CN110572259A - Third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation - Google Patents

Third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation Download PDF

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CN110572259A
CN110572259A CN201910722053.7A CN201910722053A CN110572259A CN 110572259 A CN110572259 A CN 110572259A CN 201910722053 A CN201910722053 A CN 201910722053A CN 110572259 A CN110572259 A CN 110572259A
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CN110572259B (en
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吴万青
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Hebei University
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography

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Abstract

The invention provides a third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation. The invention converts the secret information into the Bell states through coding, and the first particle of each Bell state forms a new sequence and is sent to the opposite side. When the opposite side receives the sequence, the sequence is rearranged by using the permutation operation, and then the result is sent back. Then, the second particle of each Bell state is formed into a new sequence and sent to the other party. After both sides receive the sequence, the sequences received twice are rearranged according to the permutation operation. And then the two parties execute 0-1 base measurement on the sequences received twice, and a comparison result is obtained through calculation. The insertion of the spoof state in the two transmissions ensures that the presence of an external attacker can be detected. The analysis of security shows that both external attackers and internally dishonest cheaters can be effectively overcome. The method provided by the invention can be widely applied to the field of related information security systems such as network security, electronic commerce and the like.

Description

Third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation
Technical Field
the invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation.
Background
Secure multi-party computing is the theoretical basis of distributed cryptography and is a fundamental problem in distributed computing research. Since the concept of secure multi-party computing was proposed by the YaoZhi academy of Yao in the last 80 th century, this field has become one of the important research contents of modern cryptography. The safe multi-party calculation has wide application prospect in the fields of finance, military, politics, medical treatment and the like.
The quantum information technology is a cross discipline generated by the mutual fusion of information science and physical science. The combination of quantum information technology and secure multi-party computing technology has created a new research hotspot, secure multi-party quantum computing. Many secure two-party quantum computing protocols have emerged with special utility.
The safe two-party quantum information comparison protocol is a scheme with special application functions. A scheme is designed by using the theory of quantum mechanics, so that two participating parties can compare under the premise of not publicly distributing secret information, and the comparison result is selected to be public or secret. Most of the common schemes belong to a semi-honest model, that is, a semi-honest Third Party (TP) exists to assist the protocol completion. Semi-honesty means that the TP faithfully executes the protocol and records all intermediate calculations, but he may try to steal information from the recording. However, existing semi-honest third party based protocols suffer from some drawbacks, first in that in practical situations the TP may attempt to eavesdrop on the participants' secrets through various attacks. Second, the presence of TPs adds difficulty to the implementation of the protocol and reduces efficiency.
At present, quantum secret comparison protocol results without participation of a third party are few, the realization is complex, and the realization efficiency needs to be further improved.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation, which can realize comparison of quantum secret information of two parties under the condition that no TP exists, and is safe, reliable and high in efficiency.
The purpose of the invention is realized as follows: a third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation comprises the following steps:
a. alice has secret information a, Bob has secret information b, and the length of a is consistent with that of b;
b. alice divides the secret information a into m groups to obtain:
……
Bob divides the secret information b into m groups, resulting in:
……
Wherein m is a positive integer, r is a positive integer of not less than 2, ai∈{0,1},bi∈{0,1},i＝1，...，mr2(ii) a If data block Xmand YmThe number of elements contained in the alloy is less than r2Then, the interior is alternately filled with 1 and 0 until the number of elements contained therein is r2；
c. Alice selects two permutation operations piAAnd τABob selects two permutation operations piBAnd τB(ii) a Wherein, tauAIs piAInduction operation of τBIs piBThe induction operation of (1);
d. Comparing secret information X of Alice and Bob1And Y1；
The method comprises the following specific steps:
d-1, Alice calculates tauA(X1) Bob calculates τB(Y1)；τA(X1) And τB(Y1) The formula of (1) is as follows:
d-2, according to the coding rule, Alice and Bob prepare r respectively2each Bell radical is marked as SAand SBThe following are:
Wherein:
the encoding rule agreed by Alice and Bob is as follows: classical information 0 corresponds to a quantum stateClassical information 1 corresponds to a quantum state
d-3, Alice will be the bit sequence SADivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SAThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SAthe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
similarly, Bob will be the bit sequence SBDivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SBThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SBthe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
d-4, Alice prepares single photon state as decoy state to be inserted into randomlyto obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequencesending the data to Bob; bob prepares single photon states for random insertion as decoy statesTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceSending the data to Alice; single photon state of |0>、|1〉、Or
d-5, after Alice and Bob respectively indicate that the particle sequences sent by the opposite party have been received, respectively publishing the position of the decoy state and the measurement base; respectively detecting whether an attacker exists by Alice and Bob; if there is no attacker, executing step d-6, otherwise returning to step d-1; in this step, Alice gives up the decoy state to obtain the sequenceObtaining the sequence after Bob abandons the decoy state
d-6, Alice pair sequencePerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
d-7, Bob selects a set of binary random number sequencesAlice selects a set of binary random number sequences
d-8, Bob pairs of particle sequencesPerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceAlice to particle sequenceperforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceThe corresponding rule of the unitary transformation U is as follows: for Bob, ifThen U is equal to I, ifThen U ═ X; for Alice, ifthen U is equal to I, ifThen U ═ X; x is a quantum exclusive-OR gate;
d-9, Bob prepares a single photon state to be inserted as a decoy stateAndTo obtain a new particle sequenceAndand send them to Alice; alice also prepares single photon states for insertion as decoy states intoAndto obtain a new particle sequenceAndAnd send them to Bob;
d-10, Alice and Bob perform the activity of detecting the attacker like step d-5; if there is no attacker, executing step d-11; otherwise, returning to the step d-1 to restart; in the step, the sequence is obtained after the Alice extracts the decoy stateAndBob extracts the decoy state to obtain the sequenceAnd
d-11, Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
alice pair sequencePerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
d-12, Alice to particle sequenceAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
Bob pairs of particle sequencesAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
d-13, Alice calculationGet the classical information setBob's calculationGet the classical information set
d-14, Alice and Bob publish the set tAAnd tB(ii) a If t isA＝tBSecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1＝Y1Then comparing the secret information X of Alice and Bob2And Y2I.e. the following step e is performed; if t isA≠tBsecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1≠Y1When Alice and Bob declare that their secret information is different, directly executing step f;
e. According to the step d, secret information X of Alice and Bob is compared2And Y2(ii) a If X2＝Y2Then, the secret information X of Alice and Bob are compared3And Y3(ii) a And so on; if secret information X of Alice and Bob is comparedjAnd Yj(j-2, … …, m), any X is presentj≠YjIf yes, directly executing step f; if all Xjand YjIf the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal to each other, the result that the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal is obtained;
f. Alice and Bob announce that the secret information of both are not the same.
The invention utilizes quantum entanglement and displacement operation, and inserts the decoy state into the transmitted particle sequence to ensure that two legal users can safely compare secret information so as to overcome the problem of information leakage. In the method, secret information is converted into Bell states through encoding, the first particle of each Bell state is formed into a new particle sequence, and then the new particle sequence is sent to the opposite side. After the opposite side receives the particle sequence, the quantum particle sequence is rearranged according to the convention of the permutation operation, and then the result is sent back. Then, the second particle of each Bell state is formed into a new particle sequence and then sent to the other party. After receiving the particle sequences, the two parties rearrange the quantum particle sequences received twice according to the convention of the permutation operation. And then the two parties execute 0-1 base measurement on the particle sequences received twice, and a comparison result is obtained through calculation. Inserting a spoof state in the course of two transmissions ensures that the presence of an external attacker can be detected. The analysis of security shows that both external attackers and internally dishonest cheaters can be effectively overcome. The method provided by the invention can be widely applied to the field of related information security systems such as network security, electronic commerce and the like.
Detailed Description
the invention provides a third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation, which comprises the following specific implementation methods:
Let | S | ═ rNAnd set S is as follows:
S＝{a(1，…，1,1)，…，a(1，…，1,r)，a(1，…，2,1)，…，a(1，…，2,r)，…，a(r，…，r,1)，…，a(r，…，r,r)therein of
A special permutation operation is defined on the set S below
Wherein k isi≤r，i＝1,……,N，the permutation operation pi induces a new permutation operation tau,
the set S is essentially a set consisting of a multi-index array. In quantum systems, permutation transformations of quantum particle positions may be achieved through specific quantum switching gates. The present application presents the following specific scenarios.
suppose that Alice owns a secret information a, Bob owns a secret information b, and the length of a is consistent with the length of b. The two parties of Alice and Bob compare the secret information according to the following steps:
The first step is as follows: alice sequentially divides the secret information a into m groups, resulting in:
……
Bob sequentially divides the secret information b into m groups, resulting in:
……
Wherein m is a positive integer, r is a positive integer of not less than 2, ai∈{0,1}，bi∈{0,1},i＝1，…，mr2. If data block Xmand YmThe number of elements contained in the alloy is less than r2Then, contract at data Block XmAnd YmThe inner is filled with 1 and 0 alternately until becoming a complete data block, namely: make data block XmAnd Ymthe number of inner elements is r2。
Alice and Bob agree on a coding rule, and classical information 0 corresponds to a quantum stateclassical information 1 corresponds to a quantum state
The second step is that: alice randomly selects permutation operation piAAnd τA(in the form of equations (1) and (2)), Bob randomly selects the permutation operation πBAnd τB(in the form of formulas (1) and (2)); wherein, tauAIs piAInduction operation of τBIs piBthe induction operation of (1).
The third step: comparing secret information X of Alice and Bob1And Y1。
The method comprises the following specific steps:
Calculating tau by AliceA(X1) Bob calculates τB(Y1)；τA(X1) And τB(Y1) The formula of (1) is as follows:
Secondly, according to the coding rule, Alice and Bob respectively prepare r2Each Bell radical is marked as SAand SBThe following are:
Wherein:
③ Alice will be bit sequence SADivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SAthe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SAThe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
similarly, Bob gets the following subsequences:
Fourthly, Alice prepares a single photon state to be randomly inserted into a decoy stateTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceSending the data to Bob; bob prepares single photon states for random insertion as decoy statesTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceAnd sending the data to Alice. The single photon state is from |0>、|1>、AndIs randomly selected.
Fifthly, when Bob informs Alice that it has received the particle sequenceThen, Alice informs Bob of the position and the measurement basis of the spoofed state inserted in step (iv) through a classical channel. Bob Slave sequencesextracting decoy photon to obtain sequenceBob measures the corresponding decoy photons with the correct measurement basis and sends the measurement result to Alice over the classical channel. Alice compares the measurement result with the initial state of the decoy photon, and calculates the error rate; if the error rate is lower than the set threshold value, indicating that no attacker exists, and executing a step (sixth); otherwise, the existence of the attacker is indicated, the comparison of the secret information is terminated, and the step (r) is returned to start again.
When Alice informs Bob that it has received a sequence of particlesThen, Bob informs Alice of the position of the spoofed state inserted in step (c) and the measurement basis through a classical channel. Alice slave sequenceExtracting decoy state to obtain sequenceAlice measures the corresponding decoy photons with the correct measurement basis and sends the measurement result to Bob through the classical channel. Bob compares the measurement result with the initial state of the decoy photon, and calculates the error rate; if the error rate is lower than the set threshold value, indicating that no attacker exists, and executing a step (sixth); otherwise, the existence of the attacker is indicated, the comparison of the secret information is terminated, and the step (r) is returned to start again.
Sixth, Alice pair sequenceperforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
seventhly, Bob selects a group of binary random number sequencesAlice selects a set of binary random number sequences
(iii) Bob pairs of particle sequencesPerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceAlice to particle sequencePerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceThe corresponding rule of the unitary transformation U is as follows: for Bob, ifthen U is equal to I, ifThen U ═ X; for Alice, ifThen U is equal to I, ifthen U ═ X; and X is a quantum exclusive-OR gate.
Ninthly, Bob prepares single photon state as decoy state to insert intoAndTo obtain a new particle sequenceandAnd sends them to Alice. Alice also prepares single photon states for insertion as decoy states intoAndto obtain a new particle sequenceAndand send them to Bob.
r, Alice and Bob perform the activity of detecting an attacker like step (v). If there is no attacker, the steps are executedotherwise, the process is restarted. In the step, the sequence is obtained after the Alice extracts the decoy stateAndbob extracts the decoy state to obtain the sequenceAnd
Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsthe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Alice pair sequencePerforming quantum swap operationsthe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Alice to particle sequenceAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
Bob pairs of particle sequencesAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
Alice calculationget the classical information setbob's calculationGet the classical information setalice and Bob publish the set tAAnd tB. If t isA＝tBSecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1＝Y1then comparing the secret information X of Alice and Bob2And Y2Namely, the following fourth step is executed; if t isA≠tBSecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1≠Y1At this point Alice and Bob announce that their secret information is different, i.e. the fifth step is performed directly.
the fourth step: according to the thirdStep-by-step method, secret information X of Alice and Bob is compared2And Y2. If X2＝Y2then, the secret information X of Alice and Bob are compared3and Y3(ii) a And so on. If secret information X of Alice and Bob is comparedjAnd Yj(j-2, … …, m), any X is presentj≠Yjif yes, directly executing the fifth step; if all XjAnd YjAnd if the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal, the result that the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal is obtained.
The fifth step: alice and Bob announce that the secret information of both are not the same.
the method of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to a specific example.
suppose that Alice has a secret 1011 and Bob has a secret 1000. The two parties of Alice and Bob compare the secret information according to the following steps:
The first step is as follows: both Alice and Bob divide their secret information into a group, resulting in: x11011 and Y1＝1000。
the second step is that: alice selects two permutation operationsBob selects two permutation operationsAnd
The third step: comparing secret information X of Alice and Bob1And Y1The method comprises the following steps:
Calculating tau by Alice and Bob respectivelyA(X1)＝0111，τB(Y1)＝0001。
secondly, according to the coding rule, 4 Bell bases are respectively prepared by Alice and Bob and respectively marked as SAAnd SBThe following are:
③ Alice will be bit sequence SAdivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SAThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SAThe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
Similarly, Bob will be the bit sequence SBDivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SBThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed bySBThe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
fourthly, Alice prepares a single photon state to be randomly inserted into a decoy stateto obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceSending the data to Bob; bob prepares single photon states for random insertion as decoy statesTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceand sending the data to Alice. The single photon state is from |0>、|1>、AndIs randomly selected.
Fifthly, when Bob informs Alice that it has received the particle sequenceAlice then informs Bob of the procedure through a classical channelPosition and measurement basis of the inserted decoy state. Bob Slave sequencesExtracting decoy state to obtain sequenceBob measures the corresponding decoy photons with the correct measurement basis and sends the measurement result to Alice over the classical channel. Alice compares the measurement result with the initial state of the decoy photon, and calculates the error rate; if the error rate is lower than the set threshold value, indicating that no attacker exists, and executing a step (sixth); otherwise, the existence of the attacker is indicated, the comparison of the secret information is terminated, and the step (r) is returned to start again.
when Alice informs Bob that it has received a sequence of particlesthen, Bob informs Alice of the position of the spoofed state inserted in step (c) and the measurement basis through a classical channel. Alice slave sequenceextracting decoy state to obtain sequenceAlice measures the corresponding decoy photons with the correct measurement basis and sends the measurement result to Bob through the classical channel. Bob compares the measurement result with the initial state of the decoy photon, and calculates the error rate; if the error rate is lower than the set threshold value, indicating that no attacker exists, and executing a step (sixth); otherwise, the existence of the attacker is indicated, the comparison of the secret information is terminated, and the step (r) is returned to start again.
Sixth, Alice pair sequenceperforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
In the same way, Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsthe new sequence was obtained as follows:
seventhly, Bob selects a group of binary random number sequences eB＝(0,1,1,0)∈{0,1}4Alice selects a set of binary random number sequences eA＝(1,1,0,1)∈{0,1}4。
(iii) Bob pairs of particle sequencesPerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceAlice to particle sequencePerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequencethe corresponding rule of the unitary transformation U is as follows: for Bob, ifThen U is equal to I, ifthen U ═ X; for Alfor ice, ifThen U is equal to I, ifThen U ═ X; and X is a quantum exclusive-OR gate.
ninthly, Bob prepares single photon state as decoy state to insert intoAndTo obtain a new particle sequenceAndAnd sends them to Alice. Alice also prepares single photon states for insertion as decoy states intoAndTo obtain a new particle sequenceAndand send them to Bob.
R, Alice and Bob perform the activity of detecting an attacker like step (v). If there is no attacker, the steps are executedotherwise, returning to the step (r) to restart. In the step, the sequence is obtained after the Alice extracts the decoy stateandBob extracts the decoy state to obtain the sequenceAnd
Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
in the same way, Alice pairs of sequencesperforming quantum swap operationsthe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Alice to particle sequenceAndExecute 0-1The bit measurements result in {1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1}, Bob pairs the particle sequenceAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields a {1,0,0,0,0,1,0,1 }.
alice calculationGet the classical information set tA0111; bob's calculationGet the classical information set tB1011. At which time Alice and Bob announce that their secret information is different.
What is not described in detail in this specification is prior art to the knowledge of those skilled in the art.
The above-mentioned embodiments are merely preferred embodiments for fully illustrating the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto. The equivalent substitution or change made by the technical personnel in the technical field on the basis of the invention is all within the protection scope of the invention. The protection scope of the invention is subject to the claims.

Claims (3)

1. A third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method based on permutation operation is characterized by comprising the following steps:
a. Alice has secret information a, Bob has secret information b, and the length of a is consistent with that of b;
b. Alice divides the secret information a into m groups to obtain:
……
Bob divides the secret information b into m groups, resulting in:
……
wherein m is a positive integer, r is a positive integer of not less than 2, ai∈{0,1},bi∈{0,1},i＝1，…，mr2(ii) a If data block XmAnd Ymthe number of elements contained in the alloy is less than r2Then, the interior is alternately filled with 1 and 0 until the number of elements contained therein is r2；
c. Alice selects two permutation operations piAAnd τABob selects two permutation operations piBand τB(ii) a Wherein, tauAIs piAinduction operation of τBIs piBthe induction operation of (1);
d. Comparing secret information X of Alice and Bob1and Y1；
The method comprises the following specific steps:
d-1, Alice calculates tauA(X1) Bob meterCalculation of tauB(Y1)；τA(X1) And τB(Y1) The formula of (1) is as follows:
d-2, according to the coding rule, Alice and Bob prepare r respectively2Each Bell radical is marked as SAAnd SBThe following are:
Wherein:
d-3, Alice will be the bit sequence SAdivided into two subsequencesAnd is formed by SAThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SAThe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
similarly, Bob will be the bit sequence SBDivided into two subsequencesAnd Is formed by SBThe first quantum particle of each Bell base,Is formed by SBThe sequence consisting of the second quantum particle of each Bell base, namely:
d-4, Alice prepares single photon state as decoy state to be inserted into randomlyTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequenceSending the data to Bob; bob prepares single photon states for random insertion as decoy statesTo obtain a new particle sequenceAnd will new the sequencesending the data to Alice;
d-5, after Alice and Bob respectively indicate that the particle sequences sent by the opposite party have been received, respectively publishing the position of the decoy state and the measurement base; respectively detecting whether an attacker exists by Alice and Bob; if there is no attacker, executing step d-6, otherwise returning to step d-1; in this step, Alice gives up the decoy state to obtain the sequenceobtaining the sequence after Bob abandons the decoy state
d-6, Alice pair sequencePerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Bob pairs of sequencesPerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
d-7, Bob selects a set of binary random number sequencesAlice selects a set of binary random number sequences
d-8, Bob pairs of particle sequencesPerforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequenceAlice to particle sequenceperforming unitary conversion U to obtain new particle sequencethe corresponding rule of the unitary transformation U is as follows: for Bob, ifthen U is equal to I, ifThen U ═ X; for Alice, ifThen U is equal to I, ifthen U ═ X; x is a quantum exclusive-OR gate;
d-9, Bob prepares a single photon state to be inserted as a decoy stateAndto obtain a new particle sequenceandAnd send them to Alice; alice also prepares single photon states for insertion as decoy states intoAndTo obtain a new particle sequenceAndAnd send them to Bob;
d-10, Alice and Bob perform the activity of detecting the attacker like step d-5; if there is no attacker, executing step d-11; otherwise, returning to the step d-1 to restart; in the step, the sequence is obtained after the Alice extracts the decoy stateAndBob extracts the decoy state to obtain the sequenceAnd
d-11, Bob pairs of sequencesperforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
Alice pair sequencePerforming quantum swap operationsThe new sequence was obtained as follows:
d-12, Alice to particle sequenceAndperforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
Bob pairs of particle sequencesAndPerforming a 0-1 bit measurement yields the following results:
d-13, Alice calculationGet the classical information setBob's calculationget the classical information set
d-14, Alice and Bob publish the set tAAnd tB(ii) a If t isA＝tBSecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1＝Y1Then comparing the secret information X of Alice and Bob2And Y2I.e. the following step e is performed; if t isA≠tBSecret information X owned by Alice and Bob1≠Y1when Alice and Bob declare that their secret information is different, directly executing step f;
e. According to the step d, secret information X of Alice and Bob is compared2And Y2(ii) a If X2＝Y2Then, the secret information X of Alice and Bob are compared3And Y3(ii) a And so on; if secret information X of Alice and Bob is comparedjand Yj(j-2, … …, m), any X is presentj≠Yjif yes, directly executing step f; if all XjAnd YjIf the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal to each other, the result that the secret information of Alice and Bob is equal is obtained;
f. alice and Bob announce that the secret information of both are not the same.
2. The permutation operation-based third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the single photon state in the step d-4 is |0>、|1>、or
3. The permutation operation-based third-party-free quantum information equality comparison method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the coding rule in the step d-2 is as follows: classical information 0 corresponds to a quantum stateClassical information 1 corresponds to a quantum state
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