CN110111919B - Nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system - Google Patents
Nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
- G21C9/00—Emergency protection arrangements structurally associated with the reactor, e.g. safety valves provided with pressure equalisation devices
- G21C9/02—Means for effecting very rapid reduction of the reactivity factor under fault conditions, e.g. reactor fuse; Control elements having arrangements activated in an emergency
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- G—PHYSICS
- G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
- G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
- G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
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- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
- Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
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Abstract
The invention discloses a method for controlling a shutdown circuit breaker of a nuclear power plant, which is characterized in that a main control unit and a DO unit are arranged in at least 1 protection group of a safety-level DCS (distributed control system) of the nuclear power plant, wherein the main control unit is used for calculating and determining whether to output a shutdown request after safety-level data is obtained, and the DO unit controls the shutdown of a control circuit of the shutdown circuit breaker according to whether the shutdown request exists; wherein, the DO unit includes 4 DO modules, and 4 DO modules are: the system comprises a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module, wherein the DO1 module and the DO3 module are connected in parallel to form a 1# parallel module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are connected in parallel to form a 2# parallel module, and the 1# parallel module and the 2# parallel module are connected in series on a control loop of the shutdown circuit breaker; the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in an open circuit state when the shutdown request switching value exists, and the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in a closed circuit state when the shutdown request switching value does not exist.
Description
Technical Field
The invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power, in particular to a safety-level DCS shutdown control system of a nuclear power station.
Background
At present, a safety level DCS (distributed control system) of a nuclear power station is provided with four protection groups, and an emergency shutdown signal generated by each protection group is output to a field shutdown breaker to execute actions through a DO (data only) module of the protection group. In an existing nuclear power safety level DCS, only 1 DO module is generally configured in 1 protection group, and the 1 DO module is output to a field shutdown breaker.
This design has the following problems:
1. during normal operation, it is not possible to determine whether the DO module has a shutdown function, and if the shutdown signal output function is verified,
the shutdown circuit breaker is enabled to execute actions to influence the shutdown logic of the system, so that the original logic controlled by 4 protection groups is degraded into one out of three, and the test frequency is limited;
2. similarly, a DO module failure in a protection group can cause degradation of the system shutdown logic when maintenance is required.
Disclosure of Invention
The invention aims to provide a safety-level DCS shutdown control system of a nuclear power station, which has the structure that a DO module is output in a optimized shutdown mode, so that logic degradation caused by maintenance or test is avoided.
The specific technical scheme of the invention is as follows:
a nuclear power plant safety level DCS shutdown control system,
at least 1 protection group of the nuclear power station safety level DCS system is internally provided with a main control unit and a DO unit,
wherein,
the main control unit is used for calculating and determining whether to output a shutdown request after obtaining the safety level data,
the DO unit controls the on-off of a control loop of a shutdown breaker according to whether a shutdown request exists;
wherein,
the DO unit includes 4 DO modules, and the 4 DO modules are respectively: the system comprises a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module, wherein the DO1 module and the DO3 module are connected in parallel to form a 1# parallel module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are connected in parallel to form a 2# parallel module, and the 1# parallel module and the 2# parallel module are connected in series on a control loop of the shutdown circuit breaker;
the master control unit is provided with four shutdown request output switching value channels which are respectively connected to the controlled ends of a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module in a control mode,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in an open circuit state when a shutdown request switching value exists,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in a closed state when no shutdown request switching amount exists.
The design principle of the invention is as follows: the shutdown output function is an important function of a nuclear power station safety-level DCS for guaranteeing the safety of a nuclear reactor, the shutdown output needs to be verified during the normal operation of the nuclear power station, and replacement and maintenance are needed when a DO module fails, and because the number of the DO modules in the traditional DCS is only 1 and the DO modules are connected in series on a control path, the shutdown logic degradation of a protection system can be caused when a single DO shutdown output test or fault maintenance and replacement are carried out. In the design of the invention, two DO outputs are connected in parallel, the remaining two DO outputs are also connected in parallel, and then two parallel parts are connected in series to realize shutdown signal output, so that the defect of using a single DO shutdown output is improved under the condition of not increasing the complexity of the design, and the maintainability, the reliability, the testability and the availability of the whole shutdown output are improved.
At the same time, the structure can also have a high reliability, wherein,
1. after the main control unit of the DCS system calculates external data, when the main control unit outputs no shutdown request to the control of 4 DO modules, under normal conditions, the four DO modules are switched to be in a closed state, and a control loop of a shutdown breaker is conducted, so that the control rod can be kept clamped; even if one DO module fails, the system can be ensured to work safely, for example: when the DO1 fault is abnormal, the shutdown breaker control loop can be conducted as DO3 keeps closed and DO2 or/and DO4 keeps closed.
2. After the main control unit of the DCS system calculates external data, when the main control unit outputs a shutdown request to the control of 4 DO modules, under normal conditions, the four DO modules are switched to a disconnected state, and a shutdown breaker control loop is disconnected, so that the clamping of a control rod is disconnected; even if one DO module fails, the system can be ensured to work safely, for example: when the DO1 fault is abnormal, the shutdown breaker loop can be opened due to the disconnection of DO2 and DO 4.
3. During fault maintenance, the safe operation of the system can be ensured only by disassembling 1 DO module every time, and logic degradation is avoided.
4. In the test, each test is carried out by a single DO module, namely, each single DO module carries out open-close test, for example: when the protection group works normally, the DO1 module can be subjected to opening and closing tests, after the tests are completed, the same tests are sequentially carried out on DO2, DO3 and DO4, the whole process can be automatically tested, and the purpose of shutdown function output test is achieved.
The reasons why the system can be safely operated and degradation is not caused are as follows: the invention has 4 DO modules in total, wherein 2 DO modules are connected in parallel to form OR logic, the other 2 DO modules are also connected in parallel to form OR logic, and the last 2 DO modules are connected in series to form AND logic, so that the DO module has higher logic level, and the operation of any 1 DO module cannot influence the operation of the system.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all forced guide relays.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are MOS tubes.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all triodes.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all solid relays.
A maintenance method of a nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system comprises the steps that when a DO unit fails, a failed DO module is dismounted, a new DO module is replaced, and when the DO module is dismounted: only 1 DO module in one DO unit is allowed to be disassembled.
In the testing method of the nuclear power station safety level DCS reactor shutdown control system, during testing, a closing and opening command is sent to the DO module through the main control unit, and the closing and opening command only allows 1 DO module in one DO unit to be received.
In order to verify that the invention has higher reliability than the technical scheme of a single DO module, the reliability parameter research and analysis of the invention is as follows:
DO1 and DO3 are a group of parallel outputs, DO2 and DO4 are a group of parallel outputs, and the two groups of outputs are AND logic and finally output to the shutdown circuit breaker. For the sake of analysis, it is assumed that the individual DO reliability for the shutdown output is R, typically 0 < R < 1, and is generally in series according to the system, but divided into two parallel parts:
1. a first part: DO1 connected in parallel with DO3 with reliability R1＝1-(1-R)×(1-R)；
2. A second part: DO2 and DO4 in parallel, reliability and R1In the same way, R2＝1-(1-R)×(1-R)；
3. Finally, the first part and the second part are connected in series to obtain the four DO shutdown output reliability R3＝[1-(1-R)2]2。
According to the calculation result of the above complaints, as long as R is less than R3< 1, the architecture will improve system reliability, with reliability calculations for a single DO output of shutdown yielding 0.382 < R < 1. According to the shutdown reliability requirement and experience feedback of the nuclear power plant, the reliability requirement of a single DO module is more than 0.382, namely, the reliability of the traditional single DO module is proved to be the reliability of the invention, and the reliability of the single DO module is generally 0.9 and is close to 1. Therefore, the reliability of the present application is certainly better.
Compared with the prior art, the invention has the following advantages and beneficial effects: in summary, the invention can be carried out when the whole protection group works normally in both test and single module maintenance without bypass and logic degradation, and the structure of 4 DO modules improves the availability, testability and reliability of shutdown output of each protection group.
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The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the embodiments of the invention and are incorporated in and constitute a part of this application, illustrate embodiment(s) of the invention and together with the description serve to explain the principles of the invention. In the drawings:
FIG. 1 is a diagram of a DCS system and a protection group.
Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a protected group.
FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a DO unit of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a block diagram of the 4 DO modules as switches.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following examples, and the exemplary embodiments and descriptions thereof are only used for explaining the present invention and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention.
Example one
As shown in fig. 1, 2, and 3:
nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system:
as shown in fig. 1, a main control unit and a DO unit (as shown in fig. 2) are arranged in at least 1 protection group (4 in the figure) of a nuclear power plant safety level DCS system,
wherein,
the main control unit is used for calculating and determining whether to output a shutdown request after obtaining the safety level data,
the DO unit controls the on-off of a control loop of a shutdown breaker according to whether a shutdown request exists;
wherein,
as shown in fig. 3, the DO unit includes 4 DO modules, and the 4 DO modules are respectively: the system comprises a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module, wherein the DO1 module and the DO3 module are connected in parallel to form a 1# parallel module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are connected in parallel to form a 2# parallel module, and the 1# parallel module and the 2# parallel module are connected in series on a control loop of the shutdown circuit breaker;
the master control unit is provided with four shutdown request output switching value channels which are respectively connected to the controlled ends of a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module in a control mode,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in an open circuit state when a shutdown request switching value exists,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in a closed state when no shutdown request switching amount exists.
In fig. 2, the AI unit is an external analog input, the DI unit is an external digital input, the AO unit is an analog output, and the DO unit is a switching value output, wherein the main control unit obtains the calculation parameters of the control rods according to the AI unit and the DI unit, and then performs operation to form a shutdown request. When the DO unit is communicated with the main control unit, whether the shutdown request exists or not is calculated, and then 4 DO modules are controlled through the shutdown request.
The design principle of the invention is as follows: the shutdown output function is an important function of a nuclear power station safety-level DCS for guaranteeing the safety of a nuclear reactor, the shutdown output needs to be verified during the normal operation of the nuclear power station, and replacement and maintenance are needed when a DO module fails, and because the number of the DO modules in the traditional DCS is only 1 and the DO modules are connected in series on a control path, the shutdown logic degradation of a protection system can be caused when a single DO shutdown output test or fault maintenance and replacement are carried out. In the design of the invention, two DO outputs are connected in parallel, the remaining two DO outputs are also connected in parallel, and then two parallel parts are connected in series to realize shutdown signal output, so that the defect of using a single DO shutdown output is improved under the condition of not increasing the complexity of the design, and the maintainability, the reliability, the testability and the availability of the whole shutdown output are improved.
At the same time, the structure can also have a high reliability, wherein,
as in fig. 4, consider 4 DO modules as switches:
1. after the main control unit of the DCS system calculates external data, when the main control unit outputs no shutdown request to the control of 4 DO modules, under normal conditions, the four DO modules are switched to be in a closed state, and a control loop of a shutdown breaker is conducted, so that the control rod can be kept clamped; even if one DO module fails, the system can be ensured to work safely, for example: when the DO1 fault is abnormal, the shutdown breaker control loop can be conducted as DO3 keeps closed and DO2 or/and DO4 keeps closed.
2. After the main control unit of the DCS system calculates external data, when the main control unit outputs a shutdown request to the control of 4 DO modules, under normal conditions, the four DO modules are switched to a disconnected state, and a shutdown breaker control loop is disconnected, so that the clamping of a control rod is disconnected; even if one DO module fails, the system can be ensured to work safely, for example: when the DO1 fault is abnormal, the shutdown breaker loop can be opened due to the disconnection of DO2 and DO 4.
3. During fault maintenance, the safe operation of the system can be ensured only by disassembling 1 DO module every time, and logic degradation is avoided.
4. In the test, each test is carried out by a single DO module, namely, each single DO module carries out open-close test, for example: when the protection group works normally, the DO1 module can be subjected to opening and closing tests, after the tests are completed, the same tests are sequentially carried out on DO2, DO3 and DO4, the whole process can be automatically tested, and the purpose of shutdown function output test is achieved.
The reasons why the system can be safely operated and degradation is not caused are as follows: the invention has 4 DO modules in total, wherein 2 DO modules are connected in parallel to form OR logic, the other 2 DO modules are also connected in parallel to form OR logic, and the last 2 DO modules are connected in series to form AND logic, so that the DO module has higher logic level, and the operation of any 1 DO module cannot influence the operation of the system.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all forced guide relays.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are MOS tubes.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all triodes.
The DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all solid relays.
A maintenance method of a nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system comprises the steps that when a DO unit fails, a failed DO module is dismounted, a new DO module is replaced, and when the DO module is dismounted: only 1 DO module in one DO unit is allowed to be disassembled.
In the testing method of the nuclear power station safety level DCS reactor shutdown control system, during testing, a closing and opening command is sent to the DO module through the main control unit, and the closing and opening command only allows 1 DO module in one DO unit to be received.
In order to verify that the invention has higher reliability than the technical scheme of a single DO module, the reliability parameter research and analysis of the invention is as follows:
DO1 and DO3 are a group of parallel outputs, DO2 and DO4 are a group of parallel outputs, and the two groups of outputs are AND logic and finally output to the shutdown circuit breaker. For the sake of analysis, it is assumed that the individual DO reliability for the shutdown output is R, typically 0 < R < 1, and is generally in series according to the system, but divided into two parallel parts:
a first part: DO1 connected in parallel with DO3 with reliability R1＝1-(1-R)×(1-R)；
A second part: DO2 and DO4 in parallel, reliability and R1In the same way, R2＝1-(1-R)×(1-R)；
Finally, the first part and the second part are connected in series to obtain the four DO shutdown output reliability R3＝[1-(1-R)2]2。
According to the calculation result of the above complaints, as long as R is less than R3< 1, the architecture will improve system reliability, with reliability calculations for a single DO output of shutdown yielding 0.382 < R < 1. According to the shutdown reliability requirement and experience feedback of the nuclear power plant, the reliability requirement of a single DO module is more than 0.382, namely, the reliability of the traditional single DO module is proved to be the reliability of the invention, and the reliability of the single DO module is generally 0.9 and is close to 1. Therefore, the reliability of the present application is certainly better.
It is clear to those skilled in the art that, for convenience and brevity of description, the specific implementation of the method described above can be understood with reference to the foregoing embodiments, and will not be described herein again.
In the description of the embodiments of the present invention, unless otherwise explicitly specified or limited, the terms "mounted," "connected," and "connected" are to be construed broadly, e.g., as meaning either a fixed connection, a removable connection, or an integral connection; can be mechanically or electrically connected; they may be connected directly or indirectly through intervening media, or they may be interconnected between two elements. The specific meanings of the above terms in the present invention can be understood in specific cases to those skilled in the art.
The functions, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as a stand-alone product, may be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes instructions for causing a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device) to execute all or part of the steps of the method according to the embodiments of the present invention. And the aforementioned storage medium includes: a U-disk, a removable hard disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and other various media capable of storing program codes.
The flowchart and block diagrams in the figures illustrate the architecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementations of systems, methods and computer program products according to various embodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in the flowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function(s). It should also be noted that, in some alternative implementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-based systems which perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations of special purpose hardware and computer instructions.
The above-mentioned embodiments are intended to illustrate the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention in further detail, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned embodiments are merely exemplary embodiments of the present invention, and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, and any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements and the like made within the spirit and principle of the present invention should be included in the scope of the present invention.
Claims (7)
1. Nuclear power station safety level DCS stops a heap control system which characterized in that:
at least 1 protection group of the nuclear power station safety level DCS system is internally provided with a main control unit and a DO unit,
wherein,
the main control unit is used for calculating and determining whether to output a shutdown request after obtaining the safety level data,
the DO unit controls the on-off of a control loop of a shutdown breaker according to whether a shutdown request exists;
wherein,
the DO unit includes 4 DO modules, and the 4 DO modules are respectively: the system comprises a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module, wherein the DO1 module and the DO3 module are connected in parallel to form a 1# parallel module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are connected in parallel to form a 2# parallel module, and the 1# parallel module and the 2# parallel module are connected in series on a control loop of the shutdown circuit breaker;
the master control unit is provided with four shutdown request output switching value channels which are respectively connected to the controlled ends of a DO1 module, a DO3 module, a DO2 module and a DO4 module in a control mode,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in an open circuit state when a shutdown request switching value exists,
the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are in a closed state when no shutdown request switching amount exists.
2. The nuclear power plant safety level DCS shutdown control system of claim 1, wherein the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all forced guidance relays.
3. The nuclear power plant safety-grade DCS reactor shutdown control system of claim 1, wherein the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are MOS tubes.
4. The nuclear power plant safety-grade DCS reactor shutdown control system of claim 1, wherein the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all triodes.
5. The nuclear power plant safety level DCS shutdown control system of claim 1, wherein the DO1 module, the DO3 module, the DO2 module and the DO4 module are all solid state relays.
6. The maintenance method of the nuclear power station safety level DCS shutdown control system is characterized in that when a DO unit fails, a failed DO module is dismounted, a new DO module is replaced, and when the DO module is dismounted: only 1 DO module in one DO unit is allowed to be disassembled.
7. The test method of the nuclear power station safety level DCS reactor shutdown control system is characterized in that during test, a closing and opening command is sent to a DO module through a main control unit, and the closing and opening command only allows 1 DO module in one DO unit to be received.
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