CN109889320A - A kind of full homomorphic cryptography method of efficient BGV type multi-key cipher - Google Patents
A kind of full homomorphic cryptography method of efficient BGV type multi-key cipher Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
Present invention relates particularly to a kind of efficient full homomorphic cryptography methods of BGV type multi-key cipher, comprising: carries out BGV type homomorphic cryptography to the plaintext for the user for participating in operation, obtains ciphertext corresponding to the user;The ciphertext for the user for participating in operation is extended, the extension ciphertext of corresponding user's collection is obtained;Homomorphism operation is carried out to the extension ciphertext for the user's collection for participating in operation, obtain high-dimensional BGV ciphertext, and BGV homomorphic cryptography and GSW homomorphic cryptography are carried out respectively to the key for the user for participating in calculating, and ciphertext extension and mixing homomorphism multiplication are carried out to encrypted result, to obtain computation key, dimensionality reduction is carried out to high-dimensional BGV ciphertext by computation key;To the ciphertext operation mold changing function after dimensionality reduction, reduces the noise in ciphertext, finally export the final ciphertext result of homomorphism operation.The full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher can allow for carrying out homomorphism operation between the ciphertext of user for possessing different keys, to realize safe multi-party computing function.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to information securities and secret protection field, and in particular to a kind of efficient full homomorphism of BGV type multi-key cipher
Encryption method.
Background technique
Full homomorphic cryptography (Full-homomorphic encryption, FHE) can be right in the case where key is unknown
Ciphertext carries out any calculating, has encryption and the tradable property of operation, has very high reason under current cloud computing environment
By and application value, can be widely applied to searching ciphertext, multi-party computations, cloud data analysis etc..From Gentry in 2009
After proposing the first full homomorphic encryption scheme Gen09 based on ideal lattice, described based on Gentry by full homomorphic cryptography
Blueprint, more and more full homomorphic encryption schemes (DGHV10, BV11a, BV11b, BGV12, GSW13, AP14 etc.) are mentioned
Out.
The full homomorphic cryptography of multi-key cipher (multi-key FHE, MKFHE) allows the ciphertext to different private keys to calculate, and is
Full extension of the homomorphic cryptography in terms of multi-party computations.LATV12 first proposed the concept of MKFHE, and propose one kind
The full homomorphic encryption scheme of multi-key cipher based on NTRU common key cryptosystem, but the safety base of the encipherment scheme based on NTRU
In nonstandard in polynomial ring it is assumed that can not difficult problem in stringent specification to lattice, therefore safety needs further to be examined
Card.
Clear and McGoldrick utilizes GSW type FHE, proposes first based on error problem concerning study (learning
With error, LWE) GSW type MKFHE scheme CM15, since LWE problem can be with the worst feelings in quantum specification to ideal lattice
Difficult problem under condition, therefore the safety of scheme is guaranteed, at the same in the program participant key quantity not on
Limit.Mukherjee and Wichs improve CM15, propose the MKFHE scheme MW16 based on LWE, and the program can be with
For realizing the thresholding decryption protocol of a wheel, and a two-wheeled multi-party computations (multiparty is realized on this basis
Computation, MPC) agreement.
CM15 and MW16 scheme needs in advance to be configured the quantity for participating in the square user that homomorphism calculates, and is transporting
It cannot achieve the addition of new user during calculating, such MKFHE is referred to as single-hop (single-hop) type in PS16
MKFHE.PS16 proposes the concept of multi-hop (multi-hop) MKFHE simultaneously: original participant is close after homomorphism operation
Text can re-start operation with the ciphertext for the participant being newly added, i.e., any participant can simultaneously and dynamically be added
During ciphertext operation.BP16 proposes the concept of complete dynamic MKFHE, i.e. the quantity of participant do not need in advance into
Row setting.
On TCC2017, Chen Long et al. proposes the BGV type multi-hop MKFHE based on RLWE.During program support is based on
The ciphertext packaging technique of state's remainder theorem, and the ciphertext expansion process in MKFHE is simplified, the program can be used
In the MPC agreement and thresholding decryption protocol of construction two-wheeled.
Currently, supporting the BGV type MKFHE scheme of Batched Multi-hop using CZW17 as representative.The BGV type side MKFHE
For case there are ciphertext amount, common parameter is relatively large, generates the big defect of computation key process operand.
Summary of the invention
In order to solve, ciphertext amount existing in the prior art and common parameter are relatively large, generate computation key process fortune
Big defect is measured in calculation, and the present invention proposes an efficient full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher, and the BGV type multi-key cipher is entirely same
State encryption method can allow for carrying out homomorphism operation between the ciphertext of user for possessing different keys, to realize safe
Multi-party computing function.In order to achieve the above object, The technical solution adopted by the invention is as follows:
A kind of full homomorphic cryptography method of efficient BGV type multi-key cipher, includes the following steps:
Step 1: BGV type homomorphic cryptography is carried out to the plaintext for the user for participating in operation, is obtained close corresponding to the user
Text;
Step 2: being extended the ciphertext for the user for participating in operation, obtains the extension ciphertext of corresponding user's collection;
Step 3: carrying out homomorphism operation to the extension ciphertext for the user's collection for participating in operation, obtain high-dimensional BGV ciphertext,
And BGV homomorphic cryptography and GSW homomorphic cryptography carried out respectively to the key for the user for participating in calculating, and to encrypted result into
The extension of row ciphertext and mixing homomorphism multiplication carry out high-dimensional BGV ciphertext by computation key to obtain computation key
Dimensionality reduction;
Step 4: to the ciphertext operation mold changing function after dimensionality reduction, reduce the noise in ciphertext, finally export homomorphism operation
Final ciphertext result.
Further, the concrete operations of above-mentioned steps one are as follows: given security parameter l, integer m, modulus q=ploy (n),
Polynomial ring R=Z [X]/ΦmAnd on ring B- bounded discrete point of c (B < < q), Integer N=O (nlogq),Polynomial ring Rq=R/qR;Circuit depth is L, the modulus q of each layer of circuitL> > qL-1> > > >
q0, a small integer p is simultaneously relatively prime with all moduluses,Rq=R/qR;Select L+1 a random public
VectorL=0 .., L;Definition S is an ordered set, wherein containing all participations involved in the ciphertext
Side with sequential label, and without repeat element;It defines ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { S }, l }, wherein containing use
The ciphertext c of family collection S, user collect S
(1) key generates: generate key required for j-th of participant:
Select zl,j← χ, definitionThen the private key of the participant is skj={ sl,j, l ∈
{L,...,0};
It randomly selectsDefinition:l∈
{ L ..., 0 } generates public key pkl,j={ pl,j, l ∈ { L ..., 0 };
The generating unit of required computation key when the operation of ciphertext homomorphism is calculated,
(a) for m ∈ 0 ..., βl- 1 }, j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
(b) j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
(2) ciphering process: plaintext μ ∈ R to be encrypted is inputtedpWith public key pkl,j, randomly select r ∈ R2With error matrix E
=(e1,e2)←χ2, generate plaintext μjL layers of ciphertext:
It exports ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { j }, l }.
Further, the concrete operations of above-mentioned steps two are as follows:
BGV.CTExt(cl, S '): by ciphertext tupleIt is extended toWherein S ∈ S ',
(1) ciphertext c is decomposed into k+1 equal portions:
Corresponding private keyCollect S={ i with user1,...,
ik};
(2) extension ciphertext is generated:
WhereinCorresponding expanded keys
It is easily verified that
Further, the concrete operations of above-mentioned steps three are as follows: the input t ciphertext group after ciphertext extension
(ct1,…ctt), and assume that it is in same circuit layer, andJ ∈ { 1 ..., t } generates common user's collection
(1) pass through homomorphism arithmetic unit basic in invocation schemeWithTo t ciphertext homomorphism computing circuitResult after operation is
(2) required computation key evk in ciphertext calculating process is generatedS=MKFHE.EvkGen (emS);
(3) to ciphertextCarry out dimensionality reduction:
Further, the concrete operations of above-mentioned steps four are as follows: l layers of input by the ciphertext after homomorphism operationIt calculates
Compared with prior art, beneficial effects of the present invention:
1. the present invention is converted into multi-user by single user to BGV ciphertext and GSW ciphertext, reduce the size of extension ciphertext;
2. the present invention improves conversion key generation process needed for key transformation technology, by RBGV and
The mixing homomorphism multiplication of RGSW ciphertext replaces original RGSW ciphertext multiplication, reduces the size of common parameter and computation key;
3. the value range of the private key coefficient of user is set as { -1,0,1 } by the present invention, reduce computation key generation
The size and number of ciphertext in the process;
4. the reduction of data volume can further decrease homomorphism operation present invention reduces the data volume of homomorphism calculating process
Computation complexity.
Detailed description of the invention
Fig. 1 is flow diagram of the invention.
Specific embodiment
Further detailed description is done to the present invention combined with specific embodiments below, but embodiments of the present invention are unlimited
In this.
A kind of full homomorphic cryptography method of efficient BGV type multi-key cipher is present embodiments provided, using ciphertext expansion technique,
Multi-user's ciphertext is converted by single user ciphertext, so that it is entirely same to convert single key for a full homomorphic encryption scheme of multi-key cipher
State encipherment scheme, and using key transformation technology and mold changing technology, ciphertext is handled, the dimension and noise of ciphertext are reduced.
The full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher can be effectively applied the Secure meter under cloud computing environment between multi-user
It calculates, has the good characteristics such as confidentiality, ciphertext availability, anti-conspiracy attack, the attack of anti-quantum.Compared to BGV type multi-key cipher
Full homomorphic encryption scheme [CZW17],
Referring to Fig.1, the full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher, includes the following steps:
Step 1: BGV type homomorphic cryptography is carried out to the plaintext for the user for participating in operation, is obtained close corresponding to the user
Text;
Step 2: being extended the ciphertext for the user for participating in operation, obtains the extension ciphertext of corresponding user's collection;
Step 3: carrying out homomorphism operation to the extension ciphertext for the user's collection for participating in operation, obtain high-dimensional BGV ciphertext,
And BGV homomorphic cryptography and GSW homomorphic cryptography carried out respectively to the key for the user for participating in calculating, and to encrypted result into
The extension of row ciphertext and mixing homomorphism multiplication carry out high-dimensional BGV ciphertext by computation key to obtain computation key
Dimensionality reduction;
Step 4: to the ciphertext operation mold changing function after dimensionality reduction, reduce the noise in ciphertext, finally export homomorphism operation
Final ciphertext result.
Initialization: given security parameter l, integer m, modulus q=ploy (n), polynomial ring R=Z [X]/ΦmAnd ring
The discrete point of c (B < < q) of upper B- bounded, Integer N=O (nlogq),Polynomial ring Rq=R/qR;Electricity
Road depth is L, the modulus q of each layer of circuitL> > qL-1> > ... > > q0, a small integer p is simultaneously mutual with all moduluses
Matter,Rq=R/qR;Select L+1 random public vectorsL=0 ..., L;Defining S is
One ordered set, wherein contain all participants involved in the ciphertext with sequential label, and without weight
Complex element;It defines ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { S }, l }, wherein containing the ciphertext c that user collects S, user collects S and corresponding electricity
Road
Key generates: generate key required for j-th of participant:
Select zl,j← χ, definitionThen the private key of the participant is skj={ sl,j, l ∈
{L,...,0};
It randomly selectsDefinition:l∈
{ L ..., 0 } generates public key pkl,j={ pl,j, l ∈ { L ..., 0 };
The generating unit of required computation key when the operation of ciphertext homomorphism is calculated,
(a) for m ∈ 0 ..., βl- 1 }, j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
(b) j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
Ciphering process: plaintext μ ∈ R to be encrypted is inputtedpWith public key pkl,j, randomly select r ∈ R2With error matrix E=
(e1,e2)←χ2, generate plaintext μjL layers of ciphertext:
It exports ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { j }, l }.
Decrypting process: inputAnd corresponding private key, output is in plain textOutput is in plain text
BGV ciphertext expansion process:
BGV.CTExt(cl, S '): by ciphertext tupleIt is extended toWherein S ∈ S ',
(1) ciphertext c is decomposed into k+1 equal portions:
Corresponding private keyCollect S={ i with user1,...,
ik};
(2) extension ciphertext is generated:
WhereinCorresponding expanded keys
It is easily verified that
Multi-user's ciphertext homomorphism calculating process: the input t ciphertext group (ct after ciphertext extension1,…,ctt), and
Assuming that it is in same circuit layer, andJ ∈ { 1 ..., t } generates common user's collection
(1) pass through homomorphism arithmetic unit basic in invocation schemeWithTo t ciphertext homomorphism computing circuitResult after operation is
(2) required computation key evk in ciphertext calculating process is generatedS=MKFHE.EvkGen (emS);
(3) to ciphertextCarry out dimensionality reduction:
Mold changing process: l layers of input by the ciphertext after homomorphism operationIt calculates
Safety analysis: in terms of base case, the present invention and CZW17 are added using identical BGV encipherment scheme and GSW
Close scheme.The present invention and the main distinction of CZW17 have two o'clock: on the one hand this paper presents BGV ciphertext nested type spread function,
Mixing homomorphism multiplication function between GSW type ciphertext split-type spread function, RBGV and RGSW ciphertext, the input of these three functions
It is all ciphertext with output, calculating process is all in ciphertext, so the safety of scheme will not be reduced;On the other hand, of the invention
The coefficient value of the private key of BGV ciphertext is restricted to { 0,1 } by c, it is therefore desirable to it is a degree of to increase polynomial dimension N,
To guarantee the safety of scheme.
The comparison of the storage overhead of the present invention and CZW17:
The above content is a further detailed description of the present invention in conjunction with specific preferred embodiments, cannot recognize
Fixed specific implementation of the invention is only limited to these instructions.For those of ordinary skill in the art to which the present invention belongs,
Without departing from the inventive concept of the premise, a number of simple deductions or replacements can also be made, all shall be regarded as belonging to the present invention
Protection scope.
Claims (5)
1. a kind of full homomorphic cryptography method of efficient BGV type multi-key cipher, which comprises the steps of:
Step 1: BGV type homomorphic cryptography is carried out to the plaintext for the user for participating in operation, obtains ciphertext corresponding to the user;
Step 2: being extended the ciphertext for the user for participating in operation, obtains the extension ciphertext of corresponding user's collection;
Step 3: homomorphism operation is carried out to the extension ciphertext for the user's collection for participating in operation, obtains high-dimensional BGV ciphertext, and right
The key for participating in the user calculated carries out BGV homomorphic cryptography and GSW homomorphic cryptography respectively, and carries out ciphertext to encrypted result
Extension and mixing homomorphism multiplication carry out dimensionality reduction to high-dimensional BGV ciphertext by computation key to obtain computation key;
Step 4: to the ciphertext operation mold changing function after dimensionality reduction, reduce the noise in ciphertext, finally export the final of homomorphism operation
Ciphertext result.
2. the full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the tool of the step 1
Gymnastics conduct: given security parameter l, integer m, modulus q=ploy (n), polynomial ring R=Z [X]/ΦmAnd B- bounded on ring
Discrete point of c (B < < q), Integer N=O (nlogq),Polynomial ring Rq=R/qR;Circuit depth is L,
The modulus q of each layer of circuitL> > qL-1> > L > > q0, a small integer p is simultaneously relatively prime with all moduluses,Rq=R/qR;Select L+1 random public vectorsL=0, K, L;Define S has for one
Ordered sets, wherein contain all participants involved in the ciphertext with sequential label, and without repeat element;
It defines ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { S }, l }, wherein containing the ciphertext c that user collects S, user collects S and corresponding circuit level l tri-
Partial information;
(1) key generates: generate key required for j-th of participant:
Select zl,j← χ, definitionThen the private key of the participant is skj={ sl,j, l ∈ L ...,
0};
It randomly selectsDefinition:l∈{L,...,
0 }, public key pk is generatedl,j={ pl,j, l ∈ { L ..., 0 };
The generating unit of required computation key when the operation of ciphertext homomorphism is calculated,
(a) for m ∈ 0 ..., βl- 1 }, j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
(b) j ∈ { 1 ..., k }, ζ ∈ { 0 ..., k } are calculated
(2) ciphering process: plaintext μ ∈ R to be encrypted is inputtedpWith public key pkl,j, randomly select r ∈ R2With error matrix E=(e1,
e2)←χ2, generate plaintext μjL layers of ciphertext:
It exports ciphertext tuple ct={ c, { j }, l }.
3. the full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the tool of the step 2
Gymnastics conduct:
BGV.CTExt(cl, S '): by ciphertext tupleIt is extended toIn its, S ∈ } S ',
(1) ciphertext c is decomposed into k+1 equal portions:
Corresponding private keyCollect S={ i with user1,...,ik};
(2) extension ciphertext is generated:
WhereinCorresponding expanded keys
It is easily verified that
4. the full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the tool of the step 3
Gymnastics as: input t by ciphertext extend after ciphertext group (ct1,K ctt), and assume that it is in same circuit layer, andJ ∈ { 1, K, t } generates common user's collection
(1) pass through homomorphism arithmetic unit basic in invocation schemeWithTo t ciphertext homomorphism computing circuit C, the result after operation is
(2) required computation key evk in ciphertext calculating process is generatedS=MKFHE.EvkGen (emS);
(3) to ciphertextCarry out dimensionality reduction:
5. the full homomorphic cryptography method of BGV type multi-key cipher according to claim 1, which is characterized in that the tool of the step 4
Gymnastics as: input l layer pass through homomorphism operation after ciphertextsIt calculates
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CN110889139A (en) * | 2019-11-26 | 2020-03-17 | 支付宝(杭州)信息技术有限公司 | Method and device for multi-party combined dimensionality reduction processing aiming at user privacy data |
CN111342950A (en) * | 2019-12-16 | 2020-06-26 | 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 | BGV type multi-key fully homomorphic encryption method with directional decryption function |
CN112152777A (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2020-12-29 | 西安交通大学 | Homomorphic cryptographic operation-oriented key conversion method, system, equipment and readable storage medium |
CN112152777B (en) * | 2020-08-18 | 2022-04-22 | 西安交通大学 | Homomorphic cryptographic operation-oriented key conversion method, system, equipment and readable storage medium |
CN115378571A (en) * | 2022-06-28 | 2022-11-22 | 中国人民武装警察部队工程大学 | GSW type multi-key fully homomorphic encryption method with efficient ciphertext expansion process |
CN116545676A (en) * | 2023-04-25 | 2023-08-04 | 广东润联信息技术有限公司 | Ciphertext processing method and device, electronic equipment and storage medium |
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