CN111314387B - Power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence - Google Patents
Power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence Download PDFInfo
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- Y04S—SYSTEMS INTEGRATING TECHNOLOGIES RELATED TO POWER NETWORK OPERATION, COMMUNICATION OR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES FOR IMPROVING THE ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION, MANAGEMENT OR USAGE, i.e. SMART GRIDS
- Y04S40/00—Systems for electrical power generation, transmission, distribution or end-user application management characterised by the use of communication or information technologies, or communication or information technology specific aspects supporting them
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Abstract
The invention discloses an information physical double-layer strategy optimization method of a power system considering network attack influence, and belongs to the technical field of power generation, power transformation or power distribution. The method comprises the steps of modeling a power information physical system based on an incidence matrix method; forming a mathematical vector by using a known network attack mechanism, and analyzing attack influence based on a power information physical system correlation model; on the basis of the influence of the attack on the physical side and the information side of the power system, aiming at the safety and stability control service of the power system, firstly, the existing control strategy is judged, and if the existing control strategy is feasible, the control strategy is executed; if not, optimizing a load reduction optimization strategy of the physical side according to the attack influence; optimizing the strategy transmission path on the basis of upper-layer optimization, and finally obtaining the information physical cooperation optimal control strategy of the network attack scene. The invention can form an information physical cooperative control strategy under network attack and realize better control effect.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to a power system network security technology, in particular to a power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence, and belongs to the technical field of power generation, power transformation or power distribution.
Background
The power System, one of the most important infrastructures in modern society, has been deeply integrated with communication systems, and becomes a typical Cyber Physical System (CPS). On the one hand, the grid becomes more intelligent; on the other hand, it also carries a potential risk of cyber attack. The control instructions can be disturbed by exploiting vulnerability disruption control and measurement signals in the control devices and the communication link to achieve network attacks on the power system. If the operator does not consider the impact, still operating the power system fault (e.g., transmission line disconnect) according to the established strategy may result in more actual losses in the power system than expected, or even a cascading outage.
And the command of the power information physical system is decided by the service center, reaches the secondary equipment through the information link and is finally executed. The existing physical side strategy takes the premise that both physical side equipment and communication side equipment work normally as an offline optimization control strategy; most of existing communication topology optimization methods are offline optimization methods, and a situation that communication equipment is attacked may occur in the dynamic information interaction process, and a given communication path is unavailable, so that deviation occurs between an actual communication path and an ideal communication path, correct issuing of a physical side control instruction is affected, the optimal action opportunity of secondary equipment is delayed, accidents are enlarged, loss of a power system is increased, and therefore a given strategy may not achieve an expected control effect under the influence of the attack. Therefore, the feasibility of the strategy is judged on line according to the influence of the attack, and the strategy adjustment of the information physical cooperation is carried out in a self-adaptive mode, so that the safe and stable operation of the power grid is facilitated.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a power system information physical double-layer strategy optimization method considering network attack influence aiming at the defects of the background technology, so that the online optimization of a physical information double-layer strategy is realized, and the technical problem that the existing physical side control strategy cannot realize the expected control effect under the attack influence is solved.
The invention adopts the following technical scheme for realizing the aim of the invention:
the method for optimizing the information physical double-layer strategy of the power system considering the network attack influence comprises the following steps:
obtaining the real-time state of the power information physical system under the network attack according to the information side abnormity detection result and the physical side state acquisition result of the power information physical system;
aiming at a preset specific service instruction, judging whether the state of the power information physical system under attack can normally execute the instruction by a judgment function;
if the judgment result is that the execution can be normally carried out, the execution is still normally carried out; if the judgment result is that the information and physical strategy can not be normally executed, the information and physical strategy collaborative optimization method provided by the invention is called, firstly, the strategy of the physical side is optimized to obtain the optimization strategy of the upper layer physical side, and then, the path optimization of the lower layer information side is carried out.
By adopting the technical scheme, the invention has the following beneficial effects: the application provides a physical information double-layer optimization method considering network attack factors, the state of a real-time collected system under network attack reflects the influence of network attack on equipment and the fault which can simultaneously sense the network attack in real time, the real-time state of the system after being attacked judges whether the strategy relates to the usability of a physical element, the strategy relates to the connectivity of the physical element and a communication network, the strategy relates to the connectivity of a communication link, the strategy relates to the reliability of communication link delay and further judges whether the system can normally execute a control instruction, when the system cannot normally execute, the upper-layer physical side optimization is firstly carried out and the lower-layer information side optimization is carried out, the online optimization of the physical information double-layer strategy is realized, the existing physical side ideal control strategy is fully utilized, the communication side path is adaptively adjusted according to the equipment unavailability caused by the network attack and the dynamic change optimization of the communication link, the method realizes the collaborative optimization of information physics, and overcomes the defect that the existing offline optimization scheme cannot meet the dynamic change requirement of communication topology.
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments of the present invention will be briefly introduced below, and it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only used for illustrating some embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious for those skilled in the art that other drawings can be obtained according to these drawings without inventive exercise.
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a two-tier policy optimization method disclosed in the present invention.
Fig. 2(a) and 2(b) are a network diagram and a communication topology diagram of IEEE 14 nodes.
Fig. 3 is a comparison graph of control effects of different strategies.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described clearly and completely with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are some, not all, embodiments of the present invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any inventive step, fall within the scope of the present invention.
The invention discloses a power system information physical strategy collaborative optimization method considering network attack influence, which comprises the following steps as shown in figure 1:
step S101: and obtaining the real-time state of the power information physical system under the network attack according to the information side abnormity detection result and the physical side state acquisition result of the power information physical system.
Information-side anomaly detection includes, but is not limited to: delay detection, flow detection and route detection. Physical side state acquisition includes, but is not limited to: the condition of line connection, the condition of protection device disconnection and whether the function of secondary equipment is normal.
Step S102: and aiming at the preset specific service instruction, judging whether the state of the power information physical system under the attack can normally execute the instruction by using a judgment function.
For example, the load shedding instruction operation flow of the safety and stability control service of the conventional power system is as follows: the master station acquires a system state- > matching strategy table to obtain an operation instruction- > communication network- > secondary equipment execution- > physical entity, but the current power system does not consider the possibility of network attack when making a strategy, namely, a physical side control strategy is made on the assumption that the communication node functions normally, the communication link delays normally and the secondary equipment functions normally. In fact, if the power information physical system is attacked, some links may be attacked in the above instruction issuing process, and the instruction cannot be executed normally. And then, as the system state is not restored according to the expected situation, a backup emergency strategy is started, so that the fault loss is further expanded. Therefore, for the above situation, a scalable judgment function J ((P-I)') is constructed to judge whether the preset instruction can be executed normally under the influence of the attack.
Specifically, the decision function can be written as:
wherein, (P-I)' represents the state of the physical system of the power information after being attacked; the function r judges whether the original service instruction can be normally issued or not by inquiring whether the information path related to the service and the communication element are normally connected or not; the function T judges whether the original service instruction delay meets the preset requirement or not by comparing the sum of the attacked communication delay parameters with the service threshold requirement; and the function F judges whether the original service instruction can be executed or not by judging whether the information processing and instruction processing element can work normally or not.
Step S103: if the judgment conclusion of the step S102 is that the execution can be normally carried out, the established physical side control strategy is still normally executed; if the conclusion is that the information and physical strategy can not be normally executed, the information and physical strategy collaborative optimization method provided by the invention is called, and firstly, the physical side strategy is optimized to obtain an upper layer physical side optimization control strategy. Taking the example of cutting off part of load service in an emergency situation in the safety and stability control of the power system, the optimal load reduction scheme on the physical side is optimized first.
Considering the equipment nodes which are affected by the attack and can not receive the instruction; the control equipment is affected by the attack and cannot respond to the instruction; control equipment which can not be called after being separated from the network under natural fault; the control device is attacked to be in an invisible area; the generator which can not be used normally is influenced by the attack. And obtaining a new load-cutting node set N 'under the influence of the attack based on the constraint and controlling the generator load B'.
The optimization target is that the power grid topology changes and the loss load is minimum when the power grid is attacked.
minf＝∑ t∈T L t ，
In the formula: f represents the sum of the load shedding amount of the system; t represents a system node set; t represents a node sequence number; l is t Representative nodeThe load shedding value at point t.
By adopting a direct current power flow model, the power of the line is constrained by phase angles of nodes at two ends, so that the line power flow can satisfy the constraint of the following formula:
in the formula: w represents a system line set; l represents a line serial number; f l Representing the power flow on line l; z l Represents the state of line l; x is the number of l Representing the impedance of the line l, H t Representing the node incidence matrix, δ t Representing a nodal phase angle matrix.
The power flowing into each node and the load of the node in the system should satisfy the basic balance constraint:
∑ m∈M B m G m -∑ l∈W H t F l ＝Q t -L t t∈T，
in the formula: m represents a system generator set, M represents a generator serial number, B m Representing the state of the generator, G m Representing the generated power of the generator, Q t Representing the load carried on node t.
The power flowing on the line and the output of the generator should be within respective tolerance ranges:
in the formula (I), the compound is shown in the specification,
representing the transmission limit of the line l, G m min And G m max Representing the maximum and minimum output of the generator m, respectively.
Step S104: and after the optimization strategy of the upper layer physical side is obtained, path optimization of the lower layer information side is carried out.
Considering communication links and communication nodes that are attacked to result in unavailability; consider a communication link where latency is not satisfactory. The representation of the information network graph after the invalid line is removed based on the constraint is G '═ G + Δ G ═ X', L ', W' >, X is a node set, L is a directed graph of edges, W represents the time delay between adjacent information nodes, L 'is a new information topology after being attacked, W' is new time delay data after being attacked, and a target node set Kfinal obtained by previous layer optimization is assumed that the information center node is numbered as Kstart.
The optimization target is that the communication delay after the node to be switched is changed is shortest.
Wherein w represents a communication node, T w Representing the communication delay of node w.
The scheme of the embodiment of the invention is further illustrated by a specific embodiment.
The preferred embodiment of the invention is implemented on the standard calculation example IEEE 14 node shown in figure 2(a), and can be obtained by Matlab Simulink program simulation, and when the line 6-13 is disconnected, 4.5MW load of the 14 node needs to be cut off in order to ensure the stable operation of a power grid. As shown in fig. 2(b), in the information transmission process, the secondary device generally collects and processes physical node information, and uploads the physical node information to the information node through the communication node, and the information node makes a decision according to a fault condition and issues an instruction to a related execution unit (secondary device). Under an ideal scenario, the sequence of actions of a Safety and Stability Defense System (SSDS) is as follows:
1) the SS1 sends failure information to the MS;
2) and the MS identifies the fault and makes a control decision. The decision process of MS is; firstly, according to the detected fault, an offline strategy is matched, and the strategy aiming at the fault is to cut off the load of 4.5MW carried by the node 14;
3) and the MS sends a control instruction to the relevant unit according to the control decision result.
For the fault scene, the transmission paths for uploading information are respectively as follows: ES7-SS1-MS, the route that the information issues is MS-SS3-ES 11.
If the communication node 14-ES11 is blocked due to DoS attack in the transmission process, the secondary equipment with preset action refuses to act, and acts according to the original backup protection strategy, and in order to avoid the frequency being reduced below the threshold value, the load of the 9 node needs to be cut off by 7.5 MW.
According to the method provided by the invention, a new information physical coordination control strategy obtained through double-layer optimization is adjusted to cut off the load of 6 nodes by 4.5MW as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1 comparison of different strategies
The control effect obtained by the different schemes is shown in fig. 3, and it can be seen that the method provided by the invention is effective in the scene.
The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto, and any changes or substitutions that can be easily made by those skilled in the art within the technical scope of the present invention are included in the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.
Claims (4)
1. The method for optimizing the information physical two-layer strategy of the power system considering the network attack influence is characterized in that,
determining the real-time state of the power information physical system under the network attack according to the information side abnormity detection result of the power information physical system and the collected physical side state information;
at least meeting the three constraints that the power information physical system can still normally issue a specific service instruction after network attack, the sum of communication delay parameters meets the requirement of a service threshold value, and the information processing unit and the instruction processing unit normally work, judging that the system can normally execute the specific service instruction, and according to the set physical sideThe control strategy executes the specific service instruction, and the expression that the judgment system can normally execute the specific service instruction is as follows:
wherein, (P-I) ' is the real-time state of the power information physical system after the network attack, J ((P-I) ') is a function for judging whether the system can normally execute a specific service instruction, r ((P-I) ') is a function for inquiring whether each communication element on an information path with the service instruction is normally connected or not, T ((P-I) ') is a function for comparing the sum of communication delay parameters of the power information physical system after the network attack with a service threshold value, and F ((P-I) ') is a function for judging whether the information processing element and the instruction processing element can normally work or not;
when the electric power information physical system can not normally execute a specific service instruction, firstly, a control strategy of a physical side is optimized to obtain an upper layer physical side optimization control strategy, after an invalid line in a communication network is removed, the shortest communication path of the specific service instruction issued by the upper layer physical side optimization control strategy is taken as a target optimization path, and a directed graph is adopted to optimize a path of a lower layer information side.
2. The method for optimizing the cyber-attack-impact-considered physical double-layer strategy of the power system according to claim 1, wherein the information-side anomaly detection includes but is not limited to delay detection, traffic detection, and route detection.
3. The method for optimizing the physical double-layer strategy of the power system information considering the network attack influence according to claim 1, wherein the physical side state information includes but is not limited to a line connection condition, a protection device disconnection condition, and whether a secondary device function is normal.
4. The method for optimizing the information physical two-layer strategy of the power system considering the network attack influence is characterized in that the upper-layer physical side optimization strategy comprises but is not limited to a load shedding strategy, a splitting strategy and a black start strategy.
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