CN110995840B - Remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for excavator - Google Patents
Remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for excavator Download PDFInfo
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- CN110995840B CN110995840B CN201911223958.6A CN201911223958A CN110995840B CN 110995840 B CN110995840 B CN 110995840B CN 201911223958 A CN201911223958 A CN 201911223958A CN 110995840 B CN110995840 B CN 110995840B
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
- H04L67/01—Protocols
- H04L67/02—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP]
- H04L67/025—Protocols based on web technology, e.g. hypertext transfer protocol [HTTP] for remote control or remote monitoring of applications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B19/00—Programme-control systems
- G05B19/02—Programme-control systems electric
- G05B19/04—Programme control other than numerical control, i.e. in sequence controllers or logic controllers
- G05B19/048—Monitoring; Safety
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L41/00—Arrangements for maintenance, administration or management of data switching networks, e.g. of packet switching networks
- H04L41/06—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications
- H04L41/0631—Management of faults, events, alarms or notifications using root cause analysis; using analysis of correlation between notifications, alarms or events based on decision criteria, e.g. hierarchy, tree or time analysis
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L43/00—Arrangements for monitoring or testing data switching networks
- H04L43/10—Active monitoring, e.g. heartbeat, ping or trace-route
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
- H04L9/0625—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation with splitting of the data block into left and right halves, e.g. Feistel based algorithms, DES, FEAL, IDEA or KASUMI
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- Automation & Control Theory (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Cardiology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Operation Control Of Excavators (AREA)
Abstract
The invention discloses a remote terminal anti-disassembly control method suitable for an excavator, which strengthens the communication safety between a GPS terminal and a main controller through an irreversible encryption algorithm, a cloud end and an EDS algorithm, establishes reliable object communication connection, imposes punishment on the action of damaging the connection and better prevents malicious disassembly.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of excavators, and particularly relates to a remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for an excavator.
Background
The excavator comprehensively utilizes a remote anti-theft control technology to rent and manage fault maintenance machinery, the CAN bus is communicated with the controller, the data of the excavator are collected, the real-time position of the excavator and various parameters of equipment CAN be displayed in real time, meanwhile, a control command from a monitoring center is received, the control command is issued to the CAN bus, and the command control of the excavator is realized through the excavator controller, so that the remote anti-theft technology is required to be perfected in order to prevent the excavator from working abnormally due to misoperation, and the remote anti-theft control technology plays an important role in communication.
The existing GPS terminal and the controller only detect heartbeat signals once every 2 minutes, and simultaneously check whether the fixed password is correct, otherwise, the communication is judged to be abnormal, and the working speed is reduced. However, the check mode between the GPS and the main controller is too simple, the number of password groups is small, the password is easy to crack, and the management effectiveness and the reliability of remote control of the excavator are seriously influenced. The communication connection mode is too simple, and the behavior punishment strength of the broken connection mode is insufficient.
Disclosure of Invention
According to the defects of the prior art, the invention provides a remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for an excavator.
The invention is realized according to the following technical scheme:
a remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for an excavator comprises the following steps:
step one, the GPS sends information to the main controller of the excavator and stops timing, wherein the information comprises an information type and a random code A1;
step two, the main controller receives signals and stops timing, meanwhile, the GPS terminal and the main controller calculate a random code A2 according to an irreversible algorithm formula S = F (S) and stop time negotiated by the GPS terminal and the main controller and proofread with A1, the proofreading of A1= A2 is successful, otherwise, the proofreading fails;
step three, detecting whether data sent by the GPS terminal is a heartbeat signal or an instruction is issued, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is successful, feeding back that the heartbeat is normal, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is failed continuously within 4 minutes, reporting that the communication is abnormal and executing secondary vehicle locking, and executing primary vehicle locking after the data fails continuously for more than 8 minutes; if the command is issued and the verification is successful, executing the command, otherwise, not executing;
feeding back an execution result to the GPS terminal by the main controller to serve as a first check unit X1, wherein the failure X1=100, the success X1=0 and the result accounts for 70% of the total check score;
uploading data to a cloud platform by the GPS through a cloud system, displaying the states of the excavator and the GPS on a mobile phone APP, counting the abnormal communication condition of the GPS in a unified period by taking a region as a unit, reporting the abnormal alarm of more than 50% of vehicles, reporting the abnormal treatment of the GPS, and taking a statistical percentage value as a second check unit X2 which accounts for 10% of the total check value;
step six, when X1 + X2 + 10% is equal to or more than 70, executing a depth algorithm: recording the current time B before shutdown, representing B by 64 data out of order after startup, calculating the 64 data based on a DES symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain newly combined data C, and sending C to a controller as a key check variable for both sides to check; x1 + X2 + 10% <70, the GPS can continue to use under observation;
and step seven, when the cracking rate of the check variable C in the area is used as a third check unit X3, and when the cracking rate reaches 30%, judging that the GPS has serious problems and stopping using.
Further, f (S) = S in the formula of S = f (S)5*n5+s4*n4+s3*n3+ s2 N2+ s n 1; wherein s is the value formed by the random code A and the stop time, and n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5 are the fixed values agreed by both parties, which are respectively 10, 8, 2, 3 and 7.
Further, the primary locking is an operation of shielding the engine action of the excavator.
Further, the two-stage locking is an operation for limiting the rotation speed of the engine of the excavator at a low speed.
The invention has the beneficial effects that:
the invention is applied to a hydraulic excavator, and is a control technology which is cooperated with an excavator controller to work, establishes reliable object communication connection, imposes punishment on the action of destroying the connection, prevents the operations such as irregular disassembly and the like, and ensures the overall performance and the safety of the excavator.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a remote terminal tamper control method for an excavator according to the present invention.
Detailed Description
In order to make the implementation objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. In the drawings, the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The described embodiments are only some, but not all embodiments of the invention. The embodiments described below with reference to the drawings are illustrative and intended to be illustrative of the invention and are not to be construed as limiting the invention. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention. Embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
As shown in fig. 1, the invention discloses a remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for an excavator, which is a control strategy based on an irreversible encryption algorithm, a cloud end and a DES algorithm. The irreversible encryption algorithm is characterized in that a secret key is not needed in the encryption process, the system directly processes the encryption algorithm into a ciphertext after inputting the plaintext, the encrypted data cannot be decrypted, and the data can be really decrypted only by re-inputting the plaintext and re-processing the plaintext by the same irreversible encryption algorithm to obtain the same encrypted ciphertext which is re-identified by the system. The DES algorithm is a block algorithm using key encryption.
Continuing to refer to fig. 1, a remote terminal anti-dismantling control method for an excavator comprises the following steps:
step one, the GPS sends information to the main controller of the excavator and stops timing, wherein the information comprises an information type and a random code A1;
step two, the main controller receives signals and stops timing, meanwhile, the GPS terminal and the main controller calculate a random code A2 according to an irreversible algorithm formula S = F (S) and stop time negotiated by the GPS terminal and the main controller and proofread with A1, the proofreading of A1= A2 is successful, otherwise, the proofreading fails;
step three, detecting whether data sent by the GPS terminal is a heartbeat signal or an instruction is issued, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is successful, feeding back that the heartbeat is normal, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is failed continuously within 4 minutes, reporting that the communication is abnormal and executing secondary vehicle locking, and executing primary vehicle locking after the data fails continuously for more than 8 minutes; if the command is issued and the verification is successful, executing the command, otherwise, not executing;
feeding back an execution result to the GPS terminal by the main controller to serve as a first check unit X1, wherein the failure X1=100, the success X1=0 and the result accounts for 70% of the total check score;
uploading data to a cloud platform by the GPS through a cloud system, displaying the states of the excavator and the GPS on a mobile phone APP, counting the abnormal communication condition of the GPS in a unified period by taking a region as a unit, reporting the abnormal alarm of more than 50% of vehicles, reporting the abnormal treatment of the GPS, and taking a statistical percentage value as a second check unit X2 which accounts for 10% of the total check value;
step six, when X1 + X2 + 10% is equal to or more than 70, executing a depth algorithm: recording the current time B before shutdown, representing B by 64 data out of order after startup, calculating the 64 data based on a DES symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain newly combined data C, and sending C to a controller as a key check variable for both sides to check; x1 + X2 + 10% <70, the GPS can continue to use under observation;
and step seven, when the cracking rate of the check variable C in the area is used as a third check unit X3, and when the cracking rate reaches 30%, judging that the GPS has serious problems and stopping using.
In the formula, S = f (S) = S5*n5+s4*n4+s3*n3+ s2 N2+ s n 1; wherein s is the value formed by the random code A and the stop time, and n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5 are the fixed values agreed by both parties, which are respectively 10, 8, 2, 3 and 7.
The primary locking is an operation for shielding the excavator from the action of an engine.
The two-stage locking is the operation of limiting the rotating speed of the engine of the excavator and reducing the speed.
In conclusion, the invention strengthens the communication safety between the GPS terminal and the main controller through the irreversible encryption algorithm, the cloud end and the EDS algorithm, establishes reliable object communication connection, imposes punishment on the behavior of damaging the connection and better prevents malicious disassembly.
Finally, it should be noted that the above examples are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention and not to limit the same; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to preferred embodiments, those skilled in the art will understand that: modifications to the specific embodiments of the invention or equivalent substitutions for parts of the technical features may be made; without departing from the spirit of the present invention, it is intended to cover all aspects of the invention as defined by the appended claims.
Claims (1)
1. A remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for an excavator is characterized by comprising the following steps:
step one, the GPS sends information to the main controller of the excavator and stops timing, wherein the information comprises an information type and a random code A1;
step two, the main controller receives signals and stops timing, meanwhile, the GPS terminal and the main controller calculate a random code A2 according to an irreversible algorithm formula S = F (S) and stop time negotiated by the GPS terminal and the main controller and proofread with A1, the proofreading of A1= A2 is successful, otherwise, the proofreading fails;
step three, detecting whether data sent by the GPS terminal is a heartbeat signal or an instruction is issued, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is successful, feeding back that the heartbeat is normal, if the data is the heartbeat signal and the verification is failed continuously within 4 minutes, reporting that the communication is abnormal and executing secondary vehicle locking, and executing primary vehicle locking after the data fails continuously for more than 8 minutes; if the command is issued and the verification is successful, executing the command, otherwise, not executing;
feeding back an execution result to the GPS terminal by the main controller to serve as a first check unit X1, wherein the failure X1=100, the success X1=0 and the result accounts for 70% of the total check score;
uploading data to a cloud platform by the GPS through a cloud system, displaying the states of the excavator and the GPS on a mobile phone APP, counting the abnormal communication condition of the GPS in a unified period by taking a region as a unit, reporting the abnormal alarm of more than 50% of vehicles, reporting the abnormal treatment of the GPS, and taking a statistical percentage value as a second check unit X2 which accounts for 10% of the total check value;
step six, when X1 + X2 + 10% is equal to or more than 70, executing a depth algorithm: recording the current time B before shutdown, representing B by 64 data out of order after startup, calculating the 64 data based on a DES symmetric encryption algorithm to obtain newly combined data C, and sending C to a controller as a key check variable for both sides to check; x1 + X2 + 10% <70, the GPS can continue to use under observation;
step seven, when the cracking rate of the check variable C in the area is used as a third check unit X3, when the cracking rate reaches 30%, judging that the GPS has serious problems, and stopping using the GPS;
f (S) = S in the formula of S = f (S)5*n5+s4*n4+s3*n3+ s2N2+ s n 1; wherein s is a value formed by the random code A and the stop time, and n1, n2, n3, n4 and n5 are fixed values which are agreed by the two parties and are respectively 10, 8, 2, 3 and 7;
the primary locking is the operation of shielding the action of an engine of the excavator;
the secondary locking is the operation of limiting the rotating speed of the engine of the excavator at low speed.
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| CN201911223958.6A CN110995840B (en) | 2019-12-04 | 2019-12-04 | Remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for excavator |
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| CN201911223958.6A CN110995840B (en) | 2019-12-04 | 2019-12-04 | Remote terminal anti-dismantling control method suitable for excavator |
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| CN111873941A (en) * | 2020-07-16 | 2020-11-03 | 徐州徐工汽车制造有限公司 | Vehicle remote control system and method for new energy automobile leasing business |
| CN115277788B (en) * | 2022-08-23 | 2024-04-26 | 石家庄开发区天远科技有限公司 | Engineering vehicle remote control system and method |
Citations (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105245406A (en) * | 2015-11-02 | 2016-01-13 | 厦门雅迅网络股份有限公司 | Method for preventing in-car terminal from being detached |
| CN110042879A (en) * | 2019-04-22 | 2019-07-23 | 青岛雷沃工程机械有限公司 | A kind of excavator vehicle locking method based on MD5 algorithm |
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| CN105915576A (en) * | 2015-12-18 | 2016-08-31 | 乐视致新电子科技（天津）有限公司 | Vehicle remote control method, apparatus and system |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105245406A (en) * | 2015-11-02 | 2016-01-13 | 厦门雅迅网络股份有限公司 | Method for preventing in-car terminal from being detached |
| CN110042879A (en) * | 2019-04-22 | 2019-07-23 | 青岛雷沃工程机械有限公司 | A kind of excavator vehicle locking method based on MD5 algorithm |
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