CN109858283B - Cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen - Google Patents
Cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen Download PDFInfo
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Abstract
With the development of cloud computing technology, data can be outsourced to the cloud, so that sharing among users is facilitated. However, in many cases, users may worry about the reliability and integrity of their data outsourced to the cloud, and it is therefore crucial to provide a data sharing service that meets these security requirements. The invention provides a reliable and safe data sharing scheme by adopting a threshold secret key sharing technology and a Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proving method. The scheme is not only flexible and effective, but also can realize semantic security characteristics. Furthermore, this solution enables the security of the user's decryption key and the identification of fraudsters if some of the users are dishonest. Efficiency analysis shows that this scheme has better performance in terms of computational cost than other related work. In particular, the scheme is suitable for protecting cloud medical insurance data of the user.
Description
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of information security, is particularly suitable for protecting cloud medical insurance data of a user, and relates to a cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen.
Background
Under the strong push of the innovative development trend of cloud technology, the data sharing technology of cloud computing and cloud storage becomes a promising technology which allows file owners to store and users to access conveniently. However, in storing, sharing data, file owners are increasingly concerned about the privacy of the storage and the reliable access of the data. Medical care data covers aspects of human life and includes a variety of data such as medical record information, medical insurance information, health records, genetic information, medical experimental and scientific data, and the like. Medical experimental data, scientific research data and insurance information not only relate to the privacy of data owners, but also influence the development trend of the pharmaceutical industry and even influence the national security. Therefore, in the development process and application of healthcare data, it is necessary to provide targeted compliance assurance for data source certification and medical data types.
When a person stores her medical insurance data in the cloud for occasional needs (sudden death, insurance claims, etc.), careful consideration should be given to who is allowed access to the data. In this process, due to the diversity and complexity of medical data, not only the confidentiality of the data itself but also the specificity of the actual situation need to be considered in the data storage process.
In a cloud-based medical service scenario, a patient (data owner) stores the above important personal information (e.g., electronic medical records, health files, consulting information, and financial information) in a ciphertext form, divides the access rights of a file into a plurality of copies, and assigns them to different types of groups, such as a family group, a friend group, a medical staff group, and a financial information management group, each of which is composed of a plurality of users. The proof that the patient (data owner) is in an emergency or an unexpected death and needs to retrieve the above information can be provided by a group of users even if the patient cannot. In this process, in order to ensure fairness of information extraction, it is critical to allow rights of a few users to fail, prevent a fraudster from infringing on personal interests and provide false rights by a dishonest user.
Disclosure of Invention
In order to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings of the prior art and achieve the above-mentioned needs, the present invention provides a cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen, which combines symmetric encryption and key sharing technologies, can verify and can deceive, and a data owner can designate an authorized user by himself to ensure the security of personal data; grouping management is carried out according to the types of users so as to supervise when accessing data, thereby realizing decentralized management of authority; in addition, according to the validity and fairness of the data, any behavior interfering with normal data access can be thoroughly identified, so that the stability of the system is ensured and the system can normally operate. The invention adopts a threshold secret key sharing technology and a Chaum-Pedersen zero-knowledge proving method, has the characteristics of reliability and safety, and can play a fundamental and inspirational role in the aspect of solving the medical data management in the personal health environment of the Internet.
In order to achieve the purpose, the invention adopts the technical scheme that:
a cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen is characterized in that:
hiding confidential information irrelevant to the important data, encrypting the important data and storing the important data in the cloud;
dividing the types of important data corresponding to authorized users into a plurality of groups;
each important data corresponds to a group of secret shares, each group of secret shares consists of secret shares of a plurality of different owners, each secret share is distributed to a corresponding authorized user group by using a threshold secret sharing method of Shamir, a decryption key is assigned to each authorized user group, the authorized users of each authorized user group distribute private keys, namely sub-keys of the group of decryption keys, according to the decryption keys of the group, and when the decryption keys are correctly reconstructed, the corresponding secret shares of the important data can be decrypted, so that the important data can be decrypted under mutual supervision among the groups.
The data is medical insurance data, and the confidential information irrelevant to the important data refers to personal information of an owner, including name, age, work family, address and the like; the important data refers to data of an owner directly related to medical insurance, and comprises electronic medical records, health records, consultation information and financial information, and the identity of the authorized user corresponds to the type of the important data, and comprises a family group, a friend group, a medical staff group and a financial information management group.
The confidential information irrelevant to the important data is hidden by a Bloom filter and the like.
Compared with the existing data sharing scheme, the scheme can provide the following advantages of safety and efficiency:
1) The cloud server may utilize data file tags to assist in record searching and may not be able to obtain any meaningful information about the owner data or the owner's personal confidential data.
2) The user who has access to the data file is authorized by the data owner, who can verify the decryption key sent by the owner. Even if some decryption keys from authorized users are incorrect, the system can still function properly without affecting the reliability of the data.
3) It is possible to identify in advance a dishonest user who provides a pseudo decryption key without revealing the decryption key of a dishonest user. Thus, the data file can be decrypted safely and correctly under supervision of these user groups.
Drawings
FIG. 1 is a framework for a secure shared data protection service in a cloud environment of the present invention.
Detailed Description
The embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings and examples.
As shown in fig. 1, the present invention proposes an efficient, reliable and integrated internet medical data sharing scheme to ensure semantic security and efficient use of owner data on cloud storage. Confidential information of a patient, such as name, age, work, home address and the like, which is irrelevant to important data, is hidden through a Bloom filter and the like, and important data files, such as electronic medical records, health records, consultation information and financial information, are encrypted and stored in the cloud.
In order to achieve decryption of secret data files under mutual supervision between groups, decryption keys are used for assigning rights among cloud decryption users, which are divided into groups according to their identities when registered in an agreement, such as family groups, friend groups, medical staff groups, financial information management groups, etc. Each data file corresponds to a set of secret shares, each secret share is assigned to a corresponding group of users by using Shamir's threshold secret sharing method, each group is assigned a decryption key, and authorized users of each group assign their private keys, i.e., sub-keys of the group of decryption keys, based on the group's decryption keys, and when the decryption keys are properly reconstructed, the corresponding secret shares of the data file can be successfully decrypted.
First, preliminary knowledge required for understanding the present invention is introduced:
1. key sharing scheme
The key sharing scheme divides the key into a number of parts, each part being referred to as a shared key, and the key can be recovered when the required number of shared keys is in possession.
A sharing stage: to share the key, the issuer generates shared keys for different authorized users by constructing different polynomials and then sends the shared keys to each authorized user through a dedicated channel.
A reconstruction stage: any subset of these authorized users can reconstruct the key using polynomial interpolation as long as given conditions are met.
2. Threshold encryption cryptosystem
In our protocol, a threshold key sharing system is adopted to design an encryption scheme, and the cryptosystem consists of the following five algorithms:
and (3) generating a key: taking a security parameter k, the number n of decryption groups (n is more than or equal to 1), a threshold value t (t is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n) and a random character string x as input, and outputting a public key pk and a group of shared keys { y1…ynAnd a set of verification keys v, { v }1…vn}。
Encryption: the public key pk, the random character string x and the plaintextAs an input, and outputs the ciphertext CT.
Partial decryption: the public key pk, the ciphertext CT, the index i (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n) and the corresponding shared secret key yiAs input, and outputs a corresponding decrypted share ciAnd proving that the share decryption is validDemonstration of pi。
And (3) verification: the cipher text CT, the index i (i is more than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to n), the verification key v, and the { v {1…vn}, decryption fraction ciAnd its demonstration piAs an input. And if the result is valid, outputting 1, and otherwise, outputting ^ T.
Combining: taking any subset of the public key pk and the valid decryption group t as input and outputting the plaintext
3. Bloom filter
A Bloom filter is a random data storage structure made up of a set of Hash functions BF (x) = (bh)1(x),…,bhk(x) ) is prepared. The Bloom filter is used to hide the value of the attribute or part of the information of the attribute during the access process. In this scheme, bloom filters are used to anonymously store data files, with a verification output (bh)1(x),…,bhk(x) Is matched with the input x, the searched tag is verified.
4. Proof of discrete logarithm equation
The Chaum-Pedersen attestation protocol may be used to prove equations for discrete logarithms. Let p, q be two large prime numbers, and q | p-1, let GqIs marked asThe sub-group of order q of (a),is a non-zero integer ring of modulo p, G and h being GqTwo generators. Without the need to inform a specific formula, y ≡ g can be demonstratedx(modp) and t ≡ hxThe index value x of (modp) is the same, which proves to work as follows:
If g isz≡Uye(modp) and hz≡Vte(modp),The proof is accepted; otherwise, the proof is rejected. Its reliability is that the two accepted dialog processes have the same first step, and honest verifier zero knowledge is true because for any random value e ZpAnd Z ∈ ZpArray of generated (g)zy-e,hzt-eE, z) are reliable, the distribution of values cannot be predicted from random values.
Based on the above preliminary knowledge, the present invention performs the following process:
1. system initialization
(1) The public key generator selects a group G with the order of prime number p1,G1A generator g and an anti-collision hash function H.
(2) Using grouping functionsDividing a user set U which wants to share important data of an owner into N different groups according to different identities, such as a family group, a friend group, a medical staff group and legal staffGroup, etc., denoted as U1,…,UNAnd satisfies U = U1∪…∪UN. I.e. associating user IDs in a set of usersiIs divided intoWhereinIs defined asIs provided withk belongs to {1, \ 8230;, N }, and then the user groupAlso referred to as U for shortkWherein the number of users is nk;
(3) Data owner at tkZ of degree-1pUpper selection of random number skAnd a random polynomialWherein ZpRepresenting modulo-p integer rings, each group UkIn (a) ofk,0=sk,k=1~N。
2. Key generation
IDiRepresenting users of a set of users by means of a grouping functionDivide it into groups UkWherein the number of users is nk. Is a marker group UkUser ID in (1)iNeed to be a group UkUser renumbering, user ID iniIs a group UkThe jth user in (1) is represented as IDjk。
(1) Data owner is group UkEach user ID in (1)jkUsing a set of polynomials fk(x) Calculate its shared secret yj|k=fk(xjk) WhereinIs with the userAn associated common value.
(2) Data owner first calculatesLet the validation key v = g then, the other validation keys are then calculated:wherein j =1,2, \8230;, nkFinally, discloseThe value of (c). G is G1Known generator of, skFor the selected random number, ak,iIs a random polynomial fk(x) The coefficients are known.
(3) Next, the data owner will share the secret key over the dedicated channelSent to corresponding authorized users
(4) At the user IDjkReceiving a shared secret SKjkThereafter, the received shared key SK is first verifiedjkWhether valid, i.e. verificationWherein t isk-1 is the highest degree,
(5) Validating shared secret SKjkThen useHome-general SKjkAs its shared key.
3. Data file generation
(1)Is the data to be encrypted, the owner of the data selects a random number rk∈Zp(k =1, \ 8230;, N) and a random index skI K belongs to {1, \ 8230;, N } }, and the encrypted data file isG1Item 1 representing the ciphertext, item N of the ciphertext denoted GNAnd the N +1 th item of the ciphertext is marked as C0。
(2) The owner information is expressed as (Value)owner) The label of the file is Tagowner=H(Valueowner). Label BF which is then used for retrieval and matchingowner=BF(Tagowner) May be constructed by Bloom filters.
(3) The owner anonymously uploads his encrypted data file CP to the cloud server. The format of each stored data file is as follows:
4. partial decryption algorithm
AkIs a group UkIs used to determine the set of rights to be granted,is the union of N subsets of permissions of N groups.
(1) The authorized users of these N sets of permissions calculate the Tag of the data file they want to decryptowner=H(Valueowner) And then transmits it to the cloud server.
(2) The cloud server receives a Tag provided by a userownerAnd verifying BFowner=BF(Tagowner). If so, the ciphertext CT is sent back to the user.
(3) For a given ciphertext CT, each authorized user decrypts a portion of it. Authorized user IDjkUsing his decryption key yjkTo partially decryptSimultaneous generation of a non-interactive proof pjkTo prove CjkAnd vjkHave been promoted to the same rights.
5. Data file decryption
Set of authorized users AkReceiving a corresponding data file sent by the cloud server: g1,…,GN,C0。
(1) From these sets of rights AkIs used by an authorized userChecking equationIf there is no interactive proof pjkValid, it is the honest user who provides the decryption key
In the arrangement shown in fig. 1, in order to ensure the security of personal data, the data owner may specify an authorized user himself. In addition, for efficient and convenient management, grouping management is carried out according to the types of users so as to access data in a supervision mode, and therefore a scattered authority management mechanism is achieved. In addition, due to the validity and fairness of the data, any behavior interfering with normal data access can be thoroughly identified to ensure the stability of the system for its normal operation.
Therefore, the safety and the reliability of the data file can be fully guaranteed. The scheme is not only flexible and effective, but also can realize semantic security characteristics. Furthermore, the solution enables identification of fraudsters without infringing the honesty rights. Compared with the existing fraudster identification method such as the RS code, the method can detect each dishonest user. Efficiency analysis shows that the scheme is low in calculation cost and low in bandwidth utilization rate.
Claims (2)
1. A cloud storage security data sharing method based on Chaum-Pedersen is characterized in that:
hiding confidential information irrelevant to the important data, encrypting the important data and storing the important data in the cloud;
dividing the types of the important data corresponding to the authorized users into a plurality of groups;
each important data corresponds to a group of secret shares, each group of secret shares consists of secret shares of a plurality of different owners, each secret share is distributed to a corresponding authorized user group by using a Shamir threshold secret sharing method, a decryption key is assigned to each authorized user group, the authorized users of each authorized user group distribute private keys, namely sub-keys of the group of decryption keys, according to the decryption keys of the group, and when the decryption keys are correctly reconstructed, the corresponding secret shares of the important data can be decrypted, so that the important data can be decrypted under mutual supervision among the groups;
the data is medical insurance data, and the confidential information irrelevant to the important data refers to personal information of an owner, including name, age, work family and address; the important data refers to data of an owner directly related to medical insurance, and comprises electronic medical records, health records, consultation information and financial information, and the identity of the authorized user corresponds to the type of the important data, and comprises a family group, a friend group, a medical staff group and a financial information management group;
the method comprises the following specific steps:
1) System initialization
(1.1) public key generator selects a group G with order prime p1,G1The anti-collision hash function is H;
(1.2) Using grouping functionDividing a user set U which wants to share important data of an owner into N different groups according to different identities, and expressing the groups as U1,…,UNAnd satisfies U = U1∪…∪UN(ii) a I.e. associating user IDs in a set of usersiIs divided intoWhereinIs defined asIs provided withThen the user groupReferred to as U for shortkWhere the number of users is nk;
(1.3) data owner at tkZ of degree-1pUpper selection of random number skAnd a random polynomialWherein ZpRepresenting modulo-p integer rings, each group UkIn (a)k,0=sk,k=1~N;
2) Key generation
(2.1)IDj|kIndicating the user IDiIs a group UkThe jth user in (1), the data owner is the group UkEach user ID in (1)j|kUsing a set of polynomials fk(x) Calculate its shared secret yj|k=fk(xj|k) Where j =1, \ 8230;, nk,Is with the userAn associated common value;
(2.2) data owner first calculatesLet the validation key v = g then, the other validation keys are then calculated:wherein j =1,2, \8230;, nkFinally, discloseG is G1Known generator of (2), skFor the selected random number, ak,iIs a random polynomial fk(x) Known coefficients of (1);
(2.3) data owner will share secret key through dedicated channelSent to corresponding authorized users
(2.4) at user IDj|kReceiving a shared secret SKj|kThereafter, the received shares are first verifiedKey SKj|kWhether it is valid, i.e. verifyWherein t isk-1 is the highest degree of the image,
(2.5) verification of shared secret SKj|kThe user then sends SKj|kAs its shared key;
3) Data file generation
(3.1)Is the data to be encrypted, the owner of the data selects a random number rk∈Zp(k =1, \8230;, N) and a random index skI K belongs to {1, \ 8230;, N } }, and the encrypted data file isG1Item 1 representing the ciphertext, item N of the ciphertext denoted GNAnd the N +1 th item of the ciphertext is marked as C0;
(3.2) express the owner's information as (Value)owner) The label of the file is Tagowner=H(Valueowner) BF as a tag for retrieval and matchingowner=BF(Tagowner) Constructed by a Bloom filter;
(3.3) the owner anonymously uploads its encrypted data file CP to the cloud server, and the format of each stored data file is as follows:
4) Partial decryption algorithm
(4.1)AkIs a group UkIs used to determine the set of rights to be granted,is the union of N subsets of permissions of N groups, the authorized user of which calculates the Tag of the data file that he wants to decryptowner=H(Valueowner) Then sending the data to a cloud server;
(4.2) the cloud Server receives the TagownerAnd verify BFowner=BF(Tagowner) If yes, sending the ciphertext CT back to the user;
(4.3) for a given ciphertext CT, each authorized user decrypts a portion of it, an authorized user IDj|kUsing its shared secret yj|kTo partially decryptSimultaneous generation of a non-interactive proof pj|kTo prove Cj|kAnd vj|kHave been promoted to the same privilege;
5) Decrypting the data file
(5.1) set of authorized users AkReceiving a corresponding data file sent by the cloud server: g1,…,GN,C0(ii) a From a set of authorized users AkAuthorized user of (2) using the authentication keyChecking equationIf there is no interactive proof pj|kIf the decryption key is valid, the truthful user provides the decryption key;
(5.2) if there are no dishonest ones of the authorized users, then these users are able to recover the data
2. The method for Chaum-Pedersen based cloud storage secure data sharing according to claim 1, wherein the confidential information that is not related to important data is hidden by a Bloom filter.
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