CN110828018A - Compact distributed nuclear power reactor DCS architecture - Google Patents
Compact distributed nuclear power reactor DCS architecture Download PDFInfo
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- CN110828018A CN110828018A CN201911100169.3A CN201911100169A CN110828018A CN 110828018 A CN110828018 A CN 110828018A CN 201911100169 A CN201911100169 A CN 201911100169A CN 110828018 A CN110828018 A CN 110828018A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/008—Man-machine interface, e.g. control room layout
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
- G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
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Abstract
The invention relates to a nuclear power reactor DCS architecture which is compactly arranged, and the nuclear power reactor DCS architecture comprises a non-safety-level DCS and a safety-level DCS, wherein an operator workstation is arranged in a main control chamber and used for issuing a safety-level equipment control instruction to monitor safety-level equipment, and the safety-level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the safety-level equipment through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus, a control station and a CIC cabinet in sequence; the safety level equipment feeds back safety level equipment information according to the safety level equipment control instruction, and the safety level equipment information is transmitted to the operator workstation through a safety level bus A or a safety level bus B, a control bus, a real-time server and a terminal bus in sequence. The invention simplifies the DCS system and meets the defense level requirements of compact arrangement and nuclear security.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power stations, in particular to a compact distributed DCS (distributed control system) architecture of a nuclear power reactor.
Background
The Digital Distributed Control System (DCS) is a comprehensive Control System which is developed along with the continuous rise of the automation of modern large-scale industrial production and the increasing complexity of process Control requirements, has strong data processing and communication capabilities, and is a modern device for completing process Control and management and improving the operation safety, reliability and management efficiency of nuclear power stations. At present, the digital nuclear power main control room architecture scheme based on the DCS mainly refers to a nuclear power plant main control room architecture scheme of land commercial operation, and the digital nuclear power plant DCS architecture shown in fig. 1 is divided into a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS, and is implemented by adopting different platforms. The security level DCS mainly completes monitoring of security level equipment information, the non-security level DCS mainly completes monitoring of non-security level equipment information, and the security level DCS and the non-security level equipment information can perform information transmission through the gateway. The main control indoor Operator Workstation (OWP) is provided with non-safety level monitoring equipment (NC-VDU), a monitoring signal sent by the operator workstation is transmitted to the server through a Monitoring Network (MNET), and then is connected with a first-layer control cabinet through a System Network (SNET), and the local non-safety level equipment is monitored through the control cabinet; meanwhile, OWP is also provided with a security level information monitoring means, which calls OWP security level monitoring equipment (S-VDU) from a Monitoring Network (MNET) and a gateway to a security level human-computer interface Bus (HM Data Bus), and then monitors the security level equipment information on the S-VDU, and the S-VDU monitors the security level equipment from a security level Bus (Security Bus) to an equipment interface module (CIM). The following modes are available for the monitoring operation of the security level equipment:
1. the method comprises the following steps of (1) controlling indoor non-security level monitoring equipment → a monitoring network → a non-security level gateway → a man-machine interface bus → controlling indoor security level monitoring equipment → a security level bus → a CIC cabinet → equipment;
2. main control indoor security level monitoring equipment → security level bus → CIC cabinet → equipment;
3. master control indoor diversity system monitoring equipment → diversity system terminal bus → diversity system server → diversity system control bus → diversity system cabinet → CIC cabinet → equipment.
Where "→" indicates the flow direction of the control command.
The digital nuclear power station DCS architecture aims at a main control room of a land nuclear power station, and is sufficient in space and large in scale so as to ensure that equipment has sufficient redundancy and diversity. However, for a nuclear power master control room with a compact arrangement, the requirement cannot be met due to the limited building space.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a nuclear power reactor DCS architecture which is compactly arranged so as to meet the compactness requirement of a nuclear power main control room.
The embodiment of the invention provides a compact distributed nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, which comprises a main control room, a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS;
the non-safety-level DCS comprises a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server, a control station and an operator workstation arranged in a main control room; the operator workstation is connected with the terminal bus, and the control station is connected with the control bus;
the safety level DCS comprises a safety level bus A and a safety level bus B, the safety level bus A and the safety level bus B are connected with the control bus through a gateway, the safety level bus A is connected with a first protection group, a third protection group and a plurality of CIC cabinets, and the safety level bus B is connected with a second protection group, a fourth protection group and a plurality of CIC cabinets; the CIC cabinet is also connected with the control station;
the operator workstation is used for issuing a safety level equipment control instruction to monitor safety level equipment, and the safety level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the safety level equipment through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus, a control station and a CIC cabinet in sequence;
and the safety level equipment feeds back safety level equipment information according to the safety level equipment control instruction, and the safety level equipment information is transmitted to an operator workstation through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
Preferably, one end of the control station is connected with the control bus, and the other end of the control station is connected with the non-safety-level equipment;
the operator workstation is also used for issuing a non-safety-level equipment control instruction to monitor non-safety-level equipment, the non-safety-level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the safety-level equipment through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus and the control station in sequence, the non-safety-level equipment feeds back non-safety-level equipment information according to the non-safety-level equipment control instruction, and the non-safety-level equipment information is transmitted to the operator workstation through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
Preferably, the operator workstations include a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation, and a crew length workstation; the system comprises a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation, a long unit workstation, a non-safety monitoring device and a terminal bus, wherein the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation are respectively in communication connection with the terminal bus, the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation are all provided with the non-safety monitoring device, and the non-safety monitoring device is used for displaying safety level equipment information or non-safety level equipment information.
Preferably, the security level bus a and the security level bus B are further connected to a security level monitoring device, respectively.
Preferably, the real-time server comprises a nuclear island real-time server and a conventional island real-time server, and the nuclear island real-time server and the conventional island real-time server are respectively connected with the terminal bus and the control bus.
Preferably, a large screen is further arranged in the main control room, and the large screen is connected with the terminal bus and used for displaying security level equipment information or non-security level equipment information; the safety level equipment information is transmitted to the large screen through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence, and the non-safety level equipment information is transmitted to the large screen through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
Compared with the prior art, the embodiment of the invention provides a compact distributed DCS architecture of a nuclear power reactor, which greatly simplifies the DCS system and equipment scale, and cancels a gateway from a security level to a non-security level in the 1 st path of the onshore reactor in the background technology; a security level monitoring device (S-VDU) in a main control room is cancelled, and only a non-security level monitoring device (NC-VDU) is arranged in the main control room; all safety level equipment and non-safety level equipment are monitored through 3 operator workstations under normal working conditions, under the accident, namely under the condition that three operators work and can not effectively monitor the safety level equipment, the safety level equipment is monitored through special safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU), and the safety level monitoring equipment is connected with a safety level bus of a safety level DCS. In addition, the safety level equipment is the most important of the cost, and the safety level monitoring equipment of the operator workstation is omitted, so that the safety level monitoring equipment is realized through non-safety level equipment, and the cost is greatly saved.
Additional features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by the practice of the invention. The objectives and other advantages of the invention will be realized and attained by the structure particularly pointed out in the written description and claims hereof as well as the appended drawings. Of course, it is not necessary for any product or method of practicing the invention to achieve all of the above-described advantages simultaneously
Drawings
In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly described below, it is obvious that the drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the present invention, and for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained according to the drawings without creative efforts.
Fig. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a nuclear power plant DCS architecture in the background art.
Fig. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a compact nuclear power reactor DCS architecture in the embodiment of the present invention.
Reference numerals:
the system comprises a main control room-1, a terminal bus-2, a control bus-3, a real-time server-4, a control station-5, a security level bus A-6, a security level bus B-7, a first protection group-8, a third protection group-9, a CIC cabinet-10, a second protection group-11, a fourth protection group-12, an engineer station-13, a history server-14, a computing server-15, a communication station-16, a serious accident monitoring system-17, a large screen-18, a third party instrument control system-19 and field equipment-20.
Detailed Description
Various exemplary embodiments, features and aspects of the present disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the drawings, like reference numbers can indicate functionally identical or similar elements. While the various aspects of the embodiments are presented in drawings, the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale unless specifically indicated.
In addition, in the following detailed description, numerous specific details are set forth in order to provide a better understanding of the present invention. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention may be practiced without some of these specific details. In some instances, means, elements and circuits that are well known to those skilled in the art have not been described in detail so as not to obscure the present invention.
The embodiment of the invention provides a nuclear power reactor DCS architecture which is compactly arranged and is shown in fig. 2, aiming at the DCS architecture shown in fig. 1, and the nuclear power reactor DCS architecture comprises a main control room, a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS.
As shown in the right part of fig. 1, the non-security level DCS in this embodiment includes a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server, and a control station, which are sequentially connected in a communication manner; the operator workstation is connected with the terminal bus, and the control station is connected with the control bus.
As shown in the left part of fig. 1, in this embodiment, the security level DCS includes a security level bus a and a security level bus B, where the security level bus a and the security level bus B are respectively connected to the control bus through a gateway, the security level bus a is connected to the first protection group, the third protection group and the plurality of CIC cabinets, the security level bus B is connected to the second protection group, the fourth protection group and the plurality of CIC cabinets, and the CIC cabinets are further connected to the control station.
The CIC cabinet is configured to receive a plurality of control instructions for the security level device, perform priority management on the plurality of control instructions from different positions, and then preferentially execute a control instruction with a higher priority.
It should be noted that, a CIC cabinet (Component Interface System) is a generic term, and according to different unit sizes, the number of security level buses in this embodiment is 2, and the security level buses are divided into a/B rows, where a first protection group and a third protection group are a rows, a second protection group and a fourth protection group are B rows, and all ESFACs, DTCs, and S-VDUs are not necessarily only 1 on each security level bus. The protection group is used for collecting the state information of the sensors and the equipment related to the security level to participate in the protection function, and simultaneously performing logic processing on the automatic control function and sending an operation instruction to the security level equipment.
Each protection group preferably includes a Reactor Protection System (RPS), a data transmission rack (DTC), a safety facility driving rack (ESFAC), a safety level monitoring device (S-VDU), and the like, and it should be noted that the functional device composition of the protection group is specifically configured according to actual technical requirements, which is not specifically limited in this embodiment, and the partial composition of the protection group of different nuclear power stacks may be different.
Further, the operator workstation is used for issuing a security level equipment control instruction to monitor the security level equipment, and the security level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the security level equipment through the terminal bus, the real-time server, the control bus, the control station and the CIC cabinet in sequence.
Specifically, in this embodiment, a security level device monitoring method of the DCS architecture illustrated in fig. 1 is improved, and the following monitoring methods/channels are proposed:
operator workstation → terminal bus → real-time server → control bus → control station → CIC cabinet → security level device;
→ represents the flow direction of the transmission of the security level device control instruction.
The safety level equipment feeds back safety level equipment information according to the safety level equipment control instruction, and the safety level equipment information is transmitted to an operator workstation through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
Specifically, the process of monitoring the information of the security level device in fig. 1 is as described in the background section, and it can be known from comparing the process of monitoring the information of the security level device in this embodiment with the process of monitoring the information of the security level device in the architecture in fig. 1 that the process of monitoring the information of the security level device in this embodiment is simplified. Further, as can be seen from a comparison between fig. 1 and fig. 2, the DCS architecture of this embodiment greatly simplifies the scale of the DCS system and the equipment, optimizes the connection between the non-security level DCS terminal bus and the security level DCS man-machine interface bus, cancels the gateways, cables, and the man-machine interface buses connecting the gateways from the security level to the non-security level in the DCS architecture shown in fig. 1, directly sets a control station to connect with the CIC cabinet, and simultaneously cancels the diversity drive system.
One end of the control station is connected with the control bus, and the other end of the control station is connected with the non-safety-level equipment; the control station is used for collecting monitoring information such as the state of the field sensor and the equipment, carrying out logic processing on the monitoring information, sending the information to other control stations or control rooms for monitoring, receiving an operation instruction signal of the main control room and an automatic control instruction of the system, and sending the operation instruction signal and the automatic control instruction to the field equipment.
The operator workstation is further used for issuing a non-safety-level device control instruction to monitor non-safety-level devices, the non-safety-level device control instruction is transmitted to the safety-level devices through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus and the control station in sequence, the non-safety-level devices feed back non-safety-level device information according to the non-safety-level device control instruction, and the non-safety-level device information is transmitted to the operator workstation through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
Preferably, the operator workstations include a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation, and a crew length workstation; the system comprises a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation and a long unit workstation, wherein the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation are respectively in communication connection with a terminal bus, a non-safety level monitoring device (NC-VDU) is configured on each of the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation, and the non-safety level monitoring device (NC-VDU) is used for displaying safety level device information or non-safety level device information.
Specifically, when the safety-level device information or the non-safety-level device information is fed back to a primary-loop operator workstation, a secondary-loop operator workstation or a long-span unit workstation, the corresponding non-safety-level monitoring device (NC-VDU) displays the received safety-level device information or the non-safety-level device information.
Preferably, the security level bus a and the security level bus B are further respectively connected with a security level monitoring device (S-VDU).
Specifically, as shown in fig. 2, a safety level monitoring device (S-VDU) is provided at the safety level DCS in the left part of fig. 2 in the present embodiment; all safety level equipment and non-safety level equipment are monitored through 3 operator workstations under normal working conditions, and under an accident, namely under the condition that three operators cannot effectively monitor the safety level equipment, information monitoring is directly carried out on the safety level equipment through the safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU).
The real-time server comprises a nuclear island real-time server and a conventional island real-time server, and the nuclear island real-time server and the conventional island real-time server are respectively connected with the terminal bus and the control bus. And the nuclear island real-time server is used for transmitting the relevant information acquired and processed by the control cabinet to the main control room for display and transmitting the operation instruction of the main control room to a layer of control cabinet to control the field equipment. The conventional island real-time server has the same function as the nuclear island server, the nuclear island server transmits the nuclear island related information when in normal operation, and the conventional island server transmits the conventional island related information; in case of failure, the nuclear island server and the conventional island server can be mutually standby.
Preferably, a large screen is further arranged in the main control room, and the large screen is connected with the terminal bus and used for displaying security level equipment information or non-security level equipment information; the safety level equipment information is transmitted to a large screen through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence, and the non-safety level equipment information is transmitted to the large screen through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence to be displayed.
The non-safety DCS comprises an engineer station, a history server and a calculation server, wherein the engineer station and the history server are respectively connected with the terminal bus. Specifically, the engineer station is used for modifying system configuration and configuration, and can be used for debugging a control algorithm in a debugging stage; the history server is used for collecting, storing and retrieving long-term history data; the calculation server is used for alarm and log management of the DCS system, providing alarm and log information service for a control room workstation and providing the global calculation function of the nuclear power reactor.
The non-safety DCS comprises a communication station, one end of the communication station is connected with the control bus, the other end of the communication station is connected with a third-party instrument control system, and the third-party instrument control system is connected with field equipment (non-safety-level equipment); the communication station is used for communicating information with a third-party system, and monitoring of the third-party system is achieved according to a control instruction below the operator workstation, and particularly the third-party system is a system for achieving logic processing in a non-DCS system.
The DCS architecture further comprises a serious accident monitoring system, and the serious accident monitoring system is respectively connected with the CIC cabinet and the control bus. Specifically, the severe accident monitoring system is used for a relieving function when a severe accident condition that all alternating current is lost occurs.
It should be noted that the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor in this embodiment mainly improves a monitoring mode of the safety-level device, and thereby simplifies the DCS architecture of the nuclear power reactor, so that the simplified DCS architecture can meet the requirement of compact arrangement. The CIC cabinet, the conventional island real-time server, the nuclear island server, the control station, the communication station, the engineer station, the history server, the computation server, the serious accident system, the reactor protection system, the data transmission cabinet, the safety facility driving cabinet, the safety level monitoring equipment, the non-safety level monitoring equipment, and the like are all conventional configurations in the existing nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, and therefore the functions and specific structures of these functional components are well known to those skilled in the art, and are not described in detail in this embodiment.
The embodiment of the invention meets the requirements of the standard on a deep defense system, at least 2 defense levels are realized by adopting different platforms, and the two defense levels have independence. The depth defense refers to the following technical requirements according to HAF102-2016 design safety regulations of nuclear power plants:
level 1: by correctly and conservatively designing a nuclear power plant according to appropriate quality levels and engineering practices, preventing the nuclear power plant from deviating from normal operation and preventing system failure;
level 2: detecting and correcting deviation from a normal operation state, and preventing the predicted operation event from being upgraded to an accident condition;
level 3: controlling events which are not stopped by previous defense by inherent safety characteristics, failure safety design, additional equipment and regulations, enabling the nuclear power plant to reach a stable and acceptable state after the events, and maintaining at least one barrier containing radioactive materials;
level 4: mitigating severe accidents by accident management procedures, supplementary measures and procedures to prevent accident progression, and measures to mitigate selected consequences of severe accidents, and ensuring that radioactivity release remains as low as practically possible;
level 5: the radioactive consequences that could result from potential radioactive material release due to accident conditions are mitigated by appropriately equipped emergency control centers and in-plant and off-plant emergency response programs.
Wherein, the 5 th Level (Level 5) does not relate to an instrumentation and control system, so the defense levels for the instrumentation and control system are as follows:
LEVEL 1: a line of defense;
the non-safety level equipment on the right parts of the left block and the right block in the figure 1 is used for maintaining the nuclear power reactor within the operation limit, and avoiding shutdown and starting of special safety equipment.
LEVEL 2: a main line of defense;
design benchmark accidents are handled by the left-hand implementation in fig. 1 (including protection group, ESFAC and DTC, CIC, S-VDU, etc.).
LEVEL 3: a line of defense of diversity;
the control station sends signals to the CIC control field device to deal with the failure of the main defense line by adding the right side and the CIC on the right side in the figure 1. Wherein, the failure of the main defense line only considers the CCF failure of the common cause failure of the software and does not consider the failure of the hardware equipment, so the CIC can still be used here.
LEVEL 4: a serious accident line;
the embodiment of the invention provides more diversified monitoring means, and particularly decouples the safety-level monitoring equipment and the non-safety-level monitoring equipment by using the two-layer monitoring information to realize diversified monitoring modes.
The embodiment of the invention reduces DCS two-layer monitoring equipment, provides better conditions for the design of a nuclear power main control room in compact arrangement, and provides convenience for the development of artificial designs such as channels and equipment layout.
Compared with the prior art, the DCS architecture of this embodiment greatly simplifies the scale of the DCS system and the equipment, and cancels the gateway from the security level to the non-security level in the 1 st path of the onshore heap DCS architecture shown in fig. 1 and the human-machine interface bus connecting the gateway; the main control indoor safety level monitoring equipment and the non-safety level monitoring equipment are independent, all the safety level equipment and the non-safety level equipment are monitored through 3 operator workstations under normal working conditions, and under an accident, the special safety level equipment is used for monitoring, so that the requirement of compact arrangement design is met, and meanwhile, the requirement of standard on nuclear safety defense level is met. In addition, the safety level equipment is the most important of the cost, the safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU) of the operator workstation is eliminated, and the safety level monitoring equipment is realized through the non-safety level equipment (NC-VDU), so that the cost is greatly saved.
Having described embodiments of the present invention, the foregoing description is intended to be exemplary, not exhaustive, and not limited to the embodiments disclosed. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The terminology used herein is chosen in order to best explain the principles of the embodiments, the practical application, or improvements made to the technology in the marketplace, or to enable others of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.
Claims (6)
1. A nuclear power reactor DCS architecture in compact arrangement is characterized by comprising a main control room, a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS;
the non-safety-level DCS comprises a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server, a control station and an operator workstation arranged in a main control room; the operator workstation is connected with the terminal bus, and the control station is connected with the control bus;
the safety level DCS comprises a safety level bus A and a safety level bus B, the safety level bus A and the safety level bus B are connected with the control bus through a gateway, the safety level bus A is connected with a first protection group, a third protection group and a plurality of CIC cabinets, and the safety level bus B is connected with a second protection group, a fourth protection group and a plurality of CIC cabinets; the CIC cabinet is also connected with the control station;
the operator workstation is used for issuing a security level equipment control instruction to monitor security level equipment, and the security level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the security level equipment control instruction through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus, a control station and a CIC cabinet in sequence;
and the safety level equipment feeds back safety level equipment information according to the safety level equipment control instruction, and the safety level equipment information is transmitted to an operator workstation through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
2. The compact arrangement nuclear power reactor DCS architecture of claim 1, wherein said control station is connected to a control bus at one end and to non-safety level equipment at the other end;
the operator workstation is also used for issuing a non-safety-level equipment control instruction to monitor non-safety-level equipment, the non-safety-level equipment control instruction is transmitted to the safety-level equipment through a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus and the control station in sequence, the non-safety-level equipment feeds back non-safety-level equipment information according to the non-safety-level equipment control instruction, and the non-safety-level equipment information is transmitted to the operator workstation through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
3. The compact arrangement nuclear power stack DCS architecture of claim 2, wherein said operator workstations include a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation and a crew length workstation; the system comprises a primary loop operator workstation, a secondary loop operator workstation, a long unit workstation, a non-safety monitoring device and a terminal bus, wherein the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation are respectively in communication connection with the terminal bus, the primary loop operator workstation, the secondary loop operator workstation and the long unit workstation are all provided with the non-safety monitoring device, and the non-safety monitoring device is used for displaying safety level equipment information or non-safety level equipment information.
4. The DCS architecture for a compact arrangement nuclear power stack as set forth in claim 1, wherein said safety level bus a and said safety level bus B are each further connected to a safety level monitoring device.
5. The compact arrangement nuclear power reactor DCS architecture of claim 1, wherein said real time server comprises a nuclear island real time server and a conventional island real time server, each connected to said terminal bus and control bus, respectively.
6. The DCS architecture for a compact nuclear power reactor according to claim 1, wherein a large screen is further provided in the main control room, and the large screen is connected with the terminal bus and used for displaying safety-level equipment information or non-safety-level equipment information; the safety level equipment information is transmitted to the large screen through the safety level bus A or the safety level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence, and the non-safety level equipment information is transmitted to the large screen through the control station, the control bus, the real-time server and the terminal bus in sequence.
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| CN112230548A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2021-01-15 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Nuclear power device autonomous control system |
| CN113296481A (en) * | 2021-04-29 | 2021-08-24 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Control right management system and method for backup panel of main control room of nuclear power plant |
| CN113571218A (en) * | 2021-07-08 | 2021-10-29 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Priority selection system of nuclear power station |
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| CN112230548A (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2021-01-15 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Nuclear power device autonomous control system |
| CN112230548B (en) * | 2020-10-27 | 2022-06-17 | 中国核动力研究设计院 | Nuclear power device autonomous control system |
| CN113296481A (en) * | 2021-04-29 | 2021-08-24 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Control right management system and method for backup panel of main control room of nuclear power plant |
| CN113571218A (en) * | 2021-07-08 | 2021-10-29 | 中国核电工程有限公司 | Priority selection system of nuclear power station |
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