CN112118071A - Wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference - Google Patents

Wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference Download PDF

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Publication number
CN112118071A
CN112118071A CN202010778701.3A CN202010778701A CN112118071A CN 112118071 A CN112118071 A CN 112118071A CN 202010778701 A CN202010778701 A CN 202010778701A CN 112118071 A CN112118071 A CN 112118071A
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node
time slot
signal
suspicious
user
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孙黎
张墉
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Xian Jiaotong University
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Xian Jiaotong University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/60—Jamming involving special techniques
    • H04K3/65—Jamming involving special techniques using deceptive jamming or spoofing, e.g. transmission of false signals for premature triggering of RCIED, for forced connection or disconnection to/from a network or for generation of dummy target signal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Technology Law (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention discloses a wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference, which comprises the following steps: setting up suspicious transmitting user A and suspicious receiving user B in the cell, setting up a monitoring node (E)1，E2) Suspicious transmitting user A, suspicious receiving user B and node E1And node E2Single antennas are adopted and work in a time division duplex mode; the information transmission of the user A is carried out in time slots, and in any time slot T, the node E2Eavesdropping on signals of suspect communication links, node E1Sending artificial noise, node E2Receiving a signal; at time slot T +1, node E2Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, and the node E1By receiving the signals, the method can effectively improve the self-interference resistance of the monitoring node.

Description

Wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, and relates to a wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference.
Background
In recent years, as the scale of wireless communication has gradually increased, the problem regarding securing information transmission has become increasingly troublesome. Conventional wireless security studies typically assume that wireless communications are correct in order to protect their confidentiality and usability against malicious eavesdropping and tampering attacks. However, with the advancement of infrastructure-less mobile communication technologies, the assumption of legitimate wireless communication may not always hold in practice.
In the face of such new challenges of communication security, more and more researches are beginning to shift ideas from protecting legitimate wireless communication from malicious eavesdropping and interference to monitoring and intervening suspicious or malicious wireless communication by jointly utilizing legitimate eavesdropping and interference, and a legitimate eavesdropping mode for active eavesdropping by interference is proposed.
The so far known research, the designed strategy of eavesdropping and interference is basically designed based on that the interference party adopts a full-duplex communication mode. However, a full-duplex communication node may face a strong self-interference signal when receiving a signal under test. There are many ways to eliminate self-interference in theory, but the effect is not satisfactory in practice.
Disclosure of Invention
The present invention is directed to overcome the drawbacks of the prior art, and provides a wireless monitoring method based on alternative interference, which can effectively improve the self-interference resistance of a monitoring node.
In order to achieve the above object, the wireless monitoring method based on alternative interference according to the present invention comprises the following steps: setting up suspicious transmitting user A and suspicious receiving user B in the cell, setting up a monitoring node (E)1，E2) Suspicious transmitting user A, suspicious receiving user B and node E1And node E2Single antennas are adopted and work in a time division duplex mode;
the information transmission of the user A is carried out in time slots, and in any time slot T, the node E2Eavesdropping on signals of suspect communication links, node E1Sending artificial noise, node E2Receiving a signal;
at time slot T +1, node E2Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, and the node E1Reception of the signal is performed.
In time slot T, node E2The received signals are:
y2(t)＝hA2xA(t)+h12w(t)+n2(t) (1)
wherein w (t) represents a node E1Transmitted artificial noise, xA(t) denotes a signal from a suspected transmitting user A, hA2Indicating a suspicious transmitting user A to node E2Channel coefficient of (d), h12Represents node E1To node E2Of the channel coefficient n2(t) represents a node E2The noise of (2).
At time slot T +1, node E2Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, wherein the node E2The transmission signal of (a) is:
w(t+1)＝αy2(t) (3)
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002619419860000021
representing the energy normalization factor.
At time slot T +1, node E1The received signals are:
y1(t+1)＝hA1xA(t+1)+h21αy2(t)+n1(t+1) (6)。
the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the wireless monitoring method based on the alternating interference is operated specifically, and a node E is arranged in a time slot T1Sending artificial noise signals as jammers, node E2As a listener, simultaneously receiving a signal transmitted by a suspicious transmitter and an artificial noise signal transmitted by an interference machine; in the T +1 time slot, node E2Broadcasting the mixed signal received by the node E in the T time slot as an interference signal1Node E for simultaneously receiving suspect transmitter transmissions as a lawful listener2The transmitted mixed signal is generated by node E due to artificial noise in the mixed signal1Generated, therefore node E1The artificial noise signal can be separated from the mixed signal, so that the signal transmitted by the suspicious transmitter can be decoded to realize effective legal monitoring, the self-interference resistance is higher, and for the suspicious receiver, because the artificial noise signal is unknown, the receiving signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio is obviously deteriorated, thereby producingGenerating error code platform, thus avoiding information leakage, and in summary, the node E in the invention1And node E2Compared with a full-duplex monitoring system, the self-interference resistance performance is better under the same self-interference residual level by adopting a half-duplex transceiving mode.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a system diagram of the present invention;
fig. 2 is a graph of the variation of the symbol error rate with the rise of the signal-to-noise ratio for the full-duplex monitoring scheme and the passive monitoring scheme of the present invention under the same residual self-interference level.
Detailed Description
The invention is described in further detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings:
referring to fig. 1, the wireless monitoring method based on alternative interference according to the present invention includes the following steps:
setting up a suspicious transmitting user A and a suspicious receiving user B in a cell, setting up a monitoring node (E) for ensuring public safety1，E2) In the network, it is assumed that all nodes use a single antenna and operate in a Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode, that is, each node cannot receive or transmit signals at the same Time.
The information transmission of the user A is carried out in time slots, and in any time slot T, the node E2Eavesdropping on signals of suspect communication links, node E1Sending artificial noise, node E2The received signals are:
y2(t)＝hA2xA(t)+h12w(t)+n2(t) (1)
wherein w (t) represents a node E1Transmitted artificial noise, xA(t) denotes a signal from a suspected transmitting user A, hA2Indicating a suspicious transmitting user A to node E2Channel coefficient of (d), h12Represents node E1To node E2Of the channel coefficient n2(t) represents a node E2The signal received by the suspected receiving user B is:
yB(t)＝hABxA(t)+h1Bw(t)+nB(t) (2)
wherein h isABChannel coefficient, h, representing a suspected transmitting user A to a suspected receiving user B1B
Represents node E1Channel coefficient, n, to suspect receiving user BB(t) represents the noise of the suspected receiving user B.
At time slot T +1, node E2Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, and the node E2The transmission signal of (a) is:
w(t+1)＝αy2(t) (3)
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure BDA0002619419860000041
representing the energy normalization factor, the received signal of the suspected receiving user B is:
yB(t+1)＝hABxA(t+1)+h2Bw(t+1)+nB(t+1) (4)
wherein x isA(T +1) indicates the signal transmitted by the suspected transmitting user A in time slot T +1, nB(T +1) represents the noise of the suspected receiving user B in time slot T +1, h2BRepresents node E2The channel coefficients to the suspected receiving user B, in combination with equations (1) and (3), expand equation (4) to:
yB(t+1)＝hABxA(t+1)+h2BαhA2xA(t)+h2Bαh12w(t)+h2Bαn2(t)+nB(t+1) (5)
node E1The received signals are:
y1(t+1)＝hA1xA(t+1)+h21αy2(t)+n1(t+1) (6)
combining the formula (1) and the formula (3), the formula (6) is developed as follows:
y1(t+1)＝hA1xA(t+1)+h21αhA2xA(t)+h21αh12w(t)+h21αn2(t)+n1(t+1) (7)
according to the transmission model, E1The detection method comprises the following steps:
1) node E by interaction of the Pilot Signal and channel information sent before the data Transmission begins1Channel state information h can be obtained21And channel state information hA2And from this, α is inferred, since w (t) is node E1Self-generated artificial noise signal, to ensure monitoring node E1The following processing is performed on equation (7):
Figure BDA0002619419860000051
2) will be provided with
Figure BDA0002619419860000052
The expansion is as follows:
Figure BDA0002619419860000053
according to formula (9), node E1Using maximum likelihood algorithm to xA(t) and xA(t +1) performing combined detection.
According to a transmission model
Due to suspicious receiving of unknown channel information h of user B21Therefore, the suspect receiving user B can only be right for yB(t) and yB(t +1) separately.
Through the equations (2) and (5), the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio of the suspicious receiving user B in the slot T decoding is known as:
Figure BDA0002619419860000054
the signal to interference plus noise ratio at time slot T +1 is:
Figure BDA0002619419860000055
wherein, γABRepresenting the signal-to-noise ratio, gamma, of a suspect transmitting user A to a suspect receiving user B1BRepresents node E1Signal to noise ratio, gamma, to suspect receiving user B2BRepresents node E2SNR to suspect receiving user B, when average SNR
Figure BDA0002619419860000061
In the meantime, it can be found that the received signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio at the suspicious receiving user B is still not improved, so that the suspicious receiving user B may have an error platform when decoding information, and the suspicious receiving user B may not be able to effectively recover the information from the suspicious transmitting user a.
Referring to fig. 2, when the signal-to-noise ratio increases, the symbol error rate of the node B in the passive listening scheme is also reduced because the monitoring node E does not apply interference, and when the signal-to-noise ratio increases to a certain degree, the decoding of the monitoring node E in the full-duplex listening scheme will have an error floor because the residual self-interference is dominant in the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio of the node E at this time. However, the invention adopts a half-duplex working mode, and is less influenced by residual self-interference, so that the symbol error rate of the node E in the invention under a high signal-to-noise ratio is far lower than that of the node E in a full-duplex scheme.

Claims (4)

1. A wireless monitoring method based on alternative interference is characterized by comprising the following steps:
setting up suspicious transmitting user A and suspicious receiving user B in the cell, setting up a monitoring node (E)1，E2) Suspicious transmitting user A, suspicious receiving user B and node E1And node E2Single antennas are adopted and work in a time division duplex mode;
the information transmission of the user A is carried out in time slots, and in any time slot T, the node E2Eavesdropping on signals of suspect communication links, node E1Sending artificial noise, node E2Receiving a signal;
at time slot T +1, node E2Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, and the node E1Reception of the signal is performed.
2. The method of claim 1, wherein node E is configured to monitor the time slot T for interference2The received signals are:
y2(t)＝hA2xA(t)+h12w(t)+n2(t) (1)
wherein w (t) represents a node E1Transmitted artificial noise, xA(t) denotes a signal from a suspected transmitting user A, hA2Indicating a suspicious transmitting user A to node E2Channel coefficient of (d), h12Represents node E1To node E2Of the channel coefficient n2(t) represents a node E2The noise of (2).
3. The method of claim 2, wherein node E is configured to perform wireless monitoring in time slot T +12Forwarding the signal received by the time slot T, wherein the node E2The transmission signal of (a) is:
w(t+1)＝αy2(t) (3)
wherein the content of the first and second substances,
Figure FDA0002619419850000011
representing the energy normalization factor.
4. The method of claim 3, wherein node E is configured to perform wireless monitoring in time slot T +11The received signals are:
y1(t+1)＝hA1xA(t+1)+h21αy2(t)+n1(t+1) (6)。
CN202010778701.3A 2020-08-05 2020-08-05 Wireless monitoring method based on alternating interference Pending CN112118071A (en)

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Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN108809365A (en) * 2018-06-13 2018-11-13 华侨大学 A kind of cooperation scrambling safe transmission method based on the selection of repeated link optimal user
CN110062384A (en) * 2019-04-28 2019-07-26 西安交通大学 A kind of wireless monitoring method based on signal rotation

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN108809365A (en) * 2018-06-13 2018-11-13 华侨大学 A kind of cooperation scrambling safe transmission method based on the selection of repeated link optimal user
CN110062384A (en) * 2019-04-28 2019-07-26 西安交通大学 A kind of wireless monitoring method based on signal rotation

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Application publication date: 20201222