CN109949036A - Secret protection endorsement method and device, verification method and device - Google Patents
Secret protection endorsement method and device, verification method and device Download PDFInfo
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- CN109949036A CN109949036A CN201910222102.0A CN201910222102A CN109949036A CN 109949036 A CN109949036 A CN 109949036A CN 201910222102 A CN201910222102 A CN 201910222102A CN 109949036 A CN109949036 A CN 109949036A
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Abstract
The embodiment of the invention discloses a kind of secret protection endorsement method and devices, verification method and device.The secret protection endorsement method includes that n user forms user group, and one of user signs to message；Each user has private key for user and client public key；Generate n the first signature variables；The second signature variable is obtained according to the client public key of all users in the first signature variable and user group；The first signature variable additional variable is obtained according to the private key for user of the second signature variable and the user that signs；The first signature variable, the first signature variable additional variable and one second signature variable composition signature.The embodiment of the present invention solves safety problem of the user privacy information under quantum computer attack.
Description
Technical field
The present invention relates to digital signature technology fields；More particularly to secret protection endorsement method, secret protection signature apparatus,
Secret protection signature verification method, secret protection signature verification device.
Background technique
Block chain technology is the base support technology of bit coin, first appear deliver in middle acute hearing article " bit coin:
A kind of electronic cash system of point-to-point type " in, he be described in detail how to establish it is a set of it is completely new, decentralization, be not required to
Want the block chain technology of the point-to-point trade system of foundation of trust.
The developed countries such as the U.S., European Union, Japan are actively promoting the research of block chain technical know-how, standard formulation, application
The related works such as landing.Many block chains alliance, such as R3 alliance, HyperLedger are set up simultaneously in the world, it is intended to push away
The theory and application study of dynamic block chain technology.Block chain technology be more considered after mainframe computer, personal computer,
The 5th after internet and mobile social activity overturns formula calculation, is on mankind's credit evolutionary history after blood relation's credit, your gold
Belong to the 4th milestone after credit and Central Bank's paper credit.The block chain technology of broad sense is expected to thoroughly remold human society work
Dynamic form brings deep change for fields such as finance, science and technology, culture and politics.
The application of block chain has extended to the multiple fields such as social management, Internet of Things, medical treatment & health and intelligence manufacture at present,
And 22 block chain focus on the application fields such as supply chain finance, Internet of Things.
But being constantly progressive with quantum calculation science, quantum computer has been increasingly becoming based on public key cryptography structure
The potential grave danger for the block chain built.American computer scholar Peter Shor demonstrates quantum computer can be multinomial
Big integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem are solved in the formula time.According to investigations, the safety of the public key algorithm more than 90%
Property based on the mainstreams public key cryptography such as big integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem, including currently used RSA, elliptic curve.
So quantum computer has the ability to break through using RSA and elliptic curve as most public key cryptographies of representative.
Block chain, which relies primarily on elliptic curve public key cryptographic algorithm and generates digital signature, safely trades, the most frequently used at present
The Encryption Algorithm such as ECDSA, RSA and DSA theoretically cannot all bear the attack of quantum computer.It can be seen that quantum meter
Calculation machine will generate serious threat to public key cryptography system used by current block chain；In addition, in block chain, bit coin
Etc. systems be that anonymity is realized by way of assumed name.Anonymity refers to the assumed name for having onrelevant, so-called onrelevant
Property, just refer to the angle from attacker, arbitrarily interacting twice between user and system can not be associated.In bit
In coin, although the All Activity of bit coin is all to pass through in plain text in the effect for also functioning to protection privacy of user to a certain degree
Mode disclose and be recorded on distributed account book, anyone can know therefore the details of each address transaction is handed over
Easy details will reveal the privacy of user once connecting with real identification.
In conclusion in terms of privacy of user protection and under the attack of quantum computer, existing block catenary system
With very big security risk, and hinder the extensive use of block chain technology.
Summary of the invention
Therefore, the embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of secret protection endorsement method and device, secret protection signature verification method
And device, effectively solve the problems, such as privacy of user safety under quantum computer attack.
On the one hand, secret protection endorsement method provided in an embodiment of the present invention, this method comprises: n user forms user
Group, one of user sign to message；Each user has private key for user and client public key；Generate n first
Signature variable；The second signature variable is obtained according to the client public key of all users in the first signature variable and user group；Root
The first signature variable additional variable is obtained according to the private key for user of the second signature variable and the user that signs；First signature
Variable, the first signature variable additional variable and one second signature variable composition signature.
The embodiment of the present disclosure, is provided with multiple users in a user group, and when signature, user uses the private key of oneself
It signs with the public key of users all in user group to message, to improve the anonymity of signature user, protects signature
The privacy of user；Simultaneously because public key of the signature process using total user in user group, therefore the signature is verified
When, need the public key of total user in user group to verify signature, and derive that private key is that a NP difficulty is asked from public key
Topic, so that the signature cannot be cracked in finite time by modern computer and quantum computer；The method increase signatures
Confidentiality, can not tamper, non-repudiation, improve the integrality of signature.
In one embodiment of the invention, the method for obtaining the second signature variable is: institute in user group is useful
Family is divided into two parts, first part t+1, t+2 ..., n user, second part 1,2 ..., t user；The t user is institute
State signature user；In first part, according to the client public key of users all in user group and the first signature variable, t+1 is obtained
A second signature variable；According to the client public key of users all in user group and the second signature variable, next second label are obtained
Name variable, until obtaining n-th second signature variables；In second part, according to the client public key of users all in user group,
First signature variable and n-th second signature variables obtain the 1st second signature variable；According to users' all in user group
Client public key and the second signature variable, obtain next second signature variable, until obtaining t-th second signature variables.
User group is divided into two groups, and according to a upper user's based on the user to be signed by the embodiment of the present disclosure
Public key calculates next signing messages, so that signing messages forms cyclic structure；The association between signing messages is increased,
So that the integrality of signature is good.
In one embodiment of the invention, the process for obtaining the second signature variable includes more using multivariable
Item formula value finding function, character string convergent function and character string spread function.
In one embodiment of the invention, the process for obtaining the additional variable of the first signature variable includes in use
Heart mapping transformation function and linear affine transforming function transformation function.
In one embodiment of the invention, the n first signature variable is the n stochastic variable generated.
The embodiment of the present disclosure further increases the complexity of signing messages by the way that stochastic variable is arranged, and operation of signing
Various functions are used in the process, and further improve signature cracks difficulty.
On the other hand, a kind of secret protection signature verification device provided in an embodiment of the present invention, comprising: user management mould
Block, for storing the user group with n user；Private key and public key generation module generate private key for user and use for each user
Family public key；Signature generation module generates n first signature variable, useful according to institute in the first signature variable and user group
The client public key at family obtains the second signature variable；According to the use of the second signature variable and the user that signs
Family private key obtains the first signature variable additional variable；The first signature variable, the first signature variable additional variable and one
A second signature variable composition signature.
In one embodiment of the invention, the signature generation module includes multivariable polynomial evaluation module, is provided
Multivariable polynomial value finding function；Character string restrains module, provides character string convergent function；Character string expansion module, provides word
Symbol string spread function；Centralizing mapping conversion module provides centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function；Linear affine conversion module provides linear
Affine transformation function；First signature variable generating module, for generating n first signature variable at random；Second signature variable is raw
At module, multivariable polynomial value finding function, character string convergent function and character string spread function are called, to first label
The client public key of all users carries out operation in name variable and user group, obtains the second signature variable；First signature variable operation
Module, by calling centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function and linear affine transforming function transformation function to the use of the second signature variable and the user that signs
Family private key carries out operation, obtains the first signature variable additional variable；Signature output module, by the first signature variable supplement
Variable, the first signature variable and one second signature variable composition signature, and export the signature.
The embodiment of the present disclosure provides the signature apparatus to match with above-mentioned endorsement method, real by setting functional module
Now with function corresponding in endorsement method so that the device can physically realize above-mentioned endorsement method.
In another aspect, a kind of secret protection signature verification method provided in an embodiment of the present invention, comprising: obtain signature, institute
Stating signature is the signature obtained by the upper secret protection endorsement method；According to the first signature variable and use in signature
The client public key of all users calculates the second all signature variables in the group of family；Verifying signature in second signature variable be
It is no equal with calculated second signature variable；Verification result be it is yes, then it is described signature be true.
In one embodiment of the invention, the process for calculating the second all signature variables is: according to signature
In the second signature variable, the client public key of all users calculates its next bit second in the first signature variable and user group
Signature variable successively calculates last position second signature variable；According to last position second sign variable, first signature become
The client public key of all users calculates first second signature variable in amount and user group；Verify described calculated first
Whether position signature variable is equal with the second signature variable in signature.
The embodiment of the present disclosure, the verification method is corresponding with above-mentioned endorsement method, uses the use of users all in user group
Signed data in family public key and signature generates the verify data for verifying the second signature variable in signature, determines to be verified
Whether data and the second signature variable in signature are equal, to realize the verifying to signature, signature-verification process is unique
In another aspect, a kind of secret protection signature verification device provided in an embodiment of the present invention, including signature obtain module,
Obtain the signature obtained by secret protection endorsement method as described above；Second signature variable restores computing module, according to label
The second signature variable, the first signature variable and client public key in name restore to calculate the second all signature variables；Signature is tested
Module is demonstrate,proved, whether equal with the second signature variable in signature verifies calculated second signature variable；If it is, verifying
Correctly.
The embodiment of the present disclosure provides the signature verification device to match with above-mentioned signature verification method, by the way that function is arranged
Can module realize with function corresponding in signature verification method so that the device can physically realization on
State signature verification method.
It should be understood that above general description and following detailed description be only it is exemplary and explanatory, not
The disclosure can be limited.
Detailed description of the invention
In order to illustrate the technical solution of the embodiments of the present invention more clearly, making required in being described below to embodiment
Attached drawing is briefly described, it should be apparent that, drawings in the following description are only some embodiments of the invention, right
For those of ordinary skill in the art, without creative efforts, it can also be obtained according to these attached drawings
His attached drawing.
Fig. 1 is a kind of flow diagram for secret protection endorsement method that the embodiment of the present disclosure provides；
Fig. 2 is a kind of flow diagram for secret protection signature verification method that the embodiment of the present disclosure provides；
Fig. 3 is the relationship of signature variable and client public key in a kind of secret protection endorsement method of embodiment of the present disclosure offer
Structural schematic diagram；
Fig. 4 is a kind of structural schematic diagram for secret protection signature apparatus that the embodiment of the present disclosure provides；
Fig. 5 is the structural formula of signature generation module 203 in a kind of secret protection signature apparatus of embodiment of the present disclosure offer
Schematic diagram；
Fig. 6 is the structure of operation calling module 203-2 in a kind of secret protection signature apparatus of embodiment of the present disclosure offer
Schematic diagram；
Fig. 7 is a kind of structural schematic diagram for secret protection signature verification device that the embodiment of the present disclosure provides.
Specific embodiment
Following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention, and technical solution in the embodiment of the present invention carries out clear, complete
Site preparation description, it is clear that described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present invention, instead of all the embodiments.It is based on
Embodiment in the present invention, it is obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without making creative efforts it is all its
His embodiment, shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.
[first embodiment]
As shown in Figure 1, the first embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of secret protection endorsement method, in a number of users
For in the user group of n, wherein t-th of user signs to message m, the signature process the following steps are included:
It 101, is each user's distributing user private key and client public key in user group.Wherein private key for user is vk, user group
The private key for user of interior t-th of user be vkt, for example, in user group the 3rd user private key for user vk3；Client public key is bki
(i=1,2 ..., n), wherein i indicates i-th of user.
Private key for user is private key, and client public key is disclosed key in user group.
102, the first signature variable equal with number of users is generated.Wherein the first signature variable is the change generated at random
Amount generates n first signature variable by the way of generating random number, is expressed as s0,s1,...,st-1,st+1,st+2,...,
sn。
It in first signature variable of above-mentioned generation, is numbered until n from 0, wherein unknown first signature variable st；
It would therefore be desirable to calculate the first signature variable s according to others the first signature variablet。
Calculating stDuring, the user first using all users in known first signature variable and user group is public
Key calculates the second signature variable, and detailed process is as shown in 103 and 104.
103, the second signature variable is calculated according to the client public key of all users in the first signature variable and user group.Such as figure
Shown in 3, connects according to user's ending in user group and line up ring-type, the client public key of all users is also according to corresponding in user group
Sequentially form ring-type, the client public key bk of the 1st user1With the client public key bk of nth usernIt is adjacent；Simultaneously by above-mentioned n
A first signature variable is opposite respectively at client public key according to numbering, wherein the use of the first corresponding t-th of user of signature variable S0
Family public key.
Therefore in conclusion being that boundary calculates the second signature variable by two parts content with t-th of user.
First part: the number for being greater than t calculates the second signature variable rt+1,rt+2,...rn；
First second signature variable r is calculated firstt+1, using following formula (1):
Function P in formula (1)1() is character string convergent function, and the function is by Hash operation, interception character string and connection
The operations such as character string composition.Function P1The input length of () is 28 bytes, and input includes message m, all users in user group
Client public key and first signature variable；Calculating rt+1In first signature variable be S0；Function P1The output length of () is 56
Byte, output are y；Function P1The finite field that () uses is GF (28)。
Function P1The calculating process of () are as follows: calculating m first | bk1|bk2|...|bkn|siCryptographic Hash h, then enable h ' etc.
The 40 byte character string before h；Function P1The output y=S of ()i|h′。
M is calculated using SHA-512 algorithm in the present embodiment | bk1|bk2|...|bkn|siCryptographic Hash h.
FunctionMultivariable polynomial value finding function is called, which is made of multivariable polynomial evaluation operation.FunctionThe finite field used is GF (28)；FunctionInput length be 56 bytes, input be x1,x2,...,x56；FunctionOutput be 28 bytes, output be y；The function includes 28 multivariable polynomial Its
Middle φ,γ is the public key for participating in operation, is the coefficient of multivariable polynomial, φ,γ is raw by private-public key generation module
At.
Multivariable polynomial value finding functionOperation, need to substitute into x1,x2,...,x56, solve 28 it is changeable
Polynomial value is measured, i.e. composition output.
R is calculated in the present embodimentT+1The input used is the public key and function P of t-th of user1The output of (), will be above-mentioned defeated
Enter to substitute intoIn obtain its output to need the r that solvesT+1。
For rt+2,rt+3,...rnIt is calculated using formula (2):
Wherein i=r+2, r+3 ..., n.
In formula (2)Function and P1() function is above-mentioned to explain in detail it.
P in formula (2)2() function is character string spread function, is made of Hash operation and interception string operation.
P2The finite field that () function uses is GF (28)；P2The input length of () function is 28 bytes, and input is ri-1；P2() function
Output length be 56 bytes, output be y.
The P2The calculating process of () function is: calculating r firsti-1Cryptographic Hash h；H ' is enabled to be equal to the preceding 56 byte word of h
Symbol string；Export y=h '.
Second part: the number for being less than or equal to t calculates the second signature variable r1,r2,...rt；
First second signature variable r is calculated first1, using following formula (3):
In formula (3)Function and P1() function is above-mentioned to explain in detail it.Wherein rn is first
The last one calculated second signature variable in part.
For r2,r3,...rtPart is calculated using formula as above (2).
It is above to complete the second signature variable r1,r2,...,rnEvaluation.
104, s is calculated according to the private key for user of t-th of usertValue；stFor the first label variable additional variable.
R can be calculated in the calculation formula for being primarily based on second part in above-mentioned 103t。
And it is obtained calculating r below according to formula (2)t+1Calculating formula:
R is calculated according to formula in first part (1)t+1Process it is available
Above-mentioned formula is converted to obtain:
Value first on the right side of calculation equation:
Then calculation equation P1(m,bk1,bk2,...,bkn,st(the vk of)=L °Ft, cons), wherein reflected centered on function F ()
Transforming function transformation function is penetrated, function L () is linear affine transforming function transformation function, and the private key for user vk of t-th of user is introduced in the equationt。
The finite field that function F () is used is GF (28)；The input length of function F () is 28 bytes, and input is y；Letter
The output of number F () is 56 bytes, and output is O1,O2,...,O28,V1,V2,...,V28, wherein O1,O2,...,O28It is to have
Confinement GF (28) 28 oily variables, V1,V2,...,V28It is finite field gf (28) 28 vinegar variables；Function F () includes 28
A multivariable polynomial: ∑ αijOiVj+∑βiOi+∑χijViVj+∑δiVi+ε；The private key that function F () participates in operation is α, β,
χ,δ,ε,V1,V2,...,V28, wherein α, β, χ, δ, ε are the coefficients of multivariable polynomial.
Function F (O)=y calculating process is: generating variable V at random1,V2,...,V28, and substitute into F (O)=y； F(O)
=y is converted into about O1,O2,...,O28System of linear equations；The system of linear equations is solved, O is obtained1,O2,...,O28；
Then O is exported1,O2,...,O28,V1,V2,...,V28。
The finite field gf (2 that function L () is used8)；Its input is x, and input length is 56 bytes；Its output is y, output
Length is 56 bytes；The private key that function L () participates in operation is A, B, and wherein A is the matrix of 56*56, B be length be 56 to
Amount；The fortune formula of function L () is L:y=Ax+B.
The calculating process of function L () is: being based on finite field gf (28) matrix-vector multiplication calculate A '=Ax；Based on having
Confinement GF (28) vectorial addition calculate y=A '+B.
S is finally obtained by above-mentioned calculating processtValue.
105, generating t-th of user is (r to the signature of message m1,s1,s2,...,sn)。
Based on the secret protection endorsement method that the corresponding embodiment of above-mentioned Fig. 1 provides, this method be can be applied in network
In some user a certain data and/or message are broadcasted in some particular group.For example, in block chain technology, area
Block in block chain is organized by a specific network user to be generated, some user of network user group is when generating the block
Sign simultaneously to the block, other P2P network users when obtaining the block information, need to the signature of the block into
Row verifying, and while verifying, it can't know that the block is the signature which user carries out.The present embodiment is with area
The signature of block is illustrated in block chain, is not represented the disclosure and is confined to this.Secret protection signer provided in this embodiment
Method, the present embodiment illustrate and implementation process is as follows:
In a network, a certain specific user forms a user group, and the user of the user group can generate block, and
Block forms block catenary system.User in the specific user group interconnects, and meeting when block chain increases new block
Into user group, all user's broadcast, other users need to verify new block, user when obtaining new block
When user in group verifies new block, the information of the user to sign to new block can not be known, protect
The privacy of signer.For in the non-particular group of users user or user group in other users this is cracked with illegal way
Sign block, equally can not or signer information, simultaneously because the verifying of the signature needs in user group all use
The public key at family verifies signature, and the signature for being can not be by modern computer and quantum computer in finite time
It is cracked.
In the user group with 44 users, each user all has a pair of of private key for user and client public key, wherein
Private key is vki, public key bki, wherein i indicates the cis-position number of user, and wherein client public key is well known to user in user group
Key, private key for user are only key known to individual subscriber.When the 10th user generates a new block M in user group,
The user needs to sign to new block M, and detailed process is:
Firstly generate 44 first signature variable s0,s1,s2...,s9,s11,s12,...,s44
The second signature variable r is calculated according to the client public key of users all in user group and the first signature variablei(1≤i≤
44)。
For r11,r12,...,r44Part calculates first
Then r is calculated12,r13,...,r44Part, using above-mentioned formula (2)
According to previous first
Signature variable and the second signature variable calculate the signature variable of the latter second.Such as it calculatesWherein M is new block.
R is calculated by the above process11,r12,...,r44。
For r1,r2,...,r10Part calculates first
Then r is calculated2,r3...,r10, equally use above-mentioned formula (2).
Finally obtain the second all signature variable r1,r2,...,r44。
It is calculated according to the client public key of all users in the second all signature variables, the first signature variable and user group
S10。
104 content according to a first embodiment of the present invention, available following equation:
The right of calculation equation first enables Cons is calculated.
Introduce the private key for user of the 10th user, L °F of (vk of constructor10, cons), and enable P1(M,bk1,
bk2,...,bk44,s10(the vk of)=L °F10,cons)。
The first signature variable additional variable s is calculated10.And the signature of the 10th user block new to this is
(r1,s1,s2,...,sn)。
[second embodiment]
Referring to fig. 2, the second embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of secret protection signature verification method, the verification method
Corresponding with the endorsement method in the first embodiment of the present disclosure, the signature for generating to above-mentioned endorsement method is verified.This
The implementation process of the signature verification method of open embodiment is as follows:
106, the signature that verifier verifies message m is (r1,s1,s2,...,sn).The signature passes through above-mentioned 101 to 105
Process obtains.
107, for r2,r3,...,rnIt is calculated using following formula (4):
According to formula (4), r2According to r1It is calculated, r3According to r2It is calculated, r4According to r3It is calculated, with such
It pushes away, until calculating rn。
Function P in formula (4)1(), function P2() and functionIt has been carried out in the first embodiment of the present invention
It is discussed in detail.
108, above-mentioned that r is calculatedn, it is annular in shape from 1 to n since the signature is ring signatures.rnFor being calculated
r′1, the r '1For verifying the r in signature1.Detailed process is:
R ' is calculated using formula (5)1:
109, according to above-mentioned calculated result, r ' is verified1=1It is whether true.If set up, illustrates that verifying is correct, show this
Signature (the r1,s1,s2,...,sn) be message m signature；Otherwise, which is false, should refuse the signature.
Based on the secret protection signature verification method that the corresponding embodiment of above-mentioned Fig. 2 provides, for above-mentioned block chain block
The embodiment of signature, the embodiment of the present disclosure are for the verification process of the signature of above-mentioned 10th user:
According to the signature (r1,s1,s2,...,sn) and user group in all users client public key calculate r2,r3,...,
rn, calculated using formula (4), calculated first
It is then based on r2 and r3 is calculated, r44 is successively calculated.
R ' is finally calculated according to r441, calculating formula are as follows:
Finally verify r '1=r1It is whether true.If set up, sign (r1,s1,s2,...,sn) be new block M label
Name；Otherwise the signature is false, refuses the signature.
It is signed based on secret protection endorsement method described in the corresponding embodiment of above-mentioned Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 and secret protection
Verification method, the embodiment of the present disclosure also provide a kind of computer readable storage medium, deposit for example, non-transitory is computer-readable
Storage media can be read-only memory (English: Read Only Memory, ROM), random access memory (English: Random
Access Memory, RAM), CD-ROM, tape, floppy disk and optical data storage devices etc..Calculating is stored on the storage medium
Machine instruction is protected for executing secret protection endorsement method described in the corresponding embodiment of above-mentioned Fig. 1 and/or Fig. 2 and privacy
Signature verification method is protected, details are not described herein again.
[3rd embodiment]
Referring to fig. 4, third embodiment of the invention provides a kind of secret protection signature apparatus, which includes: private
Key and public key generation module 201, user management module 202 and signature generation module 203.
Private key and public key generation module 201, for generating the private key for user and client public key of all users in user group,
Also generating in signature generation module 203 simultaneously needs public key to be used in calculating process.Its private key generated is α, β, χ, δ, ε,
V, A, B, the process for generating private key is finite field gf (28) generating random number process；Its public key generated is φ,γ is raw
Process at public key is by private key cc, β, χ, δ, ε, and V is substituted into function F () and calculated, and by private key A, B substitution function L () is fallen into a trap
It calculates, public key φ,The calculating of γ is based on
User management module 202, for managing all users in user group comprising the behaviour such as increase, reduction of user
Make；Manage user and its client public key and private key for user.
Signature generation module 203, it is private using the client public key of users all in user group, and the user of signature user
Key signs to the message to be signed.
In one embodiment, as shown in figure 5, signature generation module 203 includes:
First signature variable generating module 203-1, for generating the first signature variable at random, the first signature variable, which combines, to be used
Family public key calculates the second signature variable.Wherein the first signature variable and the second signature variable belong to a part of information of signature.
Multivariable polynomial evaluation module 203-3, including multivariable polynomial evaluation operation, provide multivariable polynomial and ask
Value function
Character string restrains module 203-4, including Hash operation, interception character string and concatenation character string operation, provides character
String convergent function P1()。
Character string expansion module 203-5, including Hash operation and character string intercept operation, provide character string spread function
P2()。
Centralizing mapping conversion module 203-6, including polygon amount equation group coefficient evaluation and solution system of linear equations operation, mention
For centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function F ().
Linear affine conversion module 203-7, including matrix-vector multiplication and vectorial addition operation provide linear affine transformation
Function L ().
Operation calling module 203-2, by calling multivariable polynomial value finding functionCharacter string convergent function P1
(), character string spread function P2(), centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function F () and linear affine transforming function transformation function L () sign to first
The the first signature variable and client public key that variable generating module 203-1 is obtained carry out operation, finally obtain signature.
In one embodiment, as shown in fig. 6, operation calling module 203-2 includes:
Second signature variable computing module 203-2-1, by calling multivariable polynomial value finding functionCharacter closed string
Hold back function P1() and character string spread function P2(), the first signature variable that the first signature variable generating module 203-1 is obtained
Operation is carried out with client public key, obtains the second signature variable.
First signature variable computing module 203-2-2, by calling centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function F () and linear affine to convert
Function L () carries out operation to the second signature variable, obtains the first signature variable additional variable, which becomes
Amount becomes for supplementing t-th first signatures lacked in the first signature variable that the first signature variable generating module generates at random
Amount, wherein t indicates signature user.
Sign output module 203-2-3, and the first signature variable computing module 203-2-2 the first signature being calculated is become
One in the first signature variable and the second signature variable that amount additional variable, the first signature variable generating module generate at random
Composition signature, and export the signature.
[fourth embodiment]
Referring to Fig. 7, the fourth embodiment of the present invention provides a kind of secret protection signature verification device, signature verification dress
Setting 30 includes: that signature obtains the signature variable recovery computing module 302 of module 301, second and verifying output module 303.
Signature obtains module 301, obtains signature, which is the secret protection signature that first embodiment of the invention provides
The signature that method obtains.
Second signature variable restores computing module 302, according to the signing messages of signature, client public key by all second
Signature variable recovery is calculated, which calls multivariable polynomial value finding functionCharacter string convergent function P1
() and character string spread function P2()；The second signature variable being calculated.
The signing messages wherein signed, one second signature variable having including it and the first signature variable；The module
Calculating process be detailed in the embodiment of above-mentioned verification method.
Verify output module 303, verifying signature in second signature variable be calculated the second signature variable whether phase
Deng；If equal, verifying is correct, which is very, to be otherwise vacation, refuse the signature.
The above-mentioned integrated unit being realized in the form of SFU software functional unit, can store computer-readable at one
In storage medium.Above-mentioned SFU software functional unit is stored in a storage medium, including some instructions are used so that a calculating
Machine equipment (can be personal computer, server or the network equipment etc.) executes the part of each embodiment method of the present invention
Step.And storage medium above-mentioned include: USB flash disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory, abbreviation ROM),
Random access memory (Random Access Memory, abbreviation RAM), magnetic or disk etc. are various to can store program
The medium of code.
Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are merely illustrative of the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than its limitations；To the greatest extent
Present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments for pipe, those skilled in the art should understand that: it is still
It is possible to modify the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or part of technical characteristic is equally replaced
It changes；And these are modified or replaceed, the essence for technical solution of various embodiments of the present invention that it does not separate the essence of the corresponding technical solution
Mind and range.
Claims (10)
1. a kind of secret protection endorsement method, including user group, user group includes n user, and one of user is that signature is used
Family, signature user sign to message；It is characterised by comprising:
Each user has private key for user and client public key；
Generate n first signature variable；
The second signature variable is obtained according to the client public key of all users in the first signature variable and user group；
The first signature variable additional variable is obtained according to the private key for user of the second signature variable and the signature user；
The first signature variable, the first signature variable additional variable and one second signature variable composition signature.
2. secret protection endorsement method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that described to obtain the second signature variable
Method is:
All users in the user group are divided into two parts, first part t+1, t+2 ..., n user, second part 1,
2 ..., t user；
The t user is the signature user；
In first part, according to the client public key of all users in the user group and the first signature variable, t+1 the is obtained
Two signature variables；
According to the client public key of all users in the user group and the second signature variable, obtains next second signature and become
Amount, until obtaining n-th second signature variables；
In second part, according to the client public key of all users, the first signature variable and n-th second signatures in the user group
Variable obtains the 1st second signature variable；
According to the client public key of all users in the user group and the second signature variable, next second signature variable is obtained,
Until obtaining t-th second signature variables.
3. secret protection endorsement method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that described to obtain the second signature variable
Process includes using multivariable polynomial value finding function, character string convergent function and character string spread function.
4. secret protection endorsement method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that described to obtain the first signature variable
The process of additional variable includes using centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function and linear affine transforming function transformation function.
5. secret protection endorsement method as described in claim 1, which is characterized in that the n the first signature variable be n with
Machine variable.
6. a kind of secret protection signature apparatus characterized by comprising
User management module, for storing the user group with n user；
Private key and public key generation module generate private key for user and client public key for each user；
Signature generation module generates n first signature variable, according to all users in the first signature variable and user group
Client public key obtains the second signature variable；First is obtained according to the private key for user of the second signature variable and the user that signs
Signature variable additional variable；The first signature variable, the first signature variable additional variable and one second signature variable composition
Signature.
7. secret protection signature apparatus as claimed in claim 6, which is characterized in that
The signature generation module includes:
Multivariable polynomial evaluation module, provides multivariable polynomial value finding function；
Character string restrains module, provides character string convergent function；
Character string expansion module provides character string spread function；
Centralizing mapping conversion module provides centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function；
Linear affine conversion module provides linear affine transforming function transformation function；
First signature variable generating module, for generating n first signature variable at random；
Second signature variable generating module calls multivariable polynomial value finding function, character string convergent function and character string extension
Function carries out operation to the client public key of all users in the first signature variable and user group, obtains the second signature variable；
First signature variable computing module, by calling centralizing mapping transforming function transformation function and linear affine transforming function transformation function to sign to second
Variable and the private key for user of signature user carry out operation, obtain the first signature variable additional variable；
Signature output module becomes the first signature variable additional variable, the first signature variable and one second signature
Amount composition signature, and export the signature.
8. a kind of secret protection signature verification method characterized by comprising
Signature is obtained, the signature is the label obtained by secret protection endorsement method described in claim 1-5 any one
Name；
According in the signature the first signature variable and user group in the client public key of all users calculate all second
Signature variable；
Whether the second signature variable in verifying signature is equal with calculated second signature variable；
Verification result be it is yes, then it is described signature be true.
9. secret protection signature verification method as claimed in claim 8, which is characterized in that described to calculate the second all label
The process of name variable is:
According in signature the second signature variable, the client public key of all users calculates it in the first signature variable and user group
The signature variable of next bit second successively calculates last position second signature variable；
The is calculated according to the client public key of all users in last the second signature variable, the first signature variable and user group
One second signature variable；
Whether equal with the second signature variable in signature verify calculated first signature variable.
10. secret protection signature verification device characterized by comprising
Signature obtains module, obtains and changes the label that endorsement method obtains by secret protection described in claim 1-5 any one
Name；
Second signature variable restores computing module, according to the second signature variable, the first signature variable and the client public key in signature
Restore to calculate the second all signature variables；
Whether equal with the second signature variable in signature signature verification module verifies calculated second signature variable；If
It is that then verifying is correct.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910222102.0A CN109949036A (en) | 2019-03-22 | 2019-03-22 | Secret protection endorsement method and device, verification method and device |
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| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201910222102.0A CN109949036A (en) | 2019-03-22 | 2019-03-22 | Secret protection endorsement method and device, verification method and device |
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| CN109949036A true CN109949036A (en) | 2019-06-28 |
Family
ID=67010730
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110493009A (en) * | 2019-09-23 | 2019-11-22 | 百度在线网络技术（北京）有限公司 | The generation method and verification method of signature, device, equipment and medium |
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2019
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Cited By (1)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110493009A (en) * | 2019-09-23 | 2019-11-22 | 百度在线网络技术（北京）有限公司 | The generation method and verification method of signature, device, equipment and medium |
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