CN109522749B - Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system - Google Patents

Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system Download PDF

Info

Publication number
CN109522749B
CN109522749B CN201811368273.6A CN201811368273A CN109522749B CN 109522749 B CN109522749 B CN 109522749B CN 201811368273 A CN201811368273 A CN 201811368273A CN 109522749 B CN109522749 B CN 109522749B
Authority
CN
China
Prior art keywords
user
independent
quantum
state
key
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Active
Application number
CN201811368273.6A
Other languages
Chinese (zh)
Other versions
CN109522749A (en
Inventor
昌燕
张仕斌
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Hefei Jiuzhou Longteng Scientific And Technological Achievement Transformation Co ltd
Original Assignee
Chengdu University of Information Technology
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Chengdu University of Information Technology filed Critical Chengdu University of Information Technology
Priority to CN201811368273.6A priority Critical patent/CN109522749B/en
Publication of CN109522749A publication Critical patent/CN109522749A/en
Application granted granted Critical
Publication of CN109522749B publication Critical patent/CN109522749B/en
Active legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Optical Communication System (AREA)

Abstract

The invention belongs to the technical field of symmetrical privacy information inquiry, and discloses a reference system irrelevant and measuring equipment irrelevant quantum privacy inquiry method and a system. Compared with the existing quantum privacy query protocol, the protocol provided by the invention is still safe under the condition that the reference system is not calibrated in the actual environment and the measuring equipment is untrustworthy.

Description

Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system
Technical Field
The invention belongs to the technical field of symmetrical privacy information query, and particularly relates to a quantum privacy query method and system with reference system independence and measurement equipment independence.
Background
Currently, the current state of the art commonly used in the industry is such that:
in communications between untrusted users, both public privacy and user-individual privacy need to be protected. Symmetric private information query (SPIR) is an application in this field, which mainly accomplishes the following tasks: the user Alice purchases a record of the database that she wants to obtain, on the one hand, the database owner Bob cannot know which record Alice has visited, and on the other hand, Alice cannot obtain other records than she has purchased. That is, SPIR protects both the privacy of the user Alice and the privacy of the database vendor Bob. Quantum Privacy Query (QPQ) is a quantum solution to the SPIR problem.
Currently, there have been many researches on quantum solutions for privacy query, such as some of the earliest quantum privacy query schemes based on oracle operations, and quantum privacy query schemes (QPQ) based on quantum key distribution, which are more mainstream later, and so on. In recent years, research on quantum privacy query is basically based on QPQ schemes for quantum key distribution, such as unidirectional or bidirectional QPQ schemes based on BB84 single photon states, QPQ schemes based on phase encoding, QPQ schemes based on entangled states, and the like. However, many of these existing theoretical and technical studies of QPQ are based on the ideal premise of device reliability and reference frame alignment, and are far from practical environment and practical application. Obviously, the reference frames are not aligned normally, and the untrustworthiness of the equipment is also an objective fact, so that neglecting security holes caused by the calibration of the reference frames and the untrustworthiness problem of the equipment (such as third-party side channel attack holes) can be a fatal security risk, and a large amount or even all of information can be leaked, so that the quantum communication protocol which is absolutely safe in theory becomes unsafe in actual communication.
In summary, all quantum privacy query schemes mainly consider threats from dishonest database owners and dishonest users, while security holes caused by the uncalibration of the reference frame and the untrustworthiness of the device are ignored.
In summary, the problems of the prior art are as follows:
(1) the prior art is very insecure in actual communication. Most of the existing theoretical research and technical research of quantum privacy inquiry are research based on the ideal premise of equipment credibility and reference system alignment, and are far away from the actual environment and the actual application. Obviously, the reference frames are not aligned normally, and the untrustworthiness of the equipment is also an objective fact, so that neglecting security holes caused by the calibration of the reference frames and the untrustworthiness of the equipment (such as third-party side channel attack holes) can be a fatal security risk, and may cause a large amount or even all of information to be leaked, so that the quantum privacy query protocol which is absolutely safe in theory becomes unsafe in actual communication.
Therefore, the prior art is not theoretically and technically safe.
The difficulty and significance for solving the technical problems are as follows:
the difficulty lies in that: theoretically, but not practically, it is a problem of almost all quantum cryptography protocols, and this has seriously hindered the practical use of quantum cryptography protocols. The quantum cryptography research is a fundamental approach for thoroughly solving the problem on the premise that the equipment is not trustable, but the implementation difficulty is high due to complete equipment independence, and the measurement equipment is the most main factor influencing the safety, so the current safety problem can be basically solved due to the measurement equipment independence.
After the technical problem is solved, the significance is brought as follows:
on the premise of carrying out calibration modeling on an actual reference system, the invention provides a reference system-independent and measuring equipment-independent quantum privacy query method by utilizing a measuring equipment-independent key distribution idea. Compared with the existing quantum privacy query protocol, the method provided by the invention is still safe under the condition that the reference system is not calibrated in the actual environment and the measuring equipment is not trusted.
Disclosure of Invention
Aiming at the problems in the prior art, the invention provides a quantum privacy query method and system with a reference system irrelevant to a measuring device. The invention aims to solve the problems that threats from dishonest database owners and dishonest users are mainly considered in all quantum privacy query methods, and security holes caused by the uncalibration of a reference system and the untrustworthiness of equipment are neglected.
The invention is realized in such a way that a quantum privacy query method with reference system irrelevant to measuring equipment comprises the following steps:
in quantum communication, on the premise of carrying out calibration modeling on an actual reference system, a reference system-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method is provided by using a measurement device-independent key distribution idea.
Regarding the calibration modeling of the actual reference frame, specifically: x, Y, ZIs the reference frame for an ideal QKD system, in an actual QKD system, typically only one direction is calibrated, while the remaining two directions are uncalibrated. It is assumed here that the Z basis of both communication parties Alice and Bob is calibrated, i.e.: zA＝ZB＝Z＝{|0>,|1>And the X and Y bases are uncalibrated, as a function of the parameter βAAnd βBThe change occurs:
Figure BDA0001869169390000031
βAand βBRepresenting the angle by which Alice and Bob's X, Y reference frames are offset.
So for Alice, her calibrated X-basis is:
Figure BDA0001869169390000032
so for Bob, his calibrated X-base is:
Figure BDA0001869169390000033
further, the reference system-independent and measuring device-independent quantum privacy query method comprises the following steps:
step 1: bob randomly prepared Quantum State |0>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to Alice;
step 2: alice randomly prepares |0>，|1>，|+>A，|->AAlice performs Bell-based measurements on his and Bob's particles and then publishes the result as
Figure BDA0001869169390000034
The position of (a).
And step 3: for each publication psi-Bob publishes binary information according to its own prepared initial state, such as: i0>And | +>BPublication 0, |1>And | ->BDisclosed is a method for producing a semiconductor device.
And 4, step 4: alice infers the initial quantum state sent by Bob based on the information published by Bob so that Alice and Bob can share a pair of inadvertent original keys.
The estimation method comprises the following steps: if the initial state of Bob preparation is |1>The initial state of Alice preparation is also |1>Then Bob publishes binary information 1, at which time Alice can conclude from table 1 that Bob's initial state of preparation must not be |1>Then the initial state of Bob preparation can only be | ->B. Alice and Bob now share a one-bit binary key of 1. Similar methods of inference are also applicable to other cases.
The meanings of table 1 are: if the position has measured psi-State, then, |0 is prepared at known Alice>In the case of state, it is presumed that Bob produces |0>The probability of a state is 0; in a known Alice prepared |0>In the case of state, it is presumed that Bob produces |1>The probability of a state is 1/2; in a known Alice prepared |0>Under the condition of state, supposing that Bob prepares | +>BState or | ->BAre each 1/4; and so on.
TABLE 1 measurement of psi-Initial state distribution probability of Alice and Bob in case of state
Alice\Bob |0> |1> |+>B |->B
|0> 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
|1> 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
|+>A 1/4 1/4 0 1/2
|->A 1/4 1/4 1/2 0
And 5: alice and Bob further compress the original secret key and then process the compressed secret key;
step 6: bob encrypts all records in the database with the known key, and Alice decrypts the records she purchased with the known key.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a reference frame independent measuring device independent quantum privacy query computer program, which implements the reference frame independent measuring device independent quantum privacy query method.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a terminal, which at least carries a controller implementing the reference frame-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method.
It is another object of the present invention to provide a computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the described reference frame-independent measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method.
Another object of the present invention is to provide a quantum privacy query control system independent of reference frame and independent of measurement device, comprising:
a second user quantum state preparation module for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by the second user>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to a first user; the first user and the second user negotiate the binary coding rule of the quantum state in advance;
a first user quantum state preparation module for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by the first user>，|1>，|+>A，|->AThe first user carries out Bell-based measurement on the own particles and the particles of the second user, and then the result is published as
Figure BDA0001869169390000051
The position of (a);
the second user binary information publishing module is used for publishing binary information according to an initial state prepared by the second user for the position published by each first user;
the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless key modules, which are used for the first user to presume the initial quantum state sent by the second user according to the information published by the second user, and the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless keys;
the original key compression processing module is used for the first user and the second user to further compress and process the original key;
and the encryption and decryption module is used for encrypting all records in the database by the second user by using the known key, and decrypting the purchased records by the first user by using the known key.
Another objective of the present invention is to provide a symmetric privacy information query network platform, which at least carries the reference frame-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query control system.
In summary, the advantages and positive effects of the invention are:
on the premise of carrying out calibration modeling on an actual reference system, a quantum privacy query method independent of the reference system and independent of the measuring equipment is provided by utilizing a measuring equipment independent key distribution idea. Compared with the existing quantum privacy query protocol, the method provided by the invention is still safe under the condition that the reference system is not calibrated in the actual environment and the measuring equipment is not trusted.
Specifically, in this scheme, the final key is not obtained based on the probe measurement result, but is obtained in an initial state prepared based on Alice and Bob (the initial state is only known by Alice and Bob themselves), and therefore, the scheme is independent of the measurement device. In addition, since a reference system calibration model is established at the beginning of the scheme, the scheme design and safety analysis are performed based on the reference system after calibration, i.e. quantum states are prepared from the basis after calibration, the scheme is also independent of the reference system. In other words, the security analysis of the database privacy and the user privacy of the scheme does not need to consider the potential safety hazard caused by the fact that the reference system is not calibrated and the measuring equipment is not trusted.
Therefore, under the condition that the reference system is not calibrated and the measuring equipment is not trustable, both the database and the user can not acquire the information of the other party by using the method of attacking the side channel of the measuring equipment by blinding attack of the strong light detector and the like. The database side Bob or the user Alice may select the pseudo-state attack policy. If Bob prepares the pseudo-state, then Alice has
Figure BDA0001869169390000061
In the case of a key bit error, i.e. she has
Figure BDA0001869169390000062
Where N represents the number of particles, even when N is 30, even if Bob's fraud is discovered
Figure BDA0001869169390000063
Less than 0.1, and the probability of Bob being found is as high as 96%, in actual communication, the value of N is typically much greater than 30, and therefore, the user privacy of this scheme is secure. If Alice prepares the pseudo state, then Alice knows that the probability of Bob's key bits is reduced to 1/2, so that by preparing the pseudo state, Alice never knows that the probability of Bob's key bits is higher than that of preparing the true state, indicating that the database privacy of this scheme is safe. The existing quantum privacy query protocol basically does not consider the premise that equipment cannot be trusted and a reference system is not calibrated, and finally, secret keys are obtained based on measurement results, so that if a dishonest database party Bob carries out methods of measuring equipment end-side channel attack such as strong light detector blinding attack and the like on user Alice, secret key bits of Alice are all leaked to the Bob, and Alice cannot find attack behaviors of the Bob.
Drawings
Fig. 1 is a flowchart of a quantum privacy query method independent of a reference frame and independent of a measurement device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a quantum privacy query control system with reference frame independence and measurement device independence, provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
In the figure: 1. a second user quantum state preparation module; 2. a first user quantum state preparation module; 3. a second user binary information publishing module; 4. the first user and the second user share a pair of inadvertent original key modules; 5. an original secret key compression processing module; 6. an encryption and decryption module.
Detailed Description
In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the present invention more apparent, the present invention is further described in detail with reference to the following embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.
The prior art is very insecure in actual communication. Most of the existing theoretical research and technical research of QPQ are research based on the ideal premise of equipment credibility and reference system alignment, and are far away from the practical environment and practical application. Obviously, the reference frames are not aligned normally, and the untrustworthiness of the equipment is also an objective fact, so that neglecting security holes caused by the calibration of the reference frames and the untrustworthiness problem of the equipment (such as third-party side channel attack holes) can be a fatal security risk, and a large amount or even all of information can be leaked, so that the quantum communication protocol which is absolutely safe in theory becomes unsafe in actual communication.
The invention is further described with reference to specific examples.
As shown in fig. 1, the reference frame independent and measurement device independent quantum privacy query method provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:
s101: carrying out calibration modeling on the actual reference system so that the actual reference system is theoretically calibrated;
s102: based on an actual reference system calibration model, a quantum privacy query method with reference system independence and measurement device independence is designed by utilizing a measurement device independence key distribution idea.
The effects of the present invention will be further described with reference to specific analyses.
1. Reference system independent and measuring device independent quantum privacy query protocol
1.1 protocol description
Assume that Bob has N records in his database, and that Alice purchased one of the records, and that Alice wants to obtain her purchased record secretly. The following protocol is intended to help Alice and Bob safely accomplish this task. On the premise of carrying out calibration modeling on an actual reference system, based on the thought of independence of measuring equipment, a pair of equipment-independent oblivious keys is distributed between Alice and Bob, Bob knows all bits of the keys, and Alice only knows part of the bits of the keys.
Regarding the calibration modeling of the actual reference frame, specifically: x, Y, and Z are the reference frames of an ideal QKD system, and in an actual QKD system, typically only one direction is calibrated, while the remaining two directions are uncalibrated. It is assumed here that the Z basis of both communication parties Alice and Bob is calibrated, i.e.: zA＝ZB＝Z＝{|0>,|1>And the X and Y bases are uncalibrated, as a function of the parameter βAAnd βBChange occursAnd (3) conversion:
Figure BDA0001869169390000081
βAand βBRepresenting the angle by which Alice and Bob's X, Y reference frames are offset.
So for Alice, her calibrated X-basis is:
Figure BDA0001869169390000082
so for Bob, his calibrated X-base is:
Figure BDA0001869169390000083
as a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the reference frame-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method includes the following steps:
step 1: bob randomly prepared Quantum State |0>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to Alice; and Alice and Bob have negotiated |0 in advance>And |1>Represents binary information 0; | Bic>BAnd | ->BRepresenting binary information 1.
Step 2: alice randomly prepares |0>，|1>，|+>A，|->AAlice performs Bell-based measurements on his and Bob's particles and then publishes the result as
Figure BDA0001869169390000084
The position of (a).
And step 3: for each publication psi-Bob publishes binary information according to its own prepared initial state, such as: i0>And | +>BPublication 0, |1>And | ->BDisclosed is a method for producing a semiconductor device.
And 4, step 4: alice infers the initial quantum state sent by Bob based on the information published by Bob so that Alice and Bob can share a pair of inadvertent original keys.
The estimation method comprises the following steps: such asThe initial state of fruit Bob preparation is | ->BThe initial state of Alice preparation is |1>Then Bob publishes binary information 1, at which time Alice can conclude from table 1 that Bob's initial state of preparation must not be |1>Then the initial state of Bob preparation can only be | ->B. Alice and Bob now share a one-bit binary key of 1. Similar methods of inference are also applicable to other cases.
The meanings of table 1 are: if the position has measured psi-State, then, |0 is prepared at known Alice>In the case of state, it is presumed that Bob produces |0>The probability of a state is 0; in a known Alice prepared |0>In the case of state, it is presumed that Bob produces |1>The probability of a state is 1/2; in a known Alice prepared |0>Under the condition of state, supposing that Bob prepares | +>BState or | ->BAre each 1/4; and so on.
TABLE 1 measurement of psi-Initial state distribution probability of Alice and Bob in case of state
Alice\Bob |0> |1> |+>B |->B
|0> 0 1/2 1/4 1/4
|1> 1/2 0 1/4 1/4
|+>A 1/4 1/4 0 1/2
|->A 1/4 1/4 1/2 0
And 5: alice and Bob further compress the original secret key and then process the compressed secret key;
step 6: bob encrypts all records in the database with the known key, and Alice decrypts the records she purchased with the known key.
As shown in fig. 2, the quantum privacy query control system with reference frame independence and measurement device independence provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:
a second user quantum state preparation module 1 for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by a second user>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to a first user; the first user and the second user negotiate the binary coding rule of the quantum state in advance;
a first user quantum state preparation module 2 for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by the first user>，|1>，|+>A，|->AThe first user carries out Bell-based measurement on the own particles and the particles of the second user, and then the result is published as
Figure BDA0001869169390000101
The position of (a);
the second user binary information publishing module 3 is used for publishing binary information according to the initial state prepared by the second user for the position published by each first user;
the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless key modules 4, which are used for the first user to presume the initial quantum state sent by the second user according to the information published by the second user, and the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless keys;
the original key compression processing module 5 is used for the first user and the second user to further compress the original key and then process the compressed original key;
an encryption and decryption module 6 for encrypting all records in the database with a key known to the second user, the first user decrypting the own purchased records with the known key.
The invention is further described below in connection with a security analysis.
2. Security analysis
2.1 Security of user privacy
The goal of database owner Bob spoofing is to know as much of the Alice's key bits as possible in the overall key without disrupting the normal execution of the protocol. Since Bob's participation in the method is only to prepare the initial state and publish binary information based on the initial state, Bob's spoofing may only be to prepare a pseudo-initial state or to publish erroneous binary information. But is easily discovered by Alice because publishing the wrong binary information immediately results in Alice inferring the wrong key. Therefore, a feasible deception is that Bob prepares a pseudo-initial state to help him know as much as possible of the location of the Alice's key bits in the entire key. Pseudo-state of Bob preparation
Figure BDA0001869169390000102
And
Figure BDA0001869169390000103
respectively replace the state | +>B，|->B. At this time, when Alice measures ψ-Alice and B in the case of statesThe initial state distribution probability of ob is shown in table 2:
TABLE 2 when Bob sends a false state and Alice measures psi-Initial state distribution probability of Alice and Bob in case of state
Figure BDA0001869169390000111
If, Bob prepares | +>BIn state, Alice prepares | +>AState, Bob publishes binary information 0, and Alice infers from Table 1 that Bob's initial state must not be | +since Alice does not know that Bob prepared the pseudo-state>B', resulting in an error in the shared key bit. When Bob prepares | ->B' State, Alice prepared | ->AThe situation is similar in the states. That is, if Bob prepares the pseudo-state, then Alice has
Figure BDA0001869169390000112
In the case of a key bit error, i.e. she has
Figure BDA0001869169390000113
Where N represents the number of particles, even when N is 30, even if Bob's fraud is discovered
Figure BDA0001869169390000114
Bob is also found with a probability of up to 96%, while the number of particles normally used for communication is much greater than 30. Therefore, the user privacy of this scheme is secure.
2.2 database Security
The goal of user Alice spoofing is to know as many key bits of Bob as possible without disrupting the normal execution of the protocol. Because Alice participates in the method only by preparing the initial state, performing Bell-based measurement and publishing to obtain psi-The position of the states, and therefore, spoofing by Alice is only possible to prepare a pseudo-original state or to publish an erroneous ψ-The position of the state. Alice may have extra credit psi-The location of the status result is published as psi-State, or will some indeed get psi-The location of the state result is not published. It is clear that in the former case, the wrong published information may result in a mismatch between Alice and Bob keys, and therefore, the attack method does not have any benefit to Alice itself, i.e., Alice does not adopt such an attack strategy. In the latter case, as long as Bob does not publish binary information, Alice cannot know which get ψ-The position of the state result helps her to know Bob's key additionally, thus reducing psi-The publishing of the location of the state result does not increase the probability that Alice will obtain additional key bits.
In addition, a possible deceptive approach for Alice is for Alice to prepare a pseudo-initial state to help her know as much of Bob's key bits as possible. Pseudo state of Alice preparation
Figure BDA0001869169390000121
And
Figure BDA0001869169390000122
respectively replace the state | +>A，|->A. At this time, when Alice measures ψ-The initial state distribution probability for Alice and Bob in the case of states is shown in table 3:
TABLE 3 when Alice sends a false state and Alice measures psi-Initial state distribution probability of Alice and Bob in case of state
Figure BDA0001869169390000123
If, Bob prepared |0>State, Alice prepares | +>A'State, Bob publishes binary information 0, and Alice cannot infer what state Bob's initial state is from Table 3. When Bob prepared |1>State, Alice prepared | ->AThe situation is similar in the' state. That is, if Alice prepares the pseudo-state, then Alice's probability of knowing Bob's key bits is reduced to 1/2, i.e., (sin θ)24, therefore, the probability of knowing Bob's key bits by preparing the pseudo-state Alice is never higher than the probability of preparing the true state. Therefore, the database privacy of this scheme is secure.
2.3 third party attacks
Since the scheme is designed based on the quantum key distribution idea independent of the measuring equipment, the final key is obtained not based on the measurement result but in the initial state based on Alice and Bob preparation, and therefore, the scheme is independent of the measuring equipment. That is, both database privacy and user privacy are secure under conditions where the measurement device is not trusted.
In addition, since a reference system calibration model is established at the beginning of the scheme, the scheme design and safety analysis are performed based on the reference system after calibration, i.e. quantum states are prepared from the basis after calibration, the scheme is also independent of the reference system.
The reference system-independent and measuring device-independent quantum privacy query method provided by the invention is provided by utilizing the measuring device-independent key distribution idea on the premise of carrying out calibration modeling on an actual reference system. Compared with the existing quantum privacy query protocol, the protocol provided by the invention is still safe under the condition that the reference frame is not calibrated in the actual environment and the measuring equipment is not trusted.
In the above embodiments, the implementation may be wholly or partially realized by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When used in whole or in part, can be implemented in a computer program product that includes one or more computer instructions. When loaded or executed on a computer, cause the flow or functions according to embodiments of the invention to occur, in whole or in part. The computer may be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a network of computers, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer readable storage medium to another, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from one website site, computer, server, or data center to another website site, computer, server, or data center via wire (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.)). The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device, such as a server, a data center, etc., that includes one or more of the available media. The usable medium may be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy Disk, hard Disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., Solid State Disk (SSD)), among others.
The above description is only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments of the present invention and is not to be construed as limiting the invention, and any modifications, equivalents and improvements made within the spirit and principle of the present invention are intended to be included within the scope of the present invention.

Claims (6)

1. A reference frame independent and measurement device independent quantum privacy query method is characterized by comprising the following steps:
in quantum communication, a practical reference system is calibrated and modeled, so that the practical reference system is theoretically calibrated;
based on an actual reference system calibration model, quantum privacy inquiry irrelevant to a reference system and measurement equipment is carried out by utilizing a measurement equipment irrelevant key distribution idea;
the quantum privacy query method with the reference system irrelevant to the measuring equipment specifically comprises the following steps:
the method comprises the following steps: second user randomly prepares quantum state |0>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to a first user; and the first user and the second user have negotiated |0 in advance>And |1>Represents binary information 0; | Bic>BAnd | ->BRepresents binary information 1;
step two: first user randomly prepares |0>，|1>，|+>A，|->AThe first user carries out Bell-based measurement on the own particles and the particles of the second user, and then the result is published as
Figure FDA0002439115130000011
The position of (a);
step three: to each one publishψThe second user publishes binary information according to an initial state prepared by the second user, such as: i0>And | +>BPublication 0, |1>And | ->B1, publication;
step four: the first user presumes the initial quantum state sent by the second user according to the information published by the second user, so that the first user and the second user share a pair of accidental original keys;
step five: the first user and the second user further compress the original key and then process the original key;
step six: the second user encrypts all records in the database with a known key and the first user decrypts the own purchased records with the known key.
2. The reference frame-independent measuring device-independent quantum privacy query method of claim 1, wherein calibration modeling of an actual reference frame comprises:
x, Y, Z are the reference frames of an ideal QKD system, in which only one direction is calibrated, and the remaining two directions are not calibrated; the Z basis of the first and second users of both parties is calibrated, ZA＝ZB＝Z＝{|0>，|1>X and Y basis are not calibrated, with parameter βAAnd βBThe change occurs:
Figure FDA0002439115130000021
βAand βBRepresenting the angle by which the X, Y reference frames of the first user and the second user are offset.
For the first user, the calibrated X basis is:
XA：
Figure FDA0002439115130000022
for the second user, the calibrated X basis is:
XB：
Figure FDA0002439115130000023
3. the reference frame-independent measuring device-independent quantum privacy query method of claim 1, wherein in step four, the inference method comprises:
if the initial state of the second user preparation is | ->BThe initial state of the first user preparation is |1>The second user publishes binary information 1, and the first user infers that the initial state prepared by the second user must not be |1>The initial state of the second user preparation can only be | ->B(ii) a The first user and the second user now share a one-bit binary key 1.
4. A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the reference frame-independent measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method of any one of claims 1-3.
5. A reference system-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query control system for implementing the reference system-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, the reference system-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query control system comprising:
a second user quantum state preparation module for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by the second user>，|1>，|+>B，|->BSending the data to a first user; the first user and the second user negotiate the binary coding rule of the quantum state in advance;
a first user quantum state preparation module for randomly preparing quantum state |0 by the first user>，|1>，|+>A，|->AThe first user carries out Bell-based measurement on the own particles and the particles of the second user, and then the result is published as
Figure FDA0002439115130000024
The position of (a);
the second user binary information publishing module is used for publishing binary information according to an initial state prepared by the second user for the position published by each first user;
the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless key modules, which are used for the first user to presume the initial quantum state sent by the second user according to the information published by the second user, and the first user and the second user share a pair of original careless keys;
the original key compression processing module is used for the first user and the second user to further compress and process the original key;
and the encryption and decryption module is used for encrypting all records in the database by the second user by using the known key, and decrypting the purchased records by the first user by using the known key.
6. A symmetric privacy information query network platform, characterized in that it carries at least the reference frame-independent and measurement device-independent quantum privacy query control system of claim 5.
CN201811368273.6A 2018-11-16 2018-11-16 Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system Active CN109522749B (en)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201811368273.6A CN109522749B (en) 2018-11-16 2018-11-16 Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201811368273.6A CN109522749B (en) 2018-11-16 2018-11-16 Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
CN109522749A CN109522749A (en) 2019-03-26
CN109522749B true CN109522749B (en) 2020-05-22

Family

ID=65778216

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
CN201811368273.6A Active CN109522749B (en) 2018-11-16 2018-11-16 Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system

Country Status (1)

Country Link
CN (1) CN109522749B (en)

Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106533676A (en) * 2016-12-22 2017-03-22 浙江神州量子网络科技有限公司 Quantum key distribution system based on reference system independent protocol
CN107070651A (en) * 2017-04-01 2017-08-18 成都信息工程大学 It is a kind of based on the unrelated quantum privacy querying method of EPR pairs of equipment

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106533676A (en) * 2016-12-22 2017-03-22 浙江神州量子网络科技有限公司 Quantum key distribution system based on reference system independent protocol
CN107070651A (en) * 2017-04-01 2017-08-18 成都信息工程大学 It is a kind of based on the unrelated quantum privacy querying method of EPR pairs of equipment

Non-Patent Citations (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
《多粒子量子纠缠态在密码协议中的应用》;张昭;《中国优秀硕士学位论文全文数据库》;20140215;第I136-212页 *
《测量设备无关量子密钥分配的实用化研究》;王超;《中国博士学位论文全文数据库》;20181015;第I136-34页 *
《量子密钥分配***实际安全性研究》;黄靖正;《中国博士学位论文全文数据库》;20141015;第I136-40页 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN109522749A (en) 2019-03-26

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
JP7011646B2 (en) Methods and systems for data security based on quantum communication and trusted computing
JP7033120B2 (en) Methods and systems for quantum key distribution based on trusted computing
US10574446B2 (en) Method and system for secure data storage and retrieval
US8639927B2 (en) Method of user-authenticated quantum key distribution
CN107070651B (en) Device-independent quantum privacy query method based on EPR pair
JP2019517184A (en) Method and system for secure data transmission
Samanthula et al. An efficient and secure data sharing framework using homomorphic encryption in the cloud
TW201616830A (en) Method, apparatus, and system for quantum key distribution, privacy amplification, and data transmission
KR101954998B1 (en) Quantum authentication method for access control between three elements of cloud computing
Sasi et al. A general comparison of symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems for WSNs and an overview of location based encryption technique for improving security
CN108365955B (en) Device-independent high-channel-capacity quantum communication system and method
US11741247B2 (en) Smart privacy and controlled exposure on blockchains
CN113141247B (en) Homomorphic encryption method, homomorphic encryption device, homomorphic encryption system and readable storage medium
CN105721146B (en) A kind of big data sharing method towards cloud storage based on SMC
US20230246822A1 (en) Systems and methods for providing secure, encrypted communications across distributed computer networks by coordinating cryptography-based digital repositories in order to perform blockchain operations in decentralized applications
Zhang et al. Antiquantum privacy protection scheme in advanced metering infrastructure of smart grid based on consortium blockchain and rlwe
CN109522749B (en) Reference system independent and measuring equipment independent quantum privacy query method and system
CN101888383B (en) Method for implementing extensible trusted SSH
US20230245111A1 (en) Systems and methods for requesting secure, encrypted communications across distributed computer networks for authorizing use of cryptography-based digital repositories in order to perform blockchain operations in decentralized applications
CN111523154B (en) Method and system for obtaining hardware unique identifier and corresponding computer equipment
US11436351B1 (en) Homomorphic encryption of secure data
Ghanbarafjeh et al. Developing a secure architecture for internet of medical things using attribute-based encryption
CN116055050B (en) End-to-end stream data encryption method and system based on cryptography access control
Olaiya et al. Encryption techniques for financial data security in fintech applications
CN114374519B (en) Data transmission method, system and equipment

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
PB01 Publication
PB01 Publication
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
SE01 Entry into force of request for substantive examination
GR01 Patent grant
GR01 Patent grant
TR01 Transfer of patent right

Effective date of registration: 20220629

Address after: 230000 Room 203, building 2, phase I, e-commerce Park, Jinggang Road, Shushan Economic Development Zone, Hefei City, Anhui Province

Patentee after: Hefei Jiuzhou Longteng scientific and technological achievement transformation Co.,Ltd.

Address before: 610225, No. 24, Section 1, Xuefu Road, Southwest Economic Development Zone, Chengdu, Sichuan

Patentee before: CHENGDU University OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

TR01 Transfer of patent right