CN110381510A - Non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag - Google Patents
Non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag Download PDFInfo
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
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Abstract
The disclosure provides a kind of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag, it includes the first vector signal that emitter transmitting includes multiple authenticating tags and multiple user informations, each authenticating tag is superimposed upon in corresponding user information, and first vector signal obtains Second support signal by wireless fading channel；Multiple user apparatus receive Second support signal respectively, channel estimation and corresponding target user's information are obtained based on Second support signal and then obtain target authentication label, residual signals and test statistics, based on channel estimation, each user apparatus obtains Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtains outage probability, and false-alarm probability is obtained based on test statistics and hypothesis testing condition, optimal threshold and detection probability, if there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus, collusion user apparatus calculates authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio and error rate and then obtains equivocal value, based on equivocal value, outage probability and detection probability detection system performance.
Description
Technical field
This disclosure relates to a kind of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag.
Background technique
Non-orthogonal multiple (NOMA, Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access) technology is the 5th generation (5G) wireless network
Key technology in new radio (NR) access technology of network.NOMA technology can be realized to large-scale access, meet it is different
The demand of the sharp increase of structure data traffic, and high bandwidth efficiency and ultralow Delay Service are provided.In addition, NOMA has been put into
Advanced (3GPP-LTE-A) standard of 5GNR standard, third generation partner program long-term evolution and next-generation general digital electro sighting target
Quasi- (ATSC 3.0).NOMA technology has brilliant performance, with traditional orthogonal multiple access (OMA) scheme (such as time division multiple acess
(TDMA) etc.) compare, NOMA system is supported in each orthogonal resource block (for example, time slot, frequency channels, spreading code or orthogonal space
Between freedom degree) in service multiple users by dividing corresponding orthogonal resource block in power domain.
The essential safety requirements of modern wireless systems are the abilities with verifying transmitter authenticity, and being capable of safety certification
The identity of legal transmitter simultaneously refuses confrontation imitation.Above-mentioned safety requirements is even more important in radio systems, because of shared matchmaker
The open nature of body brings more security breaches, and attacker can implement to eavesdrop, block or pretend to be by these loopholes
Behavior.
In existing NOMA technology, safety certification is usually realized by the conventional encryption technique on upper layer；However,
Three main problems are usually present in NOMA system to hinder to realize safety certification.First problem is the safety of upper layer encryption mechanism
Property be based on hostile end have finite computational abilities hypothesis and establish；However, with computing capability and cryptanalysis algorithm
Progress, the hypothesis of the calculating limitation in cryptographic technique is gradually broken.Second Problem is efficiency, because that can test
Before demonstrate,proving transmitter, it is inevitable in the task that various time-consumings are completed on upper layer and physical layer (PHY).Third problem is related to
Compatibility issue because the wireless device of different manufacturer production is different, and due to lacking to different digital language and
The understanding of upper layer communication program hinders the extensive connection in NOMA system.
In addition, certification fairness problem when being transmitted in existing NOMA technology there is also signal, and can not credit household
Caused by security risk.
Summary of the invention
To solve the above-mentioned problems, it can be improved system authentication safety the present disclosure proposes one kind and reduce collusion user
The non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of security risk caused by device.
For this purpose, being packet present disclose provides a kind of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag
The non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of emitter and multiple user apparatus is included, feature exists
In, comprising: emitter, it is used to emit first vector signal, the first vector signal includes multiple authenticating tags and more
A user information, each authenticating tag are superimposed upon in the corresponding user information, and the first vector signal passes through nothing
Line fading channel obtains Second support signal；And multiple user apparatus, multiple user apparatus receive described second respectively
Carrier signal, each user apparatus are based on the Second support signal and obtain channel estimation and corresponding target user's information
And then target authentication label is obtained, it is based on the channel estimation and target user's information, the user apparatus obtains residual error
Signal and test statistics is obtained based on the residual signals and the target authentication label, is based on the channel estimation, it is each
The user apparatus obtains Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtains outage probability, each user apparatus be based on the test statistics and
Hypothesis testing condition obtains false-alarm probability, theoretical based on Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came), obtains optimal threshold, base
Detection probability is obtained in the optimal threshold, wherein if there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus, the string
It seeks user apparatus and calculates authenticating tag and interference plus noise than the equivocal value with error rate and then acquisition recovery key, be based on
The equivocal value, the outage probability and the detection probability detection system performance.
In the disclosure, emitter transmitting includes the first vector signal of multiple authenticating tags and multiple user informations,
Each authenticating tag is superimposed upon in corresponding user information, and first vector signal obtains Second support letter by wireless fading channel
Number；Multiple user apparatus receive Second support signal respectively, and each user apparatus is based on Second support signal and obtains channel estimation
With corresponding target user's information and then acquisition target authentication label, residual signals and test statistics, it is based on channel estimation, respectively
A user apparatus obtains Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtains outage probability, and thereby, it is possible to detect the hidden of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System
Property.Each user apparatus is based on test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains false-alarm probability, (interior based on Neyman-Pearson
Graceful-Pearson came) it is theoretical, it obtains optimal threshold and then obtains detection probability, thereby, it is possible to detect non-orthogonal multiple Verification System
Robustness.Wherein, if collusion user apparatus calculates authenticating tag and interference there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus
Plus noise is than the equivocal value with error rate and then acquisition recovery key, generally based on equivocal value, outage probability and detection
Rate detection system performance.Thereby, it is possible to improve the safety of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System, reduce caused by collusion user apparatus
Security risk, and it is capable of the concealment of whole detection system, robustness and safety.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, each authenticating tag is mutually indepedent, described
Authenticating tag is generated by hash function, corresponding user information and key.As a result, the receiver of each user apparatus can
The transmitter of emitter is verified by corresponding authenticating tag.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, the Second support signal ykMeetWherein, k takes positive integer, hkIndicate the channel of k-th of user apparatus, PTIndicate transimission power, x indicates institute
State first vector signal, nkIndicate k-th of complicated white Gaussian noise, in first vector signal x, the function of each authenticating tag
The power allocation factor of rate distribution factor and each user information and be less than or equal to 1, i.e. ∑ βk+∑αk≤ 1, αkIndicate kth
The power allocation factor of a authenticating tag, βkIndicate the power allocation factor of the user information of k-th of user apparatus.As a result, can
Enough specific acquisition Second support signals.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, the power based on the authenticating tag point
The power allocation factor of user information with the factor or the user apparatus, the collusion user apparatus calculate authenticating tag and do
Disturb plus noise ratio.Thereby, it is possible to obtain authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio, equivocal value is obtained convenient for subsequent.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, the collusion user apparatus is based on mistake
Rate obtains target entropy, obtains the equivocal value based on the target entropy.Thereby, it is possible to obtain equivocal value with detection system
The safety of system.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, the Second support signal includes pilot tone
Signal, each user apparatus obtain channel estimation based on the pilot signal in the Second support signal.As a result, can
Enough obtain channel estimation.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, each user apparatus is made decisions
The sequence for the interference user apparatus that discharge needs to eliminate eliminates the user information of corresponding interference user apparatus based on the sequence
Obtain corresponding target user's information.Thereby, it is possible to preferably improve spectrum efficiency.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, it is dry that each user apparatus is based on the letter
It makes an uproar than obtaining traffic rate, outage probability is obtained based on the traffic rate.Thereby, it is possible to obtain the communication of each user apparatus
Rate, interruption situation when convenient for analysis carrier signal transmission, and outage probability can be obtained with the concealment of detection system.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, by the residual signals and target authentication
Label carries out matched filtering and obtains test statistics.Thereby, it is possible to obtain test statistics, so as to obtaining for subsequent false-alarm probability
?.
In the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the disclosure, optionally, it is based on Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-
Pearson came) it is theoretical, when the false-alarm probability is equal to the upper limit of false-alarm probability, obtain optimal threshold.It is optimal thereby, it is possible to obtain
Threshold value, so as to the acquisition of subsequent detection probability, and then the robustness of detection system.
This disclosure relates to based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag non-orthogonal multiple Verification System can be improved system peace
Quan Xing, can be improved system authentication fairness and reduce can not security risk caused by new user equipment device, can be avoided upper layer and recognize
Card method brings compatibility issue.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is to show the related non-orthogonal multiple certification based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of example of the disclosure
The block diagram of system.
Fig. 2 is the non-orthogonal multiple certification shown involved in this disclosed example based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag
The system model schematic diagram of system.
Fig. 3 is to show the related non-orthogonal multiple certification based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of example of the disclosure
The structural schematic diagram of the first vector signal of system.
Fig. 4 a be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure the first user equipment
The waveform diagram that one outage probability changes with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of the first user equipment.
Fig. 4 b be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure second user equipment
The waveform diagram that two outage probabilities change with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of second user equipment.
Fig. 4 c be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure the first user equipment
The waveform diagram that one certification accuracy changes with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of the first user equipment.
Fig. 4 d be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure second user equipment
The waveform diagram that two certification accuracys change with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of second user equipment.
Fig. 5 a be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure the first user equipment
The waveform diagram that one certification accuracy changes with user information length.
Fig. 5 b be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure second user equipment
Two certification accuracys are with the waveform diagram changed with user information length.
Specific embodiment
Hereinafter, explaining the preferred embodiment of the disclosure in detail with reference to attached drawing.In the following description, for identical
Component assign identical symbol, the repetitive description thereof will be omitted.Scheme in addition, attached drawing is only schematical, the mutual ruler of component
Very little shape of ratio or component etc. can be with actual difference.
It should be noted that term " includes " and " having " and their any deformation in the disclosure, such as wrapped
Include or the process, method, system, product or equipment of possessed a series of steps or units are not necessarily limited to be clearly listed that
A little step or units, but may include or with being not clearly listed or for these process, methods, product or equipment
Intrinsic other step or units.
Present disclose provides the non-orthogonal multiple Verification Systems based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag.Based on superposition physical layer
The non-orthogonal multiple Verification System of authenticating tag can be including emitter and multiple user apparatus based on superposition physical layer
The non-orthogonal multiple Verification System of authenticating tag.Namely NOMA system can be on identical time slot, frequency band and direction in space
Multiple user apparatus services.This disclosure relates to based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag non-orthogonal multiple Verification System can letter
Referred to as non-orthogonal multiple authenticates (Non-Orthogonal Multiple Access, NOMA) system.This disclosure relates to it is non-just
Hand over that multiple access Verification System can be improved security of system and certification fairness and reduce can not safety wind caused by new user equipment device
Danger.The disclosure is described in detail below in conjunction with attached drawing.
Fig. 1 is to show the related non-orthogonal multiple certification based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of example of the disclosure
The block diagram of system.Fig. 2 is to show the non-orthogonal multiple based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag involved in this disclosed example
The system model schematic diagram of Verification System.Fig. 3 is shown involved in the example of the disclosure based on superposition physical layer certification mark
The structural schematic diagram of the first vector signal of the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System of label.
In the present embodiment, as shown in Figure 1, the non-orthogonal multiple Verification System 1 based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag
Including emitter 10 and user apparatus 20.The quantity of user apparatus 20 is k.Each user apparatus 20 can be expressed as user
Device k or user apparatus Uk.K is greater than 1 positive integer.Emitter 10 and multiple user apparatus 20 are carried out by wireless channel
Communication.
In some instances, emitter 10 can be base station.Base station (such as access point) can be refer to the accession to net in
Pass through the equipment of one or more sectors and wireless terminal communications in air interface.The air frame and IP that base station can be used for receive
Frame is mutually converted, as the router between wireless terminal and the rest part of access net, wherein access its remaining part of net
Dividing may include Internet protocol (IP) network.Base station can also coordinate the attribute management to air interface.For example, base station can be
Base station (BTS, Base Transceiver Station) in GSM or CDMA, is also possible to the base station (NodeB) in WCDMA,
It can also be the evolved base station (NodeB or eNB or e-NodeB, evolutional Node B) in LTE.User apparatus 20
It can include but is not limited to user equipment.User equipment can include but is not limited to smart phone, laptop, individual calculus
Machine (Personal Computer, PC), personal digital assistant (Personal Digital Assistant, PDA), movement are mutual
Networked devices (Mobile Internet Device, MID), wearable device (such as smartwatch, Intelligent bracelet, intelligent glasses)
Each class of electronic devices, wherein the operating system of the user equipment may include but be not limited to Android operation system, IOS operation system
System, Symbian (Saipan) operating system, Black Berry (blackberry, blueberry) operating system, Windows Phone8 operating system etc.
Deng.
In some instances, the quantity of user apparatus 20 can be two.As shown in Fig. 2, emitter 10 is base station.Two
A user apparatus 20 is the first user equipment and second user equipment respectively.Shown in Fig. 2 is the downlink with dual user equipment
The NOMA system of link (Down Link, DL).Base station (BS) is served two single antenna simultaneously at same channel resource block and is used
Family equipment.In addition, the first user equipment is d at a distance from base station1.Second user equipment is d at a distance from base station2.Distance d1With
Distance d2Meet d1> d2。
In some instances, as shown in Figure 1, emitter 10 can be used for emitting first vector signal.First vector letter
It number may include multiple authenticating tags and multiple user informations.Authenticating tag is physical layer authenticating tag.Each authenticating tag phase
Mutually independent, authenticating tag is generated by hash function, corresponding user information and key.Specifically authenticating tag t can pass through
Unidirectional, impact resistant hash function g () is generated using corresponding user information and key k.As a result, each user
The receiver of device 20 can verify the transmitter of emitter 10 by corresponding authenticating tag.The quantity and use of user information
The quantity of family device 20 (subsequent detailed description) is consistent.Letter needed for each user information can carry corresponding user apparatus 20
Breath.In addition, user information is statistically incoherent with authenticating tag.
In some instances, first vector signal x meets:Wherein, skIndicate k-th of user apparatus
20 user information, βkIndicate that the power allocation factor of the user information of k-th of user apparatus 20, k take natural number, αkIndicate kth
The power allocation factor of the authenticating tag of a user apparatus 20, tkIndicate the authenticating tag of k-th of user apparatus 20.When arbitrary
αkMeet αkWhen=0, k take natural number, first vector signal is free of authenticating tag.First vector signal is normal signal at this time.
In some instances, in NOMA system as shown in Figure 2, when user apparatus 20 is two, first vector signal
Composition can be as shown in Figure 3.As shown in figure 3, first vector signal may include the first authenticating tag, the second authenticating tag,
First user information and second user information.First authenticating tag t1With the second authenticating tag t2Independently of each other.First authenticating tag
It is superimposed upon in the first user information.Second authenticating tag is superimposed upon in second user information.After being superimposed the first authenticating tag
First user information is superimposed upon in the second user information after being superimposed the second authenticating tag.First authenticating tag t1Chief Signal Boatswain
Degree, the second authenticating tag t2Signal length, the first user information s1User information length and second user information s2User
Message length is equal.The user information length of the signal length of each authenticating tag or each user information can be indicated with L.
Assuming thatFirst vector signal x meets:Wherein, β1Indicate the
The power allocation factor of the user information of one user equipment, β2Indicate second user equipment user information power distribution because
Son, α1Indicate the power allocation factor of the first authenticating tag, α2Indicate the power allocation factor of the second authenticating tag.Each power
Distribution factor meets β1+β2+α1+α2≤1.Carrier signal x can be sent in the form of block.Each block xLMiddle packet
Include corresponding first user information s1,l, second user information s2,l, the first authenticating tag t1,lWith the second authenticating tag t2,l.It can be with
Assuming thatFirst authenticating tag can be by hash function, the first user
Information and first key k1It generates, the second authenticating tag can be by hash function, second user information and the second key k2It generates.
Thereby, it is possible to obtain the independent authenticating tag of different user devices.In this case, the receiver of two user equipmenies can be with
The transmitter (also referred to as transmitter) of base station is verified by corresponding authenticating tag.First authenticating tag meets t1=g (s1,
k1).Second authenticating tag t2=g (s2,k2)。
In some instances, emitter 10 is sent to the first vector signal of each user apparatus 20 independently of being sent to
The first vector signal of other user apparatus 20.
In some instances, first vector signal x can be sent in wireless channel in the form of block.Block
The length of (i.e. " frame ") is indicated with L.Carrier signal x can be expressed as x=[x1,...,xL].Wherein, each block xLMiddle packet
Include corresponding first user information s1,lWith second user information s2,l.It assume that
In some instances, emitter 10 (such as base station) can realize the control to power by automated power control
System.For example, the radiofrequency signal of the transceiver station of base station can be sequentially input to filter and frequency converter with filter function,
And then intermediate-freuqncy signal is obtained, then this intermediate-freuqncy signal is input in the automatic power control module of base station and is controlled power.
Wherein, automatic power control module includes A/D converter, removes direct current component, power estimation unit and Feedback of Power adjustment unit.
In some instances, the automated power control process of automatic power control module includes: by intermediate-freuqncy signal by A/D
Converter obtains digital signal, which goes direct current component to obtain the digital intermediate frequency letter of zero-mean by variable points
Number, which estimates using the power that the power estimation unit of point-variable obtains signal, the power estimation value
New gain coefficient value is obtained by Feedback of Power adjustment unit, new gain coefficient is applied to the clipping adjustment in subsequent time period
Process maintains the output of digital medium-frequency signal near firm power.
In some instances, emitter 10 (such as base station) can be by above-mentioned automated power control receiving
Signal is stabilized and retransmits away, thereby, it is possible to efficiently reduce or avoid the loss of signal of communication in wireless transmissions, protects
Demonstrate,prove the communication quality of user.
In some instances, first vector signal can obtain Second support signal by wireless fading channel.Wirelessly decline
Falling channel can be bulk nanometer materials.Channel is constant on a block, and from a block to another letter
Number block randomly and independently changes.The channel of user apparatus 20 passes through hkIt indicates, wherein k takes natural number.K-th of user apparatus
20 channel hkIt is modeled as with varianceTwo independent zero mean complex Gaussian stochastic variables, i.e.,
Wherein,Wavelength X=c/f of carrier signalc.Wherein, c=3 × 108M/s and fcIt is carrier signal
Carrier frequency.Channel path loss index αdMeet αd≥2。dkIndicate between emitter 10 and k-th of user apparatus 20 away from
From.As shown in Figure 2, d1> d2.Therefore, under NOMA system shown in Fig. 2, channel is classified as 0 < | h1|2≤|h2|2With
In some instances, Second support signal yk meetsWherein, k takes positive integer, hkIndicate kth
The channel of a user apparatus 20, PTIndicate transimission power, x indicates first vector signal, nkIndicate k-th of complicated Gauss white noise
Sound, in first vector signal x, the power allocation factor of the power allocation factor of authenticating tag and each user information is (i.e. each
The power allocation factor of user information needed for a user apparatus 20) and be less than or equal to 1, i.e. ∑ βk+∑αk≤ 1, αkIt indicates
The power allocation factor of k-th of authenticating tag, βkIndicate the power allocation factor of the user information of k-th of user apparatus 20.By
This, can specifically obtain Second support signal.
In some instances, in NOMA system shown in Fig. 2, when user apparatus 20 is two, Second support signal
ykIt can satisfy:Wherein, β1+β2+α1+α2≤
1, k=1,2, PTIndicate transimission power, hkIndicate the channel of k-th of user equipment, nkIndicate k-th of complicated white Gaussian noise,
βkIndicate the power allocation factor of the user information of k-th of user equipment, skIndicate the user information of k-th of user equipment, αkTable
Show the power allocation factor of k-th of authenticating tag, tkIndicate k-th of authenticating tag.Thereby, it is possible to specifically obtain Second support letter
Number.Wherein, k-th of complicated white Gaussian noise meets nk=[nk,1,...nk,L] andEach user sets
Standby UkReceived transient channel signal-to-noise ratioMeetEach user equipment UkReceived average received noise
Compare γkMeet
In some instances, multiple user apparatus 20 can receive Second support signal respectively.Each user apparatus 20 into
Row decoding obtains corresponding target user's information.Each user apparatus 20 makes decisions the interference user apparatus that discharge needs to eliminate
20 sequence, the user information for eliminating corresponding interference user apparatus 20 based on sequence obtain corresponding target user's information.By
This, can preferably improve spectrum efficiency.Such as in NOMA system shown in Fig. 2, the first user equipment can receive the second load
Body signal y1And it is decoded and obtains first object user informationSecond user equipment can receive Second support signal y2And
It is decoded and eliminates first object user informationAnd then obtain second target user's informationSpecifically, due to γh2≥
γh1And β1≥β2> 0, second user equipment decode first object user informationAnd carry out successive interference cancellation (i.e. second
User equipment deletes the first user information s1).After carrying out successive interference cancellation, second user equipment decodes the second target use
Family information
In some instances, Second support signal includes pilot signal, each user apparatus UkBased on Second support signal yk
In pilot signal obtain channel estimation.Thereby, it is possible to obtain channel estimation Indicate the channel of k-th of user apparatus 20
Estimation, i.e.,Indicate the channel estimation of first user device 20,Indicate the channel estimation of second user device 20.
In some instances, each user apparatus 20 can obtain channel estimation and corresponding mesh based on Second support signal
It marks user information and then obtains target authentication label.The mode of authenticating tag is obtained based on emitter 10, is based on each user
Device 20 can be from Second support signal ykMiddle decoding obtains corresponding target user's informationEach user equipment UkIt can be with base
In key k and target user's informationAnd target authentication label is generated using hash function.Due to the power distribution of authenticating tag
The factor is normally provided as lower value, and hash function is healthy and strong to input error, so even if target user's information quilt
Fault recovery can also properly generate target authentication label.As a result, the receiver of each user apparatus 20 can pass through phase
The transmitter (also referred to as transmitter) for the target authentication label Verification emitter 10 answered.Such as in system as shown in Figure 2,
First user equipment is based on first object user information, first key and hash function and obtains first object authenticating tag.Second
User equipment is based on second target user's information, the second key and hash function and obtains the second target authentication label.
In some instances, it is based on channel estimation and target user's information, user apparatus 20 obtains residual signals and is based on
Residual signals and target authentication label obtain test statistics.Such as in system as shown in Figure 2, it is based on channel estimation and mesh
Mark user information, the first user equipment obtains the first residual signals and obtains the based on the first residual signals and target authentication label
One test statistics, second user equipment are obtained the second residual signals and are obtained based on the second residual signals and target authentication label
Second test statistics.The first residual signals, the first test statistics, the second residual signals and second are detailed below to examine
The acquisition of statistic.
In some instances, channel estimation and target user's information, the first user equipment U are based on1It is residual that first can be obtained
Difference signal.First residual signals r1It can satisfy:Based on channel estimation and target
User information, second user equipment U2The second residual signals can be obtained.Second residual signals r2It can satisfy:Wherein, PTIndicate transimission power.Thereby, it is possible to obtain the first residual error letter
Number and the second residual signals.
In some instances, residual signals and target authentication label are subjected to matched filtering and obtain test statistics.As a result,
Test statistics can be obtained, so as to the acquisition of subsequent false-alarm probability.For example, first user sets in system as shown in Figure 2
Standby U1The first test statistics can be obtained based on the first residual signals and target authentication label.Second user equipment U2It can be with base
The second test statistics is obtained in the second residual signals and target authentication label.Specifically, the first user equipment U1It can incite somebody to action
First residual signals r1Matched filtering, which is carried out, with target authentication label obtains the first test statistics δ1AndSecond uses
Family equipment U2By the second residual signals r2Matched filtering, which is carried out, with target authentication label obtains the second test statistics δ2AndThereby, it is possible to the first test statistics or the second test statistics are obtained in the way of matched filtering.Wherein,
τ1Indicate the first rudimentary check statistic.τ2Indicate the second rudimentary check statistic.
In some instances, wireless fading channel can be bulk nanometer materials.The channel estimation of k-th of user equipmentIt is full
FoothkIndicate the channel of k-th of user equipment.When carrier signal is marking signal, the first rudimentary check statistic
MeetSecond rudimentary check statistic meetsWhen carrier signal is normal signal, the first rudimentary check statistics
Amount meetsSecond rudimentary check statistic meetsIt is based onEach user equipment UkAuthenticity can be by each
The parameter of blockIt determines.ParameterMeetWherein, θkIt is test threshold.Test threshold θk's
Optimal value can be determined by the upper limit value of false-alarm probability.In addition,Indicate the first condition of hypothesis testing condition.Indicate false
If the second condition of test condition.First condition refers to that there is no target authentication labels in the residual signals of each user equipment.
Second condition refers to that there are target authentication labels in the residual signals of each user equipment.
In some instances, it is based on channel estimation, each user apparatus 20 can obtain Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then be interrupted
Probability.Such as in system as shown in Figure 2, it is based on channel estimation, the first user equipment obtains the first Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtains
The first outage probability is obtained, and second user equipment obtains the second Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and third Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtains second and interrupts generally
Rate.The first Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio, the first outage probability, the second Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio, third Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and second is detailed below to interrupt
The acquisition of probability.
In some instances, wireless fading channel can be bulk nanometer materials, the channel estimation of k-th of user equipmentIt is full
FoothkIndicate the channel of k-th of user equipment, the first Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,1MeetSecond Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,2,1MeetThird Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,2,2MeetWherein, hkIndicate the channel of k-th of user equipment, k=1,2,
PTIndicate transimission power,Indicate the variance of white Gaussian noise.Thereby, it is possible to obtain, the first letter under bulk nanometer materials is dry to make an uproar
Than, the second Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and third Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio.
In some instances, each user apparatus 20 is based on Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and obtains traffic rate, is obtained based on traffic rate
Outage probability.Thereby, it is possible to obtain outage probability with the concealment of detection system.For example, in system as shown in Figure 2, the
One user equipment is based on the first Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,1Obtain the first traffic rate RS2,1And then obtain the first outage probability.Second uses
Family equipment is based on the second Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,2,1With third Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio λS2,2,2Obtain the second traffic rate RS2,2,1And the third communication
Rate RS2,2,2, and then obtain the second outage probability.Thereby, it is possible to detect the concealment of physical layer certification.
In some instances, when carrier signal is marking signal, when Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio is lower than the lower limit r of traffic rate0When,
Communication can be interrupted.If authenticating tag is considered as noise, the first traffic rate RS2,1It can satisfy RS2,1=log2(1+
λS2,1).Second traffic rate RS2,2,1It can satisfy RS2,2,1=log2(1+λS2,2,1).Third communication rate RS2,2,2It can satisfy
RS2,2,2=log2(1+λS2,2,2).Wherein, λS2,1Indicate the first Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio, λS2,2,1Indicate the second Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio, λS2,2,2It indicates
Third Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio.Interruption thereby, it is possible to obtain the traffic rate of each user equipment, when convenient for analysis carrier signal transmission
Situation.
In some instances, as the first user equipment U1The first user information or second user equipment U can not be decoded2It can not
When decoding second user information, carrier signal Transmission.The first outage probability P that first user equipment calculatesS2,1MeetThe second outage probability P that second user equipment calculatesS2,2MeetWherein, RS1,1Indicate the first traffic rate, RS1,2,1Indicate the second communication
Rate, RS1,2,2Indicate third communication rate, r0Indicate the lower limit of traffic rate.Work as ξS2,1> ξS2,2When, the second outage probability
PS2,2Value be different from the second outage probability PS2,2In ξS2,1≤ξS2,2Under the conditions of value.Wherein,It is each thereby, it is possible to obtain
The outage probability of a user equipment.In this case, convenient for the concealment of detection physical layer certification.In some instances, object
The hidden certification of reason layer can be used together with other safe practices on upper layer, to obtain safer system.
In some instances, each user apparatus 20 is based on test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains false-alarm probability.
Such as in system as shown in Figure 2, the first user equipment is based on the first test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains first
False-alarm probability.Second user equipment is based on the second test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains the second false-alarm probability.
In some instances, each user apparatus 20 can be theoretical based on Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came), obtains
Optimal threshold is obtained, detection probability is obtained based on optimal threshold.Specifically, being based on Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came)
Theory obtains optimal threshold when false-alarm probability is equal to the upper limit of false-alarm probability.Thereby, it is possible to obtain optimal threshold, with after an action of the bowels
The acquisition of continuous detection probability, and then the robustness of detection system.For example, being based on Neyman-in system as shown in Figure 2
Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came) is theoretical, and the first user equipment obtains the first optimal threshold, obtains the based on the first optimal threshold
One detection probability, second user equipment obtain the second optimal threshold, obtain the second detection probability based on the second optimal threshold.
The first false-alarm probability, the second false-alarm probability, the first optimal threshold, the first detection probability, the second optimal threshold is detailed below
With the acquisition of the second detection probability.
In some instances, due toIt obtains WithIt can also obtainWithFirst
User equipment is based on the first test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains the first false-alarm probability PFA1.In some instances, it is based on
Neyman-Pearson is theoretical, the first false-alarm probability PFA1Meet PFA1≤εPFA, wherein εPFAIndicate the upper limit of false-alarm probability.Tool
It is theoretical based on Neyman-Pearson for body, optimize hypothesis testing condition, namely meeting PFA1≤εPFAIn the case of, it is maximum
Change the first detection probability.Work as PFA1≤εPFAWhen, the first false-alarm probability of setting is equal to the upper limit ε of false-alarm probabilityPFA, obtain first most
Excellent threshold valueFirst optimal thresholdMeetFirst detection probability PD,S2,1It can be
With the first optimal thresholdZero mean complex Gaussian channel obtain.First detection probability PD,S2,1It can satisfy:The first detection probability of analogy PD,S2,1Acquisition process, obtain
Obtain the second optimal thresholdSecond optimal thresholdMeetIt is optimal based on second
The second detection probability of threshold calculations PD,S2,2, the second detection probability PD,S2,2It can satisfy:Wherein,Indicate the first optimal threshold,It indicates
Second optimal threshold, L indicate the user information length of the user information in block, α1Indicate the power point of the first authenticating tag
With the factor, α2Indicate the power allocation factor of the second authenticating tag, γ1Indicate the average received signal-to-noise ratio of the first user equipment,
γ2Indicate the average received signal-to-noise ratio of second user equipment.Thereby, it is possible to detect the robustness of physical layer certification.And it can sentence
The accuracy (referred to as " accuracy can be authenticated " or " certification accuracy ") of disconnected physical layer certification.
In some instances, if the calculating of collusion user apparatus is recognized there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus 20
Label and interference plus noise are demonstrate,proved than the equivocal value with error rate and then acquisition recovery key, is based on equivocal value, interruption
Probability and detection probability detection system performance.Wherein, collusion user apparatus is that the user broken through first by illegal user's device fills
Set 20.Collusion user apparatus after being broken can attack other user apparatus 20.Based on the power distribution of authenticating tag because
The power allocation factor of the user information of son or user apparatus 20, collusion user apparatus calculate authenticating tag and interference plus noise
Than.Thereby, it is possible to obtain authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio, equivocal value is obtained convenient for subsequent.Collusion user apparatus base
Target entropy is obtained in error rate, equivocal value is obtained based on target entropy.Thereby, it is possible to obtain equivocal value with detection system
Safety.Such as in system as shown in Figure 2, when the first user equipment or second user equipment are collusion user equipment
When, collusion user equipment calculates authenticating tag and interference plus noise and restores the equivocal of key than obtaining in turn with error rate
Value, based on equivocal value, the first outage probability, the second outage probability, the first detection probability and the second detection probability detection system
System performance.It is described below when the first user equipment or second user equipment are collusion user equipment, collusion user equipment obtains
Equivocal value.
In some instances, the first user equipment U1It is an attempt to discovery second user equipment U2Authenticating tag it is insincere
User equipment.First user equipment U1It can estimate channel response h1, the first user equipment U1From received Second support signal
It deletes user information and authenticating tag obtains first object residual signals.The first object residual signals r of first of block of informationS2,1,l
MeetFirst user equipment U1Calculate the first authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio.
First authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio ηS2,1MeetWherein, α2Indicate the function of the second authenticating tag
Rate distribution factor, β2Indicate the power allocation factor of the user information of second user equipment, γ1Indicate that the first user equipment receives
Average received signal-to-noise ratio.First user equipment U1Carrier signal can be confirmed by first object residual signals.When confirmation
First error probability meetsThe first entropy is obtained based on error probability.First entropy meetsSince the first entropy is binary number, and authenticate
The signal length of label is L.Therefore, attack equipment may detect that 2LOne of kind authenticating tag.It is based on the first entropy at this time
Obtain the first equivocal value.First equivocal value ψS2,1MeetWherein, t2,lIndicate each
The second authenticating tag in block, rS2,1,lIndicate the first object residual signals of first of block of information.
In some instances, second user equipment U2It is an attempt to the first user equipment U of discovery1Authenticating tag it is insincere
User equipment.The case where when above-mentioned first user equipment of analogy is insincere user equipment, second user equipment U2It can obtain
Second target residual signal.Second target residual signal r of first of block of informationS2,2,lMeet
Second authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio ηS2,2Meet ηS2,2=α1γ2, wherein α1Indicate the power distribution of the first authenticating tag
The factor, γ2Indicate the received average received signal-to-noise ratio of second user equipment.The second error probability when confirmation meetsSecond entropy meets
Second equivocal value ψS2, 2 meetWherein, t1,lIndicate first in each block
Authenticating tag, L indicate the user information length of the user information in block, rS2,2,lIndicate second target of first of block of information
Residual signals.It is equivocal when the first user equipment or second user equipment are insincere user equipment thereby, it is possible to obtain
Value.
Below with reference to Fig. 4 a, Fig. 4 b, Fig. 4 c, Fig. 4 d, Fig. 5 a and Fig. 4 b, the system under NOMA system shown in Fig. 2 is analyzed
Performance.Fig. 4 a be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure the first user equipment first in
The waveform diagram that disconnected probability changes with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of the first user equipment.Fig. 4 b is to show the example of the disclosure
Second outage probability of the second user equipment of related non-orthogonal multiple Verification System is with second user equipment received wink
When channel SNRs variation waveform diagram.Fig. 4 c is to show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure
The waveform diagram that first certification accuracy of the first user equipment changes with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of the first user equipment.Figure
4d is that the second certification of the second user equipment for showing non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure is accurate
Property with the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio variation of second user equipment waveform diagram.
Fig. 4 a, Fig. 4 b, Fig. 4 c and Fig. 4 d waveform diagram be all in condition β1=0.5, β2=0.3 and α=0.2 is lower obtains.
As shown in fig. 4 a, waveform A1 is the waveform that the received Second support signal of the first user equipment is normal signal.Waveform B 1 is
The received Second support signal of one user equipment is the waveform of the first marking signal.Waveform C1 is the first user equipment received
Two carrier signals are the waveforms of the second marking signal.As shown in Figure 4 b, waveform A2 is the received Second support of second user equipment
Signal is the waveform of normal signal.Waveform B 2 is the wave that the received Second support signal of second user equipment is the first marking signal
Shape.Waveform C2 is the waveform that the received Second support signal of second user equipment is the second marking signal.Outage probability is (in first
Disconnected probability or the second outage probability) it is reduced with the increase of the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of corresponding user equipment.And
Lower transient channel signal-to-noise ratio region, when identical transient channel signal-to-noise ratio, the interruption of the first marking signal and the second marking signal
Probability is higher than the outage probability of normal signal.Such as
Shown in Fig. 4 c, waveform D1 is the waveform that the received Second support signal of the first user equipment is the first marking signal.
Waveform E1 is the waveform that the received Second support signal of the first user equipment is the second marking signal.As shown in figure 4d, waveform D2
It is the waveform that the received Second support signal of second user equipment is the first marking signal.Waveform E2 is that second user equipment receives
Second support signal be the second marking signal waveform.Authenticate accuracy (the first certification accuracy and the second certification accuracy)
Increase with the increase of the received transient channel signal-to-noise ratio of corresponding user equipment.Wherein, the first marking signal is only to include
The carrier signal of one shared authenticating tag, the second marking signal are the carriers for including the first authenticating tag and the second authenticating tag
Signal.
Fig. 5 a be show non-orthogonal multiple Verification System involved in the example of the disclosure the first user equipment
The waveform diagram that one certification accuracy changes with user information length.Fig. 5 b be show it is nonopiate involved in the example of the disclosure
Second certification accuracy of the second user equipment of multiple access Verification System is with the waveform diagram changed with user information length.
The waveform diagram of Fig. 5 a and Fig. 5 b are all in condition γ1=10dB and γ2It is obtained under=15dB.As shown in Figure 5 a, wave
Shape F1 is the waveform that the received Second support signal of the first user equipment is the first marking signal.Waveform G1 is the first user equipment
Received Second support signal is the waveform of the second marking signal.As shown in Figure 5 b, waveform F2 is that second user equipment is received
Second support signal is the waveform of the first marking signal.Waveform G2 is that the received Second support signal of second user equipment is second
The waveform of marking signal.With the increase of user information length L, authenticating accuracy, (the first certification accuracy and the second certification are quasi-
True property) increase therewith.
This disclosure relates to based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag non-orthogonal multiple Verification System 1 can be improved system peace
Quan Xing, can be improved system authentication fairness and reduce can not security risk caused by new user equipment device, can be avoided upper layer and recognize
Card method brings compatibility issue.
In the disclosure, the transmitting of emitter 10 includes the first vector letter of multiple authenticating tags and multiple user informations
Number, each authenticating tag is superimposed upon in corresponding user information, and first vector signal obtains the second load by wireless fading channel
Body signal；Multiple user apparatus 20 receive Second support signal respectively, and each user apparatus 20 is obtained based on Second support signal
Channel estimation and corresponding target user's information and then acquisition target authentication label, residual signals and test statistics, based on letter
Road estimation, each user apparatus 20 obtain Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and then obtain outage probability, and thereby, it is possible to detect non-orthogonal multiple certification
The concealment of system.Each user apparatus 20 is based on test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains false-alarm probability, is based on
Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came) is theoretical, obtains optimal threshold and then obtains detection probability, non-thereby, it is possible to detect
The robustness of orthogonal multiple access Verification System.Wherein, if collusion user fills there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus 20
It sets and calculates authenticating tag and interference plus noise than the equivocal value with error rate and then acquisition recovery key, based on equivocal
Value, outage probability and detection probability detection system performance.Thereby, it is possible to improve the safety of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System, drop
Security risk caused by low collusion user apparatus, and it is capable of the concealment of whole detection system, robustness and safety.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag, being includes emitter and multiple users
The non-orthogonal multiple Verification System based on superposition physical layer authenticating tag of device, which is characterized in that
Include:
Emitter, is used to emit first vector signal, and the first vector signal includes multiple authenticating tags and multiple use
Family information, each authenticating tag are superimposed upon in the corresponding user information, and the first vector signal is by wirelessly declining
It falls channel and obtains Second support signal；And
Multiple user apparatus, multiple user apparatus receive the Second support signal, each user apparatus base respectively
Channel estimation and corresponding target user's information are obtained in the Second support signal and then obtains target authentication label, are based on institute
State channel estimation and target user's information, the user apparatus obtains residual signals and based on residual signals and described
Target authentication label obtains test statistics, is based on the channel estimation, and each user apparatus obtains Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio in turn
Outage probability is obtained, each user apparatus is based on the test statistics and hypothesis testing condition obtains false-alarm probability, base
In Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came) theory, optimal threshold is obtained, detection probability is obtained based on the optimal threshold,
Wherein, if the collusion user apparatus calculates authenticating tag there are when collusion user apparatus in multiple user apparatus
With interference plus noise than with error rate so that obtain restore key equivocal value, based on it is described it is equivocal value, it is described in
Disconnected probability and the detection probability detection system performance.
2. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Each authenticating tag is mutually indepedent, and the authenticating tag is generated by hash function, corresponding user information and key.
3. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The Second support signal ykMeetWherein, k takes positive integer, hkIndicate the letter of k-th of user apparatus
Road, PTIndicate transimission power, x indicates the first vector signal, nkK-th of complicated white Gaussian noise is indicated, in first vector
In signal x, the power allocation factor of each authenticating tag and the sum of the power allocation factor of each user information are less than or equal to
1, i.e. ∑ βk+∑αk≤ 1, αkIndicate the power allocation factor of k-th of authenticating tag, βkIndicate the power point of k-th of user information
With the factor.
4. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The power allocation factor of the user information of power allocation factor and/or the user apparatus based on the authenticating tag,
The collusion user apparatus calculates authenticating tag and interference plus noise ratio.
5. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The collusion user apparatus is based on error rate and obtains target entropy, obtains the equivocal value based on the target entropy.
6. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The Second support signal includes pilot signal, and each user apparatus is based on described in the Second support signal
Pilot signal obtains channel estimation.
7. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Each user apparatus makes decisions the sequence for the interference user apparatus that discharge needs to eliminate, and is eliminated based on the sequence
The user information of corresponding interference user apparatus obtains corresponding target user's information.
8. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
Each user apparatus is based on the Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio and obtains traffic rate, obtains outage probability based on the traffic rate.
9. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
The residual signals and target authentication label are subjected to matched filtering and obtain test statistics.
10. non-orthogonal multiple Verification System as described in claim 1, it is characterised in that:
It is obtained based on Neyman-Pearson (Nei Man-Pearson came) theory when the false-alarm probability is equal to the upper limit of false-alarm probability
Obtain optimal threshold.
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