CN110443078A - A kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification - Google Patents
A kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification Download PDFInfo
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- CN110443078A CN110443078A CN201910654396.4A CN201910654396A CN110443078A CN 110443078 A CN110443078 A CN 110443078A CN 201910654396 A CN201910654396 A CN 201910654396A CN 110443078 A CN110443078 A CN 110443078A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
- G06F21/72—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information in cryptographic circuits
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
- G06F21/78—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data
- G06F21/79—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure storage of data in semiconductor storage media, e.g. directly-addressable memories
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Abstract
A kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification, including, encryption/decryption element, storage control, and storage equipment, wherein the encryption/decryption element carries out encryption and decryption processing to data according to the pattern information from hardware domain；The storage control controls the read-write operation of the storage equipment according to the pattern information from hardware domain.Safe storage system based on privilege classification of the invention, hardware cost can be effectively reduced while ensuring safety by sharing a set of encryption/decryption element and storage equipment in multiple software runtime environments.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to data safety technical field of memory more particularly to a kind of secure storage systems based on privilege classification
System.
Background technique
Storage, which refers to safely, ensures its safety, integrality, reliability and validity in data preservation.Storage is safe to include
Storage environment safety, storage medium safety, storage management safety, virus treated etc. side and.With the continuous hair of social informatization
Exhibition, the importance of data information become increasingly conspicuous, and the safety of data storage is increasingly valued by people.
2004, ARM company proposed a safety approach, i.e. Trust Zone technology.This is that one kind is integrated in CPU
Security of system expansion technique in kernel, which, which provides a kind of its, the system architecture of tight security, for kernel
Power consumption, performance and and product influence it is very little.Trust Zone technology is the technology that a software and hardware combines, from hard
Part security extension provides resource isolation, and software provides basic security service and interface.Trust Zone technology is by software and hardware
Resource isolation is at two environment, respectively safer world and the non-security world.The technology introduces a processor mode, that is, supervises
Device mode is controlled, the main function of monitor is responsible for the switching between two environment, the also default processor under monitor mode
For safe condition, it is desirable to enter monitor mode, privileged instruction can be used, i.e., security monitor is interrupted or SMC is instructed, and is passed through
The instruction can jump to the entrance of monitor.When needing to call trusted service, jumped by privileged instruction from conventional environment
Monitor is gone to, then security context is jumped to by monitor and is performed corresponding processing.
In the prior art, secure storage scheme has three ways, such as following:
Scheme 1, a set of crypto-engine, a set of storage equipment.
In the secure storage scheme, only one operating system of hardware domain -1 passes through inter-domain sharing memory and hardware domain -
2 interaction datas.There are two operating systems for hardware domain -2: safer world operation and non-security time operation system, two operation systems
System carries out data interaction by shared drive.Hardware domain -1 is shared a set of storage control with hardware domain -2 and is drawn with a set of encryption and decryption
It holds up.Storage control is only controlled by the non-security world's operating system of hardware domain -2, and crypto-engine is only by -2 safety of hardware domain
The world controls.
Fig. 1 is one structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art, as shown in Figure 1, -1 common application handle of hardware domain
The data for needing to encrypt are sent to -2 safer world of hardware domain by inter-domain sharing memory, and the control of two safer world of hardware domain adds
Decryption engine by shared drive between -2 two worlds of hardware domain passes to hardware domain-after the data passed over are encrypted
Data are written in the 2 non-security worlds, non-security world's control storage control.The number that the non-security world of hardware domain -2 encrypts needs
Pass to safer world according to by two worlds shared drive, safer world control crypto-engine the data passed over into
The non-security world is passed to by shared drive between two worlds after row encryption, number is written in non-security world's control storage control
According to.
There are following technological deficiencies for scheme 1: if non-security World data has encryption and decryption demand, needing to pass the data to
Encryption and decryption is carried out after safer world again, then passes to the non-security world, data are carried out by non-security world control storage control
Write-in.Multiple data transmitting will affect system performance and increase bandwidth demand, while repeatedly to also increase data sudden and violent for data transmitting
The risk of dew reduces the safety of data.In addition, software realization complexity is also maximum under this scheme.
Scheme 2 covers crypto-engine, a set of storage equipment more.
Only one operating system of hardware domain -1 passes through inter-domain sharing memory and -2 interaction data of hardware domain.
In the secure storage scheme, there are two operating systems for hardware domain -2: safer world operating system and non-security generation
Boundary's operating system, two operating systems carry out data interaction by shared drive.Hardware domain -1 shares a set of deposit with hardware domain -2
Store up controller.- 1 operating system of hardware domain and the non-security world's operating system of hardware domain -2 and safer world operating system respectively have one
Cover crypto-engine.
Fig. 2 is two structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art, as shown in Fig. 2, -1 common application number of hardware domain
Hardware is passed the data to by inter-domain sharing memory according to after the crypto-engine progress data encryption by -1 inside of hardware domain
The non-security world in domain -2, the non-security world's control storage control of hardware domain -2 carry out data write-in.The non-security generation of hardware domain -2
Boundary's common application data are by directly passing through control storage control after the crypto-engine encryption inside the non-security world of hardware domain -2
Device processed carries out data write-in.
There are following technological deficiencies for scheme 2: if the application of hardware domain -1 or -2 safer world of hardware domain and non-security generation
The data of boundary's application have encryption and decryption demand, can control crypto-engine progress data respectively by respective operating system and add solution
It is close, it is more convenient.But due to memory only one, and controlled by the non-security world's operating system of hardware domain -2, hardware
Domain -1 application with hardware domain -2 apply it is encrypted after data write storage device still need to pass to the non-security world, by
Non-security world's control storage control carries out data write-in.In addition, since each operating system has respective hardware respectively
Crypto-engine, hardware cost will increase.Software complexity is medium under this scheme.
Scheme 3 covers crypto-engine, more set storage equipment more.
In the secure storage scheme, only one operating system of hardware domain -1.There are two operating systems for hardware domain -2: peace
Whole world operation and non-security time operation system.- 1 operating system of hardware domain and the non-security world's operating system of hardware domain -2 with
Safer world operating system respectively has a set of storage control and crypto-engine.
Fig. 3 is three structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art, as shown in figure 3, -1 operating system of hardware domain with
The non-security world's operating system of hardware domain -2 and safer world operating system common application data pass through respectively internal encryption and decryption
Data write-in is carried out by the control storage control inside each operating system respectively after engine progress data encryption.
There are following technological deficiencies for scheme 3: each hardware domain internal operating system all has the storage equipment and hard of oneself respectively
Part crypto-engine.Best performance under this scheme, software realization complexity is minimum, while safety highest.But due to drawing
More set crypto-engines and storage equipment, cost highest are entered.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification,
A set of encryption/decryption element is shared in multiple software runtime environments and storage equipment while ensuring safety can be effective
Ground reduces hardware cost.
To achieve the above object, the safe storage system provided by the invention based on privilege classification, including, encryption and decryption list
Member, storage control, and storage equipment, wherein
The encryption/decryption element carries out encryption and decryption processing to data according to the pattern information from hardware domain；
The storage control controls the read-write operation of the storage equipment according to the pattern information from hardware domain.
Further, the pattern information, including, hardware domain information, safer world information and non-security world information.
Further, the encryption/decryption element further comprises that deciphering module, encrypting module, decruption key select mould
Block and encryption key selecting module, wherein
The decruption key selecting module selects corresponding decruption key, and send according to the pattern information from hardware domain
To the deciphering module；
The deciphering module, the decruption key sent using the decruption key selecting module, is decrypted data；
The encryption key selecting module selects corresponding encryption key, and send according to the pattern information from hardware domain
To the encrypting module；
The encrypting module, the encryption key sent using the encryption key selecting module, is encrypted data.
Further, the storage control further comprises selecting control module, and the control module is according to next
From the pattern information of hardware domain, start the read-write protection to register, controls the read-write operation of the storage equipment.
The present invention provides a kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification, accomplishes multiple software runtime environments shared one
Crypto-engine and storage equipment are covered, thus hardware cost can be effectively reduced, while accomplishing higher safety on this basis
Property and performance, realize lower software development complexity.
Other features and advantages of the present invention will be illustrated in the following description, also, partly becomes from specification
It obtains it is clear that understand through the implementation of the invention.
Detailed description of the invention
Attached drawing is used to provide further understanding of the present invention, and constitutes part of specification, and with it is of the invention
Content and embodiment together, are used to explain the present invention, and are not construed as limiting the invention.In the accompanying drawings:
Fig. 1 is one structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art；
Fig. 2 is two structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art；
Fig. 3 is three structural schematic diagram of secure storage scheme in the prior art；
Fig. 4 is the safe storage system structural schematic diagram according to the present invention based on privilege classification；
Fig. 5 is safe storage system embodiment one architecture diagram according to the present invention based on privilege classification.
Specific embodiment
Hereinafter, preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that embodiment described herein
Only for the purpose of illustrating and explaining the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention.
TrustZone hardware structure is intended to provide security framework, to enable a device to resist numerous specific by what is encountered
It threatens.TrustZone technology, which can provide, allows SoC designer from can largely realize specific function in safer world
The foundation structure that selection is carried out in component, without providing fixed and unalterable security solution.
The main security target of framework is to support to construct programmable environment, with prevent the confidentiality and integrity of assets by
Particular attack.The platform for having these characteristics can be used for constructing one group of security solution in extensive range, and use tradition side
Method constructs these solutions will be time-consuming and laborious.
It can ensure system safety in the following manner: all SoC hardware and software resources are isolated, are located at them
In two regions (the non-security world for the safer world of secure subsystem and for storing other all the elements).It supports
Hardware logic in the AMBA3 AXI bus architecture of TrustZone can ensure that non-security world's component can not access safety
World resource, to construct powerful boundary between these two regions.Sensitive resource is put into the design of safer world, Yi Ji
Reliability service software can ensure that assets can resist numerous potential attacks in the processor cores of safety, including those are generally difficult to
The attack (for example, inputting password using keyboard or touch screen) of protection.Pass through the peripheral hardware of the sensitivity of isolation safe within hardware, design
Personnel can limit the number for needing the subsystem by security evaluation, thus submitting safety certificate equipment time cost-saving.
The another aspect of TrustZone hardware structure is the extension realized in some ARM processor cores.Pass through this
A little additional increased extensions, single physical processor cores can be in a manner of timeslices safely and effectively simultaneously from non-security generation
Boundary and safer world execute code.In this way, just without using Special safety processor cores, to save chip area and energy
Source, and high-performance security software is allowed to run together with non-security world's operating environment.
After changing currently running virtual processor, the two virtual processors (are referred to as monitored by new processor mode
Mode) switching of Lai Jinhang context.
Physical processor for being controlled closely from the mechanism that the non-security world enters monitoring mode, and these mechanism
Always it is considered as the exception of monitoring mode software.The item to be monitored can (security monitoring calls (SMC) to refer to by execution special instruction
Enable) software triggering, or by hardware anomalies mechanism subset trigger.IRQ, FIQ, external data can be stopped and outside prefetches
Stop exception to be configured, so that processor is switched to monitoring mode.
The software executed in monitoring mode is to realize definition, but it usually saves the state of current region, and restores
By the state for the regional location being switched to.Then, it can be executed from the operation returned extremely, to open again in reduced zone
Dynamic treatment process.
The last one aspect of TrustZone hardware structure is to perceive Debug infrastructure safely, it is controllable to safety
The access of world's debugging, the debugging without weakening the non-security world visualize.
AXI (Advanced eXtensible Interface) is a kind of bus protocol, which is that ARM company proposes
AMBA (Advanced Microcontroller Bus Architecture) 3.0 agreements in most important part, be a kind of
On-chip bus towards high-performance, high bandwidth, low latency.Its address/control and data phase are separation, support to be misaligned
Data transmission, while in burst transfer, it is only necessary to first address, while isolated read-write data channel and supporting
Outstanding transmission access and out-of-order access, and be more easier to carry out timing closure.AXI is a new height in AMBA
Performance protocol.AXI technology enriches existing AMBA standard content, meets very-high performance and complicated system on chip (SoC)
The demand of design.
One embodiment of the present of invention is to realize the secure storage of data based on TrustZone hardware structure.Wherein,
One hardware domain 41 only one operating system, the second hardware domain 42 include two operating systems: safer world operating system with it is non-
Safety time operating system, 41 operating system of the first hardware domain, the non-security world's operating system of the second hardware domain 42 and safe generation
Boundary's operating system shares a set of encryption/decryption element 401 and a set of storage control 402.
Fig. 4 is the safe storage system structural schematic diagram according to the present invention based on privilege classification, as shown in figure 4, this hair
The bright safe storage system based on privilege classification, including, the 41, second hardware domain 42 of the first hardware domain (Domain), encryption and decryption
Unit 401, storage control 402, and storage equipment 403, wherein
First hardware domain 41 and the second hardware domain 42 are mutually isolated hardware environment, operation system that can be different with independent operating
System.
Second hardware domain 42, including safer world and the non-security world (note: the safer world base on the hardware based on ARM
In ARM TRUSTZONE).Safer world runs different operating systems from the non-security world.Therefore, in the embodiment of the present invention
In, there are three software runtime environments: the first hardware domain 41,42 safer world of the second hardware domain and the non-peace of the second hardware domain 42
The whole world.
First hardware domain 41 is provided with the first common application module 411.
Second hardware domain 42, the non-security world are provided with the second common application module 421, and safer world is provided with peace
Full application module 422.
Encryption/decryption element 401, the safer world and the non-security world of the first hardware domain 41 of receiving and the second hardware domain 42
Control, to setting from the first common application module 411, the second common application module 421, Secure Application Module 422 and storage
Standby 403 data information carries out encryption and decryption processing.
Storage control 402, the safer world and the non-security world of the first hardware domain 41 of receiving and the second hardware domain 42
Control, control storage equipment 403 reading data.
In one embodiment of the present of invention, encryption/decryption element 401 is selected according to the AxUSR information carried in ARM AXI bus
It selects key pair storing data and carries out encryption and decryption.
Fig. 5 is safe storage system embodiment one architecture diagram according to the present invention based on privilege classification, as shown in figure 5,
In one embodiment of the present of invention, encryption/decryption element 401, including, deciphering module 501, encrypting module 502, decruption key selection
Module 503, encryption key selecting module 504, wherein
Deciphering module 501, the decruption key that receiving and deciphering key selecting module 503 is sent, is decrypted data.
Encrypting module 502 receives the encryption key that encryption key selecting module 504 is sent, carries out at encryption to data
Reason.
Decruption key selecting module 503, according to the TEE/REE(safer world of input or the non-security world) and hardware domain
Information (Domain) selects decruption key and sends it to deciphering module 501.
Encryption key selecting module 504, according to the TEE/REE(safer world of input or the non-security world) and hardware domain
Information (Domain) selects encryption key and sends it to encrypting module 502.
One embodiment of the present of invention, the key 1 (KEY1) of prefabricated first hardware domain 41 and the second hardware domain 42 are non-security
World's key 2 (KEY2) and safer world key 3(KEY3).Key (KEY) is stored in the programmable storage of system non-volatile
Region (EFUSE) can only be accessed by hardware enciphering and deciphering unit 401, and software can not access.
After 41 operating system I/O request of the first hardware domain reaches encryption/decryption element 401, hardware enciphering and deciphering unit (CE) root
Which automatically selected according to the AxUSR information (for being judged from hardware domain I/O request) carried in this I/O request bus
Key 1 (KEY1) carries out data encryption, and entire ciphering process is to software-transparent.
After non-security world's operating system I/O request of the second hardware domain 42 reaches encryption/decryption element 402, hardware adds solution
Close unit 401 is automatically selected according to the AxPROT information (for being judged from which world I/O request) carried in bus
KEY2 carries out data encryption.
In one embodiment of the present of invention, storage control 402, including selection control module 505.Select control module
The 505 TEE/REE(safer worlds according to input or the non-security world) and hardware domain information (Domain), control storage equipment
Accessing operation.
In one embodiment of the invention, on the access that storage control 402 configures, according to transmission read/write channel
(R/W channel) subsidiary pattern information (hardware domain/safer world/non-security world information) starts the read-write to register
Protection, example are as follows:
Initiate a data read-write operation in the non-security world.
Safer world then also initiates a data read-write operation.
Since the I/O operation of the storage equipment in the non-security world is carrying out, when the storage IO operation of safer world is asked
Ask identified when reaching storage control 402, discovery and the present I/O operation operated from different runtime environments, because
And register setting operation is suspended.
After the completion of the I/O operation in the current non-security world, storage control 402 finds the storage operation quilt of safer world
It hangs up, carries out the storage IO operation of safer world.
One embodiment of the present of invention is provided with encryption and decryption (PRE- in the data channel for entering storage control 402
ENC/DEC) unit 401.Operating system issues block data transfer request, is entering the internal damping (buffer) of storage equipment
It is that a grouping carries out symmetric cryptography (AES) with 128bit in data channel, the key (key) of encryption can be according to transmission R/W
The subsidiary pattern information of channel automatically switch (such as: AxPROT believes on safer world and non-security world ARM AXI bus
Breath is to carry;The information in different hardware domain (Domain) can be carried by AxUSR information in AXI bus).Different mode is not with
The isolation of the mutual data of different mode may be implemented in same key,
In one embodiment of the invention, since I/O operation has atomicity, such as completing an IO read operation includes: start
Command- > data transmission -> stop command does not allow to be interrupted during atomic operation.Storage control 502 needs just
Really identification atomic operation is to determine the I/O operation from different runtime environments being suspended when can be restarted.
Those of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that: the foregoing is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and does not have to
In the limitation present invention, although the present invention is described in detail referring to the foregoing embodiments, for those skilled in the art
For, still can to foregoing embodiments record technical solution modify, or to part of technical characteristic into
Row equivalent replacement.All within the spirits and principles of the present invention, any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement and so on should all include
Within protection scope of the present invention.
Claims (4)
1. a kind of safe storage system based on privilege classification, including encryption/decryption element, storage control, and storage equipment,
It is characterized in that,
The encryption/decryption element carries out encryption and decryption processing to data according to the pattern information from hardware domain；
The storage control controls the read-write operation of the storage equipment according to the pattern information from hardware domain.
2. the safe storage system according to claim 1 based on privilege classification, which is characterized in that the pattern information,
Including hardware domain information, safer world information and non-security world information.
3. the safe storage system according to claim 2 based on privilege classification, which is characterized in that the encryption and decryption list
Member further comprises deciphering module, encrypting module, decruption key selecting module and encryption key selecting module, wherein
The decruption key selecting module selects corresponding decruption key, and send according to the pattern information from hardware domain
To the deciphering module；
The deciphering module, the decruption key sent using the decruption key selecting module, is decrypted data；
The encryption key selecting module selects corresponding encryption key, and send according to the pattern information from hardware domain
To the encrypting module；
The encrypting module, the encryption key sent using the encryption key selecting module, is encrypted data.
4. the safe storage system according to claim 2 based on privilege classification, which is characterized in that the storage control
Device further comprises selecting control module, and the control module starts according to the pattern information from hardware domain to register
Read-write protection, control it is described storage equipment read-write operation.
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