execution results of all endorsement nodes, the signed simulation execution results are sent to the sequencing node; and S124, checking the signature, endorsement policy and sorting condition in the simulated execution result after each signature by the sorting node, generating a corresponding block after the checking is passed, broadcasting the block to the bookkeeping node through a message channel, synchronizing to each endorsement node, and updating a corresponding account book under the condition that the execution results of the endorsement nodes are consistent.
In this embodiment, if the check is trouble free, a block may be generated. All nodes in the channel store copies of the same account book, the same intelligent contract is executed, the execution result of each endorsement node is consistent, if the results are inconsistent, the sequencing node can consider that the endorsement node is not synchronous or the endorsement node is illegally tampered, and the operation of updating the account book cannot be successful.
Step S130: the first information holder initiates a secure multi-party computing task to the first MPC node, and selects at least one second information holder according to the secure multi-party computing task by using a hub node in the SMPC network where the first MPC node is located.
In step S130, another information holder of the related data information type may be selected to perform secure cooperative calculation. The information holders that need to participate in the collaborative computing may be selected based on the multi-party information holders involved in the secure multi-party computing task.
Step S140: and performing cooperative calculation aiming at the safe multi-party calculation task by using a first MPC node of a first information holder and at least one second MPC node of a second information holder according to the calculation logic transmitted by the hub node and the required information inquired from the IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information to obtain a calculation result.
In specific implementation, each information holder can obtain the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext under the condition of obtaining the access right, so that the required information is inquired from the IPFS network.
For example, the step S140 may specifically include the steps of: s1411, under the condition of obtaining authorization, the first MPC node of the first information holder and the second MPC node of the at least one second information holder obtain metadata and a hash address of a ciphertext of the data information, query required information from the IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information, and control routing and computation logic transmission corresponding to the secure multi-party computation task by the hub node to complete collaborative computation of the secure multi-party computation task to obtain a computation result.
In this embodiment, only authorized participants can obtain information in the IPFS network, thereby further improving the information protection effect.
In some embodiments, before the step S140, that is, before the first MPC node of the first information holder and the second MPC node of the at least one second information holder perform the cooperative computation on the secure multi-party computation task according to the computation logic transmitted by the hub node and the required information queried from the IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information, and obtain the computation result, the method in fig. 1 may further include the steps of: s1421, a key for MAC verification is generated together with a pair random number and a single random number for cooperative calculation. The calculation result can be subjected to MAC verification by using the key for MAC verification, and the cooperative calculation can be performed by using the paired random numbers and the single random number for cooperative calculation.
Step S150: and acquiring the calculation result by using a designated MPC node in the first MPC node and each second MPC node, acquiring a homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key by using an information holder of the designated MPC node, and decrypting the calculation result by using the homomorphic private key.
In a further embodiment, in the step S150, before the information holder of the designated MPC node obtains the homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key and decrypts the calculation result by using the homomorphic private key, the method shown in fig. 1 may further include the steps of: and S170, performing MAC verification on the calculation result, and outputting the calculation result to the information holder of the designated node under the condition that the verification is passed.
In the embodiment, the MAC verification is performed at the stage of outputting the calculation result, so that the calculation result can be ensured to be correct, and the calculation result is tampered, thereby further improving the information security.
Furthermore, the MPC node in the SMPC network can not only initiate a secure multiparty computation task to perform cooperative computation with other MPC nodes, but also participate in cooperative computation for the secure multiparty computation task initiated by other MPC nodes.
Illustratively, the secure multiparty computing method supporting a blockchain shown in fig. 1 may further include the steps of: s180, the first MPC node of the first information holder participates in the cooperative computing of the secure multi-party computing task initiated by other information holders.
In a specific implementation, similar to the steps S110 to S150, the step S180 may specifically include the steps of: s181, obtaining other homomorphic public keys by a third information holder, and encrypting data information of other secure multiparty computation tasks by using the other homomorphic public keys to obtain ciphertext of other data information; s182, a third information holder stores the ciphertext of the other data information into an IPFS network, receives other hash addresses returned by the IPFS network according to the ciphertext of the other data information, and issues the metadata of the ciphertext of the other data information and the other hash addresses to a block chain; s183, a third information holder initiates other safe multi-party computing tasks to a third MPC node of the third information holder, and the pivot node is utilized to select a first information holder according to the other safe multi-party computing tasks; s184, performing other collaborative calculations on other secure multiparty calculation tasks by a third MPC node of a third information holder and a first MPC node of a first information holder according to calculation logic transmitted by a hub node and required information inquired from an IPFS network according to metadata of ciphertexts of other data information and the other hash addresses, and obtaining other calculation results; and S185, obtaining the other calculation results by using the third MPC node and the designated MPC node in the first MPC node, obtaining, by the information holder of the third MPC node and the designated MPC node in the first MPC node, other homomorphic private keys corresponding to the other homomorphic public keys, and decrypting the other calculation results by using the other homomorphic private keys.
In the embodiments, the computation nodes participating in the multi-party computation task can complete the computation task and obtain a correct and effective computation result under the background that the input of the participants is not known each other through homomorphic encryption; by ensuring that the computing node is unknown to the information of the information holder, high security of the information holder can be ensured. The combination of IPFS and blockchains creates a safer and better performing environment. The private information of the information holder is stored by using the IPFS, so that the reliability, the usability, the access efficiency and the expandability of the system are improved. Furthermore, the calculation result is verified, so that the calculation result is guaranteed not to be tampered, and the calculation process and the result are prevented from being damaged due to the existence of dishonest nodes in the safe multi-party calculation process.
In addition, an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer device, which includes a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, where the processor implements the steps of the method according to any of the above embodiments when executing the program.
Embodiments of the present invention further provide a computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored, where the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method according to any of the above embodiments.
In order that those skilled in the art will better understand the present invention, embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to specific examples.
In one embodiment, to solve the problem of privacy security and protection of information holders in a multi-party secure computing service, the invention provides a secure multi-party computing and privacy protection method supporting a block chain.
In this embodiment, it is assumed that each broadcast channel is available at a unit cost, that each participant has only one input, and that only one common output value needs to be calculated. In this embodiment, information is first encrypted using a homomorphic encryption algorithm. By using homomorphic encryption, the computing nodes in the MPC network can be guaranteed to compute while not knowing the privacy information of the information holder, and the security and privacy of the system are improved. Meanwhile, the information holder stores the corresponding ciphertext in the IPFS, the IPFS returns a unique hash address according to the file content, and the corresponding information can be found through the hash address during information access query. The IPFS has the advantages of high downloading speed, high safety, low redundancy, capability of continuously storing data and the like, a reliable, high-performance and high-quality information holder privacy and safety environment can be provided through the combination of the IPFS and the block chain, and meanwhile, the information storage capability is improved. In the process of safety calculation, routing addressing and calculation logic transmission are controlled through a pivot node, the MPC node completes cooperative calculation on the calculation logic and the selected content, identity authentication is carried out on the shared information, the calculation result is protected from being manipulated by an adversary by using MAC, and therefore the accuracy and the safety of the result of safety calculation of an information holder and multiple parties can be improved, and the only calculation result is finally output.
The secure multiparty computing and privacy protecting method supporting blockchains of the embodiment may include the following steps S1-S5.
S1, the information holder first stores the information itself in encrypted form.
The homomorphic public key and the homomorphic private key can be generated by the third-party organization running a homomorphic encryption algorithm for initialization, and the public key can be published in a whole network and the private key can be stored locally. The information holder can then encrypt the information using the homomorphic public key.
And S2, the information holder encrypts the data information and stores the data information into the IPFS network, and the IPFS returns a unique hash address according to the stored ciphertext information.
And S3, storing the encrypted ciphertext into the IPFS by the information holder, and chaining the obtained hash value and the metadata of all ciphertext information of the information holder.
S4, when a safe multiparty computation task is initiated, the hub node controls the routing and the computation logic transmission, and selects other information holders of the relevant data information types to perform safe collaborative computation.
And S5, the MPC nodes of all information holders participating in the collaborative computation inquire the required information from the IPFS according to the computation logic transmitted by the hub node, perform collaborative computation on the MPC computation task and other MPC nodes in the data flow, and route the output computation result to the designated node, so that the multi-party nodes complete the collaborative computation task and output a unique result. Meanwhile, the correctness of the output value is ensured by verifying the MAC at the end of the process.
In the step S1, during initialization, the trusted third party authority may run the Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm to generate a homomorphic public key and a private key, where the homomorphic public key is public and the private key is stored locally. The homomorphic encryption can be an encryption function which performs ring addition and multiplication operation on a plaintext for re-encryption, performs corresponding operation on a ciphertext after encryption, and has the same result. The Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm is based on the difficult problem of compound residue classes, and the algorithm can be used for ensuring that a ciphertext in a safe multiparty calculation process can be calculated, so that the privacy and the safety of information of an information holder are ensured.
Referring to fig. 2, the information holder encrypts and stores the information itself, and the ciphertext can be used for calculation in the secure multiparty calculation process, so that the privacy and the security of the information holder information are protected. The homomorphic public key and the homomorphic private key can be generated by the third-party organization running a homomorphic encryption algorithm for initialization, the public key is published in the whole network, and the private key is stored locally. The information holder then encrypts the information using the homomorphic public key. The specific homomorphic encryption algorithm can adopt a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the encryption process is specifically as follows:
s11, selecting two random large prime numbers x and y to satisfy:
gcd(xy,(x-1)(y-1))=1 (1)
the gcd () in the above formula (1) represents a function for finding the greatest common divisor of two parameters in parentheses.
And S12, calculating the values of n and tau, wherein the calculation formulas of n and tau are respectively as follows:
n=xy (2)
τ=lcm(x-1.y-1) (3)
where n and τ represent the common modulus of p and q and the least common multiple of p-1 and q-1, respectively, functionslcm() The function for finding the least common multiple of the parameter in brackets is shown.
S13, selecting a random integer
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Wherein, in the step (A),
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is of order
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Group (except 0).
S14, constructing a homomorphic public key (g,n) And a homomorphic private key (τ, k), where k is calculated as follows:
Figure 110607DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
(4)
where mod represents a modulo operation.
S15, random number is arbitrarily selected
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Wherein
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Is a group of order n (except 0), the secret information m of the encrypted information holder generates a ciphertext c:
Figure 483317DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
(5)
in the step S2, the method of this embodiment uses the IPFS to store the secret information of the information holder, the IPFS will return the hash address to the information holder, and when the MPC node needs to perform a calculation task, the MPC node can search the stored information through the hash address, and at the same time, the secret information stored in the IPFS is encrypted, so that the real secret information cannot be obtained without the private key of the information holder. IPFS is a distributed data storage protocol, each file has a unique hash value based on a content addressing mode, the direct connection between an IP address and content is released, and any node can acquire resources through a Content Identifier (CID). The following advantages can be achieved by IPFS: 1) the downloading speed is high, and the IPFS uses a BitTorrent protocol as a data transmission mode, so that the data transmission speed on the IPFS network is increased; 2) the safety is high, and compared with the existing centralized data storage mode, the IPFS distributed storage is safer; in an IPFS network, if one node fails, other nodes in the network can provide required files; 3) the redundancy is low, IPFS adopts a mode of establishing Hash duplicate removal for the data block content for storage, and the redundancy of network storage is reduced; 4) data can be stored continuously, and IPFS provides a storage mode which enables internet data to be stored all the time, so that the data can be stored safely and permanently.
Referring to fig. 3 and 4, the information holder encrypts the data information and stores the encrypted data information into the IPFS network, and the IPFS returns a unique hash address according to the stored ciphertext information, so that the pressure born by the operation of the block chain is reduced.
The block chain storage space compression ratio Ra can be shown as the following formula:
Figure 682217DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
(6)
in the above equation (6), Header represents the head of a block in the block chain,
Figure 351096DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
indicating the IPFS processed block size,
Figure 937935DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
the size of the information held by the original information holder. The information holder information storage process is as follows:
1) the information of the information holder is cut into n data blocks with the size of 256 KB, if small information content smaller than 256 KB exists, the information content is directly bound with a hash index, and the n data blocksInfCan be expressed as:
Figure 692264DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure 429276DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
Figure 952661DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
) Each data block is shown as constructed after slicing.
2) Each data block obtained by cutting
Figure 382506DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
SHA-256 operations were performed, respectively, as:
Figure 92973DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
3) performing BASE58 encoding on the obtained hash operation result, wherein the operation result is used as the unique identifier of the data block:
Figure 368096DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
4) splicing the coding results to obtain an arrayBlocksThen, the information is sequentially subjected to SHA-256 operation and BASE58 encoding, and the obtained result is the unique identifier of the information uploaded by the information holderInf.hash
Figure 11567DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
Inf.hash=BASE58(sha256(Blocks))
When the block chain link point needs information access, the access authority is obtained under a specific access strategy, metadata of related information in the block chain and the unique hash address of the metadata are obtained, and the IPFS finds the corresponding original information content according to the unique hash address.
In step S3, the information holder stores the encrypted ciphertext in the IPFS, and links the hash value and the metadata of all ciphertext information of the information holder. The combination of IPFS and blockchains provides a trusted, high-performance, high-quality information holder privacy-safe environment while increasing the ability to store information.
Referring to fig. 2 and 5, after the information holder stores the encrypted ciphertext into the IPFS, the obtained hash value and the metadata of the information are linked up, and the transaction process on the specific block chain may specifically be as follows:
1) the information holder submits a proposal for a transaction to one or more endorsement nodes, each transactiontxThe format of (d) can be expressed as:
tx=<clientID,clientSig,Payload,timestamp>
wherein the content of the first and second substances,timestampa presentation time stamp;
for different transaction requests, Payload composition is also different, and Payload mainly comprises:
Payload=<operation,data>alternatively, the first and second electrodes may be,Payload=<source,data,policies>
wherein the content of the first and second substances,operationit is shown that the specific operations are performed,datathe data is represented by a representation of,sourcea chain of source blocks is shown,policiesrepresenting an access policy.
2) After the endorsement node receives the transaction request, the transaction is simulated and executed, each endorsement node returns the signature of the simulated and executed result to the application program, the result is not directly submitted to a local account book, and the format returned to the application program can be expressed as:
tx=<Sig,clientID,Payload,chaincode>
3) and after the application program collects all endorsement responses, sending the endorsement information and the signature to the sequencing node.
4) And the sequencing node checks the signature, the endorsement strategy and the sequencing condition, if no problem exists, a block is generated, the block is broadcasted to the accounting node through a message channel, and the endorsement node is synchronized and the account book is updated.
All nodes in the channel store copies of the same account book, the same intelligent contract is executed, the execution result of each endorsement node is consistent, and if the results are inconsistent, the sequencing node considers that the endorsement node is not synchronous or the endorsement node is illegally tampered, the operation of updating the account book cannot be successful.
In the step S4, when a secure multiparty computation task is initiated, the hub node controls routing and computation logic transmission, and selects other information holders of related data information types to perform secure cooperative computation. Each participating node in the SMPC network is in the same position, and can initiate a cooperative computing task or choose to participate in a secure multi-party computing task initiated by other nodes. In addition, the whole secure multiparty computation process is divided into two stages in the embodiment, namely a preprocessing stage and an online computation stage. The preprocessing stage is mainly used for generating a secret key for MAC verification, a pair random number, a single random number and other data, and provides support for the online calculation stage; and the online data stage mainly completes cooperative computing.
Referring to fig. 6, each participating MPC node in the SMPC network is in the same position, and may initiate a cooperative computing task or may choose to participate in a secure multiparty computing task initiated by other nodes. When a safe multiparty computing task is initiated, the hub node controls routing addressing and computing logic transmission, and selects other information holders of related data information types to perform safe cooperative computing.
This embodiment may use the MAC to protect the computation results from manipulation by adversaries, and the shared secret information value and MAC are represented as follows:
1) for each shared value
Figure 346734DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
Figure 75655DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
Representing a characteristic p and the number of elements
Figure 747945DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
N is some positive integer, and the shared value can be expressed as:
Figure 245923DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
wherein the content of the first and second substances,δis a value that is disclosed as a result of,
Figure 17569DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
Figure 968208DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
each MPC node in SMPC network holds
Figure 850713DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
And
Figure 672039DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
Figure 614587DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
is in the global key
Figure 52522DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
Lower verification
Figure 473139DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
The MAC of (1).
Global key
Figure 945708DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
Generated in the pre-processing stage, which can be expressed as:
Figure 10000239765656
α
Figure 10000239811518
=
Figure 652633DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
wherein the content of the first and second substances,i=1,2,…,n,
Figure 577864DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
Figure 802172DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
in this embodiment, it is assumed that the compute node first has introduced a pre-processing procedure to share the MAC key of the secret information
Figure 10000239865606
α
Figure 10000239822238
A multiplicative triplet (〈 a 〉, 〈 b 〉, 〈 c 〉) and pairs of random values 〈 r 〉,
Figure 10000239883430
r
Figure 10000239837142
and a single random value has been generated in a pre-processing stage
Figure 10000239870062
t
Figure 10000239830630
And
Figure 10000239874438
e
Figure 10000239833454
to share the input of each node
Figure 863669DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
Each node holds a pair of available random values 〈 r 〉,
Figure 10000239888808
r
Figure 10000239839702
then, the following operations are performed:
1) will random value
Figure 10000239895510
r
Figure 10000239843694
The method comprises the steps of disclosing to an MPC node in an SMPC network;
2) each computing node broadcasting theta ← to the whole network
Figure 148019DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
-r;
3) All nodes calculate:
Figure 29388DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
〉←〈r〉+θ
and then the calculation logic of the cooperative calculation is calculated according to the calculation logic circuit controlled by the pivot node.
In step S5, the MPC nodes of all information holders participating in the cooperative computation query the required information from the IPFS according to the computation logic transmitted by the hub node, perform cooperative computation on the MPC computation task and other MPC nodes in the data stream, and route the output computation result to the designated node, so that the multi-party nodes complete the cooperative computation task and output a unique result. The correctness of the output value is ensured by verifying the MAC at the end of the calculation. Delaying the verification of the MAC to the output stage can effectively solve the problem that the computing node forges the MAC after knowing the global key.
And the MPC nodes of all information holders participating in the collaborative calculation inquire required information from the IPFS according to calculation logic transmitted by the hub node, perform collaborative calculation on the MPC calculation task and other MPC nodes in the data flow, and route the output calculation result to the designated node, so that the multi-party nodes complete the collaborative calculation task and output a unique result. Meanwhile, the correctness of the output value is ensured by verifying the MAC at the end of the process.
1) Let s1,s2,…,snIs a disclosed value, wherein:
〈sj 〉=(δj,(sj,1,sj,2,…,sj,n ),(γ(sj )1,γ(sj )2,…,γ(sj)n))
wherein j is an integer from 1 to n.
At the same time a random value
Figure 10000239904870
e
Figure 10000239850166
Also disclosed, MPC compute node setup
ei=ei
Where i =1,2, …, T, all participating nodes compute:
s←∑jej sj
2) each compute node passes FCOMFunction submission
γi←∑jejγ(sj )i
For output values 〈 y 〉, each SMPC node submits its corresponding share yiAnd gamma (y) in the corresponding MACi. Wherein FCOMThe function receives only the submitted value, which is then stored and displayed to all participants according to the submitter's requirements.
3) Subsequently, the full web publication
Figure 10000239907238
α
Figure 10000239853550
4) Each node requires FCOMFunction disclosure gammaiAnd all participating nodes verify
(s+∑j ejδj)=∑iγi
If the verification fails, stopping; otherwise, the computing node obtains the conclusion that the output result is correct.
5) To output the result y, will be to yiPromise of (1)γ(y)iDisclosed is a method for producing a semiconductor device. Where y is defined as
y=∑iyi
And each node verifies
(y+δ)=∑iγ(y)i
If the verification is passed, y is the final output result.
The safe multi-party calculation and privacy protection method for supporting the block chain has the beneficial effects that: the information of the information holder is encrypted by adopting a homomorphic encryption technology before the safe multi-party computing task is executed, so that the information of the information holder is prevented from being directly acquired by a dishonest node in an MPC network, and meanwhile, the smooth execution of the multi-party computing task is ensured, compared with a traditional safe multi-party computing model, the embodiment has higher application value in various scenes with high privacy and high safety requirements; the method comprises the steps that ciphertext information of an information holder is stored in the IPFS, the IPFS returns a unique hash address according to file content, corresponding ciphertext information can be found through the hash address during information access query, an original file of the information holder cannot be checked, and then the next operation is carried out under the condition that the information of the information holder is kept secret. The IPFS has the advantages of high downloading speed, high safety, low redundancy, capability of continuously storing data and the like; chaining the hash value returned by the IPFS and the metadata of all the ciphertext information of the information holder; the combination of the block chain and the IPFS provides a reliable, high-performance and high-quality privacy and safety environment for information holders, and improves the information storage capacity; the identity of the shared information is verified by adopting an SPDZ protocol (a protocol in secure multiparty computation), the check of the MAC is delayed to an output stage, and further, the secret of the MAC and the forged MAC value are not exposed during each information sharing; the random linear combination generated in the output stage and the check of the MAC ensure the correctness of the output result and simultaneously ensure the integrity of the computing nodes in the MPC network.
In the description herein, reference to the description of the terms "one embodiment," "a particular embodiment," "some embodiments," "for example," "an example," "a particular example," or "some examples," etc., means that a particular feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the invention. In this specification, the schematic representations of the terms used above do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the particular features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples. The sequence of steps involved in the various embodiments is provided to schematically illustrate the practice of the invention, and the sequence of steps is not limited and can be suitably adjusted as desired.
As will be appreciated by one skilled in the art, embodiments of the present invention may be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, and the like) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
The present invention is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the invention. It will be understood that each flow and/or block of the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, and combinations of flows and/or blocks in the flow diagrams and/or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions may be provided to a processor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, create means for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including instruction means which implement the function specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce a computer implemented process such that the instructions which execute on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps for implementing the functions specified in the flowchart flow or flows and/or block diagram block or blocks.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are only exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.

Claims (10)

1. A secure multi-party computing method supporting blockchains, comprising:
acquiring a homomorphic public key by a first information holder, and encrypting data information of the secure multiparty computation task by using the homomorphic public key to obtain a ciphertext of the data information;
storing the ciphertext of the data information to an IPFS network by a first information holder, receiving a hash address returned by the IPFS network according to the ciphertext of the data information, and issuing metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to a block chain;
initiating a secure multi-party computing task to a first MPC node by a first information holder, and selecting at least one second information holder according to the secure multi-party computing task by using a hub node in an SMPC network where the first MPC node is located; the first MPC node for initiating the collaborative computing task is selected from all MPC nodes of the SMPC network according to the principle that the node positions are the same;
performing cooperative calculation aiming at the safe multi-party calculation task by a first MPC node of a first information holder and at least one second MPC node of a second information holder according to calculation logic transmitted by a hub node and required information inquired from an IPFS network according to metadata and a hash address of ciphertext of data information to obtain a calculation result;
and acquiring the calculation result by using a designated MPC node in the first MPC node and each second MPC node, acquiring a homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key by using an information holder of the designated MPC node, and decrypting the calculation result by using the homomorphic private key.
2. The secure multi-party computing method in support of blockchains according to claim 1, wherein before the obtaining of the homomorphic public key by the first information holder, further comprising:
and running a homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key, disclosing the homomorphic public key to the blockchain network, and storing the homomorphic private key to the local part of the third party organization.
3. The secure multiparty computing method in accordance with claim 2, wherein generating a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key by a third party authority other than the first information holder and each of the second information holders running a homomorphic encryption algorithm comprises:
and running a Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm by a third party organization except the first information holder and each second information holder to generate a homomorphic public key and a homomorphic private key.
4. The secure multi-party computing method supporting blockchains according to claim 1, wherein before the information holder of the designated MPC node obtains a homomorphic private key corresponding to the homomorphic public key and decrypts the computation result by using the homomorphic private key, the method further comprises:
and performing MAC verification on the calculation result, and outputting the calculation result to the information holder of the specified node under the condition that the verification is passed.
5. The secure multi-party computing method in support of blockchains according to claim 1, further comprising:
the first MPC node of the first information holder participates in the cooperative computation of the secure multiparty computation task initiated by the other information holders.
6. The secure multiparty computing method in support of blockchains according to claim 1, wherein the issuing of the metadata of the ciphertext of the data information and the hash address to a blockchain comprises:
submitting a transaction request to at least one endorsement node by a first information holder;
after receiving the transaction request, the endorsement node simulates and executes the corresponding transaction, and returns the simulated execution result to the application program corresponding to the first information holder after signing;
after the application program collects the signed simulation execution results of all endorsement nodes, the signed simulation execution results are sent to the sequencing node;
and checking the signature, endorsement policy and sorting condition in the simulated execution result after each signature by the sorting node, generating a corresponding block after the checking is passed, broadcasting the block to the accounting node through a message channel, synchronizing to each endorsement node, and updating a corresponding account book under the condition that the execution results of the endorsement nodes are consistent.
7. The method as claimed in claim 4, wherein before the computation results are obtained by performing the collaborative computation on the secure multi-party computation task by the first MPC node of the first information holder and the second MPC node of the at least one second information holder according to the computation logic transmitted by the hub node and the required information queried from the IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information, the method further comprises:
a key for MAC verification is generated along with a pair of random numbers and a single random number for coordinated computation.
8. The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the secure multiparty computation task is computed by a first MPC node of a first information holder and a second MPC node of at least one second information holder in cooperation with computation logic transmitted by the hub node and required information queried from the IPFS network according to metadata of ciphertext of data information and hash address, to obtain computation results, comprising:
under the condition of obtaining authorization, a first MPC node of a first information holder and a second MPC node of at least one second information holder acquire metadata and a hash address of a ciphertext of data information, inquire required information from an IPFS network according to the metadata and the hash address of the ciphertext of the data information, and control routing and calculation logic transmission corresponding to the secure multi-party calculation task by a hub node so as to complete cooperative calculation of the secure multi-party calculation task and obtain a calculation result.
9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that the steps of the method according to any of claims 1 to 8 are implemented when the program is executed by the processor.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, on which a computer program is stored which, when being executed by a processor, carries out the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
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