CN110598158B - Reliability evaluation method for underground nuclear power station seal isolation system - Google Patents
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Abstract
The invention discloses a reliability evaluation method for a seal isolation system of an underground nuclear power station, which comprises the following steps: 1) Establishing a sealing and isolating system failure fault tree framework model by using a computer, wherein the sealing and isolating system failure fault tree framework model comprises a top-layer underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system failure event, a middle-layer equipment, component and function failure event and a bottom-layer initial event; 2) Determining the failure probability of all the initial events, the failure probability of dependent faults and the human error probability; 3) Connecting the events of adjacent levels in the model through logic gates; 4) And calculating the failure probability of the underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system and the probability importance of each starting event by using probability safety analysis software, wherein the starting event corresponding to the maximum value in the probability importance is the weak link of the whole underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system. The invention provides effective data for large-scale radioactive substance release probability evaluation by quantitatively analyzing the reliability of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of underground nuclear power station engineering, in particular to a reliability evaluation method for a seal isolation system of an underground nuclear power station.
Background
The nuclear power is clean, efficient, green and economical, and is an important component of a low-carbon energy system in China. After the fukushima nuclear leakage accident, how to ensure the safety of the nuclear power station under the extreme accident condition becomes a new nuclear power development idea. Therefore, how to prevent the large-scale release of radioactive substances in serious accidents and even extreme accidents becomes a key technical problem for the safety development of nuclear power.
The nuclear-involved parts such as reactor plants and the like are arranged underground in the underground nuclear power station, a sealing isolation system can be built by utilizing surrounding rocks of a cavern, and another entity barrier is added on the basis of four radioactive barriers of a reactor. Under the working condition of serious accidents, the containment of the sealed isolation system is utilized, the prevention and control of the diffusion of radioactive substances are facilitated, the possibility of releasing a large amount of radioactive substances is easily eliminated from the design, and extreme external artificial events can be effectively resisted. Therefore, the reliability of the containment and isolation system of a nuclear power plant is of great importance to improve the safety functions of the nuclear power plant and to assess the possibility of eliminating the release of radioactive substances in large quantities from the design.
At present, no related evaluation method exists in the reliability evaluation aspect of the sealing and isolating system of the underground nuclear power station, and no precedent of analyzing an accident sequence which may cause the failure of the sealing and isolating system exists, so how to systematically analyze the accident sequence of the failure of the sealing and isolating system of the underground nuclear power station and quantitatively evaluate the reliability of the sealing and isolating system is a problem which needs to be solved urgently.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention mainly aims to provide a reliability evaluation method for a seal isolation system of an underground nuclear power station, which realizes the objective evaluation of the reliability of the seal isolation system of the underground nuclear power station by a computer technical means and provides a research basis for improving the safety function of the underground nuclear power station and evaluating the possibility of eliminating the release of a large amount of radioactive substances from the design.
In order to achieve the purpose, the reliability evaluation method for the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system is characterized by comprising the following steps:
1) According to the possibility of an accident sequence of the underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system under an accident condition, establishing a sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model by using a computer, wherein the sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model comprises an underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system failure event arranged at the topmost layer, a device, component and function failure event arranged at the middle layer and an initial event arranged at the bottommost layer and directly causing the sealing and isolating system failure;
2) Determining the failure probability of all the initial events, the failure probability of dependent faults and the human factor error probability;
3) Analyzing and determining direct factors causing the occurrence of superior events step by step according to the sequence of system-equipment-component-function, and connecting the events of adjacent levels in the failure fault tree framework model of the sealing isolation system through a logic gate;
4) And calculating the failure probability of the underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system and the probability importance of each initial event by using probability safety analysis software, wherein the initial event corresponding to the maximum value in the probability importance of the initial event is the weak link of the whole underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system.
Preferably, the second-stage events of the sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model comprise main steam pipeline channel sealing failure, pressure relief channel sealing failure, pedestrian channel sealing failure, rail transportation channel sealing failure and mountain rock mass failure, and the second-stage events are connected with the first-stage underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system failure events by using a logic or gate.
Preferably, the events in the third-stage event of the sealed isolation system failure fault tree framework model associated with the main steam pipeline channel seal failure in the second-stage event include a double-layer airtight door failure and an inlet airtight door failure, which are connected with the main steam pipeline channel seal failure by using a logic and door.
Preferably, the events related to the sealing failure of the pressure relief channel in the second-stage event in the third-stage event of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree frame model comprise double-layer airtight door failure and mountain rock mass failure, and the double-layer airtight door failure and the mountain rock mass failure are connected with the sealing failure of the pressure relief channel by using a logic and door.
Preferably, the event related to the pedestrian passageway seal failure in the second-stage event in the third-stage event of the fault tree framework model for the seal isolation system failure includes the pedestrian passageway seal failure and the main passageway seal door failure, and the two events are connected with the pedestrian passageway seal failure by using a logic and door.
Preferably, the events related to the sealing failure of the rail transit passage in the second-stage event in the third-stage event of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree frame model comprise a double-layer airtight door fault and an entrance sealing door fault, and the double-layer airtight door fault and the entrance sealing door fault are connected with the sealing failure of the rail transit passage by using a logic and door.
Preferably, the event associated with the pedestrian passageway sealing failure in the third-level event in the fourth-level event of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree framework model includes a first safety plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, a fuel plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, and a second safety plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, and the first safety plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, the fuel plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, and the second safety plant pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault are connected with the pedestrian passageway sealing failure through a logical or gate.
Preferably, the events related to the failure of the double-layer sealing door in the initial events comprise the failure of the sealing door to close, the error opening of the sealing door and the human error, the events related to the failure of the common sealing door comprise the failure of the sealing door to close, the error opening of the sealing door, the sealing door is damaged and the human error, the events related to the failure of the massif rock mass comprise the failure of the massif protection and the splitting of the massif rock mass, and all the initial events are connected with the previous events through a logic OR gate.
Preferably, the failure probability Q of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system failure is calculated by the following formula:
where P (…) represents the probability of an event occurring, M 1 ,M 2 …M n Representing the minimum cut set of the fault tree, wherein n is a natural number;
the probability importance of the ith originating event, I (I), is calculated by:
where E represents the mathematical expectation, i is a natural number,
represents a structural function, <' > is selected>
Indicating all originating events.
In order to effectively evaluate the reliability of a sealing and isolating system of an underground nuclear power station, analyze an accident sequence which may occur to the sealing and isolating system under an accident working condition and quantitatively give the total failure probability of the sealing and isolating system, a failure fault tree framework model of the sealing and isolating system is established by means of a computer technology, a probability theory method is used to analyze the accident sequence and establish a fault tree, the probability of occurrence of a top event is analyzed by means of logical reasoning, and links and equipment which are most likely to have a leak are logically presumed.
The invention has the following beneficial effects:
1) The reliability evaluation method of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system is systematically established based on the probability safety analysis technology (PSA) for the first time. The method comprehensively considers the influence of human error, dependent fault and other factors on the reliability of the sealed isolation system, can quantitatively analyze the reliability of the sealed isolation system of the underground nuclear power station, provides effective data for the estimation of the release probability of large-scale radioactive substances, can calculate the probability importance of each event, analyzes and finds out the weak parts of the sealed isolation system of the underground nuclear power station, and improves the reliability of the sealed isolation system of the underground nuclear power station. The method of the invention provides theoretical guidance for improving the safety function of the underground nuclear power station and evaluating the possibility of eliminating the release of a large amount of radioactive substances from the design.
2) In the fault tree building process, a secondary event which directly causes the failure of the top event is selected according to the path of the radioactive substance diffusion of the underground nuclear power station. Because the paths are in parallel connection, the association degree between the secondary events of the fault tree species can be reduced, the possibility of occurrence of dependent faults among the paths of the fault tree is effectively reduced, and the analysis complexity of the fault tree is reduced.
3) The method quantitatively evaluates the contribution of all basic events to the occurrence of the top event, thereby finding out weak links in the design, construction and operation of the nuclear power plant and providing an improvement suggestion for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a system plan view of a containment isolation system of a conventional underground nuclear power plant.
Fig. 3 is a fault tree for a sealed isolation system failure in accordance with the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a dependent failure tree of the present invention.
In the figure: reactor factory building 1, reactor factory building cavern 2, main steam pipeline passageway 3, rail transport passageway 4, pressure release hole 5, pedestrian's passageway 6 ~ 8, external passageway 9, route an: main steam pipe passage, path b: pressure relief channel, path c: rail transport channel, path d: pedestrian passageway is connected to safe factory building No. one, route e: the pedestrian passageway is connected to No. two safe factory buildings, route f: pedestrian passageway, connected to the fuel plant, path g: diffused to the atmospheric environment through the mountain rock mass.
Detailed Description
For the sake of clarity and clarity of disclosure, the present embodiment describes in detail the steps of the method of the present invention by using a simplified underground nuclear power station containment and isolation system as an example, with reference to the attached drawings, so as to facilitate the understanding of the present invention by those skilled in the art, but the present embodiment should not be construed as limiting the present invention.
As shown in fig. 1 to 4, the reliability evaluation method of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system of the invention comprises the following specific steps:
1) Analyzing the accident sequence of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system under the accident condition according to the possibility of the accident sequence of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system under the accident condition, and determining an initial event related to the failure of the seal isolation system according to a logical reasoning principle; and establishing a failure fault tree framework model of the sealing isolation system by using a computer. The sealing isolation system failure fault tree framework model comprises a sealing isolation system failure event of the underground nuclear power station arranged at the topmost layer, a failure event of equipment, components and functions arranged at the middle layer and an initial event directly causing the sealing isolation system failure arranged at the bottommost layer.
The specific steps of step 1) include:
11 Failure of a nuclear power plant containment isolation system as a first stage of a fault tree;
12 As a second level of the fault tree, the second level events of the fault tree frame model of the failure of the sealing isolation system include the sealing failure of a main steam pipeline channel, the sealing failure of a pressure relief channel, the sealing failure of a pedestrian channel, the sealing failure of a rail transportation channel and the failure of a mountain rock mass.
13 The second level failure event of the logic diagram) will be the direct factor that will cause the second level failure event of the logic diagram as the third level of the fault tree. Third level events associated with a failure of the primary steam line channel seal in the second level event include a double layer air tight door failure, an inlet air tight door failure. And the third-level events related to the sealing failure of the pressure relief channel in the second-level events comprise the failure of the double-layer airtight door and the failure of the massif rock mass. And the third-stage events related to the pedestrian passageway sealing failure in the second-stage events comprise the pedestrian passageway sealing failure and the main passageway sealing door failure. Third level events associated with a failure of the rail transit passage seal in the second level event include a double layer airtight door failure, an entrance airtight door failure.
For the self-failure event of the mountain rock mass, the inner layer of the mountain rock mass is provided with a radioactive protection layer, so that the mountain rock mass failure comprises mountain protection failure, mountain rock mass cracking and the like, and belongs to an initial event; for other isolation systems, isolation failures of cave entrance and exit channels can be considered, including failures of systems such as pedestrian channel isolation, equipment channel isolation, pressure relief channel and pipeline channel isolation;
14 The direct factor to fail the third level of the logic diagram is taken as the fourth level of the fault tree. And the fourth-level event related to the sealing failure of the pedestrian passageway in the third-level event comprises the fault of the double-layer sealing door of the pedestrian passageway of the first safety plant, the fault of the double-layer sealing door of the pedestrian passageway of the fuel plant and the fault of the double-layer sealing door of the pedestrian passageway of the second safety plant.
Direct factors causing the failure of the equipment passage and pipeline passage isolation system comprise the failure of sealing equipment such as a double-layer airtight door, an inlet sealing door and the like; direct factors causing the failure of the pressure relief channel isolation system comprise the failure of sealing barriers such as a double-layer airtight door and a mountain rock mass; the underground nuclear power station is provided with a plurality of pedestrian passageways and is connected to the main passageway, so that direct factors causing failure of a pedestrian passageway isolation system include failure of sealing equipment such as a double-layer airtight door in the pedestrian passageway, an inlet sealing door in the main passageway and the like.
15 A direct factor that will cause the fourth level of the logic diagram to fail as a fifth level event of the fault tree. The events related to the faults of the double-layer sealing door in the fifth-stage event comprise that the sealing door cannot be closed, the sealing door is opened by mistake, and human errors are caused, the events related to the faults of the common sealing door comprise that the sealing door cannot be closed, the sealing door is opened by mistake, the sealing door is damaged in a sealing mode, and the human errors are caused, and the events related to the failure of the mountain rock mass comprise that the mountain protection fails and the mountain rock mass cracks.
16 The events in the fifth level of the fault tree are all possible starting points for the occurrence of an accident, so the fifth level event is taken as the originating event.
2) Collecting technical data related to the reliability of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system according to the determined initial events, and determining the failure probability of all the initial events, the failure probability of dependent faults and the human factor error probability;
the specific steps of step 2) include:
21 Determining the equipment, components and failure modes thereof related to the failure of the sealing and isolating system of the underground nuclear power plant according to the initial event determined in the step 1) are shown in the following table 1:
table 1: failure equipment and failure mode thereof
22 Determine the failure probability of each component, device, dependent failure, and human error probability;
3) As shown in fig. 3, the failure of the seal isolation system of the underground nuclear power station is used as a top event, direct factors causing the occurrence of a higher-level event are analyzed and determined step by step according to the sequence of system, equipment, component and function, and are connected with the higher-level event by using a proper logic gate until a bottom event is determined, and a fault tree of the failure of the seal isolation system is established;
the specific steps of step 3) include:
31 Using a logical or gate to connect the second stage event with the first stage subterranean nuclear power plant containment isolation system failure event.
The direct factor causing the failure of the seal isolation system of the underground nuclear power plant is determined according to the isolation system of radioactive substance diffusion of the underground nuclear power plant. In a conventional underground nuclear power plant arrangement structure, an isolation system for radioactive substance diffusion includes a main steam pipeline channel, a pressure relief channel, a pedestrian channel, a rail transportation channel, a mountain rock mass and the like. The failure of the path isolation systems can cause the failure of the sealing isolation system of the underground nuclear power station, so that the failure events of the systems are connected with a top event by using an OR gate to form a second layer of a fault tree;
32 Double-layer airtight door failure and inlet airtight door failure in the third-stage event are connected with the main steam pipeline channel sealing failure of the second-stage event by using logic; connecting the double-layer airtight door fault and the mountain rock mass failure in the third-level event with the pressure relief channel sealing failure in the second-level event by using a logic and door; connecting the pedestrian passage sealing failure in the third-level event and the main passage sealing door failure with the pedestrian passage sealing failure in the second-level event by using a logic AND gate; and connecting the double-layer airtight door fault and the inlet sealing door fault in the third-stage event with the rail transportation channel sealing failure in the second-stage event by using a logic and door.
The direct factor causing failure of the systems at the second level of the fault tree is failure of the devices that make up the systems. The failure factors of the main steam pipeline channel isolation system comprise double-layer airtight door isolation failure and inlet airtight door isolation failure; the failure of the pressure relief channel isolation system comprises the failure of a double-layer airtight door and the failure of mountain rock protection; the failure of the pedestrian passageway isolation system comprises failure of a double-layer sealing door of three pedestrian passageways and failure of a main passageway sealing door of a main passageway; the rail transit passage isolation system failure includes a double layer airtight door isolation failure and an entrance airtight door isolation failure. Determining the connection mode of the equipment and the system through the series-parallel relation among the equipment forming the system, wherein the equipment of the system belongs to the series relation, and therefore, the equipment is connected with the second layer by using an AND gate to form a third layer of the fault tree;
33 The first safety factory building pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault, the fuel factory building pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault and the second safety factory building pedestrian passageway double-layer sealing door fault in the fourth-level event are connected with the pedestrian passageway sealing failure in the third-level event by using a logic OR gate.
The direct factor causing failure of each device at the third level of the fault tree is failure of the components that make up each device. The isolation failure factors of the double-layer airtight door comprise that the double-layer airtight door cannot be closed and the double-layer airtight door is opened mistakenly; the isolation failure factors of the common airtight door comprise that the common airtight door cannot be closed, the common airtight door is opened mistakenly and the seal of the common airtight door is damaged. The connection mode of the components and the equipment is determined by the series-parallel connection relation among all the components forming the equipment, the components of the equipment belong to the parallel connection relation, and therefore the components are connected with the third layer by using an OR gate to form a fourth layer of the fault tree.
34 Consider the effect of dependent faults on failure rate. Since different devices, components may fail simultaneously due to the same reason, the same model, etc. dependent failure factors. For a nuclear power plant containment isolation system underground, considerations of dependent faults include, but are not limited to: a. when a fire disaster happens in a reactor factory building cave, all the airtight doors are in a high-temperature environment, and the sealing of the airtight doors can be failed at the same time, which belongs to common cause failure; b. the airtight door sealing rubber ring belongs to the design or manufacture of the same manufacturer, has the common defect of sealing failure caused by high-temperature hardening, and belongs to common-mode failure; c. under the condition of overpressure of a containment building cavern, the failure of the sealing of the double-layer airtight door in the same system can cause the inlet airtight door to bear higher pressure than that under normal conditions, possibly cause the failure of the inlet airtight door, and belong to causal faults. The effect of dependent failure of a device or component on the failure of a sealed isolation system is analyzed by a beta factor model, for example, failure rate P for a broken airtight door is calculated as follows:
P＝λ 1 +λ 2 -λ 1 λ 2
where λ 1 represents the independent failure rate of the airtight door breakage, and λ 2 represents the dependent failure rate of the airtight door breakage, and the failure tree thereof is shown in fig. 4.
35 The events related to the failure of the double-layer sealing door in the initial events comprise the failure of the sealing door to close, the error opening of the sealing door and the human error, the events related to the failure of the common sealing door comprise the failure of the sealing door to close, the error opening of the sealing door, the sealing door seal breakage and the human error, the events related to the mountain rock mass failure comprise the mountain protection failure and the mountain rock mass crack, and all the initial events are connected with the previous-stage events through a logic OR gate.
Human mishandling can lead to equipment and component failure. For a nuclear power plant containment and isolation system underground, human error considerations include, but are not limited to: a. misoperation of the operator may cause the sealing door to open erroneously; b. when the sealing door cannot be automatically closed, an operator is required to manually start a sealing door closing button, and the operator does not respond to the event within a specified time.
4) And (3) inputting the fault tree and related data established in the steps by using probability safety analysis software, calculating the failure probability of the underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system and the probability importance of each starting event, selecting the starting event with the largest result, namely the weak link of the whole underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system, and providing data support for the improvement of the sealed isolation system.
The specific steps of step 4) include:
41 The fault tree established in step 3) is input into probability safety analysis software, the probability of each relevant bottom event (failure or human error of equipment and components) is recorded, and the software automatically calculates the failure probability of the top event and the probability importance of the bottom event.
The failure probability Q of the top event is calculated by the formula:
wherein, P (…) represents the failure rate of a certain event (equipment and parts or human factors), M1, M2 … Mn represents the minimum cut set of the fault tree, and n is a natural number. The probability importance I (I) of the ith bottom event is calculated by the following method:
where E represents the mathematical expectation, i is a natural number, φ (…) represents a structural function,
all bottom events are represented.
42 The probability importance of the initial events is sorted from large to small, and the bottom event with the largest result is selected as the weak link of the whole underground nuclear power station seal isolation system.
Although the preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described above with reference to the accompanying drawings, the present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments, which are only illustrative and not restrictive, and those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications within the scope of the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention as claimed.
Claims (7)
1. The reliability evaluation method of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system is characterized by comprising the following steps: the method comprises the following steps:
1) According to the possibility of an accident sequence of the underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system under an accident condition, establishing a sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model by using a computer, wherein the sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model comprises an underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system failure event arranged at the topmost layer, a device, component and function failure event arranged at the middle layer and an initial event arranged at the bottommost layer and directly causing the sealing and isolating system failure;
2) Determining the failure probability of all the initial events, the failure probability of dependent faults and the human error probability;
3) Analyzing and determining direct factors causing the occurrence of superior events step by step according to the sequence of system-equipment-component-function, and connecting the events of adjacent levels in the failure fault tree framework model of the sealing isolation system through a logic gate;
4) And calculating the failure probability of the underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system and the probability importance of each initial event by using probability safety analysis software, wherein the initial event corresponding to the maximum value in the probability importance of the initial event is the weak link of the whole underground nuclear power station sealed isolation system.
2. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant seal isolation system according to claim 1, wherein: the second-level events of the sealing and isolating system failure fault tree frame model comprise main steam pipeline channel sealing failure, pressure relief channel sealing failure, pedestrian channel sealing failure, rail transportation channel sealing failure and mountain rock mass failure, and the second-level events are connected with the first-level underground nuclear power station sealing and isolating system failure events by using a logic OR gate.
3. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant seal isolation system according to claim 2, wherein: and the events related to the sealing failure of the main steam pipeline channel in the second-stage events in the third-stage events of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree frame model comprise double-layer airtight door failures and inlet airtight door failures, and the double-layer airtight door failures and the inlet airtight door failures are connected with the sealing failure of the main steam pipeline channel by using a logic AND gate.
4. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant seal isolation system according to claim 2, wherein: events related to the sealing failure of the pressure relief channel in the second-stage event in the third-stage event of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree frame model comprise double-layer airtight door failures and mountain rock mass failures, and the double-layer airtight door failures and the mountain rock mass failures are connected with the sealing failure of the pressure relief channel through a logic AND gate.
5. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant containment and isolation system according to claim 2, wherein: and the events related to the sealing failure of the rail transport channel in the second-level events in the third-level events of the sealing isolation system failure fault tree frame model comprise double-layer airtight door faults and entrance airtight door faults, and the double-layer airtight door faults and the entrance airtight door faults are connected with the sealing failure of the rail transport channel by using a logic AND gate.
6. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant seal isolation system according to claim 1, wherein: the events related to the failure of the double-layer sealing door in the initial events comprise the failure of closing the sealing door, the error opening of the sealing door and the human error, the events related to the failure of the common sealing door comprise the failure of closing the sealing door, the error opening of the sealing door, the sealing damage of the sealing door and the human error, the events related to the failure of the massif rock mass comprise the failure of protection of the massif and the cracking of the massif rock mass, and all the initial events are connected with the previous-stage events through a logical OR gate.
7. The method for evaluating the reliability of the underground nuclear power plant seal isolation system according to claim 1, wherein: the failure probability Q calculation formula of the underground nuclear power station seal isolation system failure is as follows:
where P (…) represents the probability of an event occurring, M 1 ,M 2 …M n Representing the minimum cut set of the fault tree, wherein n is a natural number;
the probability importance I (I) of the ith originating event is calculated by:
where E represents the mathematical expectation, i is a natural number,
the function of the structure is represented by,
indicating all originating events.
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