CN111245613A - Identity-based three-level key negotiation method for in-vehicle and out-vehicle networks - Google Patents
Identity-based three-level key negotiation method for in-vehicle and out-vehicle networks Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
- H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
- H04W4/48—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for in-vehicle communication
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Abstract
The invention provides an identity-based three-level key agreement method for an in-vehicle network and an in-vehicle network, which can improve the security of the in-vehicle network and improve the key agreement and replacement efficiency. According to whether the nodes in the vehicle have the external communication function or not, a safe and efficient communication scheme based on three levels of identity keys and multiple sub-keys contained in each level of key is designed, and a data access control mechanism of the nodes in and out of the vehicle is established. The invention establishes a novel vehicle internal and external node communication key agreement protocol architecture based on the novel vehicle network communication protocol security of the cryptology principle, thereby solving the information security problem of the vehicle network, namely remote attack, replay attack, tampering attack and forgery attack resistance, other communication units in the vehicle can generate a third-level key automatically to establish communication with external equipment directly without performing additional identity authentication and key agreement on the third-level key, and ensuring that the scheme has high security and efficiency.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of passwords and communication safety, in particular to an identity-based three-level key agreement method for an in-vehicle network and an out-vehicle network.
Background
At present, the development of intelligent networked automobiles is accelerated by electromotion, intellectualization and networking, and the dream that the automobiles enter families is realized. The appearance of the intelligent internet automobile revolutionized the travel mode of people. Compared with the traditional automobile, the novel traveling mode has higher safety, applicability and high efficiency. Many manufacturers have introduced vehicle sharing technology based on various approaches. But this raises various information security issues that increase the attack face for network attackers. In reality, network attackers tend to attack remotely, and illegal data frames are injected into the in-vehicle network step by step through bugs of external networks or devices, bugs in the automobile networking system and bugs of the in-vehicle network, so that automobiles are controlled.
In order to solve the problems, the invention explains the design method of the vehicle internal and external networks on the aspects of key agreement safety and efficiency in a multi-angle and all-around view, and needs to provide a vehicle internal and external network three-stage key agreement method based on identity.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to establish a novel vehicle internal and external node communication key negotiation protocol framework based on the novel vehicle network communication protocol security of the cryptography principle.
In order to achieve the above purpose, the technical solution provided by the implementation of the present invention is as follows:
and constructing an identity-based three-level key agreement method between the external device ED, the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU and the vehicle-mounted ECU by combining the characteristics of limited storage and calculation resources of the external device and the vehicle-mounted network system and the requirement on high security.
An identity-based three-level key negotiation method for an in-vehicle and external networks comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps that whether an in-vehicle node has an external communication function or not is divided into two types, wherein one type is a vehicle-mounted communication unit CU with the external communication function, and the other type is an electronic control unit ECU without the external communication function;
establishing a data access control mechanism according to the security threat level of nodes inside and outside the vehicle, namely adopting three-level keys, wherein the first-level key is the highest-level key and is used for communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and communication between the ECUs and gateway ECUs (electronic control units), namely GECUs, the second-level key is used for communication between vehicle-mounted Communication Units (CUs) and between the CUs and the ECUs, and the third-level key is used for communication between the CUs and external Equipment (ED);
7. further, according to the security threat of the nodes inside and outside the vehicle, the electronic control unit ECU inside the vehicle is a first protection object and is in the highest level, the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU is arranged, and finally the external device ED outside the vehicle is arranged.
8. Further, each level of the three-level key comprises 5 subkeys, wherein the first level key and the second level key are derived from a key derivation function HKDF and a key seedxiProduction of HKDF (seed)xi)=AKxi||UKxi||EKxi.1||EKxi.2||EKxi.3Subscript x is f or s, f is first, s is second, subscript i is ith, the key seed of the third-level key is defined by hash function H (), ID of EDEDAnd current second level key seedsGenerated as seedEDi=H(seeds||IDED) The third level key is composed of a key derivation function HKDF and a key seed of the third level keyEDiProduction of HKDF (seed)EDi)=AKEDi||UKEDi||EKEDi.1||EKEDi.2||EKEDi.3Are respectively an authentication key AKxiA key update Key UKxiAnd three encryption subkeys EKxi.jAnd j is the jth encryption sub-key.
9. Further, still include: when external devices ED and CU1When communication is established for the first time, identity authentication and key agreement are carried out, and after identity authentication, CU (central office) carries out1Will broadcast the identity ID of the external device ED in the in-vehicle networkEDSo that the external device ED communicates with other communication units CU on board the vehicle2Directly generating a third-level key without identity authentication and key agreement; wherein CU1The first CU established as ED and the vehicle-mounted end, and so on, namely CU2And a second CU established for the ED and the vehicle-mounted terminal.
10. Further, still include: when the external device ED and the on-board communication unit CU change keys, the following protocol is executed, including two rounds of messages:
step 1.1: if j ∈ {1,2}, the CU generates HMAC (·) ═ HAKEDi(CTRCU||REQEDsubk||IDCU) And the sub-key exchange message Msg of both ED and CUEDsubk(REQEDsubk| HMAC (-) is sent to ED and then CTR is updatedCUAnd j. If j is 3, CU selects to generate sub-key seedEDi+1=H(seeds||IDED) Where seed issFor the current secondary key seed, then the CU uses the update key UKEDiTo pairEncrypt to generate ciphertext CEDAnd generates a corresponding HMAC (·), and finally updates the third-level master key seed with the message MsgEDK(REQEDK||CED| HMAC (·)) is sent to the ED. Wherein HMAC (-) is a hashed MAC value, HAKEDi() For hash function values encrypted using the ED's authentication key, Msg means message, sub means subkey exchange, CTRCUMessage counter value, REQ, for CUEDsubkSubscription request, ID, to EDCUIs the identity ID identifier of the CU, REQEDKMeaning a third-level rekeying request by the ED.
Step 1.2: receiving a subkey change message MsgEDsubkThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass, then EKEDi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRCU. Receiving a third-level master key seed update message MsgEDKThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass verification, uses the update secret key UKEDiTo CEDDecrypting to obtain seedEDi+1Generating a third-level key by using a key derivation function HKDF, and finally updating the CTRCU(ii) a Wherein, EKEDi.j+1For the j +1 th encryption sub-key, UK, in the current keyEDiThe key is updated for the current key of the ED.
11. Further, still include: when the in-vehicle communication unit CU changes keys with the ECU, the following protocol is executed, including two rounds of messages:
step 2.1: if j is equal to {1,2}, GECU generatesBecome intoAnd broadcasts a rekeying subkey message Msg of the first secondary keySubk(REQSubkHMAC (·)), then let the CTRGECUAnd j plus 1. If j is 3, the GECU selects a random primary key seedfi+1And a random secondary key seedsi+1Using the renewed key UKfiAnd UKsiAre respectively encrypted intoAndand generates a corresponding HMAC (·), finally broadcasts an update message Msg of the first secondary keyK(REQK||CECU||CCUHMAC (-) and update CTRGECU. Where K means Key Change, CTRGECUIs the message counter value of the GECU, HAKsi() Hash function value for authenticated sub-key encryption using a second level key, REQSubkEncryption subkey update request, UK, for first and second-level keysfiKey update Key, UK, meaning first level KeysiKey update Key, C, to mean a second level KeyECUCiphertext to the effect that the ECU needs to decrypt EUKfi() Meaning use of UKfiEncrypted encryption function, CCUCiphertext to the effect that the CU needs to decrypt, EUKsiMeaning use of UKsiEncrypted cryptographic function, MsgKIntended for updating messages of the first secondary key, REQKIs the first secondary key update request.
Step 2.2: receive MsgSubkThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the EK is sent to the ECUsi.j+1And EKfi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRGECUReceiving MsgKThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the ECU decrypts CECUObtaining seedfi+1||seedsi+1And generating a first key with a key derivation function HKDFA level key and a second level key; CU decryption CEDObtaining seedsi+1And generates a second level key using key derivation function HKDF. Finally updating CTRGECU. Wherein, EKsi.j+1And EKfi.j+1Respectively are the current second-level key and the j +1 th encryption sub-key in the first-level key.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
the invention establishes a novel vehicle internal and external node communication key negotiation protocol architecture based on the novel vehicle network communication protocol security of the cryptology principle, thereby solving the problems of information security and the like faced by a vehicle network, such as no vehicle internal and external node data access control mechanism, single key, key waste, extra workload and the like. The other communication units in the vehicle can generate the third-level key by themselves to establish communication with the external device directly without performing additional identity authentication and key agreement on the third-level key. In addition, the three encryption sub-keys are gradually replaced, and other sub-keys are negotiated and updated after all the sub-keys to be encrypted are used, so that the complexity in the key negotiation process is solved, and the key negotiation efficiency is improved. Above, guarantee that the scheme has very high security and efficiency.
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FIG. 1 is a general flow diagram of one embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an in-vehicle node architecture according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating third-level key agreement according to an embodiment of the present invention;
FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating first and second level key negotiations according to an embodiment of the present invention;
Detailed Description
The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to embodiments shown in the drawings. These embodiments are not intended to limit the present invention, and structural, methodological, or functional changes made by those skilled in the art according to these embodiments are included in the scope of the present invention.
Referring to fig. 1, a general flow of a novel vehicle interior and exterior node communication key agreement protocol includes a first-level key agreement and a second-level key agreement of a vehicle interior node and a third-level key agreement of a vehicle exterior node.
The method specifically comprises three conditions:
the first method comprises the following steps: when the external device ED is already in the on-board communication unit CU1When communication is established and communication with other vehicle-mounted communication units in the vehicle is required to be established, the two parties can directly establish communication only by generating a third-level secret key based on identity.
And the second method comprises the following steps: and when the external device ED and the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU need to replace the key, the CU selects a key replacement mode according to the j value.
And the third is that: and when the ECU in the vehicle and the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU need to replace the key, the GECU selects a key replacement mode according to the j value.
Referring to fig. 2, a new vehicle interior and exterior node communication key agreement protocol architecture is shown. The division is made according to whether the in-vehicle node has an external communication function, and is divided into two types, one is an in-vehicle communication unit CU having an external communication function, and the other is an electronic control unit ECU not having an external communication function. A data access control mechanism is established according to the security threat level of nodes inside and outside a vehicle, namely three-level keys are adopted, wherein the first-level key is the highest-level key and is used for communication between ECUs and communication between the ECUs and a gateway ECU (electronic control Unit), namely a GECU, the second-level key is used for communication between CUs and between the CUs and the ECUs, and the third-level key is used for communication between the CUs and an external device ED. According to the remote attack mechanism, the ECU in the vehicle is a first protection object and is the highest level, then the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU is arranged, and finally the external device ED outside the vehicle is arranged.
Referring to fig. 3, the identity-based third-level key agreement protocol between the external device ED and the on-board communication unit CU is as follows:
step 1.1: if j ∈ {1,2}, CU generatesAnd replaces the subkey message MsgEDsubk(REQEDsubk| HMAC (-) is sent to ED and then CTR is updatedCUAnd j. If j is 3, CU selects to generate sub-key seedEDi+1=H(seeds||IDED) Where seed issIs the current secondary key seed. The CU then uses the update Key UKEDiTo pairEncrypt to generate ciphertext CEDAnd generates a corresponding HMAC (·), and finally updates the third-level master key seed with the message MsgEDK(REQEDK||CED| HMAC (·)) is sent to the ED. Wherein HMAC (·) is a hashed MAC value, H () is a hash function, Msg means a message, sub means a subkey exchange, CTRCUIs the message counter value of the CU.
Step 1.2: receive MsgEDsubkThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass, then EKEDi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRCU. Receive MsgEDKThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass verification, uses the update secret key UKEDiTo CEDDecrypting to obtain seedEDi+1And generates a tertiary key using key derivation function HKDF. Finally updating CTRCU。
Referring to fig. 4, the GECU performs the first and second level key agreement with the vehicle-mounted communication unit CU and the in-vehicle ECU, and the agreement process is as follows:
step 2.1: if j ∈ {1,2}, the GECU generatesAnd broadcasts a rekey subkey message MsgSubk(REQSubkHMAC (·)), then let the CTRGECUAnd j plus 1. If j is 3, the GECU selects a random primary key seedfi+1And a secondary key seedsi+1Using the renewed key UKfiAnd UKsiAre respectively encrypted intoAndand generates a corresponding HMAC (·), finally broadcasts an update message MsgK(REQK||CECU||CCUHMAC (-) and update CTRGECU. Where K means Key Change, CTRGECUIs the message counter value of the GECU.
Step 2.2: receive MsgSubkThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the EK is sent to the ECUsi.j+1And EKfi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRGECU. Receive MsgKThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the ECU decrypts CECUObtaining seedfi+1||seedsi+1And generates a primary key and a secondary key using a key derivation function HKDF. CU decryption CEDObtaining seedsi+1And generates a second level key using key derivation function HKDF. Finally updating CTRGECU。
Compared with the prior art, the identity-based three-level key agreement method for the in-vehicle network and the out-vehicle network can improve the security of the in-vehicle network and improve the key agreement and replacement efficiency. According to whether the nodes in the vehicle have the external communication function or not, a safe and efficient communication scheme based on three levels of identity keys and multiple sub-keys contained in each level of key is designed, and a data access control mechanism of the nodes in and out of the vehicle is established. The invention establishes a novel vehicle internal and external node communication key agreement protocol architecture based on the novel vehicle network communication protocol security of the cryptology principle, thereby solving the information security problem of the vehicle network, namely remote attack, replay attack, tampering attack and forgery attack resistance, other communication units in the vehicle can generate a third-level key automatically to establish communication with external equipment directly without performing additional identity authentication and key agreement on the third-level key, and ensuring that the scheme has high security and efficiency.
It should be understood that although the present description refers to embodiments, not every embodiment contains only a single technical solution, and such description is for clarity only, and those skilled in the art should make the description as a whole, and the technical solutions in the embodiments can also be combined appropriately to form other embodiments understood by those skilled in the art.
The above-listed detailed description is only a specific description of a possible embodiment of the present invention, and they are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and equivalent embodiments or modifications made without departing from the technical spirit of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (6)
1. An identity-based three-level key agreement method for an in-vehicle network and an out-vehicle network is characterized by comprising the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps that whether an in-vehicle node has an external communication function or not is divided into two types, wherein one type is a vehicle-mounted communication unit CU with the external communication function, and the other type is an electronic control unit ECU without the external communication function;
a data access control mechanism is established according to the security threat level of nodes inside and outside a vehicle, namely three-level keys are adopted, wherein the first-level key is the highest-level key and is used for communication between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) and communication between the ECUs and gateway ECUs, namely GECUs, the second-level key is used for communication between vehicle-mounted Communication Units (CUs) and between the CUs and the ECUs, and the third-level key is used for communication between the CUs and external Equipment (ED).
2. The identity-based three-level key agreement method for the in-vehicle and out-vehicle networks according to claim 1, characterized in that the security threats of the in-vehicle and out-vehicle nodes are based on a remote attack mechanism, and an in-vehicle Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is a first protection object and is the highest level, then a vehicle-mounted Communication Unit (CU) and finally is an External Device (ED) outside the vehicle.
3. The identity-based three-level key agreement method for the in-vehicle and out-of-vehicle network of claim 1, wherein the three-level key comprises 5 sub-keys for each level of key, wherein the first level key and the second level key are encrypted by a keyKey derivation function HKDF and key seedxiProduction of HKDF (seed)xi)=AKxi||UKxi||EKxi.1||EKxi.2||EKxi.3Subscript x is f or s, f is first, s is second, subscript i is ith, the key seed of the third-level key is defined by hash function H (), ID of EDEDAnd current second level key seedsGenerated as seedEDi=H(seeds||IDED) The third level key is composed of a key derivation function HKDF and a key seed of the third level keyEDiProduction of HKDF (seed)EDi)=AKEDi||UKEDi||EKEDi.1||EKEDi.2||EKEDi.3Are respectively an authentication key AKxiA key update Key UKxiAnd three encryption subkeys EKxi.jAnd j is the jth encryption sub-key.
4. The identity-based vehicle interior and exterior network three-level key agreement method according to claim 1, further comprising: when external devices ED and CU1When communication is established for the first time, identity authentication and key agreement are carried out, and after identity authentication, CU (central office) carries out1Will broadcast the identity ID of the external device ED in the in-vehicle networkEDSo that the external device ED communicates with other communication units CU on board the vehicle2Directly generating a third-level key without identity authentication and key agreement; wherein CU1The first CU established as ED and the vehicle-mounted end, and so on, namely CU2And a second CU established for the ED and the vehicle-mounted terminal.
5. The identity-based in-vehicle and external network three-level key agreement method according to claim 3, further comprising: when the external device ED and the on-board communication unit CU change keys, the following protocol is executed, including two rounds of messages:
step 1.1: if j ∈ {1,2}, CU generatesAnd sub-keys of both ED and CUChange message MsgEDsubk(REQEDsubk| HMAC (-) is sent to ED and then CTR is updatedCUAnd j. If j is 3, CU selects to generate sub-key seedEDi+1=H(seeds||IDED) Where seed issFor the current secondary key seed, then the CU uses the update key UKEDiTo pairEncrypt to generate ciphertext CEDAnd generates a corresponding HMAC (·), and finally updates the third-level master key seed with the message MsgEDK(REQEDK||CED| HMAC (·)) is sent to the ED. Wherein HMAC (-) is a hashed MAC value,for hash function values encrypted using the ED's authentication key, Msg means message, sub means subkey exchange, CTRCUMessage counter value, REQ, for CUEDsubkSubscription request, ID, to EDCUIs the identity ID identifier of the CU, REQEDKMeaning a third-level rekeying request by the ED.
Step 1.2: receiving a subkey change message MsgEDsubkThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass, then EKEDi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRCU. Receiving a third-level master key seed update message MsgEDKThen, ED verifies the message authentication code first, if pass verification, uses the update secret key UKEDiTo CEDDecrypting to obtain seedEDi+1Generating a third-level key by using a key derivation function HKDF, and finally updating the CTRCU(ii) a Wherein, EKEDi.j+1For the j +1 th encryption sub-key, UK, in the current keyEDiThe key is updated for the current key of the ED.
6. The identity-based in-vehicle and external network three-level key agreement method according to claim 3, further comprising: when the in-vehicle communication unit CU changes keys with the ECU, the following protocol is executed, including two rounds of messages:
step 2.1: if j ∈ {1,2}, the GECU generatesAnd broadcasts a rekeying subkey message Msg of the first secondary keySubk(REQSubkHMAC (·)), then let the CTRGECUAnd j plus 1. If j is 3, the GECU selects a random primary key seedfi+1And a random secondary key seedsi+1Using the renewed key UKfiAnd UKsiAre respectively encrypted intoAndand generates a corresponding HMAC (·), finally broadcasts an update message Msg of the first secondary keyK(REQK||CECU||CCUHMAC (-) and update CTRGECU. Where K means Key Change, CTRGECUIs the message counter value of the GECU,hash function value for authenticated sub-key encryption using a second level key, REQSubkEncryption subkey update request, UK, for first and second-level keysfiKey update Key, UK, meaning first level KeysiKey update Key, C, to mean a second level KeyECUMeaning that the ECU needs the decrypted ciphertext,meaning use of UKfiEncrypted encryption function, CCUMeaning the ciphertext that the CU needs to decrypt,meaning use of UKsiEncrypted cryptographic function, MsgKMeaning the update message of the first secondary key,REQKis the first secondary key update request.
Step 2.2: receive MsgSubkThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the EK is sent to the ECUsi.j+1And EKfi.j+1Acting as next session key and updating CTRGECUReceiving MsgKThen, all CUs and ECUs verify the message authentication code first, and if the message authentication code passes the verification, the ECU decrypts CECUObtaining seedfi+1||seedsi+1Generating a first-level key and a second-level key by using a key derivation function HKDF; CU decryption CEDObtaining seedsi+1And generates a second level key using key derivation function HKDF. Finally updating CTRGECU. Wherein, EKsi.j+1And EKfi.j+1Respectively are the current second-level key and the j +1 th encryption sub-key in the first-level key.
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CN113259933A (en) * | 2021-06-15 | 2021-08-13 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | Key updating method, gateway, control device, electronic equipment and medium |
CN113259933B (en) * | 2021-06-15 | 2023-08-29 | 北京天融信网络安全技术有限公司 | Key updating method, gateway, control device, electronic equipment and medium |
CN116488813A (en) * | 2023-06-26 | 2023-07-25 | 合众新能源汽车股份有限公司 | Vehicle, communication security authentication method and device thereof, electronic equipment and storage medium |
CN116488813B (en) * | 2023-06-26 | 2023-08-18 | 合众新能源汽车股份有限公司 | Vehicle, communication security authentication method and device thereof, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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