CN110443073A - A kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and system based on block chain - Google Patents

A kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and system based on block chain Download PDF

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CN110443073A
CN110443073A CN201910699492.0A CN201910699492A CN110443073A CN 110443073 A CN110443073 A CN 110443073A CN 201910699492 A CN201910699492 A CN 201910699492A CN 110443073 A CN110443073 A CN 110443073A
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block
hash value
random array
leaf node
merkle root
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Inventor
徐睿
杨华飞
郑立
刘坤
马锋
游佳
陈梦娴
蔡怡挺
池晓金
戴文博
张子谦
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
NARI Group Corp
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Wenzhou Power Supply Co of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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State Grid Corp of China SGCC
State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
NARI Group Corp
Nari Information and Communication Technology Co
Wenzhou Power Supply Co of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co Ltd
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Priority to CN201910699492.0A priority Critical patent/CN110443073A/en
Publication of CN110443073A publication Critical patent/CN110443073A/en
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    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/62Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • G06F21/64Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06QINFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/04Trading; Exchange, e.g. stocks, commodities, derivatives or currency exchange
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2107File encryption

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  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
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  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Abstract

The invention discloses a kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and systems based on block chain, initial data are stored as block, each block is linked as block chain;Initial data is stored in block body;Block head includes version number, signing messages, random array and Merkle root;Signing messages is the hash value encryption generation that hash operation generation is carried out to previous block;Random array includes N number of element, and element is random block version number or setting value;When random array element is version number corresponding with block, otherwise it is the hash value of setting value that the leaf node of Merkle root, which is the hash value of corresponding block,.Chain type verifying can be carried out when data examination by block signing messages and the verifying of merkle root is carried out by merkle root whether being tampered come verify data.Whether the data verification data that the present invention is stored using itself are tampered, and increase hardware without additional, and the time cost of altered data can be very high, can effectively ensure that the credibility of Data Audit.

Description

A kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and system based on block chain
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of data storage, and in particular to a kind of anti-tamper data storage side based on block chain Method, apparatus and system.
Background technique
Block chain is a kind of decentralization agreement combined using existing cryptographic technique and common recognition algorithm, can safely be deposited Store up data.Such as now most widely used digital cash transaction data, guarantee that Transaction Information can not be distorted.Its basic storage organization It is a kind of chronological linked data structure, the trade confirmation on block chain is jointly complete by all nodes on block chain At, guarantee that each node is reached common understanding in the case where no centralized management by common recognition algorithm, guarantee main chain data it is consistent Property.But be applied to using the block chain technology of decentralization log it is anti-tamper when, the redundancy backup of decentralization and log Centralized management theory disagree, be unfavorable for the storage of log and inquiry, audit, analysis to log.Therefore, it is necessary to benefits While characteristic anti-tamper with block chain, guarantees the centralization characteristic of log again, must just abandon the common recognition of current block chain The storage method of algorithm and multinode, the cryptographic technique that the data structured of focus on the application block chain stores theory and uses.
Key effect, log are played for the safe operation and investigation and evidence collection of system based on the security audit of log system Audit can effectively find active threat and make early warning in time.But the safety of log itself lacks guarantee, at any time all It may be distorted by criminal.Mainly there are following 3 kinds in the research of existing defence method for log audit safety problem Method protects Log security audit:
Method (1): backup log data
Regularly backup log is to backup server, (general by calculating each journal file when needing audit log A journal file can be saved within one day) hash value, and using these hash values construct a merkle tree, when backup log with When the merkle root that system log calculates is the same, illustrate that log is not tampered with, if different, passes through traversal merkle tree Find out the log being tampered.Although this method can find the position that journal file is tampered and can repair log.But Its hardware cost is higher, once and backup server attacked or gone wrong, the confidence level of log system has no way of verifying. A new problem has also been introduced in the protection of backup server.It generates merkle tree to need to carry out n-1 hash, in order to oppose Than, need to carry out the secondary hash operation of 2 (n-1) (n is the number for needing the journal file compared), and due to having used binary tree, The time complexity that journal file is distorted in positioning is O (log (n)).
Method (2), backup log hash
By backing up the hash value of every log, calculated when needing to do log audit the hash value of every log with The hash value of backup compares, if equally, illustrating that corresponding log is not tampered with, if different, illustrating that log is usurped Change.Which log is this method, which can be accurately positioned, is tampered, but increasing with journal file quantity, every record Hash increases hardware store expense.And the hash value once backed up is tampered, and distorting for log system is not found that yet.This In the hash value that backs up become new protected object, and entire journal file is not influenced on distorting for single log.It needs N times hash operation (n is the log quantity for needing to compare) is carried out, the time complexity that log is distorted in positioning is O (n).
Method (3) signs to journal file
By carrying out hash calculating to journal file, encryption conduct is then carried out to hash value by rivest, shamir, adelman The signature of this file, in log audit by calculating log hash1, then decrypted signature information acquisition hash2, is compared The value of hash1 and hash2 illustrates that log is tampered if different.Although this method does not need standby system, still Once possessing encryption and decryption key, just it is easy to forge a journal file again, and do not influence distorting for single log Entire journal file.For internal control personnel, this is easily done.
For above 3 kinds of methods, the hardware cost of method (1) is higher, and the protection of backup server is also at one New problem;Method (2) equally introduces a new protected object, i.e. log hash value;Method (3) is easy to be had by inside There are the personnel of associated rights to forge log recording.And when application method (2) or method, exists and distort individual log file not The problem of will affect other journal files.
Therefore, although this 3 kinds of methods strengthen the protection of log system to a certain extent, for increasingly developed This protection is still not enough for attack technology.
Summary of the invention
In view of the above-mentioned problems, the present invention proposes a kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and system based on block chain, Using itself storage data can verify data whether be tampered, do not need additionally to increase hardware, and distort log when Between cost can be very high, can effectively ensure that the credibility of log audit.
It realizes above-mentioned technical purpose, reaches above-mentioned technical effect, the invention is realized by the following technical scheme:
In a first aspect, the present invention provides a kind of anti-tamper date storage methods based on block chain, comprising:
The initial data that will acquire is stored as block according to the preset time interval, each block bidirection chain in chronological order It connects to form block chain;The block includes block body and block head;It is stored in the block body original in corresponding time interval Data;The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;
Signing messages encrypts generation to carry out the hash value of hash operation generation to previous block;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of area before current block The version number of block includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, at random The element of array include all blocks before the current block version number and N-C+1 setting value;
Merkle root, leaf node be based on random array calculate obtain, when random array each element be and block pair When the version number answered, the leaf node is the hash value of each corresponding block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf Child node is the hash value of setting value.
Optionally, the version number positioned at the block head of the block of block chain head end is assigned a value of non-zero, signing messages, random number Group and Merkle root are 0.
Optionally, the generating process of the merkle root specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at It include the previous block of current block in block before current block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array, using the hash value as leaf node Generate merkle root;
Alternatively,
As C≤N, the element of random array includes the version number of all blocks before current block, and fills N- C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with each element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
Merkle root is generated using the hash value as leaf node.
Optionally, further comprising the steps of before described using hash value as leaf node generation merkle root step:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value for the block R being calculated The hash value hash2 of hash1 and block R obtained in the signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block are compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The only generation of merkle root.
Optionally, the method also includes:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
For the either block in the block sets, the hash value hash3 of the block is calculated;Under the block The signing messages of one block decrypts the hash value hash4 of the block of preservation;Hash3 and hash4 is compared, if as the two, Show that the block is not tampered with.
Optionally, the method also includes:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
Enumerate the corresponding area of merkle root using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node Block;
For the either block chosen at random from the block, by merkle1 that the block saves be calculated The merkle2 of the block is compared, if the two is inconsistent, in the corresponding block of the merkle root leaf node one It is a or multiple be tampered.
Optionally, described to enumerate using the hash value of block a certain in the block sets as the merkle root of leaf node Corresponding block, specifically includes the following steps:
Traverse the random array of the block of all blocks in front;
Judge whether each random array includes a certain block version number in block sets, if so, then the block head includes Merkle root leaf node in have the hash value of a certain block in block sets;
Filter out the corresponding block of merkle root comprising a certain block hash value in block sets for leaf node.
Optionally, the merkle2 for calculating the block, specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at It include the previous block of current block in block before current block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array generates merkle2 as leaf node;
Alternatively, the element of the random array of the block chosen includes all before current block as C≤N The version number of block, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values.
Second aspect, the present invention provides a kind of anti-tamper data storage devices based on block chain, comprising:
Memory module, the initial data for will acquire are stored as block according to the preset time interval, and each block is pressed Link forms block chain before and after time sequencing;The block includes block body and block head;When stored in the block body to correspondence Between interval in initial data;The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;
Signing messages generates the encryption generation of hash value by carrying out hash operation to previous block;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of area before current block The version number of block includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, at random The element of array includes the version number of all blocks before current block, and fills N-C+1 setting value;
Merkle root, leaf node be based on random array calculate obtain, when random array each element be and block pair When the version number answered, the leaf node is the hash value of each corresponding block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf Child node is the hash value of setting value.
Optionally, the version number positioned at the block head of the block of block chain head end is assigned a value of non-zero, signing messages, random number Group and Merkle root are 0.
Optionally, the generating process of the merkle root specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at It include the previous block of current block in block before current block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array, using the hash value as leaf node Generate merkle root;
Alternatively, the element of random array includes the version number of all blocks before current block as C≤N, and Fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with each element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle root the hash value
Optionally, further comprising the steps of before described using hash value as leaf node generation merkle root step:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value for the block R being calculated The hash value hash2 of hash1 and block R obtained in the signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block are compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The only generation of merkle root.
Optionally, described device further include:
First screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
First judgment module, for calculating the hash value of the block for the either block in the block sets hash3;The hash value hash4 of the block of preservation is decrypted from the signing messages of next block of the block;Compare hash3 with Hash4, if as the two, showing that the block is not tampered with.
Optionally, described device further include:
Second screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
Second computing module, for enumerating using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node The corresponding block of merkle root;For the either block chosen at random from the block, the merkle1 which is saved with The merkle2 for the block being calculated is compared, if the two is inconsistent, the merkle root leaf node is corresponding One or more in block is tampered.
Optionally, described to enumerate using the hash value of block a certain in the block sets as the merkle root of leaf node Corresponding block, specifically includes the following steps:
Traverse the random array of the block of all blocks in front;
Judge whether each random array includes a certain block version number in block sets, if so, then the block head includes Merkle root leaf node in have the hash value of a certain block in block sets;
Filter out the corresponding block of merkle root comprising a certain block hash value in block sets for leaf node.
Optionally, the merkle2 for calculating the block, specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at Include the previous block of current block in block before current block:
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array generates merkle2 as leaf node;
Alternatively, the element of the random array of the block chosen includes all before current block as C≤N The version number of block, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values.
The third aspect, the present invention provides a kind of anti-tamper data-storage systems based on block chain, comprising:
Processor is adapted for carrying out each instruction;And
Equipment is stored, is suitable for storing a plurality of instruction, described instruction is suitable for being loaded by processor and being executed in first aspect and appoint Step described in one.
Beneficial effects of the present invention:
(1) present invention using storage itself data can verify data whether be tampered, do not need additionally to increase hard Part, and the time cost for distorting log can be very high, can effectively ensure that the credibility of log audit
(2) generation of new block increases proof of work mechanism in the present invention, must accidental validation when new block generates The correctness of block on chain, and generate merkle tree using the hash of the block of verifying and record merkle root to the area of new block Build improves the security defense capability of log system.
(3) guarantee its front and back block label in addition to doing chain type verifying to the log block in the time limit when log verifying in the present invention Name information is consistent, also needs to do the log in the time limit verifying of merkle root, prevents the chain in the entire time limit to be tampered, solve There is scheme to the problem on the weak side compared with new block protective capability.// chain type verifying here and the verifying of merkle root are mentioned for the first time, it It is preceding not explain
(4) present invention more meets the process of audit using data (log) at regular intervals as a block, can send out Now the log of which specific period goes wrong.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is the Data Audit operation flow schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 2 is the flow diagram of the anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain of an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 3 is the block structure schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 4 is the new block product process schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 5 is the audit process schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention;
Fig. 6 is the structural schematic diagram of an embodiment of the present invention merkle root verifying.
Fig. 7 is the structural schematic diagram of the Merkle root of an embodiment of the present invention.
Specific embodiment
In order to make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present invention clearer, with reference to embodiments, to the present invention It is further elaborated.It should be appreciated that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the present invention, it is not used to Limit the present invention.
Application principle of the invention is explained in detail with reference to the accompanying drawing.
Embodiment 1
In embodiments of the present invention, the initial data is set as log information, and the acquisition of the log information uses each The original interface of a system, the examination of log are related to being user and log audit crew, in other embodiments of the invention, institute Stating data can also be set as needed as other kinds of data.
In the embodiment of the present invention, it is necessary first to the log that acquisition and processing are generated by user behavior, and deposit in chronological order It stores up in log library, daily record data is then presented to log audit crew by way of list.In addition, it is also necessary to guarantee day The storage safety of will, therefore log must have anti-tamper characteristic.Specific practice in the embodiment of the present invention is: in storage log It needs to carry out the storage of block chain type to log when to log library, using the log every one section as a log block (i.e. block), Log block bidirection chain connects to form block chain, pulls one hair and move the whole body to the modification of log, distorts log and needs to reconstruct entire day Will block chain could not be found by auditing system.As shown in Figure 1, specifically includes the following steps:
The initial data that will acquire is stored as several blocks according to the preset time interval, and each block is suitable according to the time Link forms block chain before and after sequence;
The block includes block body and block head;
The initial data in corresponding time interval is stored in the block body;
The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;Method in the embodiment of the present invention is the initial data that will acquire according to preset Time interval is stored as block respectively, i.e., using log information at regular intervals as a block, therefore, is being embodied When, version number can be set to adding up since 0, No. 0 block is wound generation block, and the version number of block head is assigned a value of non- 0, signing messages, random array and Merkle root are 0;
Signing messages generates the encryption generation of hash value by entirely carrying out hash operation to previous block, can both guarantee to believe The safety of breath can guarantee the confidentiality of information again;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of area before current block The version number of block includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, at random The element of array includes the version number of all data blocks before current data block, and fills N-C+1 setting value, protects The length that N number of element of card different blocks forms random array is identical, in a kind of specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, The setting value can take -1;
Merkle root, the merkle root are the top modes of merkle tree, and leaf node is calculated based on random array It obtains, when each element of random array is version number corresponding with data block, the leaf node is each corresponding data area The hash value of block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf node is the hash value of setting value.Random array with The relationship of merkle root is as shown in Figure 7.In the block head of block add merkle root purpose be when creating new block with Machine verifies the block in block chain, and verifies whether corresponding block is tampered in log audit, improves the anti-of log system Imperial ability.
In a kind of specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, the generating process of the merkle root specifically includes following Step:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at Include the previous block of current block in block before current block:
The hash value for calculating data block corresponding with each element in random array, using the hash value as leaf Node generates merkle root;
In another specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, as C≤N, the element of random array includes being located at The version number of all data blocks before current data block, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with each element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
Merkle root is generated using the hash value as leaf node.
It further, further include following step before described using hash value as leaf node generation merkle root step It is rapid:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value for the block R being calculated The hash value hash2 of hash1 and block R obtained in the signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block are compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The only generation of merkle root.Proof of work mechanism is increased for the generation of new block, it must accidental validation when new block generates The correctness of block on chain generates merkle tree using the hash of the block of verifying, and records merkle root to the area of new block Build improves the security defense capability of log system.
As shown in Fig. 2, in a kind of specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, it is described when initial data is log Anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain the following steps are included:
Log collection completes the acquisition of log based on the original interface of each system;
Whether block is created, using log at regular intervals as a log block, so the meeting at the end of time A log block is created, newly-built block is completed by block generation module, and specific generating process is shown in Fig. 4:
Version number is obtained, random array is generated, can not only guarantee that N number of element of different blocks is not exactly the same, moreover it is possible to Enough guarantee that the hash value of each block at least can be by an other block as leaf node;
Block verifying, i.e. the hash value hash1 of calculation block R are carried out to the corresponding block of random array;Decrypt block R+1 The signing messages of the Zone R block of storage obtains the hash value hash2 of Zone R block preservation;Hash1 and hash2 is compared, if as the two, Then show that Zone R block log is not tampered with;
After verifying by block, merkle root is calculated;
The hash value for corresponding to block using random array generates merkle root as leaf node, encrypts to the merkle root Generate Merkle root encryption information;
Version number, random array, signing messages and Merkle root encryption information are packaged into block head;
Start recording data (i.e. log);
The generation of new block is completed, and is stored to log library.
Embodiment 2
The embodiment of the present invention the difference from embodiment 1 is that:
The method also includes: chain type verifying, for realizing log examination, specifically includes the following steps:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
For the either block in the block sets, the hash value hash3 of the block is calculated;Under the block The signing messages of one block decrypts the hash value hash4 of the block of preservation;Hash3 and hash4 is compared, if as the two, Show that the block is not tampered with.
Specifically:
A, Start Date S and Close Date E based on input, filter out corresponding data block SA ... ..., EA;In reality In the application process of border, the Start Date S and Close Date E can be auditor's input, when receiving opening for input Begin after date S and Close Date E, Automatic sieve selects corresponding block, which is the prior art, therefore, in the present invention Excessive repeat is not done;
B, the hash value hash3 of calculation data area block SA;
C, the signing messages of ciphertext data block SA+1 obtains the hash value hash4 of data block SA preservation;
D, hash3 and hash4 is compared, if as the two, showing that data block SA is not tampered with;
If the two is different, show that the log of block SA is tampered;
E, step B-D is repeated until block EA.
As shown in Fig. 2, in a kind of specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, the anti-tamper number based on block chain According to storage method the following steps are included:
The acquisition of log is completed based on the original interface of each system;
Using log at regular intervals as a log block, so a log area can be created at the end of the time Block, newly-built block are completed by block generation module, and front and back link forms block chain to each log block sequentially in time;Each log The structure of block is as previously described.
When auditor needs to trace to the source to entity behaviortrace, need first whether to be usurped using Audit Module verifying log Change, when use need to only input the Start Date and Close Date of log block to be verified;After log is proved to be successful, auditor is just The visual interface that the offer of audit center can be used, which is tracked entity behavior, traces to the source, and can pass through filtering screening function It can various dimensions examination entity behavior.The groundwork of Audit Module is whether verifying log is tampered, specific audit process such as Fig. 5 It is shown.
Embodiment 3
The difference of the embodiment of the present invention and embodiment 1 or 2 is:
The method also includes the verifyings of Merkle root, examine for realizing log, specifically:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
Enumerate the corresponding area of merkle root using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node Block;
For the either block chosen at random from the block, by merkle1 that the block saves be calculated The merkle2 of the block is compared, if the two is inconsistent, in the corresponding block of the merkle root leaf node one It is a or multiple be tampered.
More specifically: Start Date S and Close Date E based on input filter out corresponding data block SA ... ..., EA;In actual application, the Start Date S and Close Date E can be auditor's input, defeated when receiving After the Start Date S and Close Date E that enter, Automatic sieve selects corresponding block, which is the prior art, therefore, this Excessive repeat is not done in invention;
Enumerate the merkle root possessed comprising data block hash value a certain in data block SA to EA for leaf node Corresponding data block;In a kind of specific embodiment of the embodiment of the present invention, specifically: traverse the area of all data blocks Random array in build;Judge whether each random array includes data block SA to a certain data in data block EA block Block version number, if so, having a certain number in data block SA to EA in the leaf node for the merkle root that then the block head includes According to the hash value of block;Filtering out comprising a certain data block hash value in data block SA to data block EA is leaf node The corresponding data block of merkle root.
A certain data block is chosen at random from enumerating in the data block come, and is obtained the merkle root of preservation, is denoted as merkle1;
The merkle root for calculating the data block chosen at random, is denoted as merkle2;The one of the embodiment of the present invention In kind specific embodiment, specifically: as C > N, the element of random array includes the version of N number of block before current block This number, include the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block: calculate with it is each in random array The hash value of the corresponding data block of element generates merkle2 as leaf node;Alternatively, as C≤N, it is described to choose The element of random array of data block include the version number of all data blocks before the current data block, and fill N-C+1 setting value: the hash value and each setting value of corresponding with element in random array data block are calculated Hash value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values;
Compare merkle1 and merkle2, if the two is inconsistent, in the corresponding block of merkle root leaf node one It is a or multiple be tampered;If the two is always, merkle root leaf node corresponding block log in surface is not tampered with.
When auditor examines the block in a certain time limit, other than carrying out chain type verifying to this time limit intra block, Also need to be verified by corresponding merkle root, at least verify some block in this block segment be it is safe, do not have It is tampered with, whole fragment is prevented all to be tampered.As shown in fig. 6, SA block is the starting block for needing to audit, EA block is The end block for needing to audit, if attacker has distorted all over SA block to EA block (on condition that it is close to obtain encryption and decryption The operating right of key and database), then auditing can not just find that data (log) are tampered, if at this time passing through one again A leaf node includes that starting block merkle root of some or several blocks into end block verifies SA block to the area EA Whether it is tampered, is just very easy to find the fact that data (log) are tampered.Briefly be exactly merkle root verifying be guarantee What the block in the verifying time limit was not distorted entirely.As shown in fig. 6, firstly, enumerating any to block EA comprising block SA Then merkle root of the hash value of block Zone R block as leaf selects a merkle root verifying at random, if calculate Merkle is consistent, then block R is not tampered with.
Embodiment 4
A kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain is provided in the embodiment of the present invention, comprising:
Memory module, the initial data for will acquire are stored as block according to the preset time interval, and each block is pressed Link forms block chain before and after time sequencing;The block includes block body and block head;When stored in the block body to correspondence Between interval in initial data;The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;
Signing messages generates the encryption generation of hash value by entirely carrying out hash operation to previous block;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of area before current block The version number of block includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, at random The element of array includes the version number of all blocks before current block, and fills N-C+1 setting value;
Merkle root, leaf node be based on random array calculate obtain, when random array each element be and block pair When the version number answered, the leaf node is the hash value of each corresponding block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf Child node is the hash value of setting value.Random array and the relationship of merkle root are as shown in Figure 7.s
Preferably, it is wound generation block that definition, which is located at block first-in-chain(FIC) petiolarea block, and the block head of the wound generation block only has version Number it is assigned a value of non-zero, signing messages, random array and Merkle root are 0.
Preferably, the generating process of the merkle root specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at Include the previous block of current block in block before current block:
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array, using the hash value as leaf node Generate merkle root;
Alternatively, the element of random array includes the version number of all blocks before current block as C≤N, and Fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle root the hash value.
It is preferably, described that the hash value is used as before leaf node generation merkle root further include:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value for the block R being calculated The hash value hash2 of hash1 and block R obtained in the signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block are compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The only generation of merkle root.
Preferably, described device further include:
First screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
First judgment module, for calculating the hash value of the block for the either block in the block sets hash3;The hash value hash4 of the block SA of preservation is decrypted from the signing messages of next block of the block;Compare hash3 With hash4, if as the two, showing that the block is not tampered with.
Preferably, described device further include:
Second screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
Second computing module, for enumerating using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node The corresponding block of merkle root;For the either block chosen at random from the block, the merkle1 which is saved with The merkle2 for the block being calculated is compared, if the two is inconsistent, the merkle root leaf node is corresponding One or more in block is tampered.
Preferably, described to enumerate using the hash value of block a certain in the block sets as the merkle of leaf node The corresponding block of root, specifically includes the following steps:
Traverse the random array of the block of all blocks in front;
Judge whether each random array includes a certain block version number in block sets, if so, then the block head includes Merkle root leaf node in have the hash value of a certain block in block sets;
Filter out the corresponding block of merkle root comprising a certain block hash value in block sets for leaf node.
Preferably, the merkle2 for calculating the block, specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before the current block, described N number of to be located at Include the previous block of current block in block before current block:
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array generates merkle2 as leaf node;
Alternatively, the element of the random array of the block chosen includes all before current block as C≤N The version number of block, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values.
Embodiment 5
A kind of anti-tamper data-storage system based on block chain characterized by comprising
Processor is adapted for carrying out each instruction;And
Equipment is stored, is suitable for storing a plurality of instruction, described instruction is suitable for being loaded by processor and being executed in embodiment 1-3 and appoint Step described in one.
It should be understood by those skilled in the art that, embodiments herein can provide as method, system or computer program Product.Therefore, complete hardware embodiment, complete software embodiment or reality combining software and hardware aspects can be used in the application Apply the form of example.Moreover, it wherein includes the computer of computer usable program code that the application, which can be used in one or more, The computer program implemented in usable storage medium (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage, CD-ROM, optical memory etc.) produces The form of product.
The application is referring to method, the process of equipment (system) and computer program product according to the embodiment of the present application Figure and/or block diagram describe.It should be understood that every one stream in flowchart and/or the block diagram can be realized by computer program instructions The combination of process and/or box in journey and/or box and flowchart and/or the block diagram.It can provide these computer programs Instruct the processor of general purpose computer, special purpose computer, Embedded Processor or other programmable data processing devices to produce A raw machine, so that being generated by the instruction that computer or the processor of other programmable data processing devices execute for real The device for the function of being specified in present one or more flows of the flowchart and/or one or more blocks of the block diagram.
These computer program instructions, which may also be stored in, is able to guide computer or other programmable data processing devices with spy Determine in the computer-readable memory that mode works, so that it includes referring to that instruction stored in the computer readable memory, which generates, Enable the manufacture of device, the command device realize in one box of one or more flows of the flowchart and/or block diagram or The function of being specified in multiple boxes.
These computer program instructions also can be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device, so that counting Series of operation steps are executed on calculation machine or other programmable devices to generate computer implemented processing, thus in computer or The instruction executed on other programmable devices is provided for realizing in one or more flows of the flowchart and/or block diagram one The step of function of being specified in a box or multiple boxes.
The above shows and describes the basic principles and main features of the present invention and the advantages of the present invention.The technology of the industry Personnel are it should be appreciated that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments, and the above embodiments and description only describe this The principle of invention, without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention, various changes and improvements may be made to the invention, these changes Change and improvement all fall within the protetion scope of the claimed invention.The claimed scope of the invention by appended claims and its Equivalent thereof.

Claims (17)

1. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain characterized by comprising
The initial data that will acquire is stored as block according to the preset time interval, and front and back links shape to each block in chronological order At block chain;The block includes block body and block head;The initial data in corresponding time interval is stored in the block body; The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;
Signing messages encrypts generation to carry out the hash value of hash operation generation to previous block;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of block before current block Version number includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, random array Element include all blocks before the current block version number and N-C+1 setting value;
Merkle root, leaf node are based on random array and calculate acquisition, when each element of random array is corresponding with block When version number, the leaf node is the hash value of each corresponding block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf section Point is the hash value of setting value.
2. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: be located at area The version number of the block head of the block of block chain head end is assigned a value of non-zero, and signing messages, random array and Merkle root are 0.
3. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 1, which is characterized in that described The generating process of merkle root specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before current block, described N number of positioned at current It include the previous block of current block in block before block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array is generated the hash value as leaf node Merkle root;
Alternatively,
As C≤N, the element of random array includes the version number of all blocks before current block, and fills N-C+1 A setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with each element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
Merkle root is generated using the hash value as leaf node.
4. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 3, which is characterized in that described It is further comprising the steps of before hash value is generated merkle root step as leaf node:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value hash1 for the block R being calculated with The hash value hash2 of block R obtained in signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block is compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The generation of merkle root.
5. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the side Method further include:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
For the either block in the block sets, the hash value hash3 of the block is calculated;From next area of the block The signing messages of block decrypts the hash value hash4 of the block of preservation;Hash3 and hash4 is compared, if as the two, showing The block is not tampered with.
6. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 1, it is characterised in that: the side Method further include:
Start Date and Close Date based on input, filter out corresponding block sets;
Enumerate the corresponding block of merkle root using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node;
For the either block chosen at random from the block, by merkle1 that the block saves and described in being calculated The merkle2 of block is compared, if the two is inconsistent, one in the corresponding block of the merkle root leaf node or Person is multiple to be tampered.
7. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 6, it is characterised in that: the column Enumerate the corresponding block of merkle root using the hash value of block a certain in the block sets as leaf node, specifically include with Lower step:
Traverse the random array of the block of all blocks in front;
Judge whether each random array includes a certain block version number in block sets, if so, then the block head includes There is the hash value of a certain block in block sets in the leaf node of merkle root;
Filter out the corresponding block of merkle root comprising a certain block hash value in block sets for leaf node.
8. a kind of anti-tamper date storage method based on block chain according to claim 6, it is characterised in that: the meter The merkle2 of the block is calculated, specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before current block, described N number of positioned at current It include the previous block of current block in block before block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array generates merkle2 as leaf node;
Alternatively, the element of the random array of the block chosen includes all blocks before current block as C≤N Version number, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values.
9. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain characterized by comprising
Memory module, the initial data for will acquire are stored as block according to the preset time interval, and each block is temporally The link of sequence front and back forms block chain;The block includes block body and block head;It is stored in the block body between corresponding to the time Every interior initial data;The block head includes:
The version number C of current block;
Signing messages generates the encryption generation of hash value by carrying out hash operation to previous block;
Random array, including N number of element, as C > N, the element of random array includes N number of block before current block Version number includes the previous block of current block in N number of block before the current block;As C≤N, random array Element include the version number of all blocks before the current block, and fill N-C+1 setting value;
Merkle root, leaf node are based on random array and calculate acquisition, when each element of random array is corresponding with block When version number, the leaf node is the hash value of each corresponding block;When random array element is setting value, the leaf section Point is the hash value of setting value.
10. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 9, which is characterized in that be located at The version number of the block head of the block of block chain head end is assigned a value of non-zero, and signing messages, random array and Merkle root are 0.
11. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 9, which is characterized in that described The generating process of merkle root specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before current block, described N number of positioned at current It include the previous block of current block in block before block;
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array is generated the hash value as leaf node Merkle root;
Alternatively, the element of random array includes the version number of all blocks before current block, and fills as C≤N N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with each element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle root the hash value.
12. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 9 or 11, which is characterized in that It is described using hash value as leaf node generate merkle root step before, it is further comprising the steps of:
Block R corresponding for either element in random array, by the hash value hash1 for the block R being calculated with The hash value hash2 of block R obtained in signing messages from the latter block R+1 of the block is compared;
If as the two, showing that block R is not tampered with, the hash value of the block R is used as leaf node, is otherwise stopped The generation of merkle root.
13. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 9, which is characterized in that described Device further include:
First screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
First judgment module, for calculating the hash value hash3 of the block for the either block in the block sets;
The hash value hash4 of the block of preservation is decrypted from the signing messages of next block of the block;Compare hash3 with Hash4, if as the two, showing that the block is not tampered with.
14. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 9, which is characterized in that described Device further include:
Second screening module filters out corresponding block sets for Start Date S and Close Date E based on input;
Second computing module, for enumerating using the hash value of a certain block in the block sets as leaf node The corresponding block of merkle root;For the either block chosen at random from the block, the merkle1 which is saved with The merkle2 for the block being calculated is compared, if the two is inconsistent, the merkle root leaf node is corresponding One or more in block is tampered.
15. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 14, which is characterized in that described The corresponding block of merkle root using the hash value of block a certain in the block sets as leaf node is enumerated, is specifically included Following steps:
Traverse the random array of the block of all blocks in front;
Judge whether each random array includes a certain block version number in block sets, if so, then the block head includes There is the hash value of a certain block in block sets in the leaf node of merkle root;
Filter out the corresponding block of merkle root comprising a certain block hash value in block sets for leaf node.
16. a kind of anti-tamper data storage device based on block chain according to claim 14, which is characterized in that described The merkle2 of the block is calculated, specifically:
As C > N, the element of random array includes the version number of N number of block before current block, described N number of positioned at current Include the previous block of current block in block before block:
The hash value for calculating block corresponding with each element in random array generates merkle2 as leaf node;
Alternatively, the element of the random array of the block chosen includes all blocks before current block as C≤N Version number, and fill N-C+1 setting value:
Calculate the hash value of block corresponding with element in random array and the hash value of each setting value;
It is used as leaf node to generate merkle2 all hash values.
17. a kind of anti-tamper data-storage system based on block chain characterized by comprising
Processor is adapted for carrying out each instruction;And
Equipment is stored, is suitable for storing a plurality of instruction, described instruction is suitable for by processor load and perform claim requires to appoint in 1~8 Step described in one.
CN201910699492.0A 2019-07-31 2019-07-31 A kind of anti-tamper date storage method, apparatus and system based on block chain Pending CN110443073A (en)

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Application publication date: 20191112