CN110361761A - A kind of production GNSS cheating interference method - Google Patents
A kind of production GNSS cheating interference method Download PDFInfo
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- CN110361761A CN110361761A CN201910802591.7A CN201910802591A CN110361761A CN 110361761 A CN110361761 A CN 110361761A CN 201910802591 A CN201910802591 A CN 201910802591A CN 110361761 A CN110361761 A CN 110361761A
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/13—Receivers
- G01S19/21—Interference related issues ; Issues related to cross-correlation, spoofing or other methods of denial of service
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Abstract
The invention discloses a kind of production GNSS cheating interference methods, method includes the following steps: step 1: real satellite signal being transmitted to GNSS receiver, obtains real satellite signal；Step 2: deception control being carried out to real satellite signal according to real satellite signal, is generated with real satellite signal with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than the cheating interference signal of real satellite signal；Step 3: the cheating interference signal of high level being inputted into satellite navigation receiver, automatic growth control AGC reduces gain, satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after reducing gain；Step 4: if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference semaphore lock, enabled cheat continues to repeat step 2-4, until enabled cheat if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference signal are unlocked.The method realizes applicable Global Satellite Navigation System receiver satellite-signal deception measures, quickly accesses satellite navigation receiver, realizes navigation deception.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to a kind of satellite navigation Cheating Technology fields, and in particular to a kind of cheating interference side production GNSS
Method.
Background technique
Global navigation satellite system GNSS has the characteristics that round-the-clock, round-the-clock, comprehensive, can provide for user
Position Position, speed Velocity and time Time information.GNSS system the production of people, life every aspect all
Play most important effect.Currently, GNSS system mainly includes GPS of America, China BDS, Russian GLONASS and Europe
Tetra- large satellite navigation system of GALILEO.GNSS system is by broadcasting navigation signal, and satellite message is with data mode to carrier wave and puppet
Code is modulated twice, continuous radiation to the ground after formation radio wave.Receiver passes through the satellite-signal acquisition received and defends
Championship, which is set, carries out positioning calculation with pseudo-range information.
With the gradually expansion that satellite navigation is applied, satellite navigation Cheating Technology application is further extensive.Deceiving interference source
The interference signal similar with true navigation signal structure, which can be emitted, makes receiver acquisition in the case where receiver has no consciousness
With trace on curve, and navigation information entrained by curve is decoded to carry out positioning calculation, to generate deception
Effect.With the development of software-defined radio SDR technology, the flexibility for implementing Deceiving interference attack is increasing, implements
Cost is lower and lower.The threat that this undoubtedly faces commercial receiver is more significant.
According to the difference of Deceiving interference signal producing method, deceiving jamming can be divided into and production deception is dry
It disturbs:
(1) deceiving jamming refers to that deception side receives true satellite navigation signals only by receiver antenna, then
By power amplification appropriate, signal transmitting is then carried out by corresponding transmitting antenna alignment target receiver.As it can be seen that this is taken advantage of
Journey of out-tricking can generate signal time delay, this controllable time delay is exactly control amount when deceiving jamming forms deception.Forwarding
Formula deception process is fairly simple, haves no need to change the navigation message that satellite-signal is transmitted, but the deception process of repeating jamming
Fairly simple, receiver, which carries out some simple anti-deception measures, can be detected out the presence of curve.
(2) production cheating interference, directly duplication radio-frequency carrier, spreading code and navigation data bit, because of above- mentioned information
Corresponding GNSS civil signal is all open and clear.By changing the value of above-mentioned parameter, make the difference of they and actual signal, i.e.,
It can make receiver rear navigator fix result for generating mistake on acquisition and tracking to curve.
It wherein, can be by existing production cheating interference point according to the difficulty of implementation complexity and detection cheating interference
Are as follows: primary, middle rank and advanced production cheating interference.
Primary production deception: system is put by a main GNSS signal simulator, radio-frequency transmissions antenna and signal power
The system of big device composition.Due to lacking related prior information, the satellite-signal that simulator generates is difficult and true satellite-signal
It keeps synchronizing.It thus says to a certain extent, this curve appears to noise for GNSS receiver.But
This curve can seriously affect the capture program of receiver, lead to the decline of acquisition performance, and then receiver is forced to lose
Lock or reacquisition.
Intermediate production cheating interference: system regenerates curve, then emit and take advantage of using GNSS information is first received
The operating mode of signal is deceived, therefore interference system has reception, cheats and emit these three modules.Firstly, built-in reception mould
Block first receives after true satellite navigation signals obtain the information such as code phase, carrier doppler, satellite ephemeris, then by these letters
Breath constructs the curve synchronous with actual signal, finally the curve constructed towards the receiving antenna of intended receivers
Launch.
Advanced production cheating interference: compared with intermediate production cheating interference, advanced production cheating interference is overcome
The drawbacks of single transmitting antenna, is carried out joint deception using multiple intermediate production interference sources, can defeat and be examined based on angle of arrival DOA
The anti-deceptive interference technology of survey.But in order to realize this cheating interference, need to know the accurate coordinates point of intended receivers antenna,
Realize that the complexity of this cheating interference will be much larger than above-mentioned primary and middle rank, because in the complexity base of intermediate production
On plinth, since the pseudorange trick value in multiple intermediate cheating interference sources should converge on a point, so the clock between them is same
Step is just particularly important.Thus, it can be known that the effective range of this cheating interference is limited.And accurate phase estimation is also wanted
Ask interference source cannot be excessive with a distance from intended receivers, this is also the physical limit of such cheating interference.
Summary of the invention
The object of the present invention is to provide a kind of production GNSS cheating interference methods.The method does not need intended receivers essence
True target position is suitable for Global Satellite Navigation System receiver satellite-signal deception measures, can quickly access satellite and lead
Navigate receiver, realizes navigation deception.
In order to achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a kind of production GNSS cheating interference method, this method includes following
Step: step 1: the real satellite signal that real satellite navigation system emits being received into GNSS receiver, real satellite is obtained
Signal；Step 2: in GNSS receiver, deception control being carried out to real satellite signal according to real satellite signal, is generated and true
Real satellite-signal is with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than the cheating interference signal of real satellite signal；Step 3: by the deception of high level
Interference signal inputs satellite navigation receiver, and the automatic growth control AGC inside satellite navigation receiver reduces gain, reduces and increases
Satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after benefit；Step 4: if the satellite navigation receiver and cheating interference of losing lock
Semaphore lock, then enabled cheat continues to repeat step if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference signal are unlocked
2-4, until enabled cheat.
Most preferably, cheat the method for control the following steps are included: step 2.1: according to real satellite signal replication go out with
Real satellite signal with frequency, with the local replica signal of phase；Step 2.2: simultaneously by local replica signal and real satellite signal
GNSS receiver is inputted, the input signal of GNSS receiver Antenna aperture is generated；Step 2.3: intermediate frequency being carried out to input signal and is adopted
Sample generates if sampling signal；Step 2.4: if sampling signal and input signal being subjected to coherent demodulation processing, output is relevant
Output signal；Step 2.5: adjusting the signal message of relevant output signal, it is dry higher than the deception of real satellite signal to obtain level
Disturb signal.
Most preferably, real satellite signal is calculated according to the position of intended receivers；Real satellite signal includes
The ephemeris information and temporal information of real satellite navigation system transmitting；Temporal information is the pulse per second (PPS) of accurate whole second；It is described true
Real satellite-signal is ST(t), and meet:
Wherein, t is the pulse per second (PPS) of accurate whole second；PTFor the real satellite signal power in receiving antenna mouth face；dk(t) table
Show the ephemeris information of kth satellite；ck(t) spreading code of kth satellite is indicated；ω is the angular frequency of GNSS satellite signal frequency point
Rate；φkIndicate the initial phase of kth satellite GNSS frequency carrier.
Most preferably, local replica signal SS(t), and meet:
Wherein, PSFor receiving antenna mouth face cheating interference signal power；Δ τ be curve with respect to actual signal when
Prolong；dsk(t) ephemeris information for including by the spurious signal of kth satellite；The star of local replica signal and real satellite signal
It is identical to go through information.
Most preferably, input signal is R (t)；Some noise signal is n (t), and R (t) in input signal R (t)
Meet:
R (t)=ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
Most preferably, if sampling signal is R [nTs], and meet:
Wherein, i is the sampled point on i-th of pseudo-code sequence, and subscript T and S respectively correspond true and duplication GNSS and defend
Star signal.PiAnd diThe signal power and data bit on i-th of pseudo-code sequence are corresponded to respectively；The letter of relevant output signal
Number information includes signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudorange；τi、fdiWithBe respectively the code delay of signal, Doppler frequency and
The initial phase of i-th of pseudo-code sequence.TsIt is sampling interval, η (nTs) it is the zero-mean white Gauss noise sampled.
Most preferably, it also needs after coherent demodulation processing by exporting relevant output signal after low-pass filtering；Relevant output
Signal is Yi(NTs), and meet:
Wherein,It is i-th of pseudo-code sequence of actual signal and the puppet of local replica signal respectively
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between code sequence；Be respectively curve and
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between local replica pseudo-code sequence；η(NTs) it is after correlator low pass filters
Component of thermal noise.
Most preferably, when satellite navigation receiver is locked on i-th of real satellite signal, Doppler frequencyAnd code delayRelevant output signal Yi(NTs) meet:
Most preferably, when satellite navigation receiver is locked on i-th of cheating interference signal, curve it is more
General Le frequencyAnd code delayRelevant output signal Yi(NTs) meet:
Most preferably, cheating interference signal by enter GNSS receiver track loop, then with reduce gain after defending
The locking of star navigation neceiver.
With the invention, it is implemented without the accurate target position of intended receivers, applicable Global Satellite Navigation System connects
Receipts machine satellite-signal deception measures quickly access satellite navigation receiver, realize navigation deception.
Compared with the existing technology, the invention has the following advantages:
1, the method for the present invention, which realizes, does not need the accurate target position of intended receivers, is suitable for global navigation satellite system
The deception measures of system receiver satellite-signal.
2, the method for the present invention can be applicable to the motion carriers platform such as vehicle, unmanned plane.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is production GNSS cheating interference method flow diagram provided by the invention；
Fig. 2 is the curve and actual signal figure that production GNSS cheating interference method provided by the invention captures；
Fig. 3 is production GNSS cheating interference method provided by the invention to unmanned plane actual test result figure.
Specific embodiment
Below in conjunction with attached drawing, by specific embodiment, the invention will be further described, these embodiments are merely to illustrate
The present invention is not limiting the scope of the invention.
The present invention is a kind of production GNSS cheating interference method, as shown in Figure 1, method includes the following steps:
Step 1: the real satellite signal that real satellite navigation system emits is transmitted to GNSS receiver, it is true to obtain
Satellite-signal；The real satellite signal that GNSS receiver obtains includes ephemeris information and the time of real satellite navigation system transmitting
Information, real satellite signal are calculated according to the general location (x, y, z) of intended receivers；Temporal information is accurate whole
The pulse per second (PPS) of second；Wherein, the received real satellite signal of GNSS receiver is ST(t), and meet:
Wherein, t is the pulse per second (PPS) of accurate whole second；PTFor the real satellite signal power in receiving antenna mouth face；dk(t) table
Show the ephemeris information of kth satellite；ck(t) spreading code of kth satellite is indicated；ω is the angular frequency of GNSS satellite signal frequency point
Rate；φkIndicate the initial phase of kth satellite GNSS frequency carrier.Obtain intended receivers, accurate whole moment second t with
And the ephemeris information that real satellite navigation system is broadcast is to regenerate navigation message.
Step 2: in GNSS receiver, deception control being carried out to real satellite signal according to real satellite signal, is generated
With real satellite signal with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than the cheating interference signal of real satellite signal；Wherein, control is cheated
Method the following steps are included:
Step 2.1: real satellite navigation system hair is calculated according to the target position information (x, y, z) of real satellite signal
The pulse per second (PPS) t and ephemeris information for the accurate whole second penetrated, and copied according to the pulse per second (PPS) t and ephemeris information of accurate whole second
With real satellite signal with frequency, with the local replica signal S of phaseS(t), and meet:
Wherein, PSFor receiving antenna mouth face cheating interference signal power；Δ τ be curve with respect to actual signal when
Prolong；dsk(t) ephemeris information for including by the spurious signal of kth satellite；The star of local replica signal and real satellite signal
It is identical to go through information.
Step 2.2: local replica signal SS(t) and real satellite signal ST(t) GNSS receiver is inputted simultaneously, generated
The input signal of GNSS receiver Antenna aperture is R (t)；Some noise signal is n (t), and R in input signal R (t)
(t) meet:
R (t)=ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
Step 2.3: if sampling being carried out to input signal R (t), generates if sampling signal R [nTs], and meet:
Wherein, i is the sampled point on i-th of pseudo-code sequence, and subscript T and S respectively correspond true and duplication GNSS and defend
Star signal.PiAnd diThe signal power and data bit on i-th of pseudo-code sequence are corresponded to respectively；τi、fdiWithIt is respectively
The code delay of signal, Doppler frequency and i-th of pseudo-code sequence initial phase.TsIt is sampling interval, η (nTs) it is the zero of sampling
Mean value white Gauss noise.
Step 2.3: in receiver despreading process, by if sampling signal R [nTs] and input signal R (t) be concerned with
Demodulation process also needs to export relevant output signal by exporting relevant output signal after low-pass filtering after coherent demodulation processing
For Yi(NTs), and meet:
Wherein,It is i-th of pseudo-code sequence of actual signal and the puppet of local replica signal respectively
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between code sequence；Be respectively curve and
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between local replica pseudo-code sequence；η(NTs) it is after correlator low pass filters
Component of thermal noise.
Step 2.4: adjusting the signal message of relevant output signal, including signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudorange, deception
Interference signal is attacked previously received machine and is had been locked on i-th of actual signal, then its Doppler frequencyAnd code delayBe concerned with output signal Yi (NTs) satisfaction at this time:
Obtain the cheating interference signal that level is higher than real satellite signal 20dB or more.
Step 3: the cheating interference signal of high level being inputted into satellite navigation receiver, cheating interference signal level is than true
The big 20dB or more of satellite signal levels reaches the automatic growth control AGC inside the later satellite navigation receiver of Antenna aperture and increases
Benefit will carry out dynamic adjustment, satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after gain reduction.
Step 4: if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock enters the track loop of GNSS receiver, in tracking and real satellite
Signal is in the same direction with frequency and gain is to matched cheating interference signal, and with cheating interference semaphore lock, curve is how general at this time
Strangle frequencyAnd code delayBe concerned with output signal Y at this timei(NTs) meet:
Then enabled cheat continues to repeat step if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference signal are unlocked
2-4, until enabled cheat.
It is the case where -90dBm reaches Antenna aperture that cheating interference signal level is provided in Fig. 2, at this time since AGC gain is dynamic
State adjustment, receiver can lock the cheating interference signal with real satellite signal with frequency with phase after losing lock is mended again.To certain model
The navigation induction result of unmanned plane is as shown in figure 3, wherein A point is unmanned plane takeoff point；B is to start to trap point；C point, which is off, to lure
It catches a little；D point is shutdown signal point, it is seen that regenerative deception GNSS satellite signal can quickly access the navigation of unmanned plane GNSS satellite
In system, navigation induction deception is realized.
The working principle of the invention:
Real satellite signal is received into GNSS receiver, real satellite signal is obtained；According to real satellite signal to true
Real satellite-signal carries out deception control, generates with real satellite signal with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than taking advantage of for real satellite signal
Deceive interference signal；The cheating interference signal of high level is inputted into satellite navigation receiver, automatic growth control AGC reduces gain,
Satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after reducing gain；If the satellite navigation receiver and cheating interference of losing lock
Semaphore lock, then enabled cheat continues to repeat step if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference signal are unlocked
2-4, until enabled cheat.
In conclusion a kind of production GNSS cheating interference method of the present invention, realizes applicable Global Satellite Navigation System
Receiver satellite-signal deception measures quickly access satellite navigation receiver, realize navigation deception.
It is discussed in detail although the contents of the present invention have passed through above preferred embodiment, but it should be appreciated that above-mentioned
Description is not considered as limitation of the present invention.After those skilled in the art have read above content, for of the invention
A variety of modifications and substitutions all will be apparent.Therefore, protection scope of the present invention should be limited to the appended claims.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of production GNSS cheating interference method, which comprises the following steps:
Step 1: the real satellite signal that real satellite navigation system emits being transmitted to GNSS receiver, obtains real satellite letter
Number；
Step 2: in GNSS receiver, deception control being carried out to real satellite signal according to real satellite signal, is generated and true
Real satellite-signal is with frequency, same to phase, and level is higher than the cheating interference signal of real satellite signal；
Step 3: the cheating interference signal of high level being inputted into satellite navigation receiver, the automatic increasing inside satellite navigation receiver
Benefit control AGC reduces gain, satellite navigation receiver and real satellite signal losing lock after reducing gain；
Step 4: if the satellite navigation receiver of losing lock and cheating interference semaphore lock, enabled cheat, if the satellite of losing lock is led
Boat receiver and cheating interference signal are unlocked, then continue to repeat step 2-4, until enabled cheat.
2. production GNSS cheating interference method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the method packet of the deception control
Include following steps:
Step 2.1: being gone out with real satellite signal according to real satellite signal replication with frequency, with the local replica signal of phase；
Step 2.2: local replica signal and real satellite signal being inputted into GNSS receiver simultaneously, generate GNSS receiver antenna
The input signal in mouth face；
Step 2.3: if sampling being carried out to input signal, generates if sampling signal；
Step 2.4: if sampling signal and input signal being subjected to coherent demodulation processing, export relevant output signal；
Step 2.5: adjusting the signal message of relevant output signal, obtain the cheating interference letter that level is higher than real satellite signal
Number.
3. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 2, which is characterized in that the real satellite signal is root
It is calculated according to the position of intended receivers；The real satellite signal includes the ephemeris information of real satellite navigation system transmitting
And temporal information；The temporal information is the pulse per second (PPS) of accurate whole second；The real satellite signal is ST(t), and meet:
Wherein, t is the pulse per second (PPS) of accurate whole second；PTFor the real satellite signal power in receiving antenna mouth face；dk(t) kth is indicated
The ephemeris information of satellite；ck(t) spreading code of kth satellite is indicated；ω is the angular frequency of GNSS satellite signal frequency point；φkTable
Show the initial phase of kth satellite GNSS frequency carrier.
4. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 3, which is characterized in that the local replica signal is SS
(t), and meet:
Wherein, PSFor receiving antenna mouth face cheating interference signal power；Δ τ is time delay of the curve with respect to actual signal；dsk
(t) ephemeris information for including by the spurious signal of kth satellite；The ephemeris of the local replica signal and real satellite signal
Information is identical.
5. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 4, which is characterized in that the input signal is R (t)；
Some noise signal is n (t) in input signal R (t), and R (t) meets:
R (t)=ST(t)+SS(t)+n(t)
6. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 5, which is characterized in that the if sampling signal is R
[nTs], and meet:
Wherein, i is the sampled point on i-th of pseudo-code sequence, and subscript T and S respectively correspond true and duplication GNSS satellite letter
Number.PiAnd diThe signal power and data bit on i-th of pseudo-code sequence are corresponded to respectively；
The signal message of the relevant output signal includes signal power, Doppler frequency and pseudorange；τi、fdiWithIt is letter respectively
Number code delay, Doppler frequency and i-th of pseudo-code sequence initial phase.TsIt is sampling interval, η (nTs) be sampling zero
It is worth white Gauss noise.
7. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that after the coherent demodulation processing also
It needs by exporting relevant output signal after low-pass filtering；The relevant output signal is Yi(NTs), and meet:
Wherein,It is i-th of pseudo-code sequence of actual signal and the pseudo-code sequence of local replica signal respectively
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between column； It is that curve and local are multiple respectively
Code delay, Doppler frequency and initial phase difference between pseudo-code sequence processed；η(NTs) it is that the filtered heat of correlator low pass is made an uproar
Sound component.
8. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 7, which is characterized in that the satellite navigation receiver lock
When being scheduled on i-th of real satellite signal, Doppler frequencyAnd code delayThe relevant output
Signal Yi(NTs) meet:
9. production GNSS cheating interference method as claimed in claim 7, which is characterized in that the satellite navigation receiver lock
When being scheduled on i-th of cheating interference signal, the Doppler frequency of curveAnd code delayInstitute
State relevant output signal Yi(NTs) meet:
10. production GNSS cheating interference method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the cheating interference signal is logical
The track loop into GNSS receiver is crossed, then is locked with the satellite navigation receiver after reduction gain.
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| CN111142076A (en) * | 2020-01-06 | 2020-05-12 | 西南电子技术研究所（中国电子科技集团公司第十研究所） | Power control method for improving low interception performance of radar |
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| CN112285746A (en) * | 2020-10-21 | 2021-01-29 | 厦门大学 | Deception detection method and device based on multipath signals |
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