CN111800325A - Anonymous voting method of annular structure with separated server and encryption machine - Google Patents
Anonymous voting method of annular structure with separated server and encryption machine Download PDFInfo
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- CN111800325A CN111800325A CN202010754599.3A CN202010754599A CN111800325A CN 111800325 A CN111800325 A CN 111800325A CN 202010754599 A CN202010754599 A CN 202010754599A CN 111800325 A CN111800325 A CN 111800325A
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/42—Loop networks
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C13/00—Voting apparatus
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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Abstract
The invention belongs to the technical field of internet voting, and discloses an anonymous voting method of an annular structure with a server and an encryption machine separated, which comprises the following steps: s1, acquiring N voting participants, and randomly generating an annular voting mechanism in the N voting participants; s2, in a ring voting mechanism, a second voting party verifies and decrypts the first voting encryption information sent by the first voting party; if the verification is correct, decryption is performed and the process proceeds to step S3; if the verification fails, voting is stopped and the whole network alarms; s3, after the first voting encryption information is decrypted, first decryption information is obtained, a second voting participant carries out voting, second voting information generated by voting is comprehensively loaded into the first decryption information, second voting information is obtained, and the second voting information is encrypted to obtain second voting encryption information; s4, repeating the steps S2-S3 to complete the sequential voting of the N voting participants in the annular voting mechanism and obtain the voting result.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of internet voting, and particularly relates to an anonymous voting method with an annular structure and with a server and an encryption machine separated.
Background
Poll is an important way of collecting information, such as project voting in a project team, consumer satisfaction with a product, etc. The traditional voting mode is mostly offline voting, and has the problems of low efficiency, small sample range and poor accuracy; with the development of internet technology, online voting gradually replaces offline voting, and the problems of the traditional offline voting are effectively solved. However, online voting of the internet has the problems that voting data are easy to be distorted and the accuracy of voting results is poor; moreover, the information of the voter is uploaded to the internet through voting authorization, so that the problem that the information of the voter is leaked easily occurs.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of this, the present invention aims to provide an anonymous voting method with a ring structure in which a server and an encryption device are separated, so as to solve the problems that effective anonymity cannot be realized and voting data is tampered, thereby ensuring the accuracy of voting results and well protecting the privacy of voters.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention provides the following technical scheme: an anonymous voting method of a ring structure with a server and an encryption machine separated comprises the following steps:
s1, acquiring N voting participants, randomly generating an annular voting mechanism in the N voting participants, and performing voting of the N-1 voting participants in an irreversible and sequential manner by taking any one of the voting participants as a start in the annular voting mechanism and finishing after the voting is performed back to the start voting participants;
s2, in the annular voting mechanism, a second voting party verifies and decrypts the first voting encryption information sent by the first voting party; if the verification is correct, decryption is performed and the process proceeds to step S3; if the verification fails, voting is stopped and the whole network alarms; wherein the second voting party and the first voting party are two adjacent voting parties in the ring voting mechanism, and the first voting party performs voting before the second voting party;
s3, after the first voting encryption information is decrypted, first decryption information is obtained, a second voting participant carries out voting, second voting information generated by voting is comprehensively loaded into the first decryption information, second voting information is obtained, and the second voting information is encrypted to obtain second voting encryption information;
s4, repeating the steps S2-S3, completing the sequential voting of the N voting participants in the annular voting mechanism, and acquiring the voting result.
In the anonymous voting method, the N voting participants comprise an initiator and N-1 voters, and the annular voting mechanism starts from the initiator, sequentially executes the voting of the N-1 voters, and is finished after going back to the initiator for voting.
In the anonymous voting method according to the present invention, before performing step S2, the method further includes: and initiating a vote by the initiator, and generating basic encryption information corresponding to the initiator in the process of initiating the vote.
Further, the basic encryption information corresponding to the initiator includes: the system comprises basic voting information containing voting necessary information and basic random numbers, and an initiator carries out public key encryption and private key signature on the basic voting information to obtain the basic encryption information.
Further, the voting necessity information includes at least the voter ID.
In the anonymous voting method, each voting participant comprises a separated server and an encryption machine.
In the anonymous voting method according to the present invention, in step S2, the step of the second voting party verifying the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting party includes:
in the server of the second voting party, verifying the first voting encryption information by using the public key of the first voting party, and confirming whether the private key signature of the first voting encryption information is correct or not;
and determining the IP address sent by the first voting encryption information through the server of the second voting party, and judging whether the IP address is the IP address of the server of the first voting party.
In the anonymous voting method according to the present invention, in step S2, the step of decrypting, by the second voting participant, the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting participant includes:
sending the first voting encryption information to an encryption machine of the second voting party by using the server of the second voting party;
and decrypting the first voting encryption information by using the private key of the second voting party in the encryption machine of the second voting party to obtain first decryption information.
In the anonymous voting method according to the present invention, in step S3, the step of the second voting participant performing the vote and acquiring the second voting encryption information includes:
s31, obtaining the voting result of the second voting participant, wherein the voting result comprises approval and disapproval;
s32, acquiring a first random number in the first decryption information, and calculating a second random number according to the first random number and the voting result of the second voting participant; and the second random number is calculated in the following way:
a second random number + P; when the voting result is approved, P is 1; when the voting result is negative, P is 0;
and S32, combining the second random number and the voting necessary information to form second voting information, and performing public key encryption and private key signature on the second voting information by a second voting participant to obtain second voting encryption information.
In the anonymous voting method of the present invention, after the N voting participants complete the sequential voting in the circular voting mechanism, an nth random number is obtained, and the voting result obtained in step S4 is represented as: the vote agreed-to-nth random number-the basic random number.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following beneficial effects:
the anonymous voting method provided by the invention can effectively realize the anonymous voting operation of the voter, thereby effectively protecting the information privacy of the voter in the online voting process; and in the voting process, an annular voting mechanism is adopted, so that the latter voter can verify the information of the former voter, the problem that the voting data is falsified or intercepted can be effectively avoided, and the accuracy of the voting data of each voter in the whole voting process is ensured. In addition, a design that the server is separated from the encryptor is adopted for each voting participant, so that the following advantages are achieved:
1) the random condition that the voting party server is hijacked or the secret key is leaked can be found in time;
2) local off-line, the encryption operation is safer;
3) the voting participants can customize and customize the encryption scheme, and the voting operation is more flexible;
4) and the uniform management of local private keys by the participants is facilitated.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flow chart of an anonymous voting method provided by the present invention.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
In the invention, an anonymous voting method of a ring structure with a server and an encryption machine separated is provided. Specifically, referring to fig. 1, the anonymous voting method includes the following steps:
s1, acquiring N voting participants, randomly generating an annular voting mechanism in the N voting participants, and irreversibly executing the voting of the N-1 voting participants in turn by taking any one voting participant as a start in the annular voting mechanism and finishing after the voting is conducted back to the starting voting participants;
s2, in a ring voting mechanism, a second voting party verifies and decrypts the first voting encryption information sent by the first voting party; if the verification is correct, decryption is performed and the process proceeds to step S3; if the verification fails, voting is stopped and the whole network alarms; the second voting party and the first voting party are two adjacent voting parties in the ring voting mechanism, and the first voting party performs voting before the second voting party;
s3, after the first voting encryption information is decrypted, first decryption information is obtained, a second voting participant carries out voting, second voting information generated by voting is comprehensively loaded into the first decryption information, second voting information is obtained, and the second voting information is encrypted to obtain second voting encryption information;
s4, repeating the steps S2-S3, completing the sequential voting of the N voting participants in the annular voting mechanism, and acquiring the voting result.
As described above, with respect to the N voting participants, each of the voting participants includes a separate server and encryption engine, where the encryption engine is a local offline encryption engine.
In conclusion:
in step S2, the step of the second voting participant verifying the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting participant comprises: (a) in a server of a second voting party, verifying the first voting encryption information by using a public key of the first voting party, and determining whether a private key signature of the first voting encryption information is correct; (b) and determining the IP address sent by the first voting encryption information through the server of the second voting party, and judging whether the IP address is the IP address of the server of the first voting party.
In step S2, the step of the second voting participant decrypting the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting participant comprises: (a) sending the first voting encryption information to an encryption machine of a second voting party by using a server of the second voting party; (b) and decrypting the first voting encrypted information by using the private key of the second voting party in the encryption machine of the second voting party to obtain first decrypted information.
In step S3, the step of the second voting participant performing the vote and acquiring the second voting encryption information includes: s31, obtaining the voting result of the second voting participant, wherein the voting result comprises approval and disapproval; s32, acquiring a first random number in the first decryption information, and calculating a second random number according to the first random number and the voting result of the second voting participant; and the second random number is calculated in the following manner: a second random number + P; when the voting result is approved, P is 1; when the voting result is negative, P is 0; and S32, combining the second random number with the voting necessary information to form second voting information, and performing public key encryption and private key signature on the second voting information by the second voting participant to obtain second voting encryption information.
In step S4, after the sequential voting of the N voting participants is completed in the ring voting mechanism, the nth random number is obtained, and the voting result obtained in step S4 is expressed as: the vote agreed-to-nth random number-the basic random number.
For the anonymous voting process disclosed above, the following is explained in further detail;
specifically, a is a candidate to be voted, N voting participants of 1 … … N; where 1 is the (voting) initiator and 2 … … N is N-1 voters;
the ring voting mechanism formed in the above step S1 should be: the voting of N-1(2 … … N) voters is performed in sequence starting from the initiator 1, and the voting is finished after going back to the initiator 1, namely, a ring voting structure of 1 → 2 → 3 → … … → N → 1 is formed, thereby ensuring that all the N voting participants can complete the voting.
In detail:
(1) the initiator 1 initiates a vote;
(2) randomly generating a circular voting mechanism, such as 1 → 2 → 3 → … … → N → 1;
(3) the initiator 1 generates basic encryption information 1, wherein the basic encryption information is 1_ sig (payload, num 1); wherein: 1_ sig () represents a cryptographic signature identification of the initiator 1, specifically formed by public key encryption and private key signature of the initiator 1; the payload is represented as the voting necessary information, and the voting necessary information payload at least should include the ID of the voted candidate a; num1 is the base random number generated by initiator 1, which is any integer, for example, base random number num1 ═ 174164564.
(4) The initiator 1 sends the basic encryption information 1_ sig (payload, num1) to the voter 2 through the corresponding server 1;
(5) the corresponding server 2 of the voting party 2 receives the basic encryption information 1_ sig (payload, num1), performs signature verification through the public key of the initiator 1, and if the obtained signature private key is correct through verification, the basic encryption information is correct information; meanwhile, the server 2 is used for identifying the occurrence IP address of which the basic encryption information is 1_ sig (payload, num1), and judging whether the identified IP address is the IP address of the server 2 of the initiator 1, if so, the correct information is sent by the initiator 1, and in the state, the voting of the voter 2 is entered; otherwise, sending out an alarm that the private key is leaked or the information is tampered in the whole voting network;
(6) after the verification is correct, the server 2 pushes the basic encryption information 1_ sig (payload, num1) to the encryptor 2 of the voter 2;
(7) the voting party 2 decrypts the basic encryption information 1_ sig (payload, num1) by using the private key of the voting party in the local off-line encryption machine 2 to obtain the voting necessary information payload and the basic random number num1 (174164564); in this state, the voter 2 performs anonymous voting using the encryption device 2; if the voting result is positive, num2 ═ num1+1 ═ 174164564+1 ═ 174164565; if the voting result is against, num2 ═ num1+0 ═ 174164564+0 ═ 174164564; thereby obtaining the corresponding random number of the voter 2 after voting, and then performing public key encryption and private key signature on the voting necessary information payload and the random number num2 in the voter 2, thereby obtaining the voting encryption information 2_ sig (payload, num2) corresponding to the voter 2.
(8) The voter 2 sends the corresponding voting encryption information 2_ sig (payload, num2) to the voter 3 through its server 2; and voting by the voting party 3 according to the same principle as the above (4) to (7);
(9) repeating the above (4) - (8) until the voting of all the voting participants in 1 → 2 → 3 → … … → N → 1 is completed; when the voting party N returns to the voting party 1, the principle is the same as the principle;
(10) after the voting of the voting participant 1 (initiator 1) is completed, the encryption of the random number numN +1 and the voting necessity information payload in the initiator 1 is not performed, and at this time, the following calculation is performed:
praise vote + 1-base random num 1;
thereby obtaining the final voting result about the voted candidates.
It is noted that, herein, relational terms such as first and second, and the like may be used solely to distinguish one entity or action from another entity or action without necessarily requiring or implying any actual such relationship or order between such entities or actions.
Specifically, in the above flow and the detailed description, the meaning of the second voting party and the first voting party mentioned in the above flow is:
when the voting party 2 votes, the voting party 2 is represented as a second voting party, and the initiator 1 is represented as a first voting party;
when the voting party 3 votes, the voting party 3 is represented as a second voting party, and the voting party 2 is represented as a first voting party;
when the voting of the initiator 1 is performed, the initiator 1 is denoted as a second voting participant, and the voter N is denoted as a first voting participant.
Also, the terms "comprises," "comprising," or any other variation thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements does not include only those elements but may include other elements not expressly listed or inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.
Although embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that changes, modifications, substitutions and alterations can be made in these embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, the scope of which is defined in the appended claims and their equivalents.
Claims (10)
1. An anonymous voting method of a ring structure with a server and an encryption machine separated is characterized by comprising the following steps:
s1, acquiring N voting participants, randomly generating an annular voting mechanism in the N voting participants, and performing voting of the N-1 voting participants in an irreversible and sequential manner by taking any one of the voting participants as a start in the annular voting mechanism and finishing after the voting is performed back to the start voting participants;
s2, in the annular voting mechanism, a second voting party verifies and decrypts the first voting encryption information sent by the first voting party; if the verification is correct, decryption is performed and the process proceeds to step S3; if the verification fails, voting is stopped and the whole network alarms; wherein the second voting party and the first voting party are two adjacent voting parties in the ring voting mechanism, and the first voting party performs voting before the second voting party;
s3, after the first voting encryption information is decrypted, first decryption information is obtained, a second voting participant carries out voting, second voting information generated by voting is comprehensively loaded into the first decryption information, second voting information is obtained, and the second voting information is encrypted to obtain second voting encryption information;
s4, repeating the steps S2-S3, completing the sequential voting of the N voting participants in the annular voting mechanism, and acquiring the voting result.
2. The anonymous voting method of the ring structure in which the server is separated from the encryption device according to claim 1, wherein: the N voting participants comprise an initiator and N-1 voters, and the annular voting mechanism starts from the initiator, sequentially carries out the voting of the N-1 voters, and ends after going back to the initiator for voting.
3. The anonymous voting method using a ring structure in which a server is separated from an encryption device according to claim 2, further comprising, before performing step S2:
and initiating a vote by the initiator, and generating basic encryption information corresponding to the initiator in the process of initiating the vote.
4. The anonymous voting method of the ring structure in which the server is separated from the encryption device according to claim 3, wherein: the base encryption information corresponding to an initiator includes: the system comprises basic voting information containing voting necessary information and basic random numbers, and an initiator carries out public key encryption and private key signature on the basic voting information to obtain the basic encryption information.
5. The anonymous voting method of the ring structure with the server separated from the encryption device according to claim 4, wherein: the voting necessity information includes at least the voter ID.
6. An anonymous voting method using a ring structure in which a server is separated from an encryption device according to claim 4 or 5, wherein: each of the voting participants includes a separate server and encryption engine.
7. The anonymous voting method using a ring structure in which a server is separated from an encryption device according to claim 6, wherein the step of the second voting party verifying the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting party in step S2 comprises:
in the server of the second voting party, verifying the first voting encryption information by using the public key of the first voting party, and confirming whether the private key signature of the first voting encryption information is correct or not;
and determining the IP address sent by the first voting encryption information through the server of the second voting party, and judging whether the IP address is the IP address of the server of the first voting party.
8. The anonymous voting method using a ring structure in which a server is separated from an encryption device according to claim 6, wherein in step S2, the step of decrypting the first voting encryption information transmitted by the first voting participant by the second voting participant comprises:
sending the first voting encryption information to an encryption machine of the second voting party by using the server of the second voting party;
and decrypting the first voting encryption information by using the private key of the second voting party in the encryption machine of the second voting party to obtain first decryption information.
9. An anonymous voting method using a ring structure with a server separated from an encryptor according to claim 4 or 5, wherein in step S3, the steps of the second voting participants performing voting and obtaining second voting encryption information include:
s31, obtaining the voting result of the second voting participant, wherein the voting result comprises approval and disapproval;
s32, acquiring a first random number in the first decryption information, and calculating a second random number according to the first random number and the voting result of the second voting participant; and the second random number is calculated in the following way:
a second random number + P; when the voting result is approved, P is 1; when the voting result is negative, P is 0;
and S32, combining the second random number and the voting necessary information to form second voting information, and performing public key encryption and private key signature on the second voting information by a second voting participant to obtain second voting encryption information.
10. The anonymous voting method using a ring structure with a server and an encryptor separated from each other according to claim 9, wherein after the successive votes of N voting participants in the ring voting mechanism are completed, an nth random number is obtained, and the voting result obtained in step S4 is represented as:
the vote agreed-to-nth random number-the basic random number.
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