CN112511310A - Confusion method for encrypting identity blind signature - Google Patents
Confusion method for encrypting identity blind signature Download PDFInfo
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- CN112511310A CN112511310A CN202011309010.5A CN202011309010A CN112511310A CN 112511310 A CN112511310 A CN 112511310A CN 202011309010 A CN202011309010 A CN 202011309010A CN 112511310 A CN112511310 A CN 112511310A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3257—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using blind signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0877—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords using additional device, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard, USB or hardware security module [HSM]
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/50—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wire-line communication networks, e.g. low power modes or reduced link rate
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Abstract
The application provides an obfuscation method for encrypting identity blind signatures, which comprises the following steps: the third trusted party acquires the public parameter pub and the main private key mk generated according to the system generation algorithm setup; the third trusted party obtains the signature key sk corresponding to the identity ID of the blind signerIDAnd signing the key skIDSending the signature to a blind signer; the information receiver obtains the encrypted public key pk according to the encryption and decryption generating algorithm KGeAnd the decryption private key ske(ii) a The blind signer signs the blind signature key sk according to the confusion algorithmIDPerforming confusion processing to obtain a key after confusion; and the user encrypts the information signature of the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key to generate a ciphertext and sends the ciphertext to the information receiver. According to the method and the device, even if an attacker breaks through the encrypted identity blind signature after operation confusion, the attacker can hardly obtain the private key of the encrypted identity blind signature.
Description
Technical Field
The application belongs to the technical field of cryptography, blind signature and confusion theory, and particularly relates to a confusion method for encrypting identity blind signatures.
Background
The blind signature is different from the common digital signature, a signer does not know the content of a file issued by the signer and cannot correspond the signature process with the signature result, and the characteristic is called blindness, so that the blind signature is widely applied to the field with anonymity requirements (such as electronic payment or electronic voting). Based on the identity cryptosystem, a credible secret key generation center is used for generating a private key for a user by using a system master secret key and a user identity, and the algorithm directly inputs the user identity as a user public key without using a public key certificate, so that the problem of certificate management is solved. Identity-based blind signature schemes are therefore widely studied.
The traditional cryptographic algorithm does not consider the security risk of an algorithm operation platform during design. The security of a blind signature scheme is severely compromised if the computing device of the signature algorithm is under the control of an attacker, especially if the private signature key is exposed. For example, in a white-box attack environment, a key information of a cryptographic algorithm, namely a key, is not specially protected when software runs. An attacker can easily obtain the key information by observing or executing the cryptographic software.
The invention content is as follows:
in view of this, the present application provides a method for obfuscating a blind signature of an encrypted identity, so as to implement an efficient, safe and practical method for obfuscating an encrypted signature. In order to achieve the purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the application is as follows:
a obfuscation method of encrypting a blind identity signature, the method implemented on a cryptographic system based on obfuscation techniques, comprising:
step 1: the third trusted party acquires the public parameter pub and the main private key mk generated according to the system generation algorithm setup;
step 2: the third trusted party obtains a signature key sk corresponding to the identity ID of the blind signer through a key generation algorithm (IBBS.KG) based on the identity blind signature according to the public parameter pub, the master private key mk and the identity ID of the blind signerIDAnd signing the key skIDSending the signature to a blind signer;
and step 3: the information receiver obtains the encrypted public key pk according to the encryption and decryption generating algorithm KGeAnd the decryption private key ske;
And 4, step 4: the blind signer applies the blind signature key sk according to an obfuscation algorithm (Obf)IDPerforming confusion processing to obtain a key after confusion;
and 5: and the user encrypts the information signature of the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key to generate a ciphertext and sends the ciphertext to the information receiver.
Optionally, the expression of the system generation algorithm setup in step 1 is:
pub={p,g1,g2,h1,h2,u1,…,un,F1,F2},
g1=gα,
p=(q,G,GT,e,g)
wherein G is a cyclic group of addition, GTMultiplication loop groups, q being G and GTE is a bilinear map, G is the generator of G, G2,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element of group G, I denotes a bit string of length N ═ nn', F1,F2Is a mapping of I to a group G, ZqFor the residue class ring of mode q, a is ZqRandomly selecting elements.
Optionally, the expression of the key generation algorithm (ibbs.kg) for identity blind signature in step 2 is as follows:
wherein r is ZqRandom element of (1), g2Is a random element in G and is obtained by pub analysis.
Optionally, the encryption and decryption generation algorithm KG in step 3 specifically includes:
randomly selecting a, b epsilon ZqObtaining the encrypted private key as ske(a, b) and an encrypted public key pke=(pke1,pke2)=(ga,gb)。
Optionally, the blind signer of the step 4 uses the blind signature key sk according to an obfuscation algorithm (Obf)IDPerforming obfuscation processing to obtain an obfuscated key specifically as follows:
the blind signer obtains the parsed skID=(d0,d1)、p=(q,G,GTE, g) and pke=(pke1,pke2) For sk toID=(d0,d1) Obfuscating and obtaining an obfuscated private signature keyThe method comprises the following steps:
Optionally, in step 5, after performing information signature encryption on the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key, the generating a secret document specifically includes:
judging whether the message M is empty, if so, outputting (pub, pk)e) Otherwise, the following steps are carried out:
(d) User random selection of ZqElement x of1,x2,y1,y2,z1,z2To (σ)1,σ2,σ3) Re-randomizing and computing the signature Outputting the ciphertext
Wherein pi is the successive multiplication symbol, g2,u′,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element in group G.
Compared with the prior art, the method has the following beneficial technical effects:
(1) because the application adopts the obfuscation technology, the signer performs obfuscation processing on the signature key, the problem that the signature key is easy to attack and cause leakage in the prior art is solved, the application effectively protects the signature key of the signer, and the security of the encrypted identity blind signature is greatly improved;
(2) the confidentiality effect is good: according to the method and the device, even if an attacker breaks through the encrypted identity blind signature after operation confusion, the attacker can hardly obtain the private key of the encrypted identity blind signature.
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In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings that are required to be used in the embodiments will be briefly described below, it should be understood that the following drawings only illustrate some embodiments of the present application and therefore should not be considered as limiting the scope, and for those skilled in the art, other related drawings can be obtained from the drawings without inventive effort.
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of an obfuscation method for encrypting a blind identity signature according to the present application.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present application, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some embodiments of the present application, but not all embodiments.
As shown in fig. 1, the present application provides an obfuscation method for encrypting a blind identity signature, which is implemented on a cryptographic system based on an obfuscation technique, and includes:
s101: the third trusted party acquires the public parameter pub and the main private key mk generated according to the system generation algorithm setup;
the expression of the system generation algorithm setup is:
pub={p,g1,g2,h1,h2,u1,…,un,F1,F2},
g1=gα,
p=(q,G,GT,e,g)
wherein G is a cyclic group of addition, GTMultiplication loop groups, q being G and GTE is a bilinear map, G is the generator of G, G2,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element of group G, I denotes a bit string of length N ═ nn', F1,F2Is a mapping of I to a group G, ZqFor the residue-like rings of mode q, α is ZqRandomly selecting elements.
S102: the third trusted party obtains a signature key sk corresponding to the identity ID of the blind signer through a key generation algorithm (IBBS.KG) based on the identity blind signature according to the public parameter pub, the master private key mk and the identity ID of the blind signerIDAnd signing the key skIDSending the signature to a blind signer;
the expression of the key generation algorithm (ibbs. kg) for identity blind signature is:
wherein r is ZqRandom element of (1), g2Is a random element in G and is obtained by pub analysis.
S103: the information receiver obtains the encrypted public key pk according to the encryption and decryption generating algorithm KGeAnd the decryption private key ske;
The encryption and decryption generation algorithm KG specifically comprises:
random selection of a,b∈ZqObtaining the encrypted private key as ske(a, b) and an encrypted public key pke=(pke1,pke2)=(ga,gb)。
S104: the blind signer applies the blind signature key sk according to an obfuscation algorithm (Obf)IDPerforming confusion processing to obtain a key after confusion;
the method specifically comprises the following steps:
the blind signer obtains the parsed skID=(d0,d1)、p=(q,G,GTE, g) and pke=(pke1,pke2) For sk toID=(d0,d1) Obfuscating and obtaining an obfuscated private signature keyThe method comprises the following steps:
S105: and the user encrypts the information signature of the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key to generate a ciphertext and sends the ciphertext to the information receiver.
The method specifically comprises the following steps:
judging whether the message M is empty, if so, outputting (pub, pk)e) Otherwise, the following steps are carried out:
(d) User random selection of ZqElement x of1,x2,y1,y2,z1,z2To (σ)1,σ2,σ3) Re-randomizing and computing the signature Outputting the ciphertext
Wherein pi is the successive multiplication symbol, g2,u′,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element in group G.
Because the application adopts the obfuscation technology, the signer obfuscates the signature key, the problem that the signature key is easy to attack and cause leakage in the prior art is solved, the application effectively protects the signature key of the signer, and the security of the encrypted identity blind signature is greatly improved.
The above description is only for the specific embodiments of the present application, but the scope of the present application is not limited thereto, and any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of the changes or substitutions within the technical scope of the present application, and shall be covered by the scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (6)
1. A confusion method for encrypting identity blind signatures, which is implemented on a cryptographic system based on confusion technology, is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step 1: the third trusted party acquires the public parameter pub and the main private key mk generated according to the system generation algorithm setup;
step 2: the third trusted party obtains the signature key sk corresponding to the identity ID of the blind signer through a key generation algorithm based on the identity blind signature according to the public parameter pub, the master private key mk and the identity ID of the blind signerIDAnd signing the key skIDSending the signature to a blind signer;
and step 3: the information receiver obtains the encrypted public key pk according to the encryption and decryption generating algorithm KGeAnd the decryption private key ske;
And 4, step 4: the blind signer signs the blind signature key sk according to the confusion algorithmIDPerforming confusion processing to obtain a key after confusion;
and 5: and the user encrypts the information signature of the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key to generate a ciphertext and sends the ciphertext to the information receiver.
2. A obfuscation method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the expression of the system generation algorithm setup in step 1 is:
pub={p,g1,g2,h1,h2,u1,…,un,F1,F2},
g1=gα,
p=(q,G,GT,e,g)
wherein G isMethod cycle group, GTMultiplication loop groups, q being G and GTE is a bilinear map, G is the generator of G, G2,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element of group G, I denotes a bit string of length N ═ nn', F1,F2Is a mapping of I to a group G, ZqFor the residue class ring of mode q, a is ZqRandomly selecting elements.
4. The obfuscation method of claim 3, wherein the encryption/decryption generation algorithm in step 3 is specifically:
randomly selecting a, b epsilon ZqObtaining the encrypted private key as ske(a, b) and an encrypted public key pke=(pke1,pke2)=(ga,gb)。
5. The obfuscation method of claim 4, wherein the blind signer of step 4 applies the blind signature key sk according to an obfuscation algorithmIDPerforming obfuscation processing to obtain an obfuscated key specifically as follows:
the blind signer obtains the parsed skID=(d0,d1)、p=(q,G,GTE, g) and pke=(pke1,pke2) For sk toID=(d0,d1) Obfuscating and obtaining an obfuscated private signature keyThe method comprises the following steps:
6. The obfuscation method of claim 5, wherein the step 5, after the user performs information signature encryption on the message M to be sent according to the obfuscated key, to generate the secret document specifically includes:
judging whether the message M is empty, if so, outputting (pub, pk)e) Otherwise, the following steps are carried out:
(d) User random selection of ZqElement x of1,x2,y1,y2,z1,z2Pair(s)1,s2,s3) Re-randomizing and computing the signature Outputting the ciphertext
Wherein pi is the successive multiplication symbol, g2,u′,h1,h2,u1,u2,…,unIs a randomly selected element in group G.
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Cited By (1)
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CN116094726A (en) * | 2023-01-03 | 2023-05-09 | 西安电子科技大学 | Partially blind signature method and system based on lattice public key cryptography |
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