CN110086616B - Forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel - Google Patents
Forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
- H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/10—Integrity
- H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
- H04L1/0056—Systems characterized by the type of code used
- H04L1/0057—Block codes
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- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/004—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received by using forward error control
- H04L1/0056—Systems characterized by the type of code used
- H04L1/0061—Error detection codes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/80—Wireless
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
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Abstract
The invention discloses a forward one-time pad secret communication method based on a wireless channel.A communication party and a communication party respectively extract channel characteristics to generate a channel characteristic sequence pair; when the communication is firstly kept secret in the current master key updating period, both legal communication parties obtain the master key; and in the current master key updating period, generating a real-time key pair by using the master key to realize the secret communication of the one-time pad. The invention reduces the addition of a third party in the traditional key distribution, and eliminates the hidden trouble that the key safety is ensured depending on the calculation complexity when the key is distributed by using a public key cryptographic algorithm. Meanwhile, information transmission is not specially carried out for key distribution, transmission overhead is reduced, and secret communication efficiency is improved.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the field of communication security, and particularly relates to a key distribution technology in a wireless communication system.
Background
With the development of communication technology, wireless communication devices are increasing rapidly, and the demand for secure communication between two parties of legitimate communication is increasing gradually. Conventional group key distribution schemes typically employ either pre-distribution or rely on a trusted third party for distribution. The pre-distribution of the key can ensure security, but the updating of the key is difficult. In order to save the overhead of key distribution and management, the updating of the keys is often very slow, even fixed for a long time. However, a pre-shared key that is fixed and unchangeable for a long time may pose a serious security threat. Group key distribution methods based on trusted third parties, such as PKI (public key infrastructure), typically use asymmetric cryptographic algorithms for key distribution. However, the dynamically changing topology of the wireless network, the mobility of the terminal, makes it difficult to establish a key distribution and management center. In addition, for a wireless network with limited resources, the problems of limited computing capability, cruising capability and storage space of the terminal and the like make the wireless network unsuitable for performing encryption and decryption operation with high computing complexity. Therefore, it is an urgent problem to securely and efficiently perform secure communication in a wireless communication network.
Recently, a key generation method based on wireless channel characteristics has gained wide attention at home and abroad. By utilizing the characteristics of short-time reciprocity, randomness, eavesdropping resistance and the like of a wireless channel, two communication parties can share a secret key safely without transmitting the secret key. The key generation technology based on the wireless channel has the characteristics of small calculation amount, low complexity and real-time updating, and is widely researched. In an actual communication system, the extracted radio channel characteristics are not completely the same due to the influence of communication delay, hardware difference, and the like between both parties of communication. Therefore, in order to obtain a symmetric key, an information reconciliation process needs to be introduced in the conventional physical layer security technology based on wireless channel characteristics, and the information is reconciled through interaction, so that a consistent key is obtained. However, during the reconciliation process, the two communication parties tend to cause the leakage of information about the channel characteristics due to mutual information. In order to solve the problem that information leakage in the information reconciliation process affects the generation of the symmetric key, the two communication parties further need to finally realize the security and the randomness of the generated key through a privacy amplification process. Both of these processes will increase the complexity of the final key. In addition, in the conventional key generation technology system based on the wireless channel characteristics, channel error correction coding is often used for generating a symmetric key in consideration of being used in the process of information reconciliation. Chinese patent 201810105180.8 proposes an information transmission method based on wireless channel characteristic quantization private asymmetric key, in which two communication parties perform xor operation on the measured channel characteristic quantized private key and then perform channel error correction coding and decoding on the transmitted information to finally obtain the transmitted information. The patent is concerned with the problem of secure point-to-point communication, but does not consider how to transmit information in a secure manner when the key generation rate is not sufficient.
Disclosure of Invention
The purpose of the invention is as follows: in order to overcome the defects of the prior art and solve the safety problem that when the key generation rate is not high, multiple communications need to share one group of keys in one period of key updating, the invention provides a forward one-time pad secret communication method based on a wireless channel.
The technical scheme is as follows: a forward one-time pad secret communication method based on a wireless channel comprises the following steps:
(1) the method comprises the steps that a host computer sends a pilot signal to a slave computer, and the slave computer extracts a first channel characteristic parameter;
(2) the slave machine sends a pilot signal to the host machine, and the host machine extracts a second channel characteristic parameter;
(3) setting a sequence length threshold value, preprocessing all the extracted second channel characteristic parameters by the host computer, and quantizing the second channel characteristic parameters into a host computer binary channel characteristic sequence QAThe slave machine preprocesses all the extracted first channel characteristic parameters and quantizes the first channel characteristic parameters into a slave machine binary channel characteristic sequence QB(ii) a Judgment of QA、QBIf the length of the sequence reaches the sequence length threshold value, executing the step (4); if the sequence length threshold value is not reached, repeating the steps (1) to (3);
(4) the host computer calculates the integrity check value of the original plaintext information to be sent, and carries out error correction coding on the original plaintext information to generate a coded sequence;
(5) the host uses Q as the coded sequenceAXOR encryption, which is sent to the slave machine together with the integrity check value of the original plaintext message through a noiseless channel;
(6) the slave uses Q for the received informationBPerforming XOR decryption, and then performing error correction decoding to obtain transmission plaintext information;
(7) the slave computer calculates the integrity check value of the transmitted plaintext information, compares whether the integrity check value of the transmitted plaintext information is equal to the integrity check value of the original plaintext information, and if not, executes the step (1); if the two are equal, the transmitted plaintext message is encoded again, and then the encoded plaintext message and the received message are subjected to XOR operation to obtain QAIs mixing Q withAAnd after privacy amplification, the key is used as a master key in an updating period, and a real-time key pair is generated by using the master key to perform subsequent transmission operation.
Further, the step (8) of generating the real-time key pair by using the master key for subsequent transmission includes:
(8) providing a random sequence RiThe master and slave computer use the master key and the random sequence RiAs a streaming keyTwo inputs of the generator are used for obtaining a real-time key pair through the stream key generator;
(9) the host encrypts the information to be transmitted by using the real-time key pair, and sends the encrypted information to the slave;
(10) the slave machine decrypts the received information by using the real-time key pair and recovers the information to be transmitted.
Further, the first channel characteristic parameter in step (1) and the second channel characteristic parameter in step (2) both include one or more of received signal strength, channel state information, channel phase information, channel delay, and channel deep fading information.
Further, the preprocessing in the step (3) includes a transformation method of synchronous correction, frequency offset correction, consistency improvement of channel characteristic parameters and redundancy removal, and the transformation method includes smooth transformation, interpolation filter transformation, K-L transformation, DCT transformation, wavelet transformation, and interleaving transformation.
Further, the quantization in the step (3) includes single threshold quantization, multi-threshold quantization, adaptive threshold quantization, quantization based on guard bands, and quantization according to distribution probability.
Further, the error correction coding in step (4) includes a hamming code, a BCH code, a Reed-solomon code, an LDPC code, and a Turbo code.
Further, the privacy amplification method in step (7) is to perform mapping by using a HASH function, to remove information leakage caused in the information transmission process in step (6), and to generate a master key with a fixed length.
Further, the random sequence R in the step (8)iA pre-generated sequence of random numbers or other sequence including the current time stamp.
Further, step (8) maps the random sequence input and the master key to a stream cipher generator seed through a Hash function, and generates a real-time key pair.
Has the advantages that: the invention provides a forward one-time pad secret communication method based on a wireless channel, which takes a quantized channel characteristic sequence as a main key to realize the acquisition of the main key and the generation of a real-time key pair in secret communication. Compared with the traditional method, the method reduces the addition of a third party in the traditional key distribution, and eliminates the hidden trouble that the key safety is ensured depending on the calculation complexity when the key is distributed by using a public key cryptographic algorithm. Meanwhile, information transmission is not specially carried out for key distribution, transmission overhead is reduced, and secret communication efficiency is improved.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the overall implementation of the method of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the generation of a channel signature sequence pair at the beginning of a master key update cycle in accordance with the method of the present invention;
FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the generation of a master key for a first secure communication in the method of the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of secure communication during a current master key update period in the method of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The invention is further described with reference to the following figures and specific examples.
As shown in fig. 1, the communication system model of this embodiment mainly includes three steps for realizing the one-time pad secure communication in the master key update period for the host a and the slave B of the legal communication subscriber when the key generation rate is low: firstly, the channel characteristics are extracted and a channel characteristic sequence pair is generated as shown in fig. 2, secondly, both legal communication parties obtain the master key when the first secret communication is carried out in the current master key updating period as shown in fig. 3, thirdly, the real-time key pair is generated by using the master key in the current master key updating period as shown in fig. 4, so as to realize the secret communication of one time pad, which is described in detail as follows,
1) a legal communication node A sends a pilot signal to a node B, and extracts the received signal strength RSS of the pilot signal as a first channel characteristic parameter;
2) a legal communication node B sends a pilot signal to A, and extracts the received signal strength RSS of the pilot signal as a second channel characteristic parameter; the first channel characteristic parameter and the second channel characteristic parameter are highly similar but may have a slight difference as a set of channel characteristic sequence pairs.
3) Repeating step 1) and step 2) K times, where K is 512;
4) a and B respectively preprocess respective RSS sequences, wherein the preprocessing in the embodiment adopts K-L conversion, and the specific operation of the K-L conversion is as follows: let X be an N-dimensional pattern vector, { X } be the set of samples from M pattern classes, and the total number of samples be N. Transforming X into d dimension by using K-L transformation;
the first step is as follows: and (3) solving an autocorrelation matrix R of the sample set { X }:
the second step is that: calculating the characteristic value lambda of RjJ is 1, 2. And selecting the first d larger characteristic values.
The third step: calculating the eigenvector u corresponding to the d eigenvaluesjJ 1, 2, d, normalized to form a transform
A matrix U: u ═ U1，u2，...，uj]
The fourth step: K-L conversion is carried out on each X in the { X } to obtain a d-dimensional vector X after conversion*＝UTX。
A after preprocessing quantizes the preprocessed channel characteristic sequence into a binary channel characteristic sequence QAThe channel characteristic parameters of B are quantized into a binary channel characteristic sequence Q after being preprocessedB(ii) a In this embodiment, the quantization is a double-threshold quantization, and the double-threshold quantization algorithm is as follows:
the first step is as follows: recording upper and lower threshold values as Q+，Q-The mean M, the standard deviation S and the quantization factor α of the sequence are used to determine: q+＝M+α*S，Q-＝M-α*S。
The second step is that: the quantization criterion will be greater than Q+Is quantized to bit '1', and data less than Q is quantized to bit '0', located at Q+And Q-The data in between is discarded.
The third step: the two communication parties need to delete the index sequence of the data interactively so that the two sides delete the data at the same index position.
5) Generating channel characteristic sequence Q by A and BA，QBThen enter intoAnd a master key obtaining step. Recording information needing to be sent during the first communication of two communication parties in the master key updating period as M, calculating the integrity check sub-code (M) of M by the communication node A, and performing error correction coding on the M to obtain E (M), and performing error correction coding on the E (M) and the QAThe bits are xor' ed and sent to node B along with the beat (M).
6) In the invention, the communication channel between A and B is assumed to be a noiseless channel, so that the influence of channel noise on secret communication is avoided, and in an actual experiment, channel coding such as Turbo codes and LDPC codes can be adopted to reduce the influence of the channel noise.
7) After receiving the signal sent by A, the node B divides the received message into
And beating (M). Carrying out error correction and decryption on the E (M) to obtain an estimated value M' of the M;
8) b, calculating to obtain an integrity check value H (M ') of M', comparing with the received H (M), and verifying whether M is decoded correctly. If the two are not consistent, the M decoding fails, and the main key acquisition fails, and the channel measurement needs to be performed again in the step (1) to acquire a channel characteristic sequence; if M decodes correctly, it indicates that the first secret communication is successful, B can perform error correction coding again on the correctly decoded M to obtain E (M), and then obtain E (M) according to the received M
Obtaining the initial master key Q of the key updating periodA。
9) In order to obtain master keys with consistent length in multiple key updates, nodes A and B respectively aim at an initial master key QAPrivacy amplification is carried out to obtain a master key P in the periodAThe privacy amplification adopts an SHA-256 Hash algorithm, the maximum length of an input message of the SHA-256 algorithm is not more than 2^64 bits, and the generated output is a 256-bit message abstract.
10) The two communication parties A and B successfully acquire the master key PAThen, using random number sequence or random sequence such as current time stamp, and PATogether through a stream key generator, generating a real-time key pair KiTo proceed withAnd (6) secret communication.
11) In the updating period of the master key, A uses the real-time key pair K to send the message M to be sentiAnd carrying out exclusive-or encryption and sending to B.
12) And B, after receiving the encrypted message, decrypting the encrypted message by using the real-time key of the B to obtain the information M needing the secret communication.
Claims (9)
1. A forward one-time pad secret communication method based on a wireless channel is characterized by comprising the following steps:
(1) the method comprises the steps that a host computer sends a pilot signal to a slave computer, and the slave computer extracts a first channel characteristic parameter;
(2) the slave machine sends a pilot signal to the host machine, and the host machine extracts a second channel characteristic parameter;
(3) setting a sequence length threshold value, preprocessing all the extracted second channel characteristic parameters by the host computer, and quantizing the second channel characteristic parameters into a host computer binary channel characteristic sequence QAThe slave machine preprocesses all the extracted first channel characteristic parameters and quantizes the first channel characteristic parameters into a slave machine binary channel characteristic sequence QB(ii) a Judgment of QA、QBIf the length of the sequence reaches the sequence length threshold value, executing the step (4); if the sequence length threshold value is not reached, repeating the steps (1) to (3);
(4) the host computer calculates the integrity check value of the original plaintext information to be sent, and carries out error correction coding on the original plaintext information to generate a coded sequence;
(5) the host uses Q as the coded sequenceAXOR encryption, which is sent to the slave machine together with the integrity check value of the original plaintext message through a noiseless channel;
(6) the slave uses Q for the received informationBPerforming XOR decryption, and then performing error correction decoding to obtain transmission plaintext information;
(7) the slave computer calculates the integrity check value of the transmitted plaintext information, compares whether the integrity check value of the transmitted plaintext information is equal to the integrity check value of the original plaintext information, and if not, starts to execute from the step (1) again; if equal, to the transmissionThe plaintext message is encoded again, and then is subjected to XOR operation with the received information to obtain QAIs mixing Q withAAnd after privacy amplification, the key is used as a master key in an updating period, and a real-time key pair is generated by using the master key to perform subsequent transmission operation.
2. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step (7) of generating the real-time key pair by using the master key for subsequent transmission comprises:
(8) providing a random sequence RiThe master and slave computer use the master key and the random sequence RiAs two inputs of the stream key generator, obtaining a real-time key pair through the stream key generator;
(9) the host encrypts the information to be transmitted by using the real-time key pair, and sends the encrypted information to the slave;
(10) the slave machine decrypts the received information by using the real-time key pair and recovers the information to be transmitted.
3. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein the first channel characteristic parameter in step (1) and the second channel characteristic parameter in step (2) each include one or more of received signal strength, channel state information, channel phase information, channel delay, and channel deep fading information.
4. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein said preprocessing in step (3) includes transformation methods of synchronous correction, frequency offset correction and consistency improvement and redundancy removal of channel characteristic parameters, said transformation methods include smooth transformation, interpolation filter transformation, K-L transformation, DCT transformation, wavelet transformation, and interleaving transformation.
5. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein the quantization in step (3) comprises single threshold quantization, multi-threshold quantization, adaptive threshold quantization, guard band based quantization and probability-dependent distribution quantization.
6. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein said error correction coding in step (4) comprises hamming code, BCH code, Reed-solomon code, LDPC code and Turbo code.
7. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 1, wherein the privacy amplification in step (7) is performed by mapping with HASH function, removing information leakage caused during information transmission in step (5), and generating a master key with fixed length.
8. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 2, wherein the random sequence R in step (8)iA pre-generated sequence of random numbers or other sequence including the current time stamp.
9. The forward one-time pad secret communication method based on wireless channel as claimed in claim 2, wherein step (8) generates the real-time key pair by mapping the random sequence input and the master key to the stream cipher generator seed through a Hash function.
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| CN111010373B (en) * | 2019-11-21 | 2020-10-09 | 电子科技大学 | Privacy security coding method based on sink anchor |
| CN111065098B (en) * | 2019-12-26 | 2022-05-24 | 南京东科优信网络安全技术研究院有限公司 | Key generation method and system under fast frequency hopping communication system |
| CN111148099B (en) * | 2020-01-02 | 2021-03-23 | 燕山大学 | Side channel key generation method, device and communication system |
| CN112911592B (en) * | 2021-01-29 | 2022-10-28 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队信息工程大学 | Random sequence generation method and system for encryption and authentication integration |
| CN113938274B (en) * | 2021-10-13 | 2024-03-22 | 北京积木信创数据技术有限公司 | Data security transmission method for wearable equipment |
| CN115085922B (en) * | 2022-07-28 | 2022-12-13 | 南京曦光信息科技研究院有限公司 | Channel security coding method and decoding method |
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