CN110913390A - Anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing - Google Patents

Anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing Download PDF

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CN110913390A
CN110913390A CN201911006794.1A CN201911006794A CN110913390A CN 110913390 A CN110913390 A CN 110913390A CN 201911006794 A CN201911006794 A CN 201911006794A CN 110913390 A CN110913390 A CN 110913390A
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key
identity
vehicle
message
unit
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CN110913390B (en
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富尧
钟一民
余秋炜
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Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
Nanjing Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
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Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
Nanjing Ruban Quantum Technology Co Ltd
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/009—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity specially adapted for networks, e.g. wireless sensor networks, ad-hoc networks, RFID networks or cloud networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
    • H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
    • H04W4/44—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P] for communication between vehicles and infrastructures, e.g. vehicle-to-cloud [V2C] or vehicle-to-home [V2H]
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

The application relates to a quantum computation resistant vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing, wherein secret key cards are configured for each party in a third-party trust mechanism, a plurality of roadside units and a vehicle-mounted unit which are communicated with each other, and identity identification, a private key and algorithm parameters are stored in all the secret key cards; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists, so that the safety of identity identification of the vehicle-mounted units in the communication process of all the parties in the Internet of vehicles is further improved.

Description

Anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing
Technical Field
The application relates to the field of secret sharing, in particular to an anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing.
Background
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a mobile network created by using a wireless local area network technology and using vehicles and roadside units as network nodes to provide communication services between the vehicles (V2V) and the roadside units (V2R). The VANET is an application of a wireless Mesh network, the wireless Mesh network integrates the advantages of a wireless local area network and an ad hoc network (ad hoc), and the VANET is a network with high capacity, high speed and wide coverage range. Meanwhile, the layered topology structure of the wireless Mesh network can provide reliable transmission, has the characteristics of good expandability, low early investment and the like, and is an ideal solution for wireless broadband access.
VANET generally consists of 3 parts: a third party Trust Authority (TA), a roadside unit (RSU), and an On Board Unit (OBU). TA is a well-established third party trust authority for registration of vehicles and roadside infrastructure, generation of public parameters, distribution of keys, etc. Only the TA can reveal the true identity of the node; the RSU is an infrastructure established at the roadside and used for providing network access service for the vehicle node; the OBU is a communication unit mounted on a vehicle, and generally integrates an embedded system, a tamper-resistant security module, a global navigation positioning system, and the like.
In VANET, vehicle-to-vehicle communication and vehicle-to-RSU communication are performed in an open wireless network environment, and therefore, it is easily attacked by an attacker, which may cause leakage of user information (such as user identity, password, location information, etc.).
The problems existing in the prior art are as follows:
the ID of the OBU, as disclosed, may cause owner information to leak. If the ID is recorded at a plurality of positions, ID tracking can be realized, and serious information leakage exists under certain application scenes;
2. the OBU is issued with a symmetric key which cannot be reliably digitally signed, so that identity recognition is not facilitated;
3. an asymmetric key pair is issued to the OBU, and a private key is used for carrying out digital signature, and the mode cannot resist quantum computation because the public key needs to be disclosed when the digital signature is verified;
4. the OBU is issued with a private key of an asymmetric key, and the public key is stored in the server, so quantum computation can be resisted, but because the public key at the server is identified by a public key pointer random number of ID or similar ID, the ID or the public key pointer random number must be disclosed, and user information leakage is caused;
5. the most important element of the entire car networking system is the TA, which can have serious consequences in case its stored information is stolen.
Disclosure of Invention
In view of the foregoing, it is necessary to provide a quantum computation resistant vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing.
A quantum computation resisting vehicle networking method based on identity secret sharing is implemented among vehicle networking members, wherein the vehicle networking members comprise a vehicle-mounted unit, a third party trust authority and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third party trust authority, each party is provided with a key fob, and all the key fobs are stored with an identity, a private key and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists;
the quantum computation resisting vehicle networking method comprises the following steps of implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on a vehicle-mounted unit based on identity secret sharing, and specifically implementing the following steps in a third-party trust authority:
generating an identity and an identity random number based on a secret key management server;
generating a first key component and a second key component according to the identity identifier based on an identity secret sharing theory;
according to the first key component, the identity of the first road edge unit and the hash value of the identity random number are stored in the identity list as list items;
performing corresponding operation according to the second key component and the hash value of the identity random number to generate second key component information, selecting a first road side unit as a key distribution object, and sending the second key component information to the first road side unit;
calculating according to the master key, the identity identification and the identity random number to obtain a private key, and distributing the private key, the identity identification and the identity random number to a vehicle-mounted unit key fob;
and acquiring a message confirmation code, and verifying to complete identity registration of the vehicle-mounted unit and secret sharing of the identity identifier.
Optionally, the quantum-resistant computing vehicle networking method includes implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on the vehicle-mounted unit based on identity secret sharing, and performing the following steps on a first roadside unit serving as a key distribution object:
and acquiring the second key component, storing the second key component in the identity list, correspondingly making a message confirmation code and sending the message confirmation code to the third-party trust authority.
Optionally, the quantum computing resisting vehicle networking method further includes anonymous authentication;
after the vehicle-mounted unit is registered, the vehicle-mounted unit enters the coverage area of the second roadside unit, communication needs to be carried out in the coverage area, and authentication needs to be carried out by the third-party trust authority and the related roadside authorities, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, the vehicle-mounted unit sends a first message to a second roadside unit covering the current area, wherein the first message comprises an anonymous identity, and the anonymous identity is obtained by carrying out hash calculation on an identity random number;
step 2, the second roadside unit receives the first message, calculates according to the first message, the own identity and the group key to obtain a second message, and sends the second message to a third-party trust authority;
step 3, the third-party trust mechanism receives the second message, performs corresponding operation to generate a third message, and sends the third message to the first road edge unit;
step 4, the first road edge unit receives the third message, performs corresponding operation to generate a fourth message and sends the fourth message to a third-party trust mechanism;
step 5, the third-party trust mechanism receives the fourth information, performs corresponding operation to generate a fifth message and sends the fifth message to the second roadside unit;
step 6, the second roadside unit receives the fifth message, performs corresponding operation to generate sixth information and sends the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit;
step 7, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the sixth message, performs corresponding operation to generate a seventh message and sends the seventh message to the second roadside unit;
and 8, after receiving the seventh message, the second roadside unit verifies the seventh message to finish the anonymous authentication of the vehicle-mounted unit.
Optionally, step 3 specifically includes:
searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and obtaining that a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit is stored in a first road side unit;
calculating according to the first key component and the second message to obtain a third message, and sending the third message to the first road edge unit;
optionally, the step 4 specifically includes:
acquiring a first key component, searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and acquiring a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit;
calculating according to the second key component and the first key component to obtain an identity identifier and an identity parameter of the vehicle-mounted unit;
and generating a fourth message according to the identity identification and the identity random number.
Optionally, step 5 specifically includes:
generating a first symmetric key and a second symmetric key, wherein the first symmetric key is a session key;
encrypting according to the session key, the anonymous identity, the identity of the second roadside unit and the second symmetric key to obtain a first ciphertext;
carrying out encryption calculation according to the session key, the identity of the second roadside unit and the anonymous identity to obtain a second ciphertext;
generating a new identity random number, and calculating according to the new identity random number, the master key and the identity to obtain a new private key;
generating a pseudonym and pseudonym parameters, and generating a pseudonym secret key group according to the pseudonym and a pseudonym private key;
carrying out encryption calculation according to the new private key, the new identity random number, the group key and the name-changing secret key set to obtain a third ciphertext;
and generating a fifth message according to the first ciphertext, the second ciphertext and the third ciphertext.
Optionally, step 6 specifically includes:
correspondingly decrypting the second ciphertext to obtain a session key;
and generating sixth information according to the session key, the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and sending the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit.
Optionally, step 7 specifically includes:
correspondingly decrypting the first ciphertext to obtain the session key;
correspondingly decrypting the third ciphertext to obtain the new identity random number, a new private key, a group key and a name-changing secret key group;
correspondingly updating in a key fob according to the new identity random number and the new private key, and storing the group key and the pseudonymous key group;
and generating a seventh message according to the session key.
Optionally, in the process of information interaction between the third-party trust authority and each roadside unit, content in the interaction information is encrypted by using a session key related to the roadside unit.
The invention also provides an anti-quantum computing car networking system based on identity secret sharing, which comprises car networking members, wherein the car networking members comprise a vehicle-mounted unit, a third-party trust authority and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third-party trust authority, each party is provided with a key fob, and all the key fobs are stored with identity marks, own public keys, private keys and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists;
the alliance chain and the users comprise memories and processors, wherein computer programs are stored in the memories, and the processors realize the anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method based on identity secret sharing when executing the computer programs.
According to the quantum computation resistant vehicle networking method and system based on identity secret sharing, the identity of the vehicle-mounted unit in the vehicle network is hidden by using the identity secret sharing theory, and the purpose that the vehicle networking system can identify own users without disclosing the identity is achieved by adopting the mode of a false identity and a false implicit certificate. And the master key used to generate the key is set in the third party trust authority. According to the invention, the enemy cannot obtain the real identity of the user through communication and data storage, so that the enemy cannot realize identity tracking, and the security is greatly improved by the identity hiding method.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of an anti-quantum computing Internet of vehicles system based on identity secret sharing in one embodiment.
Detailed Description
The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and it is obvious that the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments, which can be derived by a person skilled in the art from the embodiments given herein without making any creative effort, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
For a better description and illustration of embodiments of the application, reference may be made to one or more of the drawings, but additional details or examples used in describing the drawings should not be construed as limiting the scope of any of the inventive concepts of the present application, the presently described embodiments, or the preferred versions.
It should be understood that steps may be performed in other sequences unless explicitly stated otherwise. Moreover, at least a portion of the steps may include multiple sub-steps or multiple stages that are not necessarily performed at the same time, but may be performed at different times, and the order of performance of the sub-steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but may be performed in turn or alternating with other steps or at least a portion of the sub-steps or stages of other steps.
As shown in fig. 1, a quantum computation resistant car networking method based on identity secret sharing is provided, and is implemented between car networking members, where the car networking members include a car-mounted unit, a third-party trust authority, and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third-party trust authority, each of the parties is configured with a key fob, and all the key fobs store an identity, a personal public key, a private key, and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists.
In this embodiment, the key fob used in the key pool system can store keys with large data size and also has the capability of processing information. In the invention, algorithms with corresponding requirements exist in local systems of the user side and the server side.
Key fobs have evolved from smart card technology and are identity authentication and encryption/decryption products that combine cryptography, hardware security isolation, and quantum physics (with quantum random number generators). The embedded chip and operating system of the key fob may provide secure storage of keys and cryptographic algorithms, among other functions. Due to its independent data processing capabilities and good security, the key fob becomes a secure carrier for private keys and key pools. Each key fob is protected by a hardware PIN code, the PIN code and hardware constituting two essential factors for the user to use the key fob. So-called "two-factor authentication", a user can log in to the system only by simultaneously acquiring a key fob and a user PIN code, which store relevant authentication information. Even if the PIN code of the user is leaked, the identity of the legal user cannot be counterfeited as long as the key fob held by the user is not stolen; if the key card of the user is lost, the finder can not imitate the identity of the legal user because the user PIN code is not known. In short, the key fob prevents confidential information such as keys from appearing in the form of plaintext on the disk and memory of the host, thereby effectively ensuring the security of the confidential information.
As shown in fig. 1, the method specifically includes a third-party Trust Authority (TA), a Road Side Unit (RSU), and an On Board Unit (OBU).
In this embodiment, the number of the slave RSU devices of the TA is Nu, which can be expressed as rsunnu (Nu ∈ [0, Nu-1 ]). The encryption communication mode between the TA equipment and the RSUnu can be selected to build a QKD channel between the TA equipment and the RSUnu, and a symmetric key can be issued through the QKD equipment or a key card carried by the RSUnu is used for negotiating the key by using a symmetric key pool stored with the TA pre-issued.
As shown in fig. 1, a vehicle is connected to an on-board network via an OBU (on-board unit) and an RSU on the roadside. The OBU (on board unit) is equipped with a TA pre-issued key fob. In the invention, an identity identification cryptographic technology is used, and cryptographic system parameters are established by a key management server in the TA. The creation principle is as follows:
(1) firstly, selecting a prime number P with the length more than or equal to 1024 bits, and finding a q-order subgroup G and a bilinear antipodal spine of a super-singular elliptic curve E/GF (P) and a Q-order subgroup G of the E/GF (P) which meet WDH safety hypothesis
Figure BDA0002243011860000091
G×G→GF(p2)*；
(2) Defining a hash function H1: GF (p)2)→{0，1}nAnd H2:
Figure BDA0002243011860000092
and a function H3 for mapping the user identity ID to a q-point on the elliptic curve: {0,1}n→E/GF(p)；
(3) The plaintext space is: m ═ {0, 1}nThe ciphertext space is: c ═ E/gf (p) x {0, 1}n；
(4) Randomly taking s ∈ Zq *The master key s as the algorithm system is stored only in the key management server, and the system public key P is calculatedpub＝s·P；
The algorithm parameter
Figure BDA0002243011860000093
Stored on the host keysheet card of the key management server. Authentication clothes with TAIf the server ID is IDTA, its public key is PKTA H3(IDTA), and its private key is SKTA s PKTA, and all the keys store the IDs and algorithm parameters of the TA devices
Figure BDA0002243011860000094
Figure BDA0002243011860000095
The key fob of the RSU device stores a pool of symmetric keys issued by the TA. The key management server in the TA has backup for the symmetric key pool of all RSU devices under its jurisdiction, which is a symmetric key pool group.
Both the TA and RSU device key fobs have built-in corresponding ID lists for storing secret shards of the vehicle key fob ID.
In this embodiment, the quantum-resistant computing internet of vehicles method includes implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on a vehicle-mounted unit based on identity secret sharing, and implementing the following steps in a third-party trust authority: generating an identity and an identity random number based on a secret key management server; generating a first key component and a second key component according to the identity identifier based on an identity secret sharing theory; according to the first key component, the identity of the first road edge unit and the hash value of the identity random number are stored in the identity list as list items; performing corresponding operation according to the second key component and the hash value of the identity random number to generate second key component information, selecting a first road side unit as a key distribution object, and sending the second key component information to the first road side unit; calculating according to the master key, the identity identification and the identity random number to obtain a private key, and distributing the private key, the identity identification and the identity random number to a vehicle-mounted unit key fob; and acquiring a message confirmation code, and verifying to complete identity registration of the vehicle-mounted unit and secret sharing of the identity identifier.
In this embodiment, the quantum-resistant computing internet of vehicles method includes implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on a vehicle-mounted unit based on identity secret sharing, and performing the following steps at a first roadside unit serving as a key distribution object: and acquiring the second key component, storing the second key component in the identity list, correspondingly making a message confirmation code and sending the message confirmation code to the third-party trust authority.
In this embodiment, the quantum computing resistant car networking method further comprises anonymous authentication; after the vehicle-mounted unit is registered, the vehicle-mounted unit enters the coverage area of the second roadside unit, communication needs to be carried out in the coverage area, and authentication needs to be carried out by the third-party trust authority and the related roadside authorities, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, the vehicle-mounted unit sends a first message to a second roadside unit covering the current area, wherein the first message comprises an anonymous identity, and the anonymous identity is obtained by carrying out hash calculation on an identity random number;
step 2, the second roadside unit receives the first message, calculates according to the first message, the own identity and the group key to obtain a second message, and sends the second message to a third-party trust authority;
step 3, the third-party trust mechanism receives the second message, performs corresponding operation to generate a third message, and sends the third message to the first road edge unit;
step 4, the first road edge unit receives the third message, performs corresponding operation to generate a fourth message and sends the fourth message to a third-party trust mechanism;
step 5, the third-party trust mechanism receives the fourth information, performs corresponding operation to generate a fifth message and sends the fifth message to the second roadside unit;
step 6, the second roadside unit receives the fifth message, performs corresponding operation to generate sixth information and sends the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit;
step 7, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the sixth message, performs corresponding operation to generate a seventh message and sends the seventh message to the second roadside unit;
and 8, after receiving the seventh message, the second roadside unit verifies the seventh message to finish the anonymous authentication of the vehicle-mounted unit.
Specifically, the step 3 specifically includes: searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and obtaining that a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit is stored in a first road side unit; calculating according to the first key component and the second message to obtain a third message, and sending the third message to the first road edge unit;
specifically, the step 4 specifically includes: acquiring a first key component, searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and acquiring a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit; calculating according to the second key component and the first key component to obtain an identity identifier and an identity parameter of the vehicle-mounted unit; and generating a fourth message according to the identity identification and the identity random number.
Specifically, the step 5 specifically includes: generating a first symmetric key and a second symmetric key, wherein the first symmetric key is a session key; encrypting according to the session key, the anonymous identity, the identity of the second roadside unit and the second symmetric key to obtain a first ciphertext; carrying out encryption calculation according to the session key, the identity of the second roadside unit and the anonymous identity to obtain a second ciphertext; generating a new identity random number, and calculating according to the new identity random number, the master key and the identity to obtain a new private key; generating a pseudonym and pseudonym parameters, and generating a pseudonym secret key group according to the pseudonym and a pseudonym private key; carrying out encryption calculation according to the new private key, the new identity random number, the group key and the name-changing secret key set to obtain a third ciphertext; and generating a fifth message according to the first ciphertext, the second ciphertext and the third ciphertext.
Specifically, the step 6 specifically includes: correspondingly decrypting the second ciphertext to obtain a session key; and generating sixth information according to the session key, the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and sending the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit.
Specifically, the step 7 specifically includes: correspondingly decrypting the first ciphertext to obtain the session key; correspondingly decrypting the third ciphertext to obtain the new identity random number, a new private key, a group key and a name-changing secret key group; correspondingly updating in a key fob according to the new identity random number and the new private key, and storing the group key and the pseudonymous key group;
and generating a seventh message according to the session key.
In this embodiment, in the process of information interaction between the third-party trust authority and each roadside unit, the content in the interaction information is encrypted by using a session key associated with the roadside unit.
The specific flow of the anti-quantum computing internet of vehicles method based on identity secret sharing is further described with respect to details of each step as follows:
embodiment 1, vehicle registration and ID secret sharing:
step 1
The TA generates an identity ID IDV for the key fob for the vehicle, and randomly takes an element from the finite field E/gf (p) as IDR.
Step 2
TA selects rsunnu as the key distribution object based on Nu ═ h (idr)% Nu. The TA performs (2,2) secret sharing for the IDV, and the following is a calculation procedure of the secret sharing. The constructor obtains frid (x) ═ IDV + IDR x, randomly takes a key pointer address xp, and takes out a random number x ═ x1| | | x2 of a corresponding length from a symmetric key pool corresponding to rsusnu according to xp. Wherein x1 and x2 cannot be equal; if the values are equal, the xp is replaced, and the random number is reselected. The 2 secrets, i.e. key components, are calculated as (x1, ID1 ═ fID (x1)), (x2, ID2 ═ fID (x 2)).
The key fob ID can be recovered by making 2 groups of secrets, the specific steps are as follows: 2 group secret according to formula
Figure BDA0002243011860000121
Figure BDA0002243011860000122
Lagrangian parameters λ 1 (— x2)/(x1-x2) and λ 2(— x1)/(x2-x1) were obtained. The IDV ═ λ 1 ═ ID1+ λ 2 ═ ID2 (x1 ═ ID2-x2 × ID1)/(x1-x2), and IDR ═ ID2-ID1)/(x2-x1 were determined.
Let Mxp ═ h (idr) | | ID2, where h (m) function is a classical hash function. Mxp is encrypted by using x and the message authentication code is calculated to obtain { Mxp } x | | | MAC (xp | | Mxp, x), wherein MAC (m, k) is a message authentication algorithm, k is a secret key, and m is message content. TA packs the key pointer address xp and { Mxp } x | | MAC (xp | | | Mxp, x) to get xp | | { Mxp } x | | MAC (xp | | Mxp, x) and sends to RSUnu. Meanwhile, the TA stores h (idr) ID1 idrsnu as a list entry in the local ID list, where idrnu is the identity ID stored in the rsnu device key fob. TA calculates the private key SKV ═ s × H3(IDV | | | | IDR) of the vehicle using IDV. The private key SKV and IDV | | | IDR and algorithm parameters are assigned to the registered vehicle key fob.
Step 3
Rsusnu receives the ciphertext xp | { Mxp } x | | | MAC (xp | | Mxp, x) from TA. X is extracted from xp, decrypted with x, and message authenticated to Mxp ═ h (idr) | | ID 2. Rsusnu stores h (idr) x1 (x2, ID2) in an ID list in secure memory. Rsusnu sends a response xp | { ACK } x | | | MAC (xp | | | ACK, x) to TA, ACK being an acknowledgement success or failure message.
After receiving the message, the TA decrypts the message by using x to obtain ACK, calculates a message authentication code by using x to the xp and the ACK and compares the message authentication code with the received MAC (xp | | ACK, x). After the verification is passed, if the ACK shows that the confirmation is successful, the vehicle registration and the ID secret sharing are completed.
Example 2 anonymous authentication of vehicle
For anonymous authentication purposes:
and obtaining TA authentication, and obtaining a new pseudonym, a private key corresponding to the pseudonym and a group key GK _ RSU of a local RSU coverage area. The group key may be updated, for example, once a day. The local RSU coverage area may exceed the RSU wireless signal coverage area to the outside of the wireless signal coverage area. For example, a union of a certain RSU radio signal coverage area and a certain cell in the vicinity of the RSU is defined as the RSU coverage area.
The scenario of the embodiment is that the vehicle a first connects to the internet of vehicles or enters the signal coverage area from a long-time signal shielding area, and the entering is the RSUB coverage area. Let the public and private key pair of vehicle A be PKA/SKA.
Step 1: vehicle A sends an authentication request to device RSUB
The hash value of the random number IDRA used for the ID secret sharing calculation within the key fob of vehicle a may be denoted PIDA (h (IDRA)). Vehicle a takes a timestamp NA and combines with PIDA to obtain M1_0 ═ PIDA | | | NA. The vehicle a signs the M1_0 and the self identity ID, and calculates U-r-PKA, where r is an element randomly obtained within the finite field E/gf (p). H-H2 (M1 — 0| | | IDA, U), V ═ r + H × SKA were calculated. The signature SIGN (M1_0| | | IDA, SKA) ═ U, V. So that M1 ═ M1_0| | | SIGN (M1_0| | | IDA, SKA). The vehicle a sends an authentication request M1 to the device RSUB.
Because the identity IDA of the patent is not public, the enemy cannot obtain the public key PKA; the adversary cannot get the random number r through U and the public key PKA. Because the signed content cannot be known by the enemy, the enemy cannot obtain h through the signed content; since the enemy cannot obtain r and h, the enemy cannot obtain the private key SKA through V ═ r + h × SKA. In summary, the disclosed digital signatures are resistant to attack by an adversary's quantum computer on identity-based public key cryptography.
Step 2: the device RSUB forwards the authentication request to the TA
The device RSUB receives the authentication request M1 from the vehicle a. RSUB takes the timestamp NB and is packaged to M2_0| | | M1| | | IDRSUB | | NB, where IDRSUB is the identity ID of RSUB. The encryption and calculation of the message authentication code are performed to obtain M2 ═ M2_0| { M2_1} K _ RSUB | | | MAC (M2_0| | M2_1, K _ RSUB), K _ RSUB is a symmetric key obtained by negotiation between RSUB and TA, M2_1 ═ GK _ RSUB, and GK _ RSUB is a group key used by the device RSUB. RSUB sends M2 to TA.
And step 3: TA Forwarding authentication request to device RSUA
The TA receives the message M2 from the RSUB, decrypts the M2 by using the symmetric key K _ RSUB, authenticates the message to obtain M2_0, and meanwhile verifies the timeliness of the time stamps NA and NB in the message. Finding a list entry from the local ID list according to the PIDA, namely: PIDA | IDA1| idrua, where idrua is the ID of RSUA. Let M3_0 be M2_0 and M3_1 be IDA 1. The TA calculates the message authentication code by using the symmetric key K _ RSUA negotiated with the RSUA, and packages the message authentication code to obtain M3 ═ M3_0| { M3_1} K _ RSUA | | MAC (M3_0| | M3_1, K _ RSUA), and the TA sends M3 to the device RSUA.
And 4, step 4: RSUA return response
The RSUA receives the message M3 from the TA, decrypts and authenticates the message by using the symmetric key K _ RSUA, and then checks the timeliness of the time stamps NA and NB in the message. Finding the corresponding list entry in the local ID list according to the PIDA in message M3, i.e. entry: PIDA | | x1| | (x2, IDA 2). Two secret shards are obtained according to the local x1 and (x2, IDA2) and the IDA1 in the message M3, and the identity number of the vehicle A is recovered through two secret shard calculations: IDA and a corresponding random number IDRA.
And (3) calculating to obtain a public key PKA (H3) (IDA | | | IDRA) of the vehicle A, and verifying the Signature SIGN (M1_0| | IDA, SKA) by using the public key PKA, wherein the Signature and the current verification Signature are realized Based on An IBS Signature algorithm, which is shown in An Identity-Based Signature from Gap Diffie-Hellman Groups. If the digital signature fails to verify, M4_0 is a failure message, otherwise, M4_0 is IDA | | IDRA. M4_0 is encrypted with a symmetric key K _ RSUA and the message authentication code is calculated, resulting in M4 ═ { M4_0} K _ RSUA | | MAC (M4_0, K _ RSUA). Message M4 is returned to TA. Here the vehicle signature is verified by a number of RSUs, sharing the calculated stress for the TA.
And 5: TA updates vehicle ID and sends to RSUB
The TA decrypts the message M4 by using the symmetric key K _ RSUA and authenticates the message, if the decryption obtains a failure message, the authentication fails, and the process is ended; if the IDA | | | IDRA is obtained through decryption, the normal authentication process is carried out. The TA generates two symmetric keys KAB and KTA, IBE algorithm encryption is performed on KTA by using public key PKA of a as H3(IDA | | IDRA) to obtain CTA as (UTA, VTA), and offset calculation is performed by using PKA to obtain (UTA-PKA, VTA). The IBE algorithm is described in Identity-based encryption from the Weil Pair. And respectively packaging the authentication feedback messages to obtain TICKETA ═ { PIDA | | | NA | | IDRSUB | | | KAB } KTA | (UTA-PKA, VTA) and TICKETB | { IDRSUB | | NB | | PIDA | | KAB } K _ RSUB. TA generates a new random element IDRA ' for secret sharing for vehicle a and calculates a new private key SKA ' ═ s × H3(IDA | | | IDRA '). And (2) carrying out (2,2) secret sharing calculation on the IDA to obtain two new secret fragments, and distributing the secret fragments to local and corresponding RSU equipment, such as RSUC, according to the rule in the step 1.
Let M5_0 ═ IDRA '| | SKA', M5_1 ═ GK _ RSUB | | | | Σ { ALIAS | | ASK }. Wherein, GK _ RSUB is the group key used by the device RSUB and the vehicle in its coverage area, ALIAS, and public key APK H3(ALIAS | | GK _ RSUB) and private key ASK s H3(ALIAS | | GK _ RSUB) are obtained by calculation. The said pair of the pseudonym and the public and private keys can generate corresponding number of pseudonym key sets according to the service requirement. Symmetric encryption and message authentication code calculation of M5_0 and M5_1 by KTA result in updatae [ { M5_0| | M5_1} KTA | | MAC (M5_0| | M5_1, KTA).
The TA package message results in M5, which may be expressed as M5 | | | updatae | | | TICKETB. The message M5 is sent to the device RSUB.
Step 6: RSUB forwards messages to vehicle A
The RSUB device receives the message M5 from the TA, decrypts the TICKETB in M5 with the symmetric key K _ RSUB to obtain the session key KAB issued by the TA. RSUB generates a time stamp NC, and uses KAB to encrypt and calculate message authentication code to obtain { NC } KAB | | MAC (NA | | | NC, KAB). The RSUB bundle message results in M6, which may be expressed as M6 ═ TICKETA | | updatae | { NC } KAB | | MAC (NA | | NC, KAB). RSUB returns message M6 to vehicle a.
And 7: vehicle A updates the data and returns an authentication response
The vehicle A performs offset inverse calculation on (UTA-PKA, VTA) in TICKETA by using a self public key PKA, namely, PKA is added to the UTA-PKA to obtain (UTA, VTA), and the private key of the vehicle A is used for decrypting the (UTA, VTA) to obtain a secret key KTA. And decrypting { PIDA (International Mobile Teller digital authentication for public data acquisition) NA (International Mobile Teller publication) IDRSUB (International Mobile Teller publication) KAB (public Mobile Teller B) } KTA by using KTA to obtain a session key KAB issued by the TA. And simultaneously verifying whether the PIDA and the NA are consistent with those in the self request message. Vehicle a decrypts { NC } KAB with KAB and authenticates the MAC (NA | | | NC, KAB) message, thereby authenticating RSUB as a legitimate identity.
The vehicle a decrypts { M5_0| | M5_1} KTA | | MAC (M5_0| | M5_1, KTA) with KTA and performs message authentication. And updating IDRA 'and SKA' in M5_0 to local corresponding data. And meanwhile, the local public key PKA is updated to be PKA 'H3 (IDA | | | IDRA'). The memory M5_1 is GK _ RSUB | | | Σ { ALIAS | | ASK }.
Vehicle a performs a calculation of a message authentication code for the NC and packages the message as M7, which may be denoted as M7 ═ MAC (NC, KAB). Vehicle a sends M7 to RSUB.
And 8: RSUB authentication of vehicle A
The RSUB receives the message M7, performs message authentication on the MAC (NC, KAB) by using the KAB, and does not process subsequent messages of the vehicle if the authentication fails; if the authentication is successful, the vehicle authenticates with the IDA and stores the session key KAB.
Vehicle A and RSUB communicate securely, and utilize KAB to encrypt and decrypt messages and authenticate messages. Preferably, the KAB is divided into KABE and KABA as message encryption and decryption key and message authentication key respectively
Example 3 anonymous broadcast message for vehicle
The vehicle generates a message MB _0 ═ ALIAS | | | BMSG | | | timestamp, where BMSG is the broadcast message and timestamp is the timestamp. IBS signature is carried out on MB _0| | GK _ RSUnu by using a private key ASK corresponding to the ALIAS so as to obtain SIGN (MB _0| | GK _ RSUnu, ASK). The vehicle package message MB may be expressed as MB _0| | | SIGN (MB _0| | GK _ rsuuu, ASK).
Since part of information (GK _ RSUB) for generating the public key is not disclosed, the enemy cannot obtain PK; therefore, the adversary cannot get the random number r from r PK and PK. Since the signed partial object (GK _ rsuuu) is unknown to the adversary, the adversary cannot get h through the signed object. Since the adversary cannot get r and h, the adversary cannot get SK through (r + h) × SK. In summary, the disclosed digital signatures are resistant to attack by an adversary's quantum computer on identity-based public key cryptography.
Example 4 authentication of anonymous broadcast messages
Vehicles and RSU equipment within the coverage range of the RSUnu can obtain a public key APK through calculation of the ALIAS and the group key GK _ RSUnu, and the signature of the broadcast message is verified through the APK.
The key fob used in the above method is a separate hardware isolation device. The private key and the identity ID are stored in a data security zone in the key fob, the possibility of stealing the key by malicious software or malicious operations is greatly reduced, and attacks by trojans or hackers can be resisted.
In the invention, the ID is backed up by the vehicle key fob and the corresponding RSU equipment key fob in a secret sharing mode, so that the safety of the user ID can be effectively protected, the large-scale leakage of the user information after TA is compromised is avoided, the external leakage of the public key is also avoided, and the external leakage of the public key can be greatly cracked before a quantum computer. By using the asymmetric key mode, the disadvantage that the symmetric algorithm cannot carry out reliable digital signature can be made up. The reliability of identity recognition is ensured.
Meanwhile, the method uses offsets in the process, the offsets can be calculated only by the participation of corresponding keys, and other parties which cannot know the keys cannot crack the data protected by the offsets. The data is encrypted by using the offset, so that the transmission process is safer, and the characteristic of quantum computation resistance is realized; and the calculation amount of the encryption mode is smaller than that of the common encryption mode, so that the attack of resisting a quantum computer by using the common encryption mode is avoided, and the equipment burden of each party is reduced.
The method verifies the vehicle signature by a plurality of RSUs and shares the calculation pressure for the TA.
The method utilizes the characteristics of the IBS digital signature to realize the IBS signature resisting quantum computation in a mode of hiding part of signature information, and the method can realize the effect of resisting quantum computation without encrypting the IBS signature or intermediate variables of the IBS signature. Because the quantum computation resistant IBS signature mode does not increase the signature computation amount, the attack of resisting a quantum computer by using a common encryption mode is avoided, and the equipment burden of each party is reduced.
In one embodiment, a computer device, namely a quantum computing resistant car networking system based on identity secret sharing, is provided, the computer device can be a terminal, and the internal structure of the computer device can comprise a processor, a memory, a network interface, a display screen and an input device which are connected through a system bus. Wherein the processor of the computer device is configured to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device comprises a nonvolatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system and a computer program. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of an operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used for communicating with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program is executed by a processor to implement the above-described quantum computing immunity car networking method based on identity secret sharing. The display screen of the computer equipment can be a liquid crystal display screen or an electronic ink display screen, and the input device of the computer equipment can be a touch layer covered on the display screen, a key, a track ball or a touch pad arranged on the shell of the computer equipment, an external keyboard, a touch pad or a mouse and the like.
In one embodiment, the quantum computation resistant vehicle networking system based on identity secret sharing comprises vehicle networking members, wherein the vehicle networking members comprise a vehicle-mounted unit, a third-party trust authority and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third-party trust authority, each party is provided with a key fob, and all the key fobs are stored with identity identifications, own public keys, private keys and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists;
the alliance chain and the users comprise memories and processors, wherein computer programs are stored in the memories, and the processors realize the anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method based on identity secret sharing when executing the computer programs.
The technical features of the embodiments described above may be arbitrarily combined, and for the sake of brevity, all possible combinations of the technical features in the embodiments described above are not described, but should be considered as being within the scope of the present specification as long as there is no contradiction between the combinations of the technical features.
The above examples are merely illustrative of several embodiments of the present invention, and the description thereof is more specific and detailed, but not to be construed as limiting the scope of the invention. It should be noted that, for a person skilled in the art, several variations and modifications can be made without departing from the inventive concept, which falls within the scope of the present invention. Therefore, the protection scope of the present invention should be subject to the appended claims.

Claims (10)

1. The quantum computation resisting vehicle networking method based on identity secret sharing is implemented among vehicle networking members, wherein the vehicle networking members comprise a vehicle-mounted unit, a third party trust authority and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third party trust authority, and is characterized in that each party is provided with a key fob, and all the key fobs store identity identification, own public keys, private keys and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists;
the quantum computation resisting vehicle networking method comprises the following steps of implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on a vehicle-mounted unit based on identity secret sharing, and specifically implementing the following steps in a third-party trust authority:
generating an identity and an identity random number based on a secret key management server;
generating a first key component and a second key component according to the identity identifier based on an identity secret sharing theory;
according to the first key component, the identity of the first road edge unit and the hash value of the identity random number are stored in the identity list as list items;
performing corresponding operation according to the second key component and the hash value of the identity random number to generate second key component information, selecting a first road side unit as a key distribution object, and sending the second key component information to the first road side unit;
calculating according to the master key, the identity identification and the identity random number to obtain a private key, and distributing the private key, the identity identification and the identity random number to a vehicle-mounted unit key fob;
and acquiring a message confirmation code, and verifying to complete identity registration of the vehicle-mounted unit and secret sharing of the identity identifier.
2. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 1, wherein the quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method comprises implementing vehicle registration and identity secret sharing on an on-board unit based on identity secret sharing, and performing the following steps at a first road side unit as a key distribution object:
and acquiring the second key component, storing the second key component in the identity list, correspondingly making a message confirmation code and sending the message confirmation code to the third-party trust authority.
3. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method of claim 1, further comprising anonymous authentication;
after the vehicle-mounted unit is registered, the vehicle-mounted unit enters the coverage area of the second roadside unit, communication needs to be carried out in the coverage area, and authentication needs to be carried out by the third-party trust authority and the related roadside authorities, and the method specifically comprises the following steps:
step 1, the vehicle-mounted unit sends a first message to a second roadside unit covering the current area, wherein the first message comprises an anonymous identity, and the anonymous identity is obtained by carrying out hash calculation on an identity random number;
step 2, the second roadside unit receives the first message, calculates according to the first message, the own identity and the group key to obtain a second message, and sends the second message to a third-party trust authority;
step 3, the third-party trust mechanism receives the second message, performs corresponding operation to generate a third message, and sends the third message to the first road edge unit;
step 4, the first road edge unit receives the third message, performs corresponding operation to generate a fourth message and sends the fourth message to a third-party trust mechanism;
step 5, the third-party trust mechanism receives the fourth information, performs corresponding operation to generate a fifth message and sends the fifth message to the second roadside unit;
step 6, the second roadside unit receives the fifth message, performs corresponding operation to generate sixth information and sends the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit;
step 7, the vehicle-mounted unit receives the sixth message, performs corresponding operation to generate a seventh message and sends the seventh message to the second roadside unit;
and 8, after receiving the seventh message, the second roadside unit verifies the seventh message to finish the anonymous authentication of the vehicle-mounted unit.
4. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 3, wherein the step 3 specifically comprises:
searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and obtaining that a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit is stored in a first road side unit;
and calculating according to the first key component and the second message to obtain a third message, and sending the third message to the first road side unit.
5. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 4, wherein the step 4 specifically comprises:
acquiring a first key component, searching corresponding list items in an identity list according to the anonymous identity, and acquiring a second key component of the vehicle-mounted unit;
calculating according to the second key component and the first key component to obtain an identity identifier and an identity parameter of the vehicle-mounted unit;
and generating a fourth message according to the identity identification and the identity random number.
6. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 5, wherein the step 5 specifically comprises:
generating a first symmetric key and a second symmetric key, wherein the first symmetric key is a session key;
encrypting according to the session key, the anonymous identity, the identity of the second roadside unit and the second symmetric key to obtain a first ciphertext;
carrying out encryption calculation according to the session key, the identity of the second roadside unit and the anonymous identity to obtain a second ciphertext;
generating a new identity random number, and calculating according to the new identity random number, the master key and the identity to obtain a new private key;
generating a pseudonym and pseudonym parameters, and generating a pseudonym secret key group according to the pseudonym and a pseudonym private key;
carrying out encryption calculation according to the new private key, the new identity random number, the group key and the name-changing secret key set to obtain a third ciphertext;
and generating a fifth message according to the first ciphertext, the second ciphertext and the third ciphertext.
7. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 6, wherein the step 6 specifically comprises:
correspondingly decrypting the second ciphertext to obtain a session key;
and generating sixth information according to the session key, the first ciphertext and the third ciphertext, and sending the sixth information to the vehicle-mounted unit.
8. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method according to claim 7, wherein the step 7 specifically comprises:
correspondingly decrypting the first ciphertext to obtain the session key;
correspondingly decrypting the third ciphertext to obtain the new identity random number, a new private key, a group key and a name-changing secret key group;
correspondingly updating in a key fob according to the new identity random number and the new private key, and storing the group key and the pseudonymous key group;
and generating a seventh message according to the session key.
9. The quantum computation resistant distributed car networking method of claim 3, wherein in the process of information interaction between the third-party trust authority and each roadside unit, the content in the interaction information is encrypted by using a session key related to the roadside unit.
10. The quantum computation resisting vehicle networking system based on identity secret sharing comprises vehicle networking members, wherein the vehicle networking members comprise a vehicle-mounted unit, a third party trust authority and a plurality of roadside units subordinate to the third party trust authority, and is characterized in that each party is provided with a key fob, and all the key fobs store identity identification, own public keys, private keys and algorithm parameters; the third trust authority is further configured with a key management server for generating and issuing key fobs to the on-board units and issuing symmetric key pools to the wayside units; the third party trust authority also stores a master key, and the master key is used for generating a private key of the vehicle-mounted unit; identity lists are stored in the third trust authority and key fobs of the roadside units, and identity identification components of the vehicle-mounted units are stored in the identity lists;
the alliance chain and the users comprise memories and processors, wherein computer programs are stored in the memories, and the processors realize the anti-quantum computing vehicle networking method based on identity secret sharing of any one of claims 1 to 9 when executing the computer programs.
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