CN111007471A - Method for judging interference effect of active suppression interference in simulation environment - Google Patents
Method for judging interference effect of active suppression interference in simulation environment Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
A method of determining the effect of an active squelched disturbance in a simulated environment, comprising: step one, preprocessing active interference; step two, calculating the detection probability of the guided missile terminal guided radar; and step three, judging an interference result. The method can calculate and judge the specific result of the active suppression interference according to various relevant state data, environmental data and the like in the active suppression interference application of the surface vessel. Compared with the prior direct probability generation calculation method adopted in the simulation environment, the method is relatively scientific and accurate.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of data processing, in particular to a method for judging the interference effect of active suppression interference in a simulation environment, which is particularly suitable for the combat simulation of scientific and specific active suppression interference effect required to be given (according to data such as weapon performance and state, tactical instructions, battlefield environment data and the like).
Background
The active suppression electronic interference is an important electronic interference means in the air defense back conduction electronic warfare of the surface naval vessel. In modern sea wars, surface ships encounter anti-ship missile attacks, and surface ship commanders can use active suppression to interfere enemy anti-ship missile terminal guidance radars according to battlefield situations and environmental conditions, so that the anti-ship missiles cannot accurately attack target ships.
Active suppression interference is to cover or drown out the useful signal with noise or noise-like interference signals to prevent the radar from detecting the target information. The basic principle is as follows: the radar detects the target in an internal and external noise environment based on a certain probability criterion. If the target signal energy S is compared with the noise energy N and exceeds the detection threshold D, the probability P of false alarm can be ensuredfaUnder the condition of reaching a certain detection probability PdEither a target may be found or a target may not be found. The interference suppression is to make strong interference power enter a radar receiver, reduce S/N ratio as much as possible, and cause the radar to be difficult to detect the target.
Generally, a specific active suppression interference effect judgment model in a complex and large system simulation environment is relatively simple, a relatively simple probability generation calculation model is generally applied, and the following formula is a simple probability generation calculation model described by C language.
srand((unsigned)time(NULL))
fPchaff=(double)rand()/(RAND_MAX+1)
And directly calculating the probability of interference success or interference failure by the probability generation calculation formula.
The method for judging the interference effect by using the probability generation calculation model as the active suppression has the advantages of simplicity, directness and high execution efficiency, and has the defect that whether the guided missile end guided radar is actively suppressed to generate specific interference results such as impurity tracking, miss-catching, slight interference and the like is not calculated according to various current data information of the operational situation, the opportunity of the active suppression interference, parameters such as bandwidth, power, frequency and the like of the active suppression interference, the performance parameters of the guided missile end guided radar, the flying state of the guided missile and the like.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the above technical problems, embodiments of the present invention provide a method for determining an interference effect of active suppressed interference in a simulation environment, which can calculate a specific interference result of active suppressed interference emitted by a ship on an incoming missile end-guided radar according to various relevant war technical state data and situation environment data applied by the active suppressed interference of a surface ship.
A method of determining the effect of an active squelched disturbance in a simulated environment, comprising:
step one, active interference preprocessing, namely judging the coverage range of interference frequency, and directly quitting active suppression interference damage judgment if the signal frequency transmitted by the last guided radar cannot be completely covered; otherwise, performing airspace aiming calculation, including calculating the antenna gain of the missile terminal guided radar in the active suppression interference aiming direction, and then calculating the interference power in the bandwidth of the terminal guided radar receiver;
step two, calculating the detection probability of the missile end-guided radar, which comprises the steps of judging whether air clutter exists or not, calculating the power of the air clutter if the air clutter exists, calculating the power of sea clutter, calculating the power of signal echoes of an attack target, calculating the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR, and calculating the detection probability PdThe computer simulates a Monte Carlo experiment to calculate the detection probability P of the simulation experiment0;
Step three, judging the interference result, including judging according to PdAnd P0And determining an interference result by using the data size relative relation and the specific numerical value of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR.
The interference results comprise interference invalidation, missile impurity, slight interference, missile mis-capture and continuous search.
In step three, the interference result determination includes:
comparison probability P0And probability PdSize;
if P0>PdFurther judging the magnitude of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR and a threshold value threshold1, and if the JSR is more than threshold1, judging that the missile is out of capture; if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold1, determining to continue searching;
if P0≤PdFurther judging the sizes of the comprehensive echo interference signal ratio JSR and the threshold value threshold2, if the JSR is more than the threshold2, further judging the sizes of the comprehensive echo interference signal ratio JSR and the threshold value threshold3,if the JSR is more than threshold3, judging the missile is slightly interfered, and if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold3, judging the missile is the missile-follower missile; and if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold2, judging that the interference is invalid.
The invention not only closely combines various relevant state parameters and situation environment data in the actual application process of the active suppression interference, but also can apply various mathematical models researched by theory to calculate and judge the active suppression interference effect. Compared with the prior direct probability generation calculation method adopted in the anti-aircraft anti-pilot simulation environment of the surface naval vessel, the method is relatively scientific and accurate; can be calculated to include: specific quantitative values of five interference effects such as interference invalidation (the guided missile locks and tracks a target ship), guided missile impurity tracking, slight interference, guided missile mis-capture, continuous search and the like; the training effect of the complex large system simulation environment training and the active suppression interference application of the personnel involved in the training in the loop can be improved.
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The invention may be better understood from the following description of specific embodiments thereof taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, in which:
other features, objects and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the following detailed description of non-limiting embodiments with reference to the accompanying drawings in which like or similar reference characters refer to the same or similar parts.
FIG. 1 is a schematic flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
Features and exemplary embodiments of various aspects of the present invention will be described in detail below. In the following detailed description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a thorough understanding of the present invention. It will be apparent, however, to one skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. The following description of the embodiments is merely intended to provide a better understanding of the present invention by illustrating examples of the present invention. The present invention is in no way limited to any specific configuration and algorithm set forth below, but rather covers any modification, replacement or improvement of elements, components or algorithms without departing from the spirit of the invention. In the following description, well-known structures and techniques are not shown in order to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the present invention.
Example embodiments will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, which may be embodied in various forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the concept of example embodiments to those skilled in the art.
Furthermore, the described features, structures, or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments. In the following description, numerous specific details are provided to provide a thorough understanding of embodiments of the invention. One skilled in the relevant art will recognize, however, that the invention may be practiced without one or more of the specific details, or with other methods, components, materials, and so forth. In other instances, well-known structures, materials, or operations are not shown or described in detail to avoid obscuring aspects of the invention.
As shown in fig. 1, the embodiment provided by the present invention takes the surface vessel anti-aircraft back-navigation simulation environment as an example, and includes:
active interference preprocessing, namely judging the coverage range of interference frequency, if the coverage range can completely cover the signal frequency transmitted by the last guided radar, performing airspace aiming calculation (if the coverage range can not completely cover the signal frequency transmitted by the last guided radar, directly quitting the active suppression interference damage judgment):
(1) calculating antenna gain of active suppression interference aiming direction missile terminal guided radar
Firstly, an included angle theta between an active suppression interference aiming direction and the pointing direction of a missile terminal guided radar antenna is calculated. As shown in formula (1).
Wherein A ═ is (cos α)1,sinα1,tgβ1) And B is (cos α) representing the direction vector of the main lobe of the terminal-guided radar beam2,sinα2,tgβ2) Which represents the direction vector of the jammer beam.
Secondly, whether the active interference can enter a main lobe of a guided missile terminal radar wave beam or not in a space angle is judged.
Calculating the main lobe width theta of the guided missile terminal guided radarMain lobeAs shown in formula (2).
θMain lobe=2π/L-----------------------------------------(2)
In the formula, L represents an antenna array length.
Comparing theta and thetaMain lobeIf theta < thetaMain lobeThe representation can enter a main lobe of the last guided radar beam, otherwise, the representation enters a side lobe of the last guided radar beam.
Then, the main lobe/side lobe condition of the active interference entering the terminal-guided radar beam is distinguished, and the terminal-guided radar antenna gain of the angle theta is calculated respectively. Final guidance radar beam main lobe gain f (θ): (its mathematical models are many, one of which is formula (3))
f(θ)=exp(-kθ2)--------------------------------(3)
End-guided radar beam side lobe gain f (θ): (its mathematical models are many, one of which is formula (3))
Wherein k is 1.3916/sin (0.5 theta)b)。
(2) Calculating the interference power in the bandwidth of the terminal guided radar receiver
First, a bandwidth coverage factor P is calculatedBWAs shown in formula (5).
PBW=BWMissile/BWJam (5)
Wherein BWMissile is the receiver bandwidth in MHz; BWJam is jammer bandwidth in MHz.
Then, the interference Power within the bandwidth of the receiver is calculatedJaminMisleAs shown in formula (6).
PowerJaminMisle=PowerJam×PBW(6)
In the formula, PowerJamIs the jammer power in units W.
And (II) calculating the detection probability of the missile terminal guided radar, wherein the detection probability comprises the steps of judging whether meteorological clutters exist or not, and calculating the power of the meteorological clutters if the meteorological clutters exist.
(3) Calculating meteorological clutter power
And judging whether meteorological environment factors such as rain, snow, hail and the like exist according to the data items of the battlefield environment data packet. And if so, calculating the meteorological clutter power.
1) Calculating backward scattering coefficient of meteorological clutter
Firstly, calculating a meteorological clutter backscattering coefficient according to the working frequency of the missile end-guided radar, as shown in a formula (7).
∑σi=ARB------------------------------------------------
(7)
TABLE 1 backscattering model coefficients
(8) In the formula, R is the distance between the clutter center and the missile terminal guidance radar. From table 1, the coefficient A, B in the equation (7) with the closest frequency can be selected.
2) Calculating meteorological clutter radar sectional area sigmav
Wherein R is the distance between the clutter center and the radar, theta3dBThe width of the horizontal beam is such that,vertical beamWidth, τ is the pulse width, c is the speed of light.
3) Calculating meteorological clutter power
Wherein Pt is radar transmission power, G is antenna gain, lambda is wavelength, and LrIs the link loss.
(4) Calculating sea clutter power
3) Calculating sea clutter areas
Wherein R is the distance between the clutter unit and the radar, theta3dBIs the 3dB beam width, c is the speed of light, τ is the effective pulse width, and φ is the glancing angle.
4) Calculating clutter average radar cross-sectional area sigmac
Wherein γ is 6KB-10lgλ-KA,KAAdjustment of constants, K, for sea areasBIs sea state grade.
3) Calculating and calculating sea clutter echo power Sc
In the formula: scIs the echo power; ptTransmitting a peak power for the radar; and G is the gain of the transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna.
(5) Calculating the echo power Ps of the target signal
PS=PT+2GT/R-K-20log(F)-40log(DT)+10log(σ)-----------(13)
In the formula, PTFor launching power, G, for missile-terminal guided radarsT/RFor missile end-guided radar antenna gain, DTTo be guideThe distance between the missile and the target, F is the frequency of the transmitted signal, and sigma is the cross section area of the radar target.
(6) Calculating comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR
In the formula, PJIs the active interference power, PseaIs the sea clutter power, PweatherIs the meteorological clutter power, PsIs the target signal power.
(7) Calculating the detection probability Pd (the mathematical model of which is many, formula)
(15) Is one of them. )
Wherein JSR is the interference-to-signal ratio, PfaIs the false alarm probability.
(8) Monte Carlo simulation experiment calculation probability P0
Using a computer to generate a random number P of random 0-10The value and the detection probability PdAnd (4) comparing and simulating a simulated Monte Carlo experiment.
srand((unsigned)time(NULL));
fP0=(double)rand()/(RAND_MAX+1);
(9) Determining active squelch interference results
According to the procedure given in FIG. 1, according to the detection probability Pd,P0And the interference result is judged by combining the magnitude relation of the interference signal ratio and the specific numerical value of the JSR.
Comparison probability P0And probability PdSize;
if P0>PdFurther judging the magnitude of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR and a threshold value threshold1, and if the JSR is more than threshold1, judging that the missile is out of capture; if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold1, determining to continue searching;
if P0≤PdThen further, it isJudging the sizes of the comprehensive echo interference signal-to-signal ratio JSR and a threshold value threshold2, if the JSR is more than threshold2, further judging the sizes of the comprehensive echo interference signal-to-signal ratio JSR and the threshold value threshold3, if the JSR is more than threshold3, judging the missile is slightly interfered, and if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold3, judging the missile is in the following period; and if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold2, judging that the interference is invalid.
It will be appreciated by persons skilled in the art that the above embodiments are illustrative and not restrictive. Different features which are present in different embodiments may be combined to advantage. Other variations to the disclosed embodiments can be understood and effected by those skilled in the art upon studying the specification and the claims. In the claims, the term "comprising" does not exclude other means or steps; the indefinite article "a" does not exclude a plurality; the terms "first" and "second" are used to denote a name and not to denote any particular order.
Claims (10)
1. A method of determining the effect of an active squelched disturbance in a simulated environment, comprising:
step one, active interference preprocessing, namely judging the coverage range of interference frequency, and directly quitting active suppression interference damage judgment if the signal frequency transmitted by the last guided radar cannot be completely covered; otherwise, performing airspace aiming calculation, including calculating the antenna gain of the missile terminal guided radar in the active suppression interference aiming direction, and then calculating the interference power in the bandwidth of the terminal guided radar receiver;
step two, calculating the detection probability of the missile end-guided radar, which comprises the steps of judging whether air clutter exists or not, calculating the power of the air clutter if the air clutter exists, calculating the power of sea clutter, calculating the power of signal echoes of an attack target, calculating the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR, and calculating the detection probability PdThe computer simulates a Monte Carlo experiment to calculate the detection probability P of the simulation experiment0;
Step three, judging the interference result, including judging according to PdAnd P0And determining an interference result by using the data size relative relation and the specific numerical value of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR.
2. The method of claim 1,
the interference results comprise interference invalidation, missile impurity, slight interference, missile mis-capture and continuous search.
3. The method of claim 1 or 2,
calculating the antenna gain of the missile terminal guided radar in the active suppression interference aiming direction, comprising
Firstly, calculating an included angle theta between an active suppression interference aiming direction and a guided missile terminal guided radar antenna pointing direction;
wherein A ═ is (cos α)1,sinα1,tgβ1) Which represents the directional vector of the main lobe of the end-lead radar beam, B ═ cos α2,sinα2,tgβ2) It represents the direction vector of the jammer beam;
secondly, judging whether the active interference can enter a main lobe of a guided missile terminal guided radar wave beam in a space angle;
calculating the main lobe width theta of the guided missile terminal guided radarMain lobeAs shown in formula (2):
θmain lobe=2π/L-----------------------------------------(2)
Wherein L represents the antenna array plane length;
comparing theta and thetaMain lobeIf theta < thetaMain lobeThe terminal guided radar beam main lobe can be entered, otherwise, the terminal guided radar beam side lobe is entered;
then, distinguishing the situation that active interference enters a main lobe/a side lobe of a terminal guidance radar beam, and respectively calculating the terminal guidance radar antenna gain of the theta angle; final guidance radar beam main lobe gain f (θ):
f(θ)=exp(-kθ2)--------------------------------(3)
end-guided radar beam side lobe gain f (θ):
wherein k is 1.3916/sin (0.5 theta)b)。
4. The method of claim 3,
calculating the interference power in the bandwidth of the terminal-guided radar receiver, including
First, a bandwidth coverage factor P is calculatedBWAs shown in formula (5);
PBW=BWMissile/BWJam (5)
wherein BWMissile is the receiver bandwidth in MHz; BWJam is jammer bandwidth in MHz;
then, the interference Power within the bandwidth of the receiver is calculatedJaminMisleAs shown in formula (6);
PowerJaminMisle=PowerJam×PBW(6)
in the formula, PowerJamIs the jammer power in units W.
5. The method of claim 4,
calculating the power of meteorological clutters, including
Judging whether meteorological environment factors such as rain, snow, hail and the like exist according to the battlefield environment data packet data item, if so, calculating meteorological clutter power:
1) calculating backward scattering coefficient of meteorological clutter
Firstly, calculating a meteorological clutter backscattering coefficient according to the working frequency of the missile terminal guidance radar, as shown in a formula (7);
∑σi=ARB--------------------------------------------(7)
(7) r in the formula is the distance between the clutter center and the missile terminal guidance radar;
2) calculating meteorological clutter radar sectional area sigmav
Wherein R is the distance between the clutter center and the radar, theta3dBThe width of the horizontal beam is such that,vertical beam width, τ is pulse width, c is speed of light;
3) calculating meteorological clutter power
Wherein Pt is radar transmission power, G is antenna gain, lambda is wavelength, and LrIs the link loss.
6. The method of claim 5,
calculating sea clutter power
1) Calculating sea clutter areas
Wherein R is the distance between the clutter unit and the radar, theta3dBIs 3dB beam width, c is the speed of light, tau is the effective pulse width, phi is the glancing angle;
2) calculating clutter average radar cross-sectional area sigmac
Wherein γ is 6KB-10lgλ-KA,KAAdjustment of constants, K, for sea areasBIs the sea state grade;
3) calculating and calculating sea clutter echo power Sc
In the formula: scIs the echo power; ptTransmitting a peak power for the radar; and G is the gain of the transmitting antenna and the receiving antenna.
7. The method of claim 6,
calculating the echo power Ps of the target signal
PS=PT+2GTR-K-20log(F)-40log(DT)+10log(σ)-----------(13)
In the formula, PTFor launching power, G, for missile-terminal guided radarsT/RFor missile end-guided radar antenna gain, DTDistance between the missile and the target, F is the frequency of the transmitted signal, and sigma is the cross section area of the radar target.
10. The method of claim 1,
in step three, the interference result determination includes:
comparison probability P0And probability PdSize;
if P0>PdFurther judging the magnitude of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR and a threshold value threshold1, and if the JSR is more than threshold1, judging that the missile is out of capture; if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold1, determining to continue searching;
if P0≤PdFurther judging the magnitude of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR and the threshold value threshold2, if the JSR is more than the threshold2, further judging the magnitude of the comprehensive echo interference-signal ratio JSR and the threshold value threshold3, if the JSR is more than the threshold3, judging the missile follower is slightly interfered, and if the JSR is less than or equal to the threshold3, judging the missile follower; and if the JSR is less than or equal to threshold2, judging that the interference is invalid.
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